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CIS FORUMS ON ATTACKS PROVIDE INFORMATION AND PROVOKE DEBATE

“The post-Cold War world ended yesterday,” announced Prof. Barry Posen to a standing-room-only crowd. On Sept. 12, Posen, with other CIS experts on security policy, alliance politics, human rights, and nuclear proliferation, addressed the most immediate questions provoked by the September 11 terrorist attacks, “Who? Why? And what now?” at a forum swiftly convened by CIS Director Richard J. Samuels.

Samuels organized the panel with the assistance of CIS Public Programs Director Amy Tarr, to help the MIT community begin to understand and cope with the new and frightening world created by the Sept. 11 attacks.

MIT Chancellor Phillip Clay and Dean Philip Khoury thought the CIS forums of September 12 and 17 were so helpful to the community (as many as 300 people attended each gathering) that they asked Samuels, Tarr, and MIT Professors Isabelle de Courtivron, Rosalind Williams, Olivier Blanchard, and Henry Jenkins to organize a campus-wide series of ‘teach-ins’ on the crisis. The panel discussions, which were open to the public, drew hundreds of people from across MIT and from the greater Boston community, including employees of Cambridge-based Akamai Technologies, which lost a company founder (and MIT graduate), Daniel Lewin, on one of the hijacked planes. Each event was broadcast on the web via MIT World, and most received wider press coverage.

The debate on framing the debate

Experts at the CIS forums agreed that the Sept. 11 attack marked the beginning of a new and uncertain era, but disagreed on the appropriate interpretation of the event and U.S. policy response.

One group of scholars and students insisted...
that formulating any response to the attack dominated a global view. According to Political Science Prof. Joshua Cohen, “This is the first conflict in the age of globalization, requiring truly international means in response.”

Cohen objected to the “nationalist framework” of the U.S. policy debate. “The worst thing that can be said about the events is not that they occurred on American soil, it is that it involved the slaughter of innocent people,” he said. “We ought never to respond in a way that involves the slaughter—the intentional killing—of innocent people.”

Human rights scholar Balakrishnan Rajagopal, a professor in the Department of Urban Studies and Planning, agreed. He argued that the crisis called for a “societal response, a moral response, and an international religious response” rather than immediate military action. Many participants at the Sept. 24 teach-in, which looked at the crisis from the international student’s perspective, were also alarmed by the sudden wide display of American flags and the rhetoric of war. At the Sept. 20 event, which examined the role of the media in the crisis, MIT writer-in-residence Stephen Alter said he believed that media images of Afghanistan were misleading. In the popular media, Afghanistan is “a no-man’s land, decimated by drought and famine. This makes military attacks seem necessary. Remember, there are farms and schools and teachers and children living there,” he said.

International relations scholars on the panels were more likely to perceive the events as attacks on the United States, and more likely to argue for an armed response. Prof. Harvey Sapolsky, director of the Security Studies Program at CIS, said that the attacks on the United States may have resulted from “an overactive foreign policy” that has produced “numerous enemies.” Nonetheless, Sapolsky argued that “September 11 was an attack against America, and it needs a destructive response.”

Prof. Stephen Van Evera characterized bin Laden’s Al Qaeda organization as “not appeasable. Therefore, we must defeat it.” Barry Posen, also a professor of political science and security studies, said the attacks were evidence of a “colossal failure of deterrence. It’s quite essential that a message be sent. You can’t get away with doing this to the U.S.”

But even those scholars who argued that the Sept. 11 attack is properly viewed from a national perspective said they believed that any successful U.S. policy response will depend on securing allies, particularly in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Posen warned that a war against terrorism is unwinnable without help. “We can no longer afford to act unilaterally whenever we please and must instead harness a coalition. Diplomacy, intelligence, and law-enforcement will be key, along with a selective use of military power,” he said. Sapolsky advocated large-scale humanitarian operations in the Arab world. Van Evera emphasized that U.S. policy makers must consider the perceptions of foreign actors. “Our response must be legitimate in the eyes of the society from which the terror came. If you disregard values they hold dear, you will fail. This will require a major media campaign to the Muslim world,” Van Evera said.

Political Science Prof. Nazli Choucri cautioned that it may be easier to talk about multilateralism than it is to conduct a foreign policy based on it. Moderate Arab regimes may be actual or potential U.S. allies, she said, but none is a liberal democracy and all face significant domestic opposition. Leaders in these states might not be able to both provide for U.S. demands and at the same time manage their domestic problems.

Continued threats
CIS experts on weapons technology and terrorism painted a grim picture of United States susceptibility to future terrorist attacks. If the Sept. 11 strike had been with a nuclear weapon rather than passenger planes, argued CIS senior research associate Allison Macfarlane, the dead would have numbered in the hundreds of thousands. Nuclear weapons may not be far out of terrorists’ reach, Macfarlane said. Much of the weapons-grade plutonium and highly-enriched uranium in the former Soviet Union is now stored at poorly-guarded sites, and is vulnerable to theft and smuggling. In addition, recent cutbacks in U.S. programs to employ Soviet-trained weapons scientists may have given terrorists more access to the brain power needed to construct these weapons.

Greg Koblentz, a graduate student whose research focuses on terrorism, also worries about weapons of mass destruction. “We have to assume that groups interested in mass casualties will try to adopt these technologies,” he asserted. “Unfortunately, technical barriers to terrorism are rather low, and are receding” Koblentz called for federalizing security at airports, increasing patrols at U.S. borders, new vigor in intelligence-gathering, and increasing patrols at U.S. borders, new vigor in intelligence-gathering, and “hardening” soft targets, like stadiums and shopping malls, with “guns, gates, and guards.”

At the teach-in on technology and terrorism, however, Hugh Gusterson, professor in MIT’s Science, Technology, and Society program, warned that technological answers are short-term solutions. “Increasing security technically does not address the root problems, which are political, not technical,” he cautioned.
A free press does not appear, like Aphrodite on the waves, in the wake of regime change.

they now knock on the back door of the news room. Over the last two decades, scholars have devoted a tremendous amount of attention to the spread and deepening of democracy around the world. Despite this burgeoning literature on democratization, however, there has been little systematic research on the emergence of independent media. How does a free press, presumably one of the most vital ingredients in modern democratic governance, develop? What role does it play in promoting democratic transition? While theorists of democratization have lavished attention on constitutional design, electoral systems and political parties, social movements, interest groups, civilian control of the military, and related topics, they have left such questions about the media not simply unanswered but virtually unaddressed.

This omission is puzzling, given the crucial role that the mass media play in modern democracy. Without a relatively diverse and independent press, it is difficult to see how citizens can acquire sufficient information to make meaningful political choices or hold government representatives accountable for their actions. If the information on which citizens base their political attitudes is censored or distorted, proper evaluation of official decisions becomes difficult, and mass opinion itself appears increasingly manufactured.

Locomotive or Caboose?

How, exactly, does a free press arise? How does it escape from, evade, or resist official control? And what effect does its success in doing so have on political transition? Although little explicit research has been done on these questions, there is a default hypothesis that answers them both: the emergence of a free press is simply a product of broader opening in the political system. Political reforms reduce censorship, and full-fledged democratization ultimately guarantees media freedom. From this perspective, the media exert little real influence over the course of regime change; any role they do play is essentially epiphenomenal. Media opening – the process by which mass media become more representative of societal viewpoints and more independent of official control – is thus merely a by-product of democratization.

There is an important element of truth to this argument: political liberalization does promote media opening. By itself, however, political liberalization does not guarantee independence or diversity in the media. Or, to put the matter more bluntly, a free press does not appear, like Aphrodite on the waves, in the wake of regime change. Many new democracies emerged from political transition with media that were beholden to politicized state ownership (Hungary and the Czech Republic), corruption (Korea), private concentration in the hands of like-minded entrepreneurs (Brazil and Russia), and other unsavory inheritances. Official tolerance and political reform are at best necessary conditions for media freedom, not sufficient ones.

Models of changes in press coverage proposed on political reform misstate the relationship between media opening and political transition. They portray the press as a sort of free rider on democratization – as one Mexican journalist put it, not a locomotive of change but a caboose of the state. Rather than promoting regime change, this interpretation would suggest, the media are simply dragged along by larger political developments over which they have little influence. This interpretation, of course, does not accord with the salient role that mass media have played in democratization in countries from the fall of Ferdinand Marcos in Philippines to the campaign for direct elections in Brazil to the failed Soviet coup attempt of August 1991.

I argue that both pieces of the traditional argument are wrong. First, political liberalization is not the sole or even the most important driver of change in the media. Journalistic norms and commercial competition between media outlets also play powerful roles in shaping the behavior of the press. In Mexico, for instance, journalists’ views about their role in society were a decisive factor in the
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Market competition plays a powerful role in encouraging the press to experiment with more independent coverage.

Fourth Estate had gone well beyond what the government deemed acceptable. At that point, however, many independent publications were sufficiently well established to fend off official assaults. Market competition plays a powerful role in encouraging the press to experiment with more independent coverage. Even in an authoritarian system, private media may face powerful incentives to meet audience demands. In Mexico, for instance, television was long dominated by a single private network (Televisa) that consistently supported the ruling party and limited opposition access to the airwaves. In its capacity as ruling party cheerleader, Televisa helped sell PRI to an increasingly dubious mass public. Following the privatization of government ownership, media competition helped to delegitimize PRI’s authoritarian regime in the eyes of the mass public.

Another typical consequence of media opening is increased scrutiny of government actions and decisions. In Mexico, for instance, more aggressive coverage of previously “closed” topics by elements of the print media produced a series of revelations that reverberated throughout the Mexican political system. Even broadcast media, locked in competition for market share, began to cover potentially shocking political events. The ensuing scandals helped to delegitimize Mexico’s authoritarian regime in the eyes of the mass public.

Yet another common consequence of media opening is greater coverage of opposition parties during election campaigns. In Mexico, coverage of campaigns became substantially more equitable during the 1990s, contributing to opposition victory in the watershed legislative elections of 1997. The repercussions of increased media coverage continue to be felt in the presidential elections of 2000, in which opposition candidate Vicente Fox finally defeated the PRI.

Media opening and democratization are thus best conceived as interacting and reinforcing processes. Political liberalization leads to a relaxation in censorship, constrains the arbitrary use of power against independent media outlets, and encourages reform in the legal structure governing the press. At the same time, independent coverage promotes civic mobilization, increases public scrutiny of official actions and decisions, and levels the electoral playing field. Although political liberalization undoubtedly promotes media opening, changes in the media also propel political reform. Because the causes of these changes in the media often lie outside the political system itself—in the competition between rival media outlets and in the norms of journalists themselves—media opening is not simply a function of political reform.

These findings have a number of implications for new democracies and for countries in transition from authoritarian rule. First, to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which ended the Pacific War, MIT’s Center for International Studies helped organize an innovation series of panel discussions spread across both Japan and the United States. Two central panel groups were assembled in San Francisco and Tokyo, linked by satellite to one another and to a series of discussion groups and local panels held at twenty-four universities in the United States and Mexico.

The discussion theme was “The Geopolitics of Security in East Asia.” The San Francisco panel, moderated by CIS Director Professor Richard Samuels, focused largely on strategic and military issues, while the Tokyo panel, moderated by Tokyo University Professor Motodai Ito, primarily explored economic and trade issues. Despite this theoretical division of labor among military and economic lines, however, some of the best interaction came in exchanges between panels, as specialists in one area were able to bring new perspectives to policy issues in the other area.

One of the most interesting findings to emerge from the discussions was that unlike the 1970s and 1980s—when strategic issues (i.e., fear of Soviet aggression) bound the allies together—economic ones threatened to tear them apart. Today, economic interests have converged to a considerable degree, even as political and strategic issues are sparking greater debate. Nonetheless, the alliance remains a major source of stability in the region.

One of the main points of divergence was the scope of U.S. and Japanese interests in financial issues. Taro Kono, a member of the Liberal Democratic Party Diet from the Liberal Democratic Party, said that Japan could not subscribe to any attempt to contain its neighbor. Finally, psychological and identity issues, especially national means of viewing their common histories, might result in the divergence of other interests between the two allies.

Michael Green, of the U.S. National Security Council, felt that current differences within the alliance were over means rather than ends, but this distinction appeared less than satisfying, at least on security issues, to several other panelists. Taro Kono, a member of the Diet from the Liberal Democratic Party, said that while the American side was seeking to move the relationship from one of ‘burden sharing’ to one of ‘power sharing,’ many in obvious interests in the world. Rather, interests are always being “defined and redefined by the democratic process.” He nonetheless listed four areas where significant differences in U.S. and Japanese interests might exist— all of which were echoed throughout the evening by other panelists, especially those in Japan.

First, Tanaka mentioned issues, such as global warming, where many Japanese felt that America might not be taking world opinion into account. Second, Japan and the U.S. may have different approaches on regional issues. While the United States appeared to be losing interest in strengthening regional unity through APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), several other states, including Japan, China, and South Korea, were finding new energy in an ASEAN+3 forum (Association of South East Asian Nations plus Japan, China, and South Korea) that approached regional issues from a different perspective. A third point of potential difference was the approach to individual Asian countries, by far the most important of which is China. Tanaka suggested some concern over the American attitude towards China, and stated that Japan could not subscribe to any attempt to contain its neighbor. Finally, psychological and identity issues, especially national means of viewing their common histories, might result in the divergence of other interests between the two allies.

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Tokyo were already seeking to go beyond ‘power sharing’ to ‘goal sharing’ U.S. lack of support, or active opposition to, international efforts – including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Kyoto accord on global warming, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the biological and chemical weapons convention, and moves to ban landmines – raises the issue of whether the two sides share the same goals at all.

Steven Vogel, a professor at the University of California, echoed Kono’s argument about Japan’s dissatisfaction with its perceived subordinate position in terms of agenda setting. Specifically, Vogel said that although elites in Japan want to see a more independent foreign policy and although American policy makers welcome that in general terms, American officials are far more reluctant when Japan actually voices its dissent. Vogel, like several other panelists, suggested that while the issue of U.S. bases and force restructuring might prove somewhat divisive, the most troublesome issues to the American-Japanese alliance related to China policy. He felt that Japan believes strongly in engagement with China, while the American approach is significantly more complex and sometimes adversarial in tone.

While questions of global vision, regional politics, and China policy were regarded as potentially divisive issues on the security front, however, the panelists tended to see considerably less room for trouble on the economic front. As Michael Green observed, the name of the new negotiating framework between the two countries, the “economic partnership for growth,” has moved economic discussions towards a win-win approach. Under the current framework, subcommittees have been established and real progress made on issues related to foreign investment and deregulation. Charles Lake II, currently the general counsel and deputy president of APLAC Japan, the insurance firm, indicated that the tone on these issues has changed so dramatically over the last several years that the U.S. American Chamber of Commerce in Tokyo had changed the name of its annual white paper from the ‘trade white paper’ to the ‘business white paper.’ Currently, the American business community can take its problems directly to Japanese officials with a reasonable expectation of having them adequately addressed – before they become ‘trade’ issues.

Finally, one of the most powerful themes running through the entire discussion of both security and economic issues was the need for greater public voice and administrative accountability. Akitaka Tanaka observed that national interests are defined through the democratic process. Taro Kono agreed, warning that the alliance, which has hitherto been an alliance between governments, cannot stand unless it moves to include the two peoples. In particular, he suggested that the Japanese public has been excluded by the governing system from effective participation in foreign policy and, public policy formation more generally. And Richard Samuels reminded us that elites are far more likely to accept the relationship than is the general public, a circumstance that, if uncorrected, could have dire consequences. All agreed that since political reform is likely to result in more responsive government, policy specialists must engage the public more actively in a discussion about important security issues, not least of which is the future of the US-Japan security alliance.

For nearly a decade, analyses of U.S. foreign policy have been routinely framed by a single question: How should U.S. foreign policy change after the cold war? While some analysts from both the left and the right answer by calling for an American return to a more isolationist posture, policymakers have thus far escaped the lure of this Siren’s song. Instead, in Europe another answer has begun to take shape — NATO has expanded and changed its mission. In East Asia, however, the inertia of America’s cold war era bilateral alliances continues to constrain creative strategic thinking.

The key issue is how to respond to a rapidly rising China. The key issue that Japan will face over the next several decades is how to respond to a rapidly rising China. Sino-Japanese relations are important because they are at the foundation of U.S. policy toward East Asia. American decisionmakers will decide how to remain involved in the region — and indeed whether or not to remain involved at all — on the basis of their expectations regarding Sino-Japanese relations. Unfortunately, these expectations are often based on misguided analysis. Many analysts predict conflict between the two great powers in the region, whether or not the United States remains involved in the region. I am not so pessimistic. There are reasons for optimism, even if expansionist aims and a willingness to use force characterize Chinese foreign policy in the future (and this is by no means assured). Japan does not need to feel unduly threatened by China, and its own balancing efforts will not likely lead to a spiral of rivalry and security competition with China.

Defining Assertive versus Circumscribed Balancing

Some balancing policies seem, by their nature, more assertive, active, or aggressive, while others seem far more circumscribed, passive, and restrained. Offensive realists who argue that security is scarce and therefore competition is fierce. In contrast, defensive realists take a relatively optimistic view of international politics, suggesting security is plentiful and states need only make moderate attempts to secure themselves. Two major assumptions distinguish the defensive realist argument. First, defensive realists focus on the role of defense dominance. If defense is dominant, then an increase in an adversary’s defensive assets does not threaten your own security, even if you make no changes. Second, defensive realists believe that states learn from past attempts that the costs of expansion often outweigh its benefits. This socialization-against-aggression effect leads states to avoid aggressive policies and engage in restrained behavior in the pursuit of their own security.

A defensive realist understanding allows for the probability that states will adopt policies to defend themselves without engaging in assertive, active behavior. I call these states ‘circumscribed balancers.’ Circumscribed balancing policies are defined as those that meet the following criteria:

1. The propensity to avoid strong, countervailing alliances and to avoid in particular durable, formal, and tight alliances
2. The narrowness (as opposed to comprehensiveness) with which one state counters its opponent’s growth in other geographic (or functional) areas. Assertive balancers engage, oppose, and react to

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While the American side was seeking to move the relationship from one of ‘burden sharing’ to one of ‘power sharing,’ many in Tokyo were already seeking to go beyond ‘power sharing’ to ‘goal sharing’.

JAPAN’S FOREIGN POLICY FUTURE: IMPLICATIONS FROM INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

CHRISTOPHER P. TWOMEY

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their opponent’s growth in every area and dimension. This was the case in the cold war for both the United States and the Soviet Union. We could also imagine countermeasures aimed not only at responding to military growth, but also technical or economic (mercantile) gains. Circumscribed balancers are less worried about these peripheral areas and issues, but rather concern themselves only with the relevant bilateral military balance, narrowly defined.

3. The avoidance of offensive strategies and capabilities in favor of defensive strategies. When states choose to use the current technology for relatively nonoffensive capabilities and strategies, I refer to them as more circumscribed balancers.

What Does This Mean for the System?
The distinction between assertive and circumscribed balancing would be merely of descriptive interest (if even that) were it to have no real world implications. Circumscribed balancing, however, does not lead to many of the benefits that a balance of power system is reputed to supply. Once the possibility for states to respond to the growing threat of circumscribed balancing is considered, the system as a whole looks much more stable: while peace will still be ensured by the great powers, some of them may have no incentive to counter aggressive moves against others. In systems or regions with at least one great power engaging in circumscribed balancing, the periphery will simply become much more secure.

Although defensive realism and circumscribed balancing would be merely of descriptive interest (if even that) were it to have no real world implications. Circumscribed balancing, however, does not lead to many of the benefits that a balance of power system is reputed to supply. Once the possibility for states to respond to the growing threat of circumscribed balancing is considered, the system as a whole looks much more stable: while peace will still be ensured by the great powers, some of them may have no incentive to counter aggressive moves against others. In systems or regions with at least one great power engaging in circumscribed balancing, the periphery will simply become much more secure. However, there are a variety of military factors that will make it difficult for China to threaten Japan anytime in the near future — with or without the U.S. Japan Alliance. First, although the Chinese military is quite large, it is technologically backward and is unlikely to be a match for Japan for some time. The Center for Naval Analyses argues that 2020 is the earliest China could develop a regional navy and this would be one that pales in comparison to the Japanese’s of today.

Second, there is a big difference between continental and maritime power. China maintains a very large, albeit relatively unmechanized, army including over two million soldiers. This huge war-making capability, however, is only relevant if Chinese ground forces face Japanese ground forces. It is difficult to imagine such an instance. Amphibious conflict heavily favors the defender; if ever there is an unambiguously defense dominant situation, that is it. China has trouble mounting combined maneuvers on a divisional scale and only has enough amphibious warfare ships to support an overseas invasion of a division or two. Moreover, Japan is dominant in the sea, where her interests are greatest, while China has traditionally been a continental power.

Although nuclear weapons are the most potent military asset in the Chinese arsenal, there are reasons for the Japanese to avoid undue consternation over them. The delivery technologies of the Chinese weapons are relatively inaccurate. This would decrease their utility against point naval targets (that is, a Japanese escort fleet), although not against cities. China will retain the option of destroying Japanese urban areas — and thereby, the power for nuclear blackmail. This sort of nuclear blackmail could certainly be used to deter Japanese involvement in crises in areas such as Taiwan or the South China Sea. If it acts as a circumscribed balancer, however, Japan is unlikely to counter Chinese moves in these areas anyhow.

The other outstanding issue between these two Asian giants concerns the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. This small group of islands — claimed by both nations, but occupied by Japan — has recently been an issue of nationalist attention in both countries (and even more prominently in Taiwan and Hong Kong). Some also believe that the islands sit over potentially rich oil fields. Although this dispute may be a nationalist tinderbox in both Japan and China, Japan nevertheless has little to fear here. It has several options that it can use for dealing with this territorial dispute other than war. Equitable solutions that allow both sides to reap the benefits of any possible oil reserves can be arranged. Indeed in the event China controlled the islands, Beijing would likely turn to a foreign firm to assist in developing any oil fields. There is no reason that this firm could not be Japanese.

Both these issues — Chinese nuclear weapons and the uncertain status of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands — are serious and potentially very problematic. There are no guarantees against miscalculation. Nonetheless there are grounds for optimism in each case based on reasonably strong disincentives for conflict. In every other area, Japan is quite simply very secure. China lacks the capability to threaten core Japanese interests today, and this will continue for the next several decades.

If any country has had grounds to learn that aggression does not pay, it is Japan.

The Socialization Effect — A Legacy of the Second World War

If any country has had grounds to learn that aggression does not pay, it is Japan. Because of its 1930s and 1940s foreign policy, Japan was bombed with atomic weapons and occupied. Its constitution was rewritten. It has had few troops stationed on its territory for fifty years. The legacy of the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki has been profound and sustained. School children are still taken to the Hiroshima war museum in dresses, and awareness of the gruesome brutality of that particular attack is commonplace in wide segments of Japanese society. Japan is a more likely candidate for socialization by the international system than any other country. This socialization against aggression shows itself repeatedly in modern Japan. First, the government goes to great lengths to characterize its own forces in defensive terms, as mentioned above. It is common for scholars studying defense issues in East Asia to face genuinely naive statements from otherwise sophisticated Japanese students: “Japan has no military. We have a peace constitution.” One of the more divisive debates in recent memory in...
Japan was over the question of whether Japanese Self-Defense troops should be allowed to participate in peacekeeping missions. That this militarily minor issue was so divisive suggests the depths to which this socialization against a foreign role for their military has permeated Japanese society.

The whitewashing of certain aspects of the Second World War history in Japanese textbooks may decrease this socialization, but the logic of this effect is not entirely clear. When Japanese texts downplay the degree of Japanese expansionism and culpability, many Japanese may well take away the lesson that even relatively moderately assertive foreign policies will lead to a backlash from the international system, thus amplifying the socialization effect.

Furthermore, a number of institutions of Japanese government also bear witness to this socialization. The Defense Agency lacks ministerial status and thus is easily overpowered bureaucratically by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Finance. Article Nine in the Japanese Constitution continues to restrain at least the pace of any change in its military status. It is no accident that these institutional constraints were a result of U.S. occupation: systemic pressure of the clearest kind.

Finally, this lesson is continually reinforced by several of Japan’s neighbors in northern East Asia (China and Korea) who continually complain about the atrocities of Japanese soldiers and about the evil of their war. This is certainly heard by Japanese policymakers. I am not arguing that Japan will remain socialized against military action in all circumstances. Japan is a nation with potent military capabilities, which they would not doubt use if directly attacked. However, Japan has indeed been socialized against an asserted foreign policy.

**Whither the U.S.-Japan Alliance?**

An important piece of evidence that Japanese foreign policy should be characterized as circumscribed balancing comes from examination of the current U.S.-Japan alliance. Looking at this relationship provides at least some indirect evidence regarding how the Japanese might respond to a Chinese threat.

The April 1996 summit between President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto was the beginning of an effort to inject new meaning into the alliance after the cold war. The major change in the final 1997 version of the Guidelines is a section outlining cooperation in situations in areas surrounding Japan that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security. The scope and detail of this section suggest an important deepening of the alliance when compared to the 1978 Guidelines. There are, however, also plenty of reasons for skepticism.

A pledge to play an active role in enforcing economic sanctions in the form of naval embargoes (or at least to consider doing so depending on situational factors) might perhaps appear substantial. Its value, however, is unclear since Japanese officials have ruled out the use of live ammunition for the Japanese navy in enforcing UN sanctions. Another item for possible U.S.-Japanese operational cooperation listed in the Guidelines is “minesweeping operations in Japanese territory and in high seas around Japan.” Japanese have imagined Japanese minesweepers accompanying U.S. vessels in the waters to the east of Taiwan. Japanese officials, however, have made it clear that they have nothing like this in mind. According to the Defense Agency, “the Self Defense Forces will not conduct mine-sweeping operations for the advancement of U.S. vessels.” According to leaks from the ruling coalition, the restrictions will go even further “Minesweeping will only be carried out for mines clearly perceived to have been abandoned under international law.” Finally, regarding its promise of rear area support, this kind of alliance support is hardly a major step away from Japan’s current role, or from that it actually played during both the Korean and Vietnam Wars.

**CATEGORIZING THE IMPLICATIONS OF DEFENSIVE REALISM ON BALANCING POLICIES**

1. These two assumptions of defensive realism...2. If we have these policy implications...

More generally, we might compare the U.S.-Japan alliance to other alliances that the United States has globally. Clearly it pales in comparison with the strength of NATO, which provides a unified command structure, has recently successfully concluded its first out-of-area operation, and continues to grow. Even the U.S.-alliance with South Korea has a unified military command. These two are strong robust alliances capable of deterring threats, and failing that — jointly defeating the aggressor on the battlefield.

Since the cold war ended, Japan has not taken substantial steps to revamp its alliance with the United States, or make it a vehicle to contain China. At best, Japan has offered to consider assisting the United States with logistics in areas far removed from the front line. Despite limited rhetorical flourishes, Japanese has neither significantly strengthened the alliance to allow it to face potential Chinese expansion throughout the region nor has it allowed it to wither completely. This, again, is precisely what we would expect from a circumscribed balancer.

Implications for the United States

That there is a substantial chance for a peaceful accommodation between the two Asian giants — even in the absence of an American stabilizing presence in Japan — should be a great relief to U.S. policymakers. Japan, however, will also avoid pursuit of any broader policies in the region that support other American interests there. In addition to the fact that the United States trades more with East Asia than with Europe (or indeed any other region of the world), there are a number of other specific security interests at stake in the region. Debates over the exact nature of these absurd, but most analysts would at least be willing to accept some subset of the following: securing sea-lanes of communication; maintaining an American leadership role in regional and global international institutions; promoting peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula on Seoul’s terms, encouraging peace.
For the United States to achieve these regional objectives, it will need to remain involved in the region. A strengthened and more equitable U.S. - Japan alliance is the best means to do this.

and ensuring the independence of Indochina and Southeast Asia. All of these American preferences diverge from those of Japan, or more precisely from those that a Japan unaligned with the United States and engaged in a circumscribed balancing policy would be willing to defend. Japan is less likely than the United States to get between China and Taiwan. Similarly, while such a Japan has an interest in peaceful commerce in the South China Sea, it is unlikely to defend that position very strongly. More likely, it would choose instead to pay a premium to renege its commerce, if this option were possible. Also, although Japan is unlikely to want to see any strengthening of the North Korean regime, it is less likely to promote unification of the peninsula.

For the United States to achieve these regional objectives, it will need to remain involved in the region. A strengthened and more equitable U.S. - Japan alliance is the best means to do this. The alliance is particularly attractive because it already exists, making both nations (as well as their neighbors throughout the region) comfortable with it, and because Japanese bases sit near the three great regional powers. American interests, however, are not exclusively served by a close alliance with Japan. Although the alliance provides the United States with a (subsidized) foot in the regional door, like any alliance, this one is not without its own political, economic, and technological costs. Pursuing alternate alliances or increasing those that a Japan unaligned with the United States with a (subsidized) foot in the regional door, like any alliance, this one is not without its own political, economic, and technological costs. Pursuing alternate alliances or increasing the size of our military can also ensure that American interests in the region are achieved. Relying on a circumscribed balancing Japan to maintain regional stability on its own will not. 

Some people clearly feel that market systems suffer from lots of failures. But other scholars — particularly those writing about post-socialist economies — conflate market systems with commercially successful systems, just as Chinese bureaucrats and business leaders do. A good example is a banking crisis. In the United States, the S&L scandal was viewed as a market failure: a combination of some agency problems and some policy problems produced an incentive structure that led to the crisis. In China, when we see a banking crisis, many assume a priori that markets haven’t been pushed far enough, that the problem is too much government, and that the solution is more market.

We should at least consider that problems in the West and in China are more similar than different. We shouldn’t assume economic problems in developing economies are due to non-operation of markets — often they are due specifically to the operation of markets. When problems come up — whether in financial markets, or in enterprise reform, the emphasis is often on market liberalization without sufficient emphasis on market failures. Both in the literature and in policy debates in China, that false dichotomy leads to policy mistakes.

Put simply, many in China equate a market system with a commercially successful system. In reality, not all markets produce commercially successful systems. 

Edward S. Steinfeld, a China specialist and an assistant professor of political science, is currently researching financial reform in China, with a focus on the relationship between ideas about market and economic outcomes in reforming systems. Précis sat down with him in September.

précis: You have argued that the debate on economic planning vs. markets in China is now over. The debate now centers on the type of market that China will adopt. E.S. Nobody seriously talks about retreating form market economics in China. Debates between conservatives and liberals are not over whether or not to have a market, but about the appropriate levels of government intervention, the appropriate size of the state sector, and the appropriate pace of change.

What concerns me — on all sides of the debate — is that there are assumptions about what markets can do to build China, and these assumptions are sometimes completely out of line with reality. There are expectations that markets can achieve growth without pain, and problems when those expectations aren’t met.

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précis: So there seems to be a disconnect between the belief that a market economy will arise and the understanding of how that market will work. Do you find that business managers and party officials have different understandings of market economics?

E.S. Frankly, in the West, even in academic writings, there are also implicit differences. The same people will apply notions about economics to emerging markets like China that are very different than those that would be applied in the United States.
I have mixed feelings about this, and my work shows both sides. On one hand, the same mistakes do seem to be made over and over again.

But, to some extent, there is increasing awareness in China of the costs of those mistakes. Notions of markets are twisted, but largely because of the Asian financial crisis. There is more recognition of the problems that need to be addressed. And that’s a change for the Chinese. But again, in a gradual, progressive direction towards change.

The view of WTO as a catalyst for major change is also too optimistic, because it overestimates the liberalizing effects of the WTO. The American government and much of the world rightly advocate WTO as a mechanism for liberalization and against protectionism. But a good argument can also be made that American support for WTO is motivated by protectionism: America has largely tried to use WTO negotiations to institutionalize various modes of protection in certain sectors.

precise: While many state-sector firms in China continue to struggle and require subsidies, the private sector is booming. Has China’s official recognition of the private sector changed the political balance of power?

E.S. It’s still a bit early to say. Policy makers in China now recognize that the private sector is by far the most dynamic sector of the economy, by far has the largest employment growth. Partly because of that, policy makers have

quite a proliferation of ideas. Dissent from the Communist Party is not tolerated, but the acknowledgement of the stakes in the economic debate is widespread, and there are rich debates about which measures the government and the Party should take.

That said, there are many people who view themselves as extremely liberal, and forward thinking, who assume that as long as you expose a system to markets, growth will occur and favored sectors will thrive. Just as scholars equate markets with commercial success, many government officials and managers in China assume that marketization will revive core enterprises. It will revive firms. When the market begins to work, and selects against badly performing firms and banks, governments jumps in and works out those firms. Rather than conclude that markets were in fact working, the government assumes they’ve got the wrong blend of market policy. They jump in with a new set of market remedies.

The WTO, to some extent, is the latest example of this trend. The Chinese believe that the WTO will be used to revive core enterprises. It’s a progressive policy, but China’s expectation of how WTO will impact on the economy may be quite different than others’ expectations. Now that China has committed internationally to this rather extreme form of market opening, what will China’s response be if the market begins to select against its core enterprises?

precise: You report that many in China recognize past policies, like repeatedly bailing out failing companies, as mistakes. But in spite of this understanding, policy makers continue to repeat the same mistakes. Will the country’s entry into the WTO force China out of this rut?

E.S. I have mixed feelings about this, and my work shows both sides. On one hand, the same mistakes do seem to be made over and over again.

But, to some extent, there is increasing awareness in China of the costs of those mistakes. Notions of markets are twisted, but largely because of the Asian financial crisis. There is more recognition of the problems that need to be addressed. And that’s a change for the Chinese. But again, in a gradual, progressive direction towards change.

The idea prevalent in the West that the WTO is the next shock that is going to expose China to competition from the West is both too pessimistic and too optimistic at the same time. It’s too pessimistic, because it underestimates the changes that have already happened at very high levels in China. I think China is dramatically different from what it was like ten years ago, or even five years ago.

The view of WTO as a catalyst for major change is also too optimistic, because it overestimates the liberalizing effects of the WTO. The American government and much of the world rightly advocate WTO as a mechanism for liberalization and against protectionism. But a good argument can also be made that American support for WTO is motivated by protectionism: America has largely tried to use WTO negotiations to institutionalize various modes of protection in certain sectors.

Within the last decade, Armenian lobby groups in the United States have achieved considerable success in gaining political and material support from Washington. Annual aid for the state of Armenia totals around $100 million, Section 907 of the Freedom of Support Act blocks aid to Armenia’s rival Azerbaijan, negotiations on an arms deal with Turkey are stalled, and support is gaining for an official US governmental recognition of the Armenian genocide of 1915-1923.

This success of the Armenian lobby is surprising, given Armenia’s limited expatriate community in the US, lack of strategic importance, and blemished record on human rights. Armenian-Americans number only around 1 million. Although concentrated in a few states (Massachusetts and California), their voting impact is moderate relative to other ethnic groups, such as Mexican-Americans or African-Americans. Furthermore, US national interests towards the Caucasus do not suggest that Armenia is the most important state to target in that region. Azerbaijan, the country with which Armenia has a land and border dispute, holds oil and natural gas reserves. Turkey — a historic and contemporary foe of Armenia — is a regionally important NATO member and ally to the US. Lastly, Armenia has received considerable US aid despite waves of undemocratic practices, such as banning political parties, media censorship, and the occupation of 10% of Azerbaijan. It is therefore hard to argue that Washington supports Armenia as a reward for its democratic and human rights practices. What, then, explains the degree of Washington’s interest in Armenia and Armenian issues?

The amount of aid and support for Armenia and Armenian issues is best explained by the intense lobbying efforts of Armenian-Americans in the United States. The lobbying success of this small ethnic minority is largely the result of an intense inter-community rivalry between two factions within the Armenian-American community, represented by two ethnic lobby groups: the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) and the Armenian Assembly of America (the Assembly).

Competition between these two lobby groups has led to hyper-mobilization of this ethnic group’s resources: their different approaches to lobbying have mobilized more Armenians and allies than one organization alone; and two lobby groups have doubled outreach projects and resources on Armenian issues, magnifying the Armenian presence in the US. Competition has benefited the Armenian-Americans because, although the community is divided, both lobby groups largely agree on policy objectives. In other words, they compete over means, but both groups agree over U.S. policy ends.

The Schism within the Armenian-American Community

The Armenian-American diaspora suffers continued on next page...
from a schism that has torn through virtually every aspect of the community’s life. This schism has led to the construction of parallel organizations — churches, schools, newspapers, charities, social clubs and lobby groups. The schism has occurred between those who supported political movements voicing for revolution in the homeland and those who believed reform within Ottoman and Russian political systems was the better option for Armenians. The political and ideological split heightened with the founding of the Republic of Armenia in 1918 and its fall to the Soviets in 1920. These developments created two camps within the Armenian-American community. The first camp consisted of the Dashnaktsutiun Armenian Revolutionary Front (ARF), which formed the government of the Republic and was exiled with Soviet takeover. They espoused a staunch anti-Soviet, anticommunist rhetoric. The second camp consisted of those opposed to ARF ideology and politics. They aligned against the ARF to support the Soviet takeover of the Republic, arguing that the Soviet Union would provide protection against Turkish aggression. The schism within the Armenian community culminated with the 1933 assassination of the Soviet-sympathizing Archbishop of the Armenian Apostolic (Orthodox) Church in New York. The assassination was believed to be an ARF plot. The Cold War further impacted tensions within the Armenian-American community. The ARF’s anti-Communist stance was in line with America’s Cold War ideology and foreign policy. For the opposing political parties, however, their support of a Soviet- governed Armenia became increasingly difficult to defend in light of geo-strategic circumstances. In the United States, this led to the domination of ARF-political lobbying, beginning with the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia (ACIA) in 1918, which later became the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA). In 1972, several influential Armenian-Americans opposed to ARF ideology and goals formed a second lobby group, the Armenian Assembly of America.

ANCA and the Assembly are very different organizations, which, in turn, have produced different resources and lobbying efforts. First, the two organizations have different ultimate goals for Armenia. ANCA strives for “a unified, free, and independent Armenia,” taken from the ARF’s 1918 slogan from the Republic of Armenia. The Assembly, on the other hand, uses language that is more akin to US foreign policy ideals: participatory democracy and a market economy. Second, the two organizations differ in structure. ANCA stresses its essence as a grassroots movement, while the Assembly focused early efforts on elite-level fundraising that have been augmented by recent efforts at grassroots mobilization. Third, the two organizations also have formed different alliances. ANCA works with Greek, Kurdish, and Greek-Cypriot lobby groups in addition to labor unions. The Assembly boasts a strong tie with the United Nations and works closely with the US Holocaust Memorial Museum to raise awareness of genocide.

The lobby groups have produced their own outreach projects to their Armenian constituencies and the general public. In addition to publishing their own periodicals, each organization maintains a website with information on lobby objectives and progress. Both groups also sponsor research institutes aimed at raising awareness on Armenian issues. The Zoryan Institute, created in 1982, promotes awareness on the Genocide; the Armenian Diaspora, and contemporary issues in Armenia. And the Assembly founded the Armenian Research Institute (ANI) in 1997, which focuses on increasing public awareness of the Armenian Genocide. The two lobby groups are also aligned with different Armenian charities. ANCA works with the Armenian Relief Society and the Assembly with the Armenian General Benevolent Union. The Assembly has worked towards “confidence building measures” between Armenia and Azerbaijan, including economic and environmental projects, with the hopes of establishing a lasting peace between the two states. The Assembly has worked towards “confidence building measures” between Armenia and Azerbaijan, including economic and environmental projects, with the hopes of establishing a lasting peace between the two states. Competition between these two lobby groups has led to hyper-mobilization of this ethnic group’s resources.

ANCA uses a “bottom up” approach towards attaining US recognition of the Armenian Genocide, encouraging states and cities in the US to recognize the genocide and thus put pressure on the federal government to follow suit. Currently 30 states recognize the Genocide. The Assembly pressures for Genocide recognition through the research of ANI (including publications, school curricula on the genocide), and the creation of an Armenian Genocide Museum and Memorial, scheduled to open in Washington, DC in the coming years. Thus far, attempts for national recognition of the Armenian genocide by the US have been thwarted, usually with the claim that recognizing the Genocide will strain relations with Turkey and threaten strategic security interests of the US, particularly regional stability in the Near East. However, ANCA’s international chapters have been more successful. They claim credit for persuading the UN, the EU, France, Italy, Great Britain, Greece, Belgium, Lebanon, Russia, Cyprus, Canada, and Argentina to recognize the Genocide.

The Assembly works towards “confidence building measures” between Armenia and Azerbaijan, including economic and environmental projects, with the hopes of establishing a lasting peace between the two states. Nagorno Karabakh and US Aid In 1988, two events in the homeland sparked political activism of Armenians in the US and worldwide. The first was the wreaking of Armenian demands for unification between the Soviet Republic of Armenia and the Armenian exclave of Nagorno Karabakh, in neighboring Azerbaijan. The second was a devastating earthquake that killed over 25,000 Armenians, injured 19,000 and left more than 500,000 homeless. These two events, followed by Armenia’s independence in 1991, mobilized the Armenian-American diaspora to lobby for aid and political recognition of Nagorno Karabakh’s right to independence. Armenians have successfully lobbied for over $900 million in aid to Armenia and Karabakh per annum, making it one of the top recipients of US aid and earning it the nickname the “Israel of the Caucasus.”

The lobby groups have been less successful in attaining recognition for Nagorno Karabakh. ANCA has succeeded in gaining recognition of Karabakh’s independence in Massachusetts and Rhode Island as part of its “bottom up” strategy. The Assembly has worked towards “confidence building measures” between Armenia and Azerbaijan, including economic and environmental projects, with the hopes of establishing a lasting peace between the two states. Recent negotiations in Key West toward a mediated solution to Nagorno Karabakh were unsuccessful.

Section 907 Maintenance of Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act is the strongest evidence of Armenian lobby success. Section 907, passed in 1992, prohibits Azerbaijan from receiving US aid until it ends a fuel and transport embargo to Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh and improves its treatment of Armenians within its borders. Section 907 has remained in place despite rigorous campaigning from opposition lobbies, most notably 14 oil companies, the Turkish Caucus, and pro-Israel lobbies. These groups, which argue that U.S. needs to support and develop Azerbaijan and neighboring Central Asian states to balance against threats from Iran, China, and Islamic fundamentalism, call for abolition of Section 907. Both Armenian
Armenian success suggests that electoral politics are not the most important factor for determining an ethnic group’s influence in Washington.

lobby groups use similar strategies and tactics to ensure 907’s survival: they secure Congressional backing through the bipartisan Congressional Caucus on Armenian issues bolstered by grassroots letter-writing campaigns.

blocking Arms to Turkey and the Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline

There are two policy objectives for which ANCA is more rigorously campaigning than the Assembly: blocking arms deals to Turkey, and withholding US taxpayer funding for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. ANCA, together with Kurdish and Greek lobby groups, have called for the

Withholding taxpayer money to fund the project unless Armenia is included in the deal, offering the country access to fuel and revenue from transportation fees.

Rival organizations + common intermediate objectives = policy success

Armenian lobby efforts have been so successful because ANCA and the Assembly — divided by historical legacies and political strategies — are united by common policy objectives. The rival organizations have employed a wider variety of lobbying efforts and mobilized more resources than a unified group would have.

The success of this small ethnic minority in achieving its policy goals suggests the following about ethnic lobbies in general. First, the size of an ethnic group does not necessarily determine lobbying success. Second, Armenian success suggests that electoral politics are not the most important factor for determining an ethnic group’s influence in Washington. Concentrations of Armenians only impact a few congressional elections. Armenians therefore exert their influence by other means, namely alliance building, and most likely through campaign financing. Third, the Armenian case implies that ethnic lobby groups can sway US foreign policy goals. US interests in the Caucasus and its alliances further call for withholding military aid to Turkey under the Code of Conduct Legislation, which restricts arms sales based on human rights abuses. ANCA and its allies claim success in stalling a $4 million arms deal to Turkey under the Clinton administration.

More recently, in June of 2001, members of the U.S. House of Representatives Armenian Caucus introduced House Resolution 162, which calls for a reassessment of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, which transports oil from the Caspian Sea to a Turkish port, bypassing Armenia. Specifically, the resolution calls for

On 24 April, at a gala dinner at the Ritz Carlton Hotel, the Japan Society of Boston bestowed its 2000 John E. Thayer III award on Patricia Gercik, Managing Director of the MIT Japan Program. Gercik was recognized for her lifetime work of furthering understanding between Japan and the United States. In presenting the award, the President of the Japan Society, Peter Grilli, explained that Gercik “has been an extraordinary bridge between the United States and Japan who exemplifies the objective of the award.” He told her that “the passion you exude for the Japanese culture and your genuine desire to share that with others are inspiring.”

Mr. Gercik, who grew up in Japan, came to the MIT Japan Program in 1984 and was instrumental in making it the country’s largest program of applied Japanese studies. At MIT she teaches students about Japan, supervises their placement in Japanese internships, cultivates relationships with firms and institutions on both sides of the Pacific, helps to raise funding, and manages relationships with the Japanese community in the Boston area. She is also author of On Track with the Japanese (Kodansha), which uses the experiences of MIT interns to teach executives poised to go to Japan about the challenges they will face.

According to Professor Richard J. Samuels, Founding Director of the MIT Japan Program and Director of the Center for International Studies, “Pat has no peer in education about Japan. She is unselfish and passionate about sharing her deep grasp of things Japanese with MIT students, faculty, and Program sponsors. Her influence also extends far beyond MIT and Boston. Pat has been a national leader in coordinating efforts on campuses from Massachusetts to California to stimulate more and better understanding about Japan. This recognition could not be more well deserved.”

Patricia Gercik, Managing Director of the MIT Japan Program

moved to recognize the private sector officially, and Jiang Zemin stated that the Party will now welcome entrepreneurs.

In many ways, these changes are just after-the-fact recognition of the status quo. But over the long run, they are good developments. They represent further dilution of traditional Party ideology. It’s clear that there are some new players, that they have created an opening for the private sphere and for the growth of an impressive civil society.

Change isn’t happening as fast as some of us would like. But ten years ago in China, everybody in the cities had a government job and lived in government housing. People were subject to the vagaries of politics and policies at every moment of their lives. Whether or not China was totalitarian — forget the semantics — everything was political.

I look at the very same people I was working with in the past: friends are now living in their own houses, working for private firms. They have carved out and are able to enjoy a civil sphere. That is a revolutionary change.
AMY TARR, a former print and broadcast journalist, began a new phase in her career at CIS this past summer in the newly-created position of Director of Public Programs. Marsha Bolton, a former administrative assistant at the Center, stepped into Tarr’s old role as coordinator of CIS’s Seminar XXI program.

“We are very pleased to have been able to promote both Marsha and Amy from within CIS. The Center continues to be a place where opportunity and excellence are found in equal measure,” said Bill Keller, the Center’s executive director.

Tarr, through her work at Seminar XXI, has been a familiar face at the Center for four years. “It was a privilege, through Seminar XXI, to get to know leading academics with expertise on a range of topics in international relations, as well as senior policy makers at the Pentagon and various intelligence, budget and diplomatic agencies,” Tarr said. “I often felt like a student in the course myself, and like to think I have a much more nuanced approach to certain issues as a result of my tenure at the program.” Tarr’s new position will allow her to exercise her skills and contacts in journalism and broadcasting. “I’m pleased now to have the opportunity to help CIS develop a stronger profile in the media. Getting the word out about the amazing range of expertise at the Center is more important than ever, in the aftermath of the events of September 11,” she said.

Bolton, a former assistant with the Security Studies Program, is CIS’s new coordinator for Seminar XXI, a program that brings together scholars, military leaders, and policy makers.

According to Bolton, the September attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center have made her job at Seminar XXI more challenging and more important. “Our field was deeply impacted by the events of September 11, and it’s a challenge to acknowledge that impact in our events, while continuing to address the many other issues that remain important,” she said. “I’m excited to be involved in the Seminar XXI Program as it grows to meet the challenge, by giving our leaders and policy makers a unique perspective on the issues they face.”

Mellon-MIT Inter-University Program on Non-Governmental Organization and Forced Migration invites proposals for field research grants.

Deadline: January 7, 2002

For information, contact Laurie Scheffler at lauries@mit.edu or see our website at http://web.mit.edu/cis/programs/international-migration.html