Work in Progress

'Obligations to Merely Statistical People'
Forthcoming in the Journal of Philosophy

This is about whether, when we don't give to charity, we can take consolation in the thought that no person is worse off for our not giving.

The Limits of Kindness
Forthcoming with Oxford University Press, 2013

My new book. Its aim is to derive a substantial theory of normative ethics from some very spare, uncontroversial assumptions about rationality, benevolence and essence. By way of a preview, here's a draft of the introduction.

'Determinism, Sloth and the Opacity of the Future'
In progress

This paper, co-authored with Richard Holton, is about the significance of the fact that we are, in certain ways, unpredictable to ourselves. Richard and I will welcome your comments.

'Self-Reinforcing and Self-Frustrating Decisions'
In progress

This paper, co-authored with Brian Hedden, is about (really against) theories that say that sometimes what you ought to do depends on what you believe you will do. Brian and I will welcome your comments.

Published Work on Ethics and Practical Rationality

'Obligation and Regret When There is No Fact of the Matter About What Would have Happened If You Had Not Done What You Did'
Noûs 45, no. 1, 2011

This is about conditional under-specification and the objective ought. Moral: sometimes there is a difference between what there is most reason for you to do and what a fully informed, benevolent observer would want you to do.

'Take the Sugar'
Analysis 70, no. 2, 2010

I raise a problem about you ought to behave, when you have sweetening-insensitive negative preferences (when you lack preferences between items, and still lack preferences if one item is mildy improved). For decision theorists, this problem gives rise to a fork in the road. I present two ways to extend standard decision theory so as to accomodate two different solutions to the problem.

'Perfectly Balanced Interests'
Philosophical Perspectives 23.1, 2009

This is about cases in which people's interests conflict. I argue that how we think about some important such cases depends on how we think about a very general problem about you ought to behave, when you have sweetening-insensitive negative preferences (when you lack preferences between items, and still lack preferences if one item is mildly improved). I discuss the significance of this problem for decision theory in 'Take the Sugar', above.

'The Ethics of Morphing'
Philosophical Studies 145, no. 1, July 2009

This is a more general paper about inter-personal aggregation -- trading off costs and benefits when the people who suffer the costs are not the same as the people who reap the benefits. Loosely the idea is that, because the space of all metaphysically possible states of affairs is exceedingly rich in detail, and because identity across possible states of affairs is a slippery thing, pure benevolence (wanting things to be better for particular people) commits us to aggregating inter-personally.

'A Puzzle About Other-Directed Time Bias'
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86, no. 2, June 2008

I want my pains to be behind me and my pleasures ahead of me. Should I want the same for other people? Yes, in spite of prevalent intuitions to the contrary.

'Rationality and the Distant Needy'
Philosophy & Public Affairs 35, no. 2, Spring 2007

This is my argument for the claim that morality and rationality, together, are very demanding indeed. It is much harder than you think to be morally decent and rational.

'Voices From Another World: Must We Respect the Interests of People Who Do Not, and Will Never, Exist?'
Ethics 117, no. 3, April 2007

This is about the rights and wrongs of bringing people into existence. In a nutshell: sometimes what matters is not what would have happened to you, but what would have happened to the person who would have been in your position, even if that person never actually exists.