"6CASCON 4.01.02Copyright 1987-99 Lincoln P. Bloomfield & Allen Moulton.Cascon 4.1 Rev 99A ;gxRmGAXc %M~1-U BN KEW P!%"j!CFD6!$I#O@E2AFV$$ 2 ]d| ]u CW -y@   &   R  + !! "" &&? ''j (( )) ,,9--q..;;::)55Y66@??G88u1100//C7799>>"ABCD*kEJ DI2_CHHMFKGLTJOINSX\`ZQVuOTRW0V[vPUUZ]9^`_XbWaZdLgvh[e\\fij kVlmn+ftpq1rsstpqGrksvlk }p ~  !`!e}!f~!^v8"_w"`x"bz#mY#l#n#o$wO$x$y$z%uQ%{%|%&=&{&&&BG"'**N'''<<'==2(Ycy(i(j(ay/)33)44)22)gY*c{*TY*LQ +KPR+NS++%,|,,-Y-%%--).##{../i/ //0.0Q0p0 0 0 1 S11 12HF222 3X333:4v44445<5m555666b6667J7771888 9#e9!9%:$W:):';&9;(;*;+<H<8<2<;<<H==k=/=1=:+>t>>>?Z??>??7@@R@Ao@B@C@A5AeAAAAEBu7UBt6BBF2CGrCHCKCDMDLvDDD EPHEyEE SFFFGQgGRG G H eH HH4I]IIII*Jh*^Ji+JJj,KZKVK]K[7L9LSL\M_!YMf(Mg)N`"tNUNWNX&OYfO"O^ O4Pb$Pc%Pd&%Qe'iQk-Ql.Qm/)Rn0xRo1Rq3Rw9>Sv8Sx:Sy;TYT@TATz<UQWUPUMUNUO'V.aVV,V-(W6iW3W5W4X0SXNXJXL%YK^YMYY=Z7ZIZJ3[Tv[I[E\Di\F\G<]C]a#]O)^~B^|>^}?_Vm_W_b_a`Uc`d`c`eLa~aYaXa*b Z\bwbb [b \b ]cTCcRc`c9ddnd%ve&w4e"sleiejemMfkfffg ghHgogpglh q\h!rhh3igiii#tj$uMj'xj-~j*{j/%kjk1k2k84l(yrl)zl4'v?v@vB>wCwDwH-xIkxPxQyTByXyYy]Fzzzz:{`{{a{b{v{d-|em|c|f|h#}jw}i}l}k5~ms~n~u~p3qerstGzgÀ$|U}~с#i Q7܄NDžRֆMۇ LՈ|҉%n-p㋧j  [ ֍>|Lxw{<;9S ^g[oNXAEMP"S?WTSvIXCNGIESTD C*HN12345SRegionAfricaEuropeMiddle EastPacific, East Asia & SE AsiaSouth Asia & SW AsiaWestern HemisphereConflict ClassInterstatePrimarily InternalInterventionColonialIssues DisputedEthnicGovernanceIndependenceResourcesStrategicTerritoryLevel of IntensityDispute with No Military AspectConflict with Military PreparationsHostilities with Organized Armed ConflictStatus of ConflictPhase 1: DisputePhase 2: ConflictPhase 3: HostilitiesPhase 4: Post-hostilities ConflictPhase 5: Post-conflict DisputeDispute SettledPrevious or general relations between sidesGreat power or allied involvementGeneral external relationsMilitary-strategicInternational organization (UN, legal, public opinion)Ethnic (refugees, minorities)Economic/resourcesInternal politics of the sidesCommunication and informationActions in disputed area One side's previous support left a legacy of good will between the two sides One side seeks friendly relations with the other Both sides had previously agreed to settle disputes peaceably The two sides are historic enemies Border between sides is in dispute Border between sides is clearly defined Buffer area separates the two sides No buffer area separates the two sides One side is controlled politically by the other One side is not controlled politically by the other One side suspects intentions of the other One side opposes the form of government of the other One side sees other groups succeed against the other One side had been historically dominant in area Historically "non-status quo" side was the only effective force in area Leaders of one side are nostalgic over historical memory of lost empire One side's other preoccupations delay negotiations One side's new leader identifies his predecessors' excesses with the other side Infiltrators of one side undermine political structure of other side One side does not openly support subversion in the other side "Status quo" side had succeeded in dealing with a comparable threat elsewhere The strongest force in "non-status quo" side is linked to a superpower "Non-status quo" side fears that "status quo" side might foment separatism Great powers encourage close relations between the sides Great powers do not encourage close relations between the sides A strong ally of one side had shown willingness to use force in the region A strong ally of one side was unwilling to use its force in the region Historic rivalry motivates great powers to exclude other's forces from the area Great power dispute leads to competition for favor of one side's leadership One side's increasing support from one great power, given its proximity to a second, tends to isolate that side in a showdown One side is receiving material support from an outside power Neither side is receiving outside support Great power concerns lead to stationing foreign troops in one side Increasing ties between one great power and "non-status quo" side lead to its use as a base for former's regional penetration Relations of "non-status quo" side with one great power warm, while cooling with another One superpower's concern with the other's military bases coincides with "non-status quo" side's desires Rivalry between great power allies of "non-status quo" side encourages lack of restraint in that side's leadership One side is focused on conflict with an outside party One side seeks support from outside party Neither side seeks external support External party had given both sides money and material support Primary ally of one side is dependent on the other side and its allies for military and economic support Dispute threatens stability and security of the region Majority in one side favors union with culturally related country Political turmoil within outside party affects its brothers in one side "Status quo" side has military superiority "Non-status quo" side has military superiority Military situation clearly in favor of "status quo" side Military situation in the area clearly in favor of "non-status quo" side Military technology of one side significantly superior One side militarily weak and powerless to resist Military technology of neither side superior A strong ally of one side has military force nearby There are foreign military bases There are no foreign military bases One side discounts independence of other side in light of foreign military bases A military resistance had been organized to fight an invader One side has extensive experience in guerrilla and terrorist tactics "Non-status quo" side acquired large stocks of arms and ammunition in a previous conflict An existing military force opposes "non-status quo" side but is not allied with "status quo" side One side possesses significant nuclear technology Both sides possess significant nuclear technology One side believed to be developing nuclear weapons capability Both sides believed to be developing nuclear weapons capability One side believed to be developing chemical or biological warfare capability Both sides believed to be developing chemical or biological warfare capability World opinion favors "status quo" cause World opinion favors "non-status quo" cause "Status quo" side concerned with world reaction "Non-status quo" side concerned with world reaction One side had signed international agreements prohibiting threat or use of force International organization is active for peaceful settlement No involvement yet of international organization Regional security organization takes strong action Regional security organization's action is weak History of distrust between ethnic groups One ethnic group has greater political/economic power than another Religion of sides differs Areas adjacent to "non-status quo" side contain people who aspired to join it Impending emergence of an independent homogeneous state stimulates aspirations of related people elsewhere Conflict among nomadic groups for scarce resources leads to conflict Both sides have economic and social problems with refugees One side able to use refugees or ethnic forces of the other side as proxies Pressure groups created of refugees and their supporters Sudden influx of population into area Substantial migrant worker population Difference in population density between sides "Status quo" side derives much economic advantage from "non-status quo" side "Non-status quo" side derives much economic advantage from other side Economic policy of one side exploitative Small fraction of population of "status quo" side controls substantial proportion of land or economic resources Small fraction of population on "non-status quo" side controls substantial proportion of land or economic resources "Status quo" side dependent on external economic aid "Non-status quo" side dependent on external economic aid Disparity between sides in level of technological development Domestic economic demand in "status quo" side exceeds available resources Domestic economic demand in "non-status quo" side exceeds available resources "Status quo" side is experiencing depressed economic conditions "Non-status quo" side is experiencing depressed economic conditions Area of conflict contains significant strategic resources Area of conflict has no significant strategic resources Area of conflict is adjacent to or contains an important ground or sea trade route "Status quo" side is dependent on external sources of energy "Non-status quo" side is dependent on external sources of energy "Status quo" side is energy-independent "Non-status quo" side is energy-independent Policy of one side is repressive, providing few legitimate channels of dissent One side had been focusing on other disputes Both sides extremely nationalistic One side very nationalistic, other side much less so Neither side very nationalistic One side, having fought for independence, discounts independence won by negotiations One side's policies suggest orientation toward a neighboring great power's enemies Many on one side owe allegiance to an outside organization The outnumbered side monopolizes the political, economic, and social power and material benefits of the area Leaders of one side preoccupied with consolidating internal hegemony and restoring order "Status quo" side is very cohesive "Non-status quo" side is very cohesive "Non-status quo" side's base of support is split "Status quo" side's base of support is split "Non-status quo" side's main vehicle of action hitherto successful "Non-status quo" side's main vehicle of action hitherto unsuccessful "Status quo" side provides more self-government to "non-status quo" side "Status quo" side denies more self-government to "non-status quo" side "Non-status quo" side seeks to intimidate its potential base of support "Non-status quo" side favors a popular front approach "Non-status quo" side shifts from popular front approach to revolution Moderate leaders of "non-status quo" side fear appearing as weaker champions for change "Status quo" leaders oppose overt action against other side "Non-status quo" leaders oppose overt action against other side "Status quo" side avoids direct provocation Not all leaders of "non-status quo" side are willing to use violent means Unity of "non-status quo" side shaken by a leadership crisis Unity of "status quo" side shaken by a leadership crisis Internal political divisions within one side cause leaders to seek a unifying issue One side claims a "mission" to carry out its policy Style of leader of one side favors dramatic gestures One side considers itself culturally superior Public opinion in one side moves away from support of other side to opposition Sides have open and accessible means of communication Sides do not have open and accessible means of communication Communications between the sides have been disrupted Normal diplomatic channels between the sides have been disrupted Area of dispute is object of competing claims Legal status of disputed area is ambiguous Previous ruler of the disputed area had fixed the border unsuccessfully "Status quo" side controls disputed area "Non-status quo" side controls disputed area The disputed area is strategically important to "status quo" side The disputed area is strategically important to "non-status quo" side Disputed area economically important to both sides Leaders of one side share same political ideology as leaders in disputed area Head of one side has family ties in disputed area Political party in "non-status quo" side has close ties with parties in disputed area "Status quo" side has weak forces in the disputed area "Status quo" side has substantial forces in the disputed area "Status quo" forces in the disputed area are heavily dependent on outside logistic support Armed force in disputed area unable or unwilling to support government One side fears loss of disputed area means loss of status Population in disputed area poorly integrated Ethnic divisions within the disputed area favor "non-status quo" side Ethnic divisions within the disputed area do not favor "non-status quo" side Immigrants to disputed area from one side increase tension Revolt in disputed area means rejection of union with "status quo" side One side follows a policy of repression against political groups in the disputed area One side encourages rebellious groups in the disputed area One side follows a policy of toleration vis-a-vis political groups in the disputed area Opposition in disputed area has eliminated any potential middle-ground The leader of the disputed area proposes a cooling-off delay Nationalist feelings in the disputed area are stimulated by occupation troops Incidents in the disputed area increase in seriousness and number The proximity of the stronger side to the disputed area gives it great influence "Status quo" side's major allies disfavor its policy toward the disputed area A majority of the area residents register their desire to accede to the other side Good information available to the sides about events in the disputed area Little accurate information available to the sides about events in the disputed area Direct negotiations take place between the sides One side agrees to negotiate One side refuses to negotiate Both sides unwilling to negotiate Sides share a common heritage Sides do not share a common heritage The leaders of one side approach the other side's leader for a modus vivendi Representatives of the sides agree to a meeting of leaders Deep ideological split develops between the sides The two sides are not ideologically divided Partial agreements have previously been reached One side underestimates own strength and overestimates that of the other and its ally One side accuses other of using allies to subvert government One side charges the other with fomenting revolt within its territory One side succeeds in influencing the other by non-military means One side fails to influence the other by non-military means Police or military measures taken by one side increase momentum for change Time decreases in which an opportunity can be exploited "Status quo" side takes strong measures against "non-status quo" side and its supporters "Non-status quo" side believes the other side will never yield to its demands Public opinion in one side aroused by action of other side Public opinion in one side is indifferent The US is impartial at this stage The US is not impartial at this stage US policy supports "status quo" side US policy is friendly to "non-status quo" The US urges direct talks to settle the dispute US public opinion is favorable to "non-status quo" side The Soviet Union is impartial at this stage The Soviet Union is not impartial at this stage Great powers are losing interest in the conflict One great power becomes an active mediator A previously-supportive great power drops its support Great powers collaborate on resolution of conflict Regional powers actively pursue peaceful settlement One side discounts the threat of intervention by the other side's ally Major ally of "non-status quo" side strongly prefers a peaceful settlement Major ally of "status quo" side strongly prefers a peaceful settlement No major ally of "non-status quo" side shows a preference for peaceful settlement No major ally of "status quo" side shows a preference for peaceful settlement "Status quo" side's major ally is distracted and gives it relatively low priority Splits within one side are exacerbated by nearby ideological struggles One side feels an influential outside party is neglecting its commitment One side engaged in repressive action against neighbor of the other side Leaders of a third party engaged in a conflict with one side seek help from other side A third party in a position to influence both sides seeks to restrain one side A third party in a position to influence both sides makes no attempt to restrain one side A neutral third party is believed by one side to be an agent for the other side "Non-status quo" side is tied up in another conflict Settlement of another conflict leaves "non-status quo" side free to concentrate on this one The success of similar groups elsewhere offers model for "non-status quo" side The military balance favors "status quo" side The military balance favors "non-status quo" side Military technology of one side is significantly superior to other One side's military strength is growing One side obtains arms and ammunition left over from another conflict One side seeks foreign military aid to redress military balance in the area No foreign military aid is sought One side has limited control over its military forces "Non-status quo" side agrees to place its military forces under neutral command Use of military forces alienates "non-status quo" side One side interprets "routine" troop movements by other side as a threat One side possesses significant nuclear technology Both sides possess significant nuclear technology One side believed to be developing nuclear weapons capability Both sides believed to be developing nuclear weapons capability One side believed to be developing chemical or biological warfare capability Both sides believed to be developing chemical or biological warfare capability The United Nations urges both sides to negotiate a settlement The UN takes other action The UN fails to take action One side had signed international agreements prohibiting threat or use of force Regional organization takes action Regional organization fails to take action A credible third party is available Third party presses for resolution of conflict Mediatory efforts to date are skilfully performed One party faces international denunciation UN sends observer or peacekeeping force to the area Religion of sides differs One side sees its ethnic troubles as inspired by the other side "Status quo" side is split along ethnic and/or religious or cultural lines "Non-status quo" side is split along ethnic and/or religious or cultural lines One ethnic group has more political/economic power than another Clashes increase between one side and a dissident ethnic group Discontent increases within the other side of one side's ethnic brethren One side is committed to unification of ethnic group Many on one side are linked ethnically with neighboring group that achieved the same goal There is a substantial flow of refugees Minority group in "non-status quo" side disfavors changing status quo Sudden influx of population into area Large migrant worker population in area The sides have substantially different population density The economic policy of one side is exploitative Small fraction of population of "status quo" side controls large proportion of land or economic resources Small fraction of population on "non-status quo" side controls large proportion of land or economic resources Disparity between sides in level of technological development Area contains internationally significant strategic resources Area contains no internationally significant strategic resources Area of conflict is adjacent to or contains an important ground or sea trade route "Status quo" side is dependent on external economic aid "Non-status quo" side is dependent on external economic aid Domestic demand in "status quo" side exceeds available resources Domestic demand in "non-status quo" side exceeds available resources "Status quo" side has been experiencing depressed economic conditions "Non-status quo" side has been experiencing depressed economic conditions "Status quo" side is dependent on external source of energy "Status quo" side is energy-independent "Non-status quo" side is dependent on external sources of energy "Non-status quo" side is energy-independent International economic sanctions are invoked International economic sanctions are effective International economic sanctions are not effective "Non-status quo" side believes it can win through political means "Status quo" side believes it can win through political means Neither side believes it can win through political means Leaders of one side believe that limited violence will give weight and urgency to diplomatic efforts One side's policy increases in militancy Government policy vis-a-vis the other side encounters political opposition One side shifts from downgrading the dispute to exaggerating it One side hardens position and will negotiate only if its claim is accepted Opposition parties in one side urge firmer policy toward other side Opposition parties in one side want to achieve their ends more rapidly Opposition parties in one side urge use of force to achieve their goals One side believes that prompt action is needed to forestall more extreme action Authorities of one side are divided on whether to deal with the other side unyieldingly or moderately One side fears that yielding to the other side's demands will lead others to make similar demands Humanitarian motives make action seem urgent Domestic political situation of one side heightens public attention to the conflict Public opinion hardens against the other side "Status quo" side agrees to submit the dispute to a plebiscite "Non-status quo" side agrees to submit the dispute to a plebiscite Some clashes involve persons under neither side's control "Non-status quo" side has the experience and capacity to carry on hostilities "Non-status quo" side lacks the experience and capacity to carry on hostilities Individuals with personal stake in status quo are involved in inflammatory incidents "Non-status quo" side develops a strategy which was successful elsewhere "Status quo" side adopts a strategy which was successful elsewhere One side fears if planned action is reversed those involved will proceed without restraint "Status quo" side concerned over world opinion "Non-status quo" side concerned over world opinion Aid to one side portends its use as a base for political action in the region One side wishes to keep its role covert or indirect One side obtains a proxy force to carry out its policy Members of one side are agitated by political developments in other areas of the region "Status quo" side calculates that its action will be successful "Non-status quo" side calculates that its action will be successful For the first time political groups begin to emerge on one side Opposition parties in "status quo" side urge concession to "non-status quo" side's Focus is shifting from external and/or military to internal, civil concerns Sides have open and accessible means of communication Sides do not have open and accessible means of communication Normal diplomatic channels between the two sides disrupted "Status quo" side controls disputed area "Non-status quo" side controls disputed area The economic value to both sides of disputed area increases The economic value to one side of disputed area increases The disputed area does not have important economic value "Status quo" side's strategic interest in disputed area increases "Non-status quo" side's strategic interest in disputed area increases "Status quo" side has military superiority in disputed area "Non-status quo" side has military superiority in disputed area One side increases its capability to deploy military forces in disputed area One side sends troops to disputed area Both sides strengthen military forces in disputed area "Status quo" side reinforces its garrison in disputed area There is a weak countervailing military force near disputed area One or both build border posts in territory claimed by the other One or both sides establish military posts in territory claimed by the other One side to the dispute reinforces its border garrisons Both sides to the dispute reinforce their border garrisons Minor incidents occur along the border between the two sides The major allies of each side agree that disputed area is in the sphere of influence of one of them Allies disagree that disputed area is in one side's sphere of influence Strategic concerns require avoiding events in the disputed area that would disturb great power relationships The rights of minority groups in disputed area are guaranteed The rights of minority groups in disputed area are not guaranteed In disputed area popular sentiment overwhelmingly favors change A majority of the disputed area residents register their desire to accede to the other side One side follows a policy of toleration vis-a-vis political groups in disputed area One side follows a policy of repression against political groups in disputed area One side uses its military presence in disputed area to pursue long-held ideological, political, economic, and strategic goals One side engages in fomenting and encouraging rebellious groups in the area The proximity of one side to disputed area and its greater power give it great influence Ties of one side's leader's to disputed area make action seem urgent One side refuses to intervene in disputed area unless leader in that area accedes to its demands Incidents in disputed area increase in seriousness and number Little accurate information available to the sides about situation in disputed area Accurate information available to the sides about situation in disputed area Both sides appear to have limited objectives One or both sides do not appear to have limited objectives One or both sides try to penetrate deeply into the other's territory Neither side attempts to penetrate deeply into the other's territory Leader of one side desires to avoid wider war with other side "Non-status quo" side succeeds in establishing a rival government to "status quo" side "Non-status quo" side fails to establish a rival government to "status quo" side "Non-status quo" side achieves its primary goals "Non-status quo" side has not achieved its primary goals "Non-status quo" side is willing to discuss ending hostilities Both sides are willing to negotiate a settlement Sides appear unwilling to negotiate a settlement The sides are negotiating Sides share much common heritage Partial agreements have been reached Leader of one side announces a cease fire Leader of one side calls for a summit meeting "Status quo" side makes some concessions Leader of one side heeds warning that harsh measures will result in action by the other side "Status quo" side removes leader of other side who could have restraining influence "Status quo" side rallies support among members of the other side One side's leaders assure other side that regular forces will not be used to overthrow them Strong superpower diplomatic support to "status quo" side Strong superpower diplomatic support to "non-status quo" side A superpower appears to be neutral A superpower fears growth of conflict into a wider war The prestige of a superpower is committed to settlement Major powers supply arms and equipment to "status quo" side to redress imbalance Major powers supply arms and equipment to "non-status quo" side to redress imbalance Arrival of arms in one side raises the prospect of a wider war Great power interest in the area increases A great power's diplomatic support encourages one side to continue the struggle Great power gives "status quo" side substantial economic aid Great power gives "non-status quo" side substantial economic aid Great power supporter of "status quo" side contemplates intervention Great power supporter of "non-status quo" side contemplates intervention A great power urges one side to avoid provoking a full-scale war A great power indicates interest in terminating hostilities and negotiating a settlement Great powers urge cease fire and avoidance of intensification Great powers/superpowers are losing interest in the conflict One great power/superpower becomes active mediator A previously supportive great power/superpower drops out Great powers/superpowers collaborate to resolve conflict Regional powers want a peaceful settlement Great power supporter of "non-status quo" side refuses to assure aid Great power supporter of "status quo" side refuses to assure aid One side receives aid from a supporter Supporter of one side threatens unilateral intervention Use of force by one side alienates potential allies States in the region give material support to "non-status quo" side States in the region give material support to "status quo" side After major ally of one side withdrew, another ally was acquired After major ally of one side withdrew, another ally was not available "Non-status quo" side fearful of potential ally's intentions Countries on which "non-status quo" side is dependent are unable or unwilling to give further support Countries on which "status quo" side is dependent are unable or unwilling to give further support Both sides dependent for aid on outside party pressing for an end to hostilities Despite one side's military success, its ally is unwilling to impose solution Actions of country supporting one side confirm its threat to intervene "Status quo" side has the military advantage "Non-status quo" side has the military advantage Military balance remains heavily in favor of one side Military technology of one side significantly superior Militarily the hostilities are inconclusive One side has overwhelming military and logistical preponderance for the terrain One side has very weak military forces The military strength of one side increases "Status quo" side uses superior military power to win military victory One side is ill-informed on size of forces needed to execute its avowed policy Initial hostilities fail to delay change in status quo "Status quo" side's forces are ineffective and unable to stop or deflect attack of "non-status quo" side Only a small proportion of each side's forces are engaged A large proportion of each side's forces are engaged "Non-status quo" side uses superior military power to win military victory The manner in which fighting breaks out suggests that hostilities are largely accidental Hostilities having broken out almost accidentally, neither side can follow up One side resorts to guerrilla warfare The terrain is unsuitable for guerrilla warfare "Non-status quo" side has few, primitive arms, and weak training and organization Armed forces of supporters of both sides become involved Armed forces of supporters of both sides do not become involved Major ally of one side responds to attacks with large reinforcements Military action by one side leads to combat with allies of the other side Larger strategic concerns constrain pressure from states influential with "status quo" side One side's ally's military mission has expanded from logistic support to advice on military operations Prolonged or intensified hostilities may trigger a mutual security agreement to which one side belongs Outside parties halt military aid to both sides One side unable to cut off arms supply to other side External pressures for termination develop One side's move against the other side's supply lines risks retaliation Foreign officers in one side's armed forces threaten withdrawal if that side continues military activities Neither side can obtain a decisive military victory at an acceptable level of commitment and risk Rapid growth of one side's armed forces sacrifices quality of training Force is not used for military victory, but to strengthen diplomacy by threatening a wider war Commander of one side's army advises against more military activity One side failed to move beyond terrorism and isolated guerrilla activity Military and para-military units act on their own initiative New military effectiveness on one side discourages other side from belief in military victory Raids by one side into other's territory inflict no military damage One side must commit more troops than anticipated One side feels that a cease fire in place would leave the other's troops too close Reasons for initial intervention by one side remain, but forces committed are inadequate The strategic interests of the side that intervened in hostilities retain importance Military tactics of "status quo" side restrict scale and scope of hostilities One side possesses significant nuclear technology Both sides possess significant nuclear technology One side believed to be developing nuclear weapons capability Both sides believed to be developing nuclear weapons capability The UN begins to assert itself strongly The UN does not assert itself strongly The UN presses for an immediate cease fire The adversaries agree to a UN cease fire resolution "Non-status quo" side is anxious to see the conflict in the UN "Status quo" side is anxious to see the conflict in the UN The UN actively seeks a political formula to end the hostilities The UN Secretary General urges restraint on both sides UN Security Council membership favors end to hostilities and negotiated settlement UN Security Council adopts a resolution calling for a ceasefire A great power vetoes UN Security Council resolution UN General Assembly is convened under the Uniting for Peace resolution UN General Assembly declines to place question on its agenda UN General Assembly favors end to hostilities UN General Assembly discusses the conflict but takes no action The UN creates a body to make an on-the-spot report and facilitate negotiations A UN body condemns those aiding "non-status quo" A UN body condemns those aiding "status quo" UN agrees to send a peacekeeping force to the area Plans for a UN force are elaborated and contingents committed UN force's mandate supports objectives of "non-status quo" side UN force's mandate supports objectives of "status quo" side Regional organization to which sides belong offers to mediate One side withdraws from international organization Ethnic rivalries exist in "status quo" side Ethnic rivalries exist in "non-status quo" side Refugees from one side return to carry out raids Violence occurs between ethnic groups within country supporting one side Strife between ethnic groups in one side raise doubt about that side's viability "Status quo" side faces economic problems as a result of hostilities "Non-status quo" side faces economic problems as a result of hostilities The costs of hostilities for both sides are becoming burdensome in terms of other goals Great power ally of "status quo" side threatens to cut economic aid Great power ally of "non-status quo" side threatens to cut economic aid Great powers threaten to withdraw economic aid from both sides unless cease fire established One side's advances threaten important resource on other side "Non-status quo" side's military and territorial objectives appear limited "Non-status quo" side's military and territorial objectives do not appear to be limited Opposition in one side increases as violence escalates Domestic public opinion comes to favor "status quo" side Domestic public opinion comes to favor "non-status quo" side Public opinion in one side rallies against the other side Heavy domestic pressure is generated in one side to cease hostilities Public opinion in "status quo" side favors a negotiated settlement Internal unrest likely to be triggered by continued hostilities Internal unrest unlikely to be triggered by continued hostilities "Status quo" side counters violence by arrests and strong reprisals "Non-status quo" side wins political concessions At times extremist political groups in both sides gain control over policy "Non-status quo" side denies any connection with the hostilities "Non-status quo" side creates a rival government One side dramatizes its position by an international incident One side feels responsible for the fate of its proxy forces Some military officers on one side believe a military solution is possible Opposition within "status quo" side reaches high into the military One side's prime role in the military action is widely assumed despite attempts to keep it covert Splits occur in the leadership of one side Splits within one side become open rifts Unity of one side is reinforced as members take action against suspected traitors A coalition is emerging within one side in opposition to party in power One side is ideologically committed to prolonging the fight Ideological split exists among "non-status quo" side's supporters Ideological split exists among "status quo" side's supporters One side seeks to isolate the other side from its base of support Prolongation of hostilities erodes resources of one side One side is over-confident in seeking military solution "Non-status quo" side resorts to guerrilla war Initial objective of one side conceived as being limited and for humanitarian reasons "Non-status quo" side's hope for political gains is not fulfilled "Non-status quo" side not prepared to act independently Sides have open and accessible means of communication Sides do not have open and accessible means of communication Some military officers of both sides, as citizens of a third party, provide communication channel between opposing forces Communications are inadequate between one side's political leader and its military forces in the field "Status quo" side lacks anticipated support in disputed area "Non-status quo" side lacks anticipated support in disputed area "Status quo" side misinterprets nature of events in disputed area Supporters of "status quo" side in disputed area begin to turn against it Both sides worry about effects of military activity on hostile ethnic groups in disputed area UN focuses world attention on developments in disputed area Both sides agree to let the UN ascertain the wishes of population in disputed area International organization body is slow in reaching disputed area Moderating third-party forces in disputed area begin to phase out Troops of interested parties present in disputed area form a peacekeeping force One side warns that any offensive action in disputed area will result in wider war Dangers of all-out war increase when hostilities spill out of disputed area Geography of disputed area makes it difficult to prevent one side from reinforcing Practical geographical limits in disputed area make extended operations difficult One side has a sanctuary in terrain difficult for other to reach Geographic isolation of disputed area keeps "non-status quo" side activity at relatively low level Nature/location of "non-status quo" side's attack weakens its claim to be supporting groups in disputed area Each side labels other the aggressor and sees its own actions as defensive Important interests of one side in disputed area threatened by other side's actions There is united opposition to "non-status quo" side's action One side's administration near disputed area is unable to prevent military activity One side claims proof of the other's complicity in military activity in disputed area Raids by one side into disputed area do not cause significant damage or provoke local unrest Forces of one side sufficient to control raiding groups in disputed areaUpCascon DatabaseACWMIT92NX*8-\-8]-/0/G00 1^Ŭ8(4V0D36H܎r'aKk;F}{W~?}ks׿Go2k#y+{}k=~x}mu>T1@@($RT(D6H܆Մr#]S Angola Civil War 1974-Angolan governmentUNITAADYMIT92N *+j+Y(, }@L#w]2P LpL*&1;. < J<w}{y~ͯY7;Kӿ{߂s?U@L"GP D0@ "0(Є T F @Aden (South Yemen) 1963-67United KingdomRival nationalist groupsAFGMIT92NH. -K-x-Y/j -fh`Ӂ83ƯTRA%`֎?Ń/'T@ZTE3RunH}[_t~{wo]}o7|4߾{^wD]*8h AX,@$ Ž7xDA$'T@HPD43RQp.HAfghanistan 1979-88Soviets-Afghan CommunistsAfghan rebelsAIWMIT92Nz*M&,R&,0"x Ɏ_\2^ u:QyX uݿ_}N}{|?w~׀8H@0F i % Arab-Israeli War 1967IsraelUAR (Egypt-Syria)ALGMIT92N0)L)*m,*a+`c+'n` p`0I6Vpd<M {g[=y߯ٞ7knωS_ܽ!` bPNQ.B E@Angolan Independence 1961-74PortugalIndigenous rebel groupsBAHMIT92N$ &dK,,M:Cera%H-D@ "}gv:<}Sa @ P" Bahrain 1970United Kingdom (Bahrain)IranBANMIT92Nd),v,,,>6-=rѭlo#xռ i%h7`oKFg?W QRW@{!tD/4۟_5?W_f[Wz4p~_rAh !xBИ@(($h0 |-MhKFG:C QRW0@!4DNBangladesh 1971PakistanBangladeshBELMIT92N -=)+/C^5}ʨ]}O>?zMD‡5׺S%x@ oKψR  -[7 N7} 0w-J~`>Belize-Guatemala 1948-1991Belize governmentGuatemalan governmentBOLMIT92N@  )D+3%,',M,JP*@`+NZ 1Db6AqB60J$ ?/Kkg=ާnߨH9;wٝG ߯g{qYsOܷk?@e߹{ٙ@(@ +0H !D`@pB"DH$ TBolivia 1967BoliviaCuban-led insurgentsBOPMIT92NH *+/;+3;+QdB@"HD(j8Fnq  6@D  0` 0& (Yw{~^wݷOܵ?u_`@ @@8@ HD  Bay of Pigs 1961CubaUSABURMIT92N +9+++,,,4,`[/(\//WBQB0=F8jq Pl #2@@+I )nv?ZÕVz_U#V_?_-NayvuAB%F0j! ! 1!"@+ Burundi 1965-Government (Tutsi dominated)HutusCAMMIT92NH &-4G./qf E9#0 jD$[{o@QSӽ`_{+?v<.~CG7KZ߽unZ 8! jDZCHJSCambodia 1979-Heng Samrin/VietnameseKhmer Rouge/Sihanouk/SereiCARMIT92N)/--{..Cq22?C7߻k"kc/lnǁŀ(gs_O4Cr?D_OÀ~WX=P45{\vsvpB 0<@7XI "+B,f$v@Chile-Argentina (Beagle Channel) 1977-85ChileArgentinaCHAMIT92Np\-x- .. /(\/D0ZypNM> Wzɛ^D&+ L.Ţx5J! K]0m8@m?4cӞ8o}xϾryX>?~?yzn 7 AP, N b2(0AP@@Ca@Congo (Katanga) 1960-63Congo (Zaire)Katanga ProvinceCUBMIT92N@ (6)z**P@d!DD1 7p!0HbAPIK!J?yoco}c߷knը_ٳe_?׻osg}߷o͸?{o[@DaDB H@A@ B Cuba 1952-59Batista GovernmentCastro oppositionCYCMIT91R(++b++K(,(,+8-:-! q@2'1) ` ( 1 h0lE";\#HG1o%O_8$sԊ~߳w;@5p@ @!) 10d@"# @!LB:"Cyprus (communal)1963-Turkish CypriotsGreek CypriotsCYEMIT92N'))P*C*=Y@DDm@1#`Xx6LӀL O !P0> EƁ 9Y??qOK}cߟﳵko^첧S9]w&?߳o{O}ZR磭oߙ?Sq۫(@@D HDA@ @ L "@1Cyprus (enosis) 1954-59United KingdomCyprusCZEMIT92N  ;@X//Ĩ/ŶP a a PzH00 (/}]o`=9ǫf˯ToX@A Pz@00`Czechoslovak revolution 1989-90Czechoslovakian GovernmentVarious opposition groupsDOMMIT92N@*Pe+M+x+++z0@@0` k D)`4@`0 QNQ;1J@?o{}os߷o]F_e\^ w?Te{}S߷>o߽Q߼ݽϠ0`"Dx`@ @B1B"Dominican Republic 1965-66Military juntaBosch and PRDDRHMIT92N$K+\+M+>4@*'(P 1-dQ , @,*̀0WC߷ڽzW/U?v/=`~0@(r'P !( ,@ Dominican Republic-Haiti 1963HaitiDominican RepublicELSMIT92NH&@, . /I/M\ %`j w7Nd=xͶ?c~~XDŽA`.TQ",fH֔TxB)0JBf$y%`Ethiopia-Eritrea 1974-93EthiopiaEritreaEUSMIT92N+h,p\-l@ 0CB4$A@m MyO<_{߯?WomIsݾߖ:?'@" "$@HP MEcuador-USA 1963-75USAEcuadorFAMMIT92Nn.ro.Fp.C mz84:*:@c.p /js,BYV00wQڢe =|߮Ww~-[@=n:/?hjBX $ @-\*0A# D.P$  bGhana-Upper Volta 1964-66Upper VoltaGhanaGYVMIT92N%`+,,-&}bH6'{XVOkq(a.xa~0<{_}=/]/O_i;9qUw rcTB@h"IR`.`$@A PP0Guyana-Venezuela 1970GuyanaVenezuelaICBMIT92N&! (***,d+e+73$"@yBQ0() HA}0JBn1XA#!)?oK}ݜ߷ﳿo$B=Նm]w߾Y~m/Wo:k}ٚz[߷ﳽo߽R]>ݽ 0m $EH@  @@FA # India-China border 1954-62IndiaChinaIMCMIT92N'%{c++ ++;RUL6z B cK  @P@QDL B `C`-0A?o[}\]߿ݷ{/߼__ݽ /Ջ7o;}_}o?o~ټn@@ @Q@AP@DL H@`)A`Indonesia-Malayasia 1963-65MalaysiaIndonesiaINPMIT92N(d)+j+*A )bb; ހo_Om(Vl|A[W7u4s׭ R{lg {_/zνf=5/|u?_|WhzBB 1JL!@J(H 1a-India-Pakistan 1965-IndiaPakistanIRIMIT92N)A($ .P#.t[//M* y=gJM9AuE*Soě5;"Bvq=D~Gs $e#=w}z:wa/:qaޝg+םwokÿ]~:[OpgJ@9ŏeqf"A (n0@tA!qe #Iran-Iraq 1980-1990IranIraqIRKMIT92N*A(*<+++L,0V;@b@ K( !7@9MK< b D!Jl?oo;}Tk3oܽWYo?zo{}n2-oܩ_Ws6"  ! 0@1HI b BHIraq (Kurds) 1958-63IraqKurdsIWIMIT92N0+ ,`S((x(()7>)B)i)k]1R`h H8T@0I+|   l @P!0/"=IdPYZ) ?ok}m߷{oތ}L[_/x_N{k|ݷ;pշ/o߉=wy[@(`@@ "U?op}W瓿Wo߹_ռw`@P )  @E% 0 P@QP*Lebanon 1957-58GovernmentUnited National FrontMAEMIT92N@1%)>)@)d)/H76@ `H *"n@ D@7Ј EB b?Cc}Ϸ{oͽH9wռ{?ok}_Ϸﳟo߽ݽo6@ `H n@ @3E`B bMalayan Emergency 1948-60GovernmentMalayan Communist PartyMEWMIT92N2G,>-R- f$2A gh]ψ_^= yx`C"`@߽t︻];}W[L"tOأ}gK]>w1z7D  d@ \L4`G PY C!Middle East War 1973IsraelArab StatesMOMMIT92N$3&P*9++,;B29.E;Ckq*,,Lo] $0^Ou"-O}^9W^?ۆ{qpOP8 9`a,q @fPP) ZMorocco-Mauritania 1957-70MauritaniaMoroccoMOSMIT92N 4lw**`-eQ@1@8Qg@`%  7j{ `O!0 m}k4YWt_߷Ҁom?M!0WVsMdlzv#os˧{yY w@@0A$@@!$jPBq `@0 Morocco-Spain 1956-75SpainMoroccoMOZMIT92NH5;p\-!,.P/F0Ӯf 1d$@,l@9Z86z/Ā ET @{\ my_1?c9OSӶ/NfGxw+w0bz1d$,L@)ta"X A @As\ Mozambique Civil War 1975-94Mozambique Frelimo governmentRenamo oppositionMUSMIT92NT6<0O* *$**,9Qyp5iL(մ0#7 \F3τ6Q[h %D_Lw~?|7_f`_a  HK̰_' PDE`|  $DMuscat and Oman 1957-70Sultanate of Oman (Muscat and Oman)Imamate of OmanNAMMIT92N7;)#,p\-P//U&`f(7UHd7h֒DVzJYC%iFan}yW_>O~ٿHuw{wOoq?f?Qڟ_z P&D7Edy'hDRJC%`)`VNamibian Independence 1947-90Namibian regime/South AfricaUNITA, Angola, CubaNCAMIT92N 8&(t. 5P%@ bcP ,h T~@.O>ӿ_o_|s_׽7[0$@ @a & (@ThA INew Caledonia 1984-French GovernmentKanak SeparatistsNCRMIT92N@9(=) (*O*O*v*ra*``/!\h"*4 k0|=W<tu h< ..o?Wc:t_{UM׽y~?{ۿ߯w_ra*@P`/ @h"*\(JK\=Up4T( P*.Nicaragua-Costa Rica 1955-56Costa RicaNicaraguaNIBMIT92N:!D+&,&,,,jq ?hw55*m,""$ċ-ij8~4`TVW *mR \ 4?:_~CQm CZϟo{]ެҀ_`'5(e("(  $@D80@!DRW *LR!T Nigeria (Biafra) 1967-70NigeriaEastern region (Biafra)NICMIT92NH;(p$.K. o. /8P+Mx/xRQvvyc63t /^GZy0G4SRΝw%ݽ[[>___1ߩWdnrD݁҇ϧW~^8P4(`x xRQ vv8 tt &~iZP{p00B0 R8@"@ sNicaragua 1980-90Sandinista governmentContras/U.S.NIHMIT92N<$#*G*K*+1' % @ {51CD9,Ź!A()?)4e)}Ju_ ALIQ v$Tg ḾXx qvv _da4/o{u?Nc=`ۗ'Xeo^uBu ALAP 0$@' 1 ātmxpvR_@`HD!,Palestine 1947-49Arab StatesPalestinian Jews (Israel)PANMIT92N? `+-+S+-& $%@$H> >o3$BH4oiS(G߿{}<G+KnZmOτ9|$Wvا$$H0 @:o"€І@ A DPanama 1964USAPanamaPHHMIT92N@@&~&T((**F |6Mk09TO){`\ˤ@% DDhx(Snk ~=ߵﳟoߩXyݽ*Sܣ {n3{==o?_ߥgo9]p 2E)  P#@@@ D "@ Philippines (Huks) 1946-54GovernmentHuk insurgentsQUMMIT92NLA')+*H* Y@@0(xXb!jx"`}߷ﳿo\,@ Yy߷볟tk^_ݽ9 (8H b@`Quemoy-Matsu 1954-58Nationalist ChinaPeoples Republic of ChinaSEKMIT92NB.+<+$+Q+\$ 8H(@se M$0A 0Nʃ34niI!U$~?g }\쳿{j[QCY;ӈg9g=@ݧ{j{߹޷S)=ݿY߳~ 0@CD`L `@O0@B D @ @! Somalia-Ethiopia-Kenya 1960-64Ethiopia-KenyaSomaliaSINMIT92NC 0O*Ez*z*'Vv (x2l N\g45`P4YX^   ߤﱿoש?ټ{?ߴog_ݭ~V P NT!0$j Sinai 1956EgyptIsraelSOIMIT92N\DA(((O(Z(_("@TP Ph Q c8 n !"z Bœdv"~?Yo[}??ߥ糽oO۳ݽ;^}?U'ozu=S7Y;p߷n=g]iOw~Y>@@P Ab8 Ą  "z B`Soviet-Iran 1945-46IranSoviet UnionSPBMIT92NE&p'! N,d0)  e ](W_Sq5~zlI(_4Mo~F<,5u<~v7~%A(Qa< x8ZlXȁ ASpain-Basque 1968-Spanish governmentBasque separatistsSPIMIT92NF%(5-@k0:5 %JX@< JH8"1 oqzl? 7ߵ YSq~cqϡeoDpl{dJX, JH  oaxSpratly Islands 1974-Vietnam et al.ChinaSRIMIT92NG;@v*!,.3/5/D/`/@ @ `tu.i.@o[d3&?pF4JP5!t4M? oOyO?]]~ͳ^@@EF2P@!# @@HB0: Syria-Turkey 1956-57SyriaTurkeyTASMIT92NKm.3/nbR5fav~awkڝX9཮v/ߑ5%bavnATaba Strip 1982-89IsraelEgyptTRIMIT92N L(M* ,*!,*j=9b<28Qc|dt9 }wW|a{O,"0 0Q  $D8} b Trieste 1945-54ItalyYugoslaviaULSMIT92NM 3 F%K,E00з0p9:Ġj3)ѻ+X0" 3ԛop`T0gt6H8$n}?_{Ekԟ{ﰫۇvf>{o}WLۿ?XSd|ƭ1@ B)< @< " ԓ$d20M@0 @ 8 0b4 9Ulster 1968-Protestant majority and UK governmentCatholic minorityUSMMIT92NN)+!~+ %hdCiQ>.ܜ%("US-Mexico Border 1895-1963United StatesMexicoVENMIT92N@O**h+`+#, @ POB c0L3@!BA!6 @P !`?g{=ߧoߩ?@8]y]Uf:{sutf߉?Y< D @ # "@!B@H ($ @@A@ Venezuela 1960-63GovernmentTerrorist groupsWESMIT92NP#P-h`-`-/Ӑ uD=h3o(Tҕl8$B6pdao&W4uŠYow^=?cHX|x93[~70plw|OŹW^8o 7E3,# $p axCU0FU€Western Sahara 1973-Spain/MoroccoPolisario/SADRWIRMIT92NQi)*(=+c++ٜe @f@A,b@dLQ p$A R$0Nā)| R 9 eoBMX)Y`?oi+}/3oԬtCXٮ}?uo{{5p'˳?g߹]緳]ٝ~倯@@`@@L R $ %@#`PWest Irian 1962-63NetherlandsIndonesiaYEMMIT92NHRa+d+d++,ALGFrance's 1947 Algerian statute stifled Muslim hopes for greater political participation. French preoccupation elsewhere left control with local Europeans who neglected the 80% rural population.A secret group, CRUA, decided on a military insurrection before reconciling the goals of all nationalist factions.Some 70 acts of violence were perpetrated by 30 armed bands. A Front for National Liberation (FLN), formed to seek aid in building an Army of National Liberation (ALN), eventually gained support of most nationalists except a rival MNA faction. Early ALN success was reversed after February 1956 by French action creating electrified border barriers, troop build-ups, a "grid" strategy, and social reforms. Later actions, such as kidnapping FLN leaders, invading Suez [see SUE], and bombing a Tunisian village, lost France support in the UN and elsewhere during a prolonged period of governmental instability. General Charles de Gaulle's election in mid-1958 and offer of self-determination prompted the "Ultras" uprising and a "General's Revolt" by the Secret Army Organization (OAS) in Algeria in April 1961.A cease-fire was agreed with the FLN at Evian. On July 3, referenda in France and Algeria approved the Evian accords giving Algeria independence and France access to Saharan resources.Algerian independence was proclaimed by France.#LmdALMMorocco is the core of a once-great Maghrib Empire. At independence in 1956, borders with Spain, Mauretania and Algeria remained uncertain. Irredentist pressures prompted Mohammed V to lay claim in February 1958 to vast Saharan regions including the Tindouf and Colomb-Bechar regions of Algeria.Once independent in 1962, Algeria placed troops in Tindouf where pro-Morocco sentiment led to incidents across the border. Moroccan anti-Algerian feeling was fed by Algerian slighting of prior aid, Algiers' support of Egypt in pan-Arab affairs and the discovery of manganese in Colomb-Bechar. Mauretania's acceptance as an OAU founding member left Algeria the main target of Hassan II, who was coming under increasing domestic pressure to take a hard line. At Oujda on October 5 1963 the rival Foreign Ministers agreed to a heads of state meeting and a boundary commission.Before either body met, Algerian troops captured two outposts, Morocco mobilized, and troops were committed in three areas. Algeria received Soviet and Egyptian aid. Mediation attempts by Ethiopia, Tunisia, the UNSYG and the Arab League failed. On an initiative by Mali, agreement was reached at Bamak on a November 2 cease-fire and an OAU Council of Ministers meeting.An OAU-sponsored Committee obtained agreement to end the conflict, but the border issue remained unresolved.On January 15 1969 the Presidents of Algeria and Morocco signed a 20-year treaty of cooperation. A joint commission agreed on the boundary on May 27 1970. The Tindouf would remain Algerian with joint exploitation of the area's iron ore resources.The agreement was completed in June 1972 at an OAU summit in Rabat.# ANGThe indigenous African population far outnumbered the colonial elite but was excluded from the electorate and subjected both to Christian proselytizing and repressive labor policy.Anti-colonial sentiment spreading throughout Africa was reflected in mounting opposition in Angola (and Portugal) to Portuguese dictator Antonio de Oliveira Salazar. The Portuguese expanded their military presence as their policies toward their African colonies attracted international attention and UN disapproval. The first of three competing indigenous nationalist forces, the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola), mobilized in 1956 under Dr. Antonio Agostinho Neto.Riots occurred in the capital, Luanda, followed by a series of violent upheavals in which two other exile groups took part: the FNLA (Front for the Liberation of Angola) under Holden Roberto, and UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) under Dr. Jonas Savimbi. The dissidents, hampered by competition between them, were no match for an efficient and ruthless regime. The UN proved powerless, given the unwillingness of Portugal's NATO allies --the US and the UK -- to bring pressure. Some major legal and social reforms accompanied the repression.Sporadic clashes continued to occur between supporters of the three exile groups. A military coup in Portugal in April 1974 led to dissolution of the empire. Fighting between rival nationalist groups resulted in Portugal granting independence to the Angolan people rather than any organization.The MPLA declared itself the government of Angola. [see ACW]#BAHThe UK decision to withdraw from the Persian Gulf by the end of 1971, and thus remove its protection of Bahrain (traditional since 1820), revived a continuing Iranian claim based on Persian rule from the early 17th century until 1783 when the current ruling dynasty was established. On March 28 1970 the UNSYG announced receipt of letters from Iran and the UK requesting that he designate a personal representative Vittorio Winspeare-Giucciardi to ascertain the wishes of the people. On May 11 1970 the UNSC endorsed Winspeare's conclusion that an overwhelming majority wished recognition of Bahrain's identity as a fully independent and sovereign state free to decide its own relations with other states.In the UNSC Iran announced the dispute ended as both parties accepted the Winspeare Report.#uABAN[See INP.] East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) became part of Pakistan at independence in 1947. Resentful of West Pakistan's domination, the separatist Awami League formed in 1949. A United Front coalition of 5 discordant parties (including the Awami League) defeated the ruling West Pakistani Muslim League in 1954. Economic stagnation in East Pakistan accentuated cultural and linguistic rifts. In 1966 Awami leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman sought increased autonomy. His arrest helped coalesce Bengali opinion when Pakistani President Ayub Khan was forced out in 1969. Ayub's successor Yahya Khan called for elections.The Awami League swept East Pakistan, and won a bare majority in the national assembly as well. The West Pakistan leadership was unwilling to accept Mujib as Prime Minister and the assembly never met. Martial law was declared March 1971. Mujib ordered a general strike. Yahya responded with West Pakistan troops. Civil disturbances increased in violence. Mujib was arrested again. On March 26 1971 the Awami League declared independence, and formed a government in exile in India.Civil war ensued, with about a million Bengalis killed. Millions of refugees poured into India. India declared war on Pakistan on December 3.The defeat of Pakistan permitted the creation of Bangladesh.Mujib was freed, and took office. The United Front coalition dissolved and resultant rifts led to a series of coups and military rule.Pakistan formally recognized Bangladesh's independence.#BELIn 1788 Spain granted Great Britain permission to settle the area today known as Belize while retaining formal sovereignty. Britain assumed control when the Spanish Empire was dismantled in 1816, and in 1859 signed a treaty with Guatemala fixing the borders. Renamed British Honduras, the area became a Crown colony in 1862. Guatemala, in 1933, registered a claim that Britain had reneged on a 1859 treaty provision, thereby nullifying it. Guatemala claimed sovereignty as the legal heir to the Spanish empire in the region. British Honduras voted to remain under British protection with a greater degree of autonomy. In 1948 Guatemala closed its borders with British Honduras. Britain sent 3 warships to the area and tensions eased.Guatemala severed diplomatic relations with Britain. In 1964 Britain granted British Honduras self-government but continued its military presence. The country was renamed Belize in 1976. Britain had taken the case to the UN and in 1980 the UN General Assembly adopted the Belizean independence resolution by 125-1 (Guatemala). The Assembly demanded that Guatemala enter negotiations with Britain and Belize. However a proposed agreement between the three parties caused widespread local unrest, and further negotiations broke down. Britain and Belize agreed on a constitution and independence was granted in September 1981. Guatemala refused to accept it.Following Belize's admission as a full member of the OAS in January 1991 and recognition by Honduras in February, Guatemala in September officially recognized Belize's sovereignty and independence. In return Guatemala was granted the use of Belizean ports and control over a 3-mile sea corridor permitting access to the port of Puerto Barrios.#IoBOLGeographic, demographic and historical forces had impeded exploitation of Bolivia's natural wealth. In 1952 nationalist reformers seized power, but lost support as economic problems and corruption persisted. The popular Vice President, General Rene Barrientos Ortuno, took control in 1964 and in 1966 was elected President. Opposition continued particularly from the tin miners.Cuban leader Fidel Castro reportedly considered setting up a base for revolution in the Southern Cone of Latin America. Revolution promoter Che Guevara chose Bolivia and took command. Despite friction between local pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions, advance agents collected supplies. Guevara arrived in November and began training Cuban and Bolivian recruits despite adverse conditions, including peasant disinterest.A successful guerrilla ambush began five months of clashes. In June-July, Army occupation of some mines triggered a miners' strike and widespread urban protests. Fearing to unite miners and guerrillas, Barrientos declared a state of siege. By July 10 the crisis eased and thereafter the guerrillas, lacking popular and even local Communist Party support, and facing special army units trained by US Special Forces, rapidly became decimated. Guevara, whose presence was not officially confirmed until July, was captured and executed on October 9.The Cuban-inspired insurgency was suppressed.The July 1968 publication of Che's diary, leaked to Cuba by the Bolivian Interior Minister, caused a major confrontation between rival military leaders. Martial law was declared. Tension eased in October and a new, largely civilian cabinet was named.#(BOPAfter Fidel Castro's assumption of power in Cuba, US relations deteriorated. Resentment of US economic pressure, bombing raids by exiled followers of former Cuban President Fulgencio Batista from Florida, and fear of US invasion were matched by US outrage at property expropriations and political executions, plus anger at Castro's pro-Soviet Communist leanings.CIA arming and training of exiles, approved by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, was begun in contact with opposition groups within Cuba. Failure to consolidate indigenous guerrilla groups led to an expanded invasion force. Official relations worsened as Soviet arms arrived in Cuba. Washington complained to the OAS, Castro denounced the US to the UNGA, the US imposed an export embargo, and in January 196l broke relations. With President John F. Kennedy's approval, subject to the non-use of US forces, the invaders left their Guatemalan training camp on April 14.Exile pilots bombed Cuban planes on the ground but failed to destroy Cuban air power. Exile forces landed on April 17 but Cuban planes prevented supply ships from landing. US naval forces and aircraft remained offshore and inactive. The invasion force was captured when its supplies were exhausted and President Kennedy refused to commit US forces.Diplomatic efforts ultimately led to the prisoners' release. The USSR announced an agreement to supply arms and technical help to Cuba. US-Cuban relations remained in the deep-freeze, particularly after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1963.#/IOpBURIn Burundi (85% Hutu, 14%Tutsi, 1%Twa) power struggles between King and Tutsi leaders necessitated Hutu alliances, thus permitting more Hutu participation than in ethnically identical Rwanda. Tutsis feared loss of power from UN pressure on Belgium to democratize before 1962 independence. The king's son, of the Tutsi-dominated UPRONA party, was assassinated by Tutsi rivals in October 1961 politicizing ethnic ties. The monarchy, controlling both bureaucracy and army, deprived Hutu and most Tutsi of significant power.The King called elections in May 1965, reneged on democratization when the Hutu party defeated UPRONA, introduced a second, nominated chamber, and rejected all Hutu nominees for Prime Minister. With fewer elected officials, every electoral route to Hutu power seemed foreclosed.A weak Hutu coup attempt failed but the King fled. Hutu attacks on Tutsi in the provinces triggered a massive army response. Some hundred Hutu officers and politicians were executed in the capital, and 2500-5000 Hutu elsewhere. Army power was now unchallenged.The new king was deposed by Captain Michel Micombero who declared a republic. Hutu politicians and soldiers staged a failed coup in 1969.The Army response to a failed Hutu coup in 1972 killed 100,000-200,000, including virtually all educated Hutus, and spawned a like number of refugees.Differences within the military elite were contained until 1976 when Micombero was overthrown by Col. Jean-Baptiste Bagaza who sought to pacify Hutu with land reform and economic development instead of political reform. He was replaced by coup in 1987 by Major Pierre Buyoya who continued the exclusion of Hutu from real power.With rumors rampant in both communities that attacks by the other were planned, unannounced army maneuvers sparked Hutu to burn bridges to hinder the army, and caused the Tutsi to flee. Hutu interpreted the fleeing Tutsi as the signal of a pogrom and murdered some hundreds. The army then killed an estimated 15,000 Hutu.Buyoya's attempts to lessen tension by reintroducing Hutu into his army and administration were resisted by the Bagaza faction and the army. A new constitution adopted by referendum in 1992, however, provided for representation by all ethnic groups. Unexpectedly a Hutu, Melichior Ndadaye, was elected President in June, 1993. [Phase 3-4: 10/1993] The President was assassinated when a failed coup left 100,000 dead, 600,000 refugees in neighboring countries, and one million internally displaced. The new President, Hutu Silvester Nibantunganya, failed to control the Tutsi-dominated army and died in a suspicious plane crash in April 1994 [Phase 4-4: 9/1994] An agreement on power-sharing was reached with UN help, and a weak coalition government took office. [Phase 3-5: 4/1995] Tutsi-led army attacks on Hutu civilians led to massive Hutu flight and almost complete ethnic segregation. [Phase 4-5: 6/1995] An OAU peace mission arrived. After 17,000 Hutu refugees were turned back at the Tanzanian border in January 1996, the UNSYG proposed sending guards to defend aid workers and a rapid-reaction force on standby in Zaire. The OAU approved but the Burundian army was opposed. The UNSC on March 5 1996 opted for diplomatic solutions, but by mid-1996 wholesale killings were reported by both Tutsi-dominated army and Hutu rebels. Regional sanctions were imposed accompanied by intense mediatory efforts, with former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere as facilitator, paralleled by efforts by the St. Egidio community in Rome. In early June, 1998 President Pierre Buyoya signed into law a transitional constitution including in government the mostly Hutu Frodebu party plus other reforms. Later that month the warring factions agreed to a truce and another round of negotiations to end the fighting that had produced more than 150,000 casualties since 1993.# CAMThe Vietnam-backed Heng Samrin regime now controlled Phnom Penh and most of Cambodia east of Thailand. Skirmishes continued along the border. Cambodia faced famine from agricultural disruption and near anarchy. By October 280,000 tons of food aid had arrived from the USSR and Vietnam, and 2,000 tons from the West. A large US aid program was targeted at border camps. With food from Western donors going to refugee populations and direct military aid from China, the Khmer Rouge regrouped on the Thai border. Western support fostered smaller anti-communist movements, the two largest led by Son Sann (Serei) and Prince Sihanouk. These 3 opposition groups, under pressure from the US and ASEAN, formed an unstable alliance against the Heng regime in February 1981.A pattern emerged over the next decade of hostilities during the December-April dry season, and retrenchment during the wet season. Viet attacks were particularly heavy in 1981 and 1983-85. In the late 1980s, the Khmer Rouge began to strike deeper into Cambodia. Periodic talks under UN, ASEAN, and French auspices failed over the issue of Khmer Rouge and Heng regime participation in any future government.As some Vietnamese troops withdrew and US-USSR relations improved, the US in July 1990 abandoned its opposition to the Vietnam-installed regime. At Djarkata in September the parties tentatively committed to peace and to elections under UN supervision. In May 1991 the four combatants agreed to a cease-fire sponsored by France and the UNSYG. On October 23 the Paris Agreement called for a 70 per cent reduction in armies, with remaining weapons surrendered to UN peacekeepers; joint interim governance including all factions; and a UN Transition Authority (UNTAC) subsequently funded at $1.9 billion, to prepare for UN-supervised elections. Persistent Khmer Rouge violations of the agreement including refusal to demobilize, prompted UN-imposed trade sanctions on November 30,1992. The Khmer Rouge took no part in the UN-monitored May 1993 elections which brought to power the Royal Government of Cambodia. Cambodia remained divided between government zones and autonomous KR zones. Fighting continued propelling 30,000 refugees into Thailand. North Korea sponsored a round-table conference on "peace and national reconciliation" in May 1994, which led to a six-month amnesty for Khmer Rouge members. Several thousands defected, although a hard-core of 5-10,000 remained. Meanwhile the dual government of Hun Sen and Norodom Ranariddh broke down. In February, 1998 the rival factions signed a truce and in June the UN agreed to monitor elections scheduled for July. In April KR leader Pol Pot, responsible for mass murder of his people in the 1970's, died.#CARPossession of 3 islands in the Beagle Channel (Picton, Lennox, Nueva) had been in contention since the early 1800s colonial period. At stake also were their congruent maritime extensions (30,000 square miles), with fishing and mineral (especially oil) rights, and possible Antarctic rights. Often negotiated, the issue went to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1971 which ruled for Chile on May 2 1977. Argentina disputed the decision and sought bilateral negotiations. In July each side protested territorial buoys placed by the other. Argentina repeatedly violated Chilean air and maritime space. Bilateral negotiations failed. On 25 January 1978 Argentina declared the award "fundamentally null."Tensions increased. Two bilateral commissions, seeking a solution, accomplished little. Chile asked for ICJ mediation; Argentina sought continued negotiation. On December 9 1978 Argentina sent a naval squadron to the Beagle Channel region. Chile followed suit. Both prepared for war. On December 11 Pope John Paul II sent a personal message to both presidents urging a peaceful solution. War preparations continued as did diplomatic efforts to avert hostilities. Argentina complained to the UN; Chile asked the OAS to convene. On December 21 Chile accepted the Pope's mediation. Argentina did so the next day. On January 9 the Act of Montevideo was signed pledging both sides to a peaceful solution and a return to the military situation of early 1977. No significant reduction in tensions occurred until the democratic government of Raul Alfonsin took office in Argentina in December 1983 and on January 23 1984 signed, as did Chile a Treaty of Peace and Friendship.After 80 per cent of the Argentine electorate voted to accept the Vatican-mediated compromise, a protocol of agreement to a treaty was signed on October 18. It was ratified by Argentina on March 14 1985 and by Chile on April 12 1985.At the Vatican, Chile and Argentina signed a treaty giving the islands to Chile but most maritime rights to Argentina.#hbbFCHAThe population of Chad comprises Arabic-speaking Muslim nomads of North Africa and French-speaking sedentary farmers of Central Africa. After independence in 1960, the policies of President Francois Tombalbaye had the support of France. In response, northerners created FROLINAT (Front for the Liberation of Chad) which received arms from pre-Quadafi Libya. Libya had taken control of the mineral-rich Aouzou strip in 1973. In 1975 Tombalbaye was overthown and replaced by Gen. Felix Malloum who appointed as Vice-President FROLINAT leader Hissen Habre. The coalition fell apart.Habre's forces seized the capital, N'Djamena. In August representatives of 11 Chadian factions met in Lagos with observers from 10 African countries and the OAU. Goukini Oueddei became president of a transitional government of national unity (GUNT).Goukini and Habre forces fought in N'Djamena. GUNT arranged the withdrawal of French forces and with Libyan aid drove Habre's forces into Cameroon and W. Sudan. While recognizing GUNT, the US in 1981 sent aid to Habre via Egypt and Sudan. Goukini, at French insistence, persuaded Libya to withdraw by mid-November. Habre, circumventing OAU peacekeepers, retook N'Djamena in June 1982. Goukini, with Libyan help, attacked from the north. France sent troops to help Habre halt the offensive at the 16th parallel.France and Libya agreed to withdraw their forces from Chad, but Libyan President Muammar Quadafy reneged and took control above the 16th parallel. Chadians rallied to Habre.Goukini, with Libyan aid, attacked southward. France sent Habre air and logistic support. In September Goukini, with US aid, fought Libya. Libya's air attacks south of the 16th parallel threatened military confrontation with France.Quadafi, while maintaining his claim to the disputed Aouzou Strip, admitted his adventure into Chad had been a mistake. In August 1989 both sides agreed to withdraw troops and seek a peaceful settlement. When mediation failed to resolve the Aouzou Strip dispute, the case went to the ICJ, which ruled against Libya in February 1994.Libyan withdrawal from the Strip was monitored by a small UN observer group, UNASOG, and completed on May 31, 1994.# |CHVChina, whose relations with Vietnam were historically bad, backed Hanoi in its war with first France and then the US, but in 1975 suspended aid to Vietnam. By 1978 Vietnamese nationalized trading, enforced citizenship requirements and forced migration to new economic zones were adversely affecting ethnic Chinese. Refugee flows to China increased dramatically, provoking Chinese protests. Disputes between Vietnam and Cambodia (temporarily named Kampuchea) also increased, China and the US supporting the Kampuchean position. On November 3, Vietnam signed its first friendship treaty with the USSR. On December 15, the US and China announced normalization of relations.Vietnam backed an 'indigenous' revolt in Kampuchea against Pol Pot, the murderous communist ruler, and with 50,000 troops (ultimately 200,000) took Phnom Penh within 10 days. By January 1 Chinese troops were reported massing on the Vietnamese border. Both sides soon charged border violations and raids. The reported massing of Vietnamese troops near the border led to clashes. Chinese Vice Premier Deng Hsaio-Ping, during a US visit January 29-February 5, hinted at retaliation against the Vietnamese. Both the US and USSR sent naval forces to the area. Vietnam asked for international assistance.China entered Vietnam in strength to "teach Vietnam a lesson". Casualties on both sides were reported high. International opinion generally condemned China. The US was accused by the USSR, Taiwan, and Vietnam of tacit backing of China. Vietnam requested UNSC action, but the Council temporized. Soviet aid to Vietnam increased. Fighting continued sporadically until mid-March.Peace talks began, but remained deadlocked during negotiations from April-July. UNSYG Kurt Waldheim facilitated a POW trade. Accusations by both sides focused on border raids and the plight of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam.China reported a Vietnamese border attack and massing of Vietnamese troops. From February thru December 1980 Vietnam charged Chinese aggression. China rejected Vietnamese offers to resume stalled peace talks. Vietnamese attempts to eradicate Kampuchean rebels on the Thai-Kampuchean border were met by Chinese military activity on Vietnam's northern border.After a decade of competition over Cambodian rule and the potentially oil-rich Spratly Islands [see SPI], China and Vietnam backed a UN plan for pacifying Cambodia, and held secret meetings to reconcile their differences. Trade having increased by 60% in 1995, agreement was reached in December to restore rail links and boost trade and investment. Each side renewed a pledge to resolve territorial disputes peacefully.#COLGeneral Gustavo Rojas Pinilla's National Popular Alliance (NPA) party charged fraud after its close loss to the established Liberal and Conservative parties in the April 19 presidential elections. NPA radicals stole the sword and epaulets of Simon Bolivar, famed Central American liberator, the first of many such stunts by the Movimiento de Abril 19, or M-19. On February 27 1980 M-19 raided an Embassy reception, holding 52 hostages including ambassadors under siege for 61 days of negotiations. The guerrillas then flew to Cuba with ransom money and the promise of an international commission to monitor human rights. In November 1982 President Belisario Betancur offered amnesty to 6 rebel groups including M-19. 900 political prisoners were freed and 1000 rebels turned in weapons. M-19 lost support by demanding further concessions. Continuing violence led to a signed truce on August 24 1984 to take effect in a week. The truce survived the assassination of a M-19 founding member and parliamentarian by the right wing. An armistice was negotiated, but charges of violations on both sides soon ended the truce.M-19 raided the Palace of Justice in Bogota. The army, without Presidential consultation, laid siege. A day later the 100 dead included the Supreme Court President, 5 Justices, and all M-19 raiders, an event that spurred increased violence by rebel groups of left and right, drug traffickers, the military and police.M-19 declared a unilateral cease fire. Against a background of extensive chaos and limited military gains, the government and M-19 reopened talks on April 1 1989. M-19 sought constitutional changes to break the ruling two-party coalition, an economic plan to help the poor and judicial reforms.M-19 renounced violence and after the presidentail election became the third largest political party. M-19 leader Navarro Wolff opened talks with five other guerrilla groups to moderate their violent opposition, and entered the Cabinet. A popular vote on December 1990 gave M-19 the largest delegation to the convention to rewrite the 1886 constitution. M-19 lost electoral support as protest votes turned elsewhere. Other rebel groups remained active. By 1996 guerrilla numbers resembled those of a decade earlier, but most were thought to seek the money to be made from kidnappings and extortion, and from guarding coca crops and drug factories, rather than social change. President Ernesto Samper, elected in 1994, established a peace commission to arrange peace talks, but his government was weakened by evidence of drug-related corruption involving the President himself. President Andres Pastrana improved prospects for domestic peace by unprecedentedly meeting wit h the head of the leading Marxist rebel group in July 1998 a month after being elected.#CONKatanga province's President Moise Tshombe requested Belgian paratroopers to quell rebels in the chaos following the Congo's independence from Belgian rule (the country is Zaire today). The UN created a UN peacekeeping force for the Congo (ONUC). On July 11, just prior to ONUC's arrival to arrange Belgian withdrawal, Tshombe declared Katanga independent.Tshombe ordered mobilization to resist the UN force, which he called "Lumumba's agent" referring to leftist Premier Patrice Lumumba. ONUC neutrality in the dispute between Lumumba and President Joseph Kasavubu, each of whom dismissed the other, made possible the peaceful entry of UN peacekeepers. Events culminating in Lumumba's murder in February 1961 engendered crises in the Congo and also the UN and Africa. This reinforced Tshombe's position, now supported by an army led by white mercenaries. ONUC was authorized to use force to end Katanga's secession. On August 28 UN troops began rounding up mercenaries in Katanga. Tshombe refused negotiations.ONUC attacked, declared the secession ended, but agreed to a truce on September 21. Dissatisfied with this compromise, central government forces invaded on October 30 but were routed. With a renewed UNSC mandate, ONUC attacked again on December 5 but desisted on December 18 when Tshombe agreed to unity talks. When these failed a year later, ONUC attacked and finally overcame Katangese resistance. A monumental crisis ensued in the UN featuring Soviet political assaults from the left on the UNSYG, and from the right by thwarted Katanga-based mining interests and their political supporters in Europe and the US.Katanga surrendered to ONUC and the Leopoldville government. A January 17 agreement permitted Congolese civil and military personnel to supervise reintegration. [The Congo became Zaire in 1971, its capital Leopoldville renamed Kinshasa. With the defeat of Zairean government forces in 1996 and the departure of dictator Mobutu Sese Seko in the spring of 1997, the victorious rebel leader Laurent Kabi la renamed Zaire the Democratic Republic of the Congo.]#'CUBPost-war economic stagnation, worsened by the inelastic US sugar market, underlay the coup d'etat by Cuban General Fulgencio Batista y Zaldivar on March 10 1952.Guerrilla leader Fidel Castro planned to occupy the Moncada Barracks and establish a popular militia to support a revolutionary government controlling the eastern area. On July 26 1953, the Batista government repulsed the Moncada attack, captured surviving rebels and suspended civil rights. On release from prison in a general amnesty following Batista's 1954 election, Castro organized an invasion force in Mexico. A planned uprising by disaffected students and professionals failed to occur on November 30.With no popular uprising, Castro's invading force was decimated. The 17 survivors regrouped in Cuba's Sierra Maestra mountains. For two years the 26 July Movement, with mounting local and foreign support, conducted an insurgency campaign that brought on widespread governmental repression. On March 14 1958 the US suspended arms aid to Batista whose brutal counter-terror tactics alienated even his own troops. Their defections aided a gradual collapse after July 1958 when a Castro-initiated unity pact signed in Venezuela brought together most groups opposing Batista except the Cuban Communist Party.After Santa Clara fell, Batista left for the Dominican Republic. Castro's movement accepted the surrender of remaining forces and quickly established itself as the government. [See BOP]#F)aCYCIndependence from Britain after the long struggle over "enosis" (union with Greece [see CYE] left sharp communal differences between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The 1960 constitution gave the President (Greek-Cypriot Archbishop Makarios III) and Vice-President (Turkish- Cypriot Rauf Denktash) some veto powers, barred enosis and/or partition, and permitted two British bases and the stationing of Greek and Turkish troops.President Makarios proposed constitutional changes designed to remove a bottleneck in government by curtailing the legislative powers of the T-Cypriots. T-Cypriot rejection provoked G-Cypriot anger and violent disputes.Clashes between armed irregulars provoked severe communal fighting and the centralized administration collapsed. A Turkish invasion threat, plus Soviet objection to (and Cypriot rejection of) a NATO peace force, led to UNSC approval on March 4 of a peacekeeping force, UNFICYP, and a UN mediator. Renewed conflict included bombing raids from Turkey in August.After pacification, both sides rearmed. The G-Cypriot request to end three-power guarantees renewed T-Cypriot fear of enosis.The G-Cypriot National Guard touched off serious fighting. Turkish mobilization prompted a US-UN-NATO-sponsored mediation mission led by US deputy secretary of defense Cyrus Vance.A threatened Turkish invasion was called off, and both Greece and Turkey agreed to withdraw all non-Cypriot forces, except UN peacekeepers, from the island. Direct communal negotiations began in 1968 but made little progress.After the death of enosis-advocate rebel G-Cypriot Gen. George Grivas in January 1974, G-Cypriot troops in July overthrew the government led by Archbishop Makarios, who then charged the Greek military government with complicity in the coup. Fearing enosis, Turkish forces invaded and occupied 45% of the island.The T-Cypriots, with one-fifth of the populace and per capita income one-third of Greek Cyprus, in 1983 declared 37% of the island the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" but it is recognized only by Turkey. UN mediation under Diego Cordovez featured a proposal, rejected by the T-Cypriots, for a bizonal federation in which each community would retain a majority in areas it controls. The situation escalated when in January, 1997 G-Cyprus announced purchase of Russian S-300 anti-aircraft missiles, which Turkey threatened to bomb if installed. Prospects were further dimmed by the European Union's decision in December, 1997 to put off Turkey's membership application but opening talks in April 1998 on membership for Cyprus; T-Cypriots rejected an invitation to be part of the Cypriot negotiating team. Tensions increased in June 1998 with Greece and Turkey competitively deploying warplanes on the island . UNFICYP continued to patrol the "Green Line".#9CYEBritish-occupied Cyprus contained two communities, the Greek Orthodox Christians (75%) and Turkish Muslims (18%), who lived for the most part in mutual cultural isolation. Greek-Cypriot pressures on Britain to permit "enosis" (union with Greece) increased markedly after 1950.The Cypriot Patriarch, Archbishop Makarios III, directed political and military efforts designed to achieve enosis by provoking British repression and attracting UN attention. Greek sympathizers sent arms. The UN's failure to support self-determination, the transfer of the British Middle East Command from Suez to Cyprus, plus secret Greek encouragement, all underlay a decision by Greek-Cypriot leaders to begin hostilities.Coordinated sabotage and violent demonstrations brought on a State of Emergency on November 26 1955. Greece, Turkey, and Britain failed to agree on ultimate sovereignty. Turkey and Turkish Cypriots demanding partition of the island between Greek and Turkish Cypriots grew more militant. In September 1958, Makarios, by changing the emphasis from self-determination to independence, paved the way for a 3-power agreement in principle.Greece, Turkey and Britain agreed to become guarantors of independence without either enosis or partition. The Republic of Cyprus was established on August 16 1960. [Conflict continued between Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus, and in the late 1990's UNFICYP remained in place. See CYC.]#`CZEIntermittent popular opposition during 45 years of Soviet-enforced communist rule continued as student groups organized forums and discussions of possible reforms, both illegally and through the official youth organization. By 1989, following profound changes in Soviet domestic and foreign policy including the implicit revocation of the Brezhnev Doctrine during revolutionary reform in Poland, talk of reform escalated among students and such established opposition groups as Charter 77.A permitted student demonstration to honor the 50th anniversary of a Czech student martyr on November 17, 1989, which thousands attended, was violently suppressed by riot police as the crowd approached Wenceslas Square, killing one and injuring many. Next morning large numbers of students and others returned to the Square and a student group congregated in a theatre to consider further plans including a strike. Support from other diverse groups such as Charter 77 led to the formation of Civic Forum (CV) whose most prominent leader was dissident playwright Vaclav Havel. A sister Slovakian organization, People Against Violence (PAV) also formed. Within 3 days government leaders faced hundreds of thousands of demonstrators led by CV leaders, demanding widespread political and economic reforms. By day 8 the entire Politburo and Central Committee resigned. On day 10, direct negotiations with the Prime Minister began. On day 17 President Gustav Husak, having promised to end Party domination, announced a new cabinet, ostensibly "a broad coalition" although Communist party members numbered 16 among 21 proposed members. Huge demonstrations persisted including a successful general strike on November 27. On December 10 Husak resigned and the Federal Assembly elected Vaclav Havel to the office to lead the country to free parliamentary elections.Following elections on June 8-9, in which Havel's Civic Forum and People Against Violence won a majority, Havel formed a new cabinet, "the government of national sacrifice" with a Slovak, Marian Calfa, as Prime Minister. Havel was reelected to the Presidency on July 5. [In 1992 Czechoslovakia was separated into two sovereign states, the Czech Republic and Slovakia]#GnDOMJuan Bosch's presidential victory in December 1962 sparked local commercial-military alarm at his alleged pro-Communism, and at the new Constitution of April 1963. On September 1 1963 a military coup installed a Triumvirate that was eventually led by Gen. Donald Reid Cabral with US support.The replacement of Bosch's elected goverment prompted young military officers to rally to Bosch's PRD party. In late 1964, in the Rio Piedras Pact, they vowed to restore the constitutional President.The rebellion against the military junta began prematurely, but military professionals in the leadership refused to engage the rebels. Street crowds, hailing Reid's decision to step down, overwhelmed the police. When the installation of a provisional President was broken up by junta-inspired air raids, the populace was inflamed. The US, fearing a Communist Cuban-style take-over, landed Marines on April 28 ostensibly to protect American lives, later supporting Gen.Antonio Imbert Barreras as provisional President. OAS, UN, US and Red Cross mediation efforts alternated with periods of heavy fighting. Finally, the OAS-sponsored peacekeeping force, IAPF, became effective and won popular support. Hector Garcia Godoy was accepted conditionally by both sides as provisional President, but substantial US pressure was required to persuade Imbert to retire.The Act of Reconciliation led to a general amnesty and Garcia's installation on September 3.Newly-elected President Joaquin Balaguer took office, and IAPF withdrawal began. [Despite continued, though gradually decreasing, political instability marked by threats of military coups, acts of terrorism and mass demonstrations, President Balguer was reelected in 1970 and 1974, defeated in 1978, reelected although blind in 1986 and again in 1990 in a close election that required a recount, and finally replaced in May 1996.]#g|DRHForeign hostility to the Haitian regime ruled by Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier, and expectations of an internal revolt, were heightened after President Duvalier acted to end open rivalry between the army and the thuggish "Tonton Macoute" palace guard by forcibly retiring 63 leading army officers. Those not arrested sought refuge in foreign embassies. After a reported attempt on the lives of Duvalier's children, two Haitian police entered the Dominican Republic embassy in Port-au-Prince on April 26, seized 22 Haitians as alleged assassins and refused to leave without them.DR President Juan Bosch threatened invasion unless the police withdrew. An OAS mission arrived April 30. By May 2, 4,000 DR troops were at the border, gunfire was heard through Port-au-Prince and a US naval force stood offshore. The DR agreed to defer action pending the OAS report. On May 3 Duvalier declared martial law and on May 6 in the UNSC charged the DR with aggression. DR troops began pulling back on May 13. By July 16 Duvalier declared all internal resistance ended. A new crisis occurred when Hait