Brad Skow, Fall 2006, Tuesdays, 1:20-3:50, Herter 113.
Track 1 (for graduate or undergraduate students): 5-7 page paper due October 31st (30% of final grade); 12-18 page paper due at the end of the semester (70% of final grade). [Graduate students wanting to take an "incomplete" must submit a draft of their final paper by the end of the semester.]
Track 2 (for undergraduate students): 5 page paper due October 17th (30% of final grade); 5 page paper due November 21st (30% of final grade); 6-8 page paper due at the end of the semester (40% of final grade).
Paper writing resource: Jim Pryor's guidelines on writing a philosophy paper.
Undergraduates must obtain my permission to enroll in this course. I generally grant permission only to philosophy majors who have taken the junior year writing seminar.
("*" indicates optional reading that may not be discussed in class.)
Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic, chapter IV, esp. pp.71-79.
Quine, Reference and Modality, in From a Logical Point of View.
*Soames, Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Volume 1, chapter 12.
*Burgess, Quinus ab omni naevo vindicatus, in Meaning and Reference, ed. Kazmi.
Van Inwagen, Two Concepts of Possible Worlds.
*Kripke, Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic.
Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility, chapter 3, chapter 4, and chapter 6.
Sider, Reductive Theories of Modality, section 3.3.
*Sider, Another Look at Armstrong's Combinatorialism.
Quine, Truth By Convention. (Our focus will be on pp.103-106.)
Sider, Reducing Modality.
Melia, Against Modalism.
Rosen, Modal Fictionalism.
Nolan, Three Problems for 'Strong' Modal Fictionalism.
*Forbes, Melia on Modalism.
*Hazen, "Expressive Completeness in Modal Language."
*Nolan, Modal Fictionalism.
*Rosen, "A Problem for Fictionalism about Possible Worlds."
*Noonan, "In Defense of the Letter of Fictionalism."
*Nolan and Hawthorne, "Reflexive Fictionalisms."
Kim, Concepts of Supervenience.
Kim, 'Strong' and 'Global' Supervenience Revisited.
*Sider, In Defense of Global Supervenience.
*Moyer, Weak and Global Supervenience.
*Sider, "Global Supervenience and Identity Across Times and Worlds."
Lewis, Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow.
Bennett, Counterfactuals and Temporal Direction.
*Lewis, "Counterfactuals and Comparative Possibility."
Nolan, Impossible Worlds: A Modest Approach.
Lange, A Counterfactual Analysis of the Concepts of Logical Truth and Necessity.
Kripke, Naming and Necessity, lecture III, excerpt. (Don't forget to read the footnotes.)
Salmon, How Not to Derive Essentialism from the Theory of Reference.
Robertson, Possibilities and the Arguments for Origin Essentialism.
*Van Inwagen, Plantinga on Trans-World Identity (strongly recommended).
*Hawthrone and Gendler, Origin Essentialism: The Arguments Reconsidered.
*Noonan, "The Necessity of Origin."
Kaplan, How to Russell a Frege-Church.
Adams, Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity.
Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, pages 220-227.
*Huggett, Atomic Metaphysics.
Fine, Essence and Modality (featuring Einar Bohn).
Yablo, Identity, Essence, and Indiscernibility.
Soames, Kripke, the Necessary Aposteriori, and the Two-Dimensionalist Heresy
*Byrne and Pryor, Bad Intentions.
Williamson.
Lewis, "Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic."
Kripke, Naming and Necessity, excerpt.
Feldman, Counterparts.
Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, excerpt.
Hazen, "Counterpart-Theortic Semantics for Modal Logic."
Merricks, "The End of Counterpart Theory."
Williamson and Fara, Counterparts and Actuality.
Sider, "Beyond the Humphrey Objection."