On May 15th and 16th, 2002, the Center for International Studies celebrated its 50th anniversary with a series of events that demonstrated the strength and breadth of its achievements over the past half-century. In his opening remarks, CIS Director Richard J. Samuels noted that “an anniversary like this gives us the chance to look back and reflect on how large a swath of world affairs the Center’s been witness to, has been affected by, and in its own way has tried to shape…. We’re very pleased at how much has changed in the last fifty years at the Center.”

The events reflected a year of planning by Amy Tarr, CIS Director of Public Programs, Laurie Scheffler, Assistant to the Director of CIS, Tisha Gomes, formerly the Assistant to the Executive Director and currently the Executive Director of CIS’s Seminar XXI Program, and Professor Samuels.

The kick-off to the anniversary, a dinner at the Royal Sonesta Hotel in Cambridge, brought together current and former affiliates of CIS, including faculty, students, staff, and friends of the Center. MIT President Charles Vest was on hand to announce a $10 million gift by the Starr Foundation (see below), which, among other things, guarantees that CIS will continue to sponsor key scholarships.

**Sadako Ogata’s Journey to Cambridge**

The keynote speech was delivered by Dr. Sadako Ogata, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees from 1991-2001. During her tenure at the U.N., Dr. Ogata oversaw humanitarian efforts around the world and played a critical role in ameliorating refugee problems stemming from wars and natural disasters. Dr. Ogata

__CIS RECEIVES $10 MILLION GIFT FROM STARR FOUNDATION__

At CIS’s 50th anniversary celebration dinner at the Royal Sonesta Hotel in Cambridge on May 15th, MIT President Charles M. Vest surprised most in the audience with the announcement of a $10 million, three-year grant to the Center from the Starr Foundation, one of the largest private foundations in the United States.

This is the largest gift from a private foundation ever given in support of a component of the School of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences, surpassing the Foundation’s $6 million gift to the MIT International Science and Technology Initiatives (MISTI) in 1998 to support student internships abroad.

The grant will help CIS to continue its work in the study of international security, refugees and crisis management, human rights and justice, science and technology, national security policy, as well as fund its newly-named series of public forums, the CIS Starr Forum.

President Vest said of the gift, “This new commitment is a tremendous and well-deserved vote of confidence in the Center’s continued and future contributions to the health and security of our world.”
worked closely with the late Professor Myron Weiner, a former director of CIS, so her participation in the celebration was, in part, a tribute to him.

Professor Samuels and the event’s organizers were relieved that Dr. Ogata made it to the event. A few weeks earlier, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan had named Dr. Ogata to the U.N.’s fact-finding mission in Jenin, on the West Bank, following a controversial Israeli military action there, and it seemed that she would be unable to attend. The mission was cancelled, however, and Dr. Ogata flew to Cambridge soon after returning to the U.S. from mission headquarters in Geneva, in order to honor her commitment to the Center.

A Day-Long Symposium

The anniversary dinner was followed by a day-long symposium on May 16th. It began with a videotaped greeting by Walt Rostow, Rex G. Baker, Jr. Professor Emeritus of Political Economy at the University of Texas at Austin and one of the original faculty members at CIS. (Professor Rostow taught economic history at MIT from 1950-1961 before becoming a national security advisor to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.) Professor Rostow’s remarks were followed by four panel discussions that touched on various aspects of the Center’s work, past and present, and included an impressive array of speakers, some of whom traveled long distances to participate.

Policy and University Research

Moderating the first discussion, “Research and the National Interest,” was Professor Emeritus Carl Kaysen, Senior Lecturer at CIS and former Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Kennedy. The panelists discussed the relationship between fundamental university research and the formulation of national policy, and addressed the Center’s own role in the creation of foreign policy.

Francis Bator — who was Executive Assistant to Max Millikan, CIS’s first director, was Deputy National Security Advisor to President Johnson, and currently is Emeritus Professor of Political Economy at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government — explained to those in the audience who were not at the Center in its early years that CIS took on the task of applying social science to serious foreign policy problems during the most critical point of the Cold War.

Another panelist, Francis X. Sutton, former deputy vice president and acting vice president of the international division of the Ford Foundation, spoke on “Interest in the Exotic,”
the collaboration between the Ford Foundation and the Center’s research. The Ford Foundation was one of the major sponsors of the Center in its early years.

In his remarks, Professor Thomas Schelling of the University of Maryland noted that research is a key producer of human capital. “Academic research and teaching have had a greater influence on defense policy than on any area of policy at the national level,” he said, adding that the importance of the research done at CIS has largely been due to the significant interaction between high-ranking U.S. military officers and academics (as is currently the case with the Military Fellows Program organized by the Center’s Security Studies Program).

Finally, MIT Professor of Physics Ernest J. Moniz, former Undersecretary of Energy, spoke about the tensions that exist at institutions like MIT between conducting research that serves the government and maintaining the openness that is the hallmark of scientific activity. He cited the tensions that came to a boil in the 1960s when CIS’s relationship with the CIA was attacked, and, eventually, ended.

The Future of Conflict

Although generally optimistic over the long run, experts on the second panel, “Conflict in the Twenty-First Century,” predicted that significant levels of civil warfare would continue in the near term. CIS Associate Director Stephen Van Evera, an expert on the causes of war, moderated the discussion and was the most pessimistic about the future of warfare. He talked of a world replete with nuclear and biological weapons which are likely to fall into the hands of actors who cannot be deterred.

In contrast, Professor John Mueller of Ohio State University expanded on the thesis of his book, The Obsolescence of Major War, arguing that war has been delegitimized since World War I and that major-power war will be far less likely in the future. Instead of major-power war, he said, we will continue to see “criminal warfare” in the form of civil wars based on predation, often in failed states.

Professor Jack Snyder of Columbia University expressed optimism about the positive effects of American hegemony and the spread of democracy for peace in the long run, but predicted that these same factors were likely to cause greater levels of conflict in the short run.

The fourth panelist, Dr. Cindy Williams, Senior Fellow at the Security Studies Program and an expert on the U.S. defense budget and military forces, highlighted new trends in warfare. Most grippingly, she drew attention to the problem of mass-casualty terrorism and the failure of the United States to shift its fiscal priorities to respond to the post-9/11 world. She criticized the government for ignoring the “shots across the bow” presented by the terrorist attacks.

New Frontiers in Human Rights

The third panel at the CIS Symposium examined human rights challenges in the 21st century. The discussion was led by Professor Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Director of the CIS Program on Human Rights and Justice. Professor Rajagopal addressed to the pessimism about human rights that has arisen since 9/11 despite the 1990s being the “age of human rights”—this as countries around the world reflected human rights concerns in their constitutions and in policies concerning military intervention.

Professor Saskia Sassen of the University of Chicago addressed the effects of globalization on human rights. Although globalization itself has not been detrimental to progress, she said, it has had several unintended and unfortunate results that have been detrimental to human rights—such as “strategies of despair,” economic systems that form on the backs of weak groups (often women) and trample their basic rights.

Tom Farer, Dean of the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver, spoke about the prospects for humanitarian intervention after 9/11, given what he continued on next page
sees as the Bush doctrine of taking unilateral action to hunt down and destroy Al Qaeda’s terrorist network. He argued that U.S. actions outside the U.N. forum have the potential to shatter norms of human rights. But he added that thus far, the United States has consulted others and may be able to preserve the normative system that has been built over the last 50 years — if it continues to act multilaterally.

His Excellency C.G. Weeramantry, retired vice president of the International Criminal Court, spoke on the importance of a multicultural approach to international justice. He criticized the Western monocultural vision of international law and warned that the provision of human rights and elimination of violence is dependent upon understanding the different cultures that make up the world community. In his words, “we must think not in terms of a clash of civilizations but of a confluence of civilizations, where we gather together all the richness that humanity is heir to and put it together in a form that makes it the common inheritance, the common property of all.”

Professor Joshua Cohen, Head of MIT’s Department of Political Science, concluded with a discussion of whether we can hope for “more than minimalism” in human rights. He argued that we can, and that we should be more ambitious.

**CIS and Global Education**

The final panel, led by Professor Suzanne Berger, addressed the significance of global education in the new century. She commended the Center for taking a lead among universities in “trying to define global education and trying to define what the international role of the university should be in American society more broadly,” and argued that MIT is at a decision point at which it can choose whether to become a global university or a national institution.

Dr. Norman Neureiter, Science and Technology Advisor to the U.S. Secretary of State, described himself as “irredeemably maniacal” about the value of an international education, calling it the responsibility of all Americans to receive one in order to become responsible citizens. He said that his office is engaged in trying to better integrate science and technology expertise into foreign policy.

Forced into global competition in the 1980s, Arthur Pfaelzer, President of Intronics, Inc., a Massachusetts-based converter and signal processor manufacturer, spoke of how he turned to MIT’s Japan Program to help him provide his small company with an international edge.

To end the discussion, Xiaomin Mou, a Ph.D. Candidate in the Harvard-MIT Health, Science and Technology Program, shared her experiences as an MIT International Science and Technology Initiatives (MISTI) intern six years ago. After her freshman year at MIT, she traveled to China to teach students about the internet, teamwork, and communication. Her experience inspired her to study speech communication and learn about Japan. After studying Japanese language and culture for three years, she told the rapt audience, she again took advantage of MISTI programs by taking a job at IBM Tokyo through MIT Japan. Ms. Mou movingly conveyed the value of the Center’s international programs and how an international education can broaden one’s perspective, understanding, and involvement in policy.

**Celebrating the Center**

Professor Kenneth Oye, Director of the Center from 1992-2000, made closing remarks on “what we are doing as scholars and whether it is useful in terms of the problems that face us today.” He reminded the audience that behind every policy controversy there is a scholarly debate. Although CIS research often goes against the grain, he said, it makes key contributions to policy—contributions that should be celebrated.

In his summary of the day’s activities,
Professor Samuels said, “The anniversary event was a reassuring affirmation that while the Center has evolved and reinvented itself several times in the past 50 years, CIS research remains focused on the goals first articulated by the Center’s founders. We remain attentive to the critical role international education in science and technology plays in the transformation and future conduct of foreign affairs and commercial diplomacy. We continue to seek new ways in which the social sciences, in conjunction with emerging technologies, can be brought to bear on public policy. This new knowledge, and a range of unresolved problems, from financial crises to international terrorism, continue to drive us to reaffirm our mission and to increase significantly our efforts to generate the knowledge, skills, and leadership necessary to address an increasingly complex international political and economic environment.”

Professor Emeritus Eugene Skolnikoff, CIS Director from 1972-1987, discussing the Center’s past and future challenges.

Xiaomin Mou, Ph.D. candidate in the Harvard-MIT Health, Science & Technology Program, movingly describes her experiences as an intern in MISTI’s China Program.
Two years ago, with the 50th Anniversary of CIS approaching in May of 2002, CIS Director Richard J. Samuels asked Political Science Professor Emeritus Donald L.M. Blackmer to write a history of the Center in honor of the occasion.

Professor Blackmer, a comparativist who has written on Soviet and European communism, was an obvious choice for the project. His affiliation with the Center dates back to 1956, when he became executive assistant to CIS’s first director, Max F. Millikan. Professor Blackmer later served as CIS’s Assistant Director (as well as Head of the Political Science Department and Associate Dean of the School of Humanities and Social Sciences).

In accepting the project, Professor Blackmer decided to concentrate on the Center’s early years. The resulting book, *The MIT Center for International Studies: The Founding Years 1951-1969*, is a captivating and detailed exploration of how one of the leading centers for international policy research came to be founded at MIT, a university known for its work in engineering and the sciences but not the social sciences.

As preparation for telling this “very special story,” Professor Blackmer spent months searching the MIT archives and other files. During the course of his research, he says, he discovered how important a role MIT’s top administrators played in the founding of CIS. Then-President James Killian and Provost Jay Stratton “took hold of the idea to start the Center well before the Institute was fully committed to developing the social sciences or working on international issues.”

Like many institutions founded in the 1950s, the Center’s early years were shaped by the Cold War. In fact, CIS was formed as the result of Project Troy, a government-sponsored program headquartered at MIT. Physical scientists in the group were asked to find a way to circumvent Soviet jamming of Voice of America broadcasts, while social scientists set out to determine what kinds of information would best serve U.S. interests behind the Iron Curtain — otherwise known as psychological warfare.

According to Professor Blackmer, the biggest challenge in writing the book was trying to “communicate the feeling and responses of people of that time to a newer generation more familiar with Vietnam than World War II. It was inescapably clear that the Center’s work was influenced by the policy environment and the politics of the time.”

In addition to covering the controversies surrounding CIA funding for certain CIS projects until the mid-1960s, the sometimes-close ties between Center researchers and Washington policymakers, the creation of the MIT political science department during this period as a direct outgrowth of the Center’s work, and the souring of CIS’s close relationship with the government of India during the 1960s, the Blackmer history also examines CIS’s work on political and economic development, international communication, and Communist societies. The Center’s researchers, he says, believed that encouraging economic growth and democracy abroad was “the best way in which these societies could be prevented from falling under communist control.”

Today’s CIS is maintaining the Center’s original dual focus, Blackmer says, conducting quality academic research while also contributing to the national policy discourse. Furthermore, he notes, the Security Studies Program carries on the Center’s early focus on policy-related research in national security, and the Center’s year-old Program on Human Rights and Justice takes up the spirit of CIS’s early development work.

A limited number of copies of *The Founding Years* are available, free of charge, by contacting ciscommunications@mit.edu.
Blackmer on the origins of the Center: The Center’s programs in international communication, economic and political development, and communist studies were shaped by the political context of the day and by intellectual currents mediated by the Ford Foundation and other providers of research funding. In these fields the Center, by arriving on the scene at the right time, recruiting a talented, multifaceted group of scholars, and betting on the value of interdisciplinary team research, played a pioneering role. As the Vietnam conflict deepened, some of the Center’s work became controversial, seeming to represent points of view regarded by some as emblematic of the Cold War.

Blackmer on the Center’s work in development: During the 1950s and 1960s, the Center was widely recognized for its development work. It played a pioneering role by launching ambitious programs of policy-oriented field work while simultaneously sponsoring basic research on the development process as a whole. In addition to these scholarly contributions, Center members participated vigorously in debates about economic aid as an instrument of American foreign policy, attempting to influence not only policy makers in the executive and legislative branches, but public opinion more generally. In this context more than any other, the Center as an institution was an actor on the political stage.

Blackmer on the Center’s distinctive qualities as a research institution: For fifteen years or so the Center had functioned as a special sort of hybrid. On the one hand, it had been created as, in effect, a semi-autonomous “think tank” doing policy-relevant research supported by government contracts and foundation grants, with a staff of senior and junior researchers almost all of whom had short-term appointments. On the other hand, the Center was formally an interdisciplinary research group operating within a university that had educational as well as research responsibilities. . . .

This hybrid model ran well for a time, in large measure because in the 1950s MIT was a university with two unusual attributes. First, its disciplinary base in the social sciences was weak, which meant that disciplines and departments, except for economics, were not as dominant as in most universities. This enabled the Center in its first two decades to play a leading role in developing the social sciences at MIT. [T]he circumstances that made this possible faded away, as the Center . . . gave birth to an increasingly strong Political Science Department.

MIT’s second distinctive attribute was its valued tradition of prestigious research laboratories, supported almost entirely by the government, that had helped to solve problems of vital national import. This tradition, reflected in Project Troy, goes a long way toward explaining why MIT was so supportive of the Center in its early years. This characteristic too became radically weakened in the 1960s, largely in response to changes in the national and international environment. An early sign of this was mounting pressure on the Center to abandon its contractual relationship with the CIA. The pressure was exerted intermittently by the MIT administration and the Visiting Committee, then more forcefully by Center members involved in the India crisis and some of their colleagues in Economics. But these local pressures were also manifestations of a more general change of attitude among Americans toward their government and its foreign policy. Actions and associations that had seemed entirely appropriate in a period suffused by the shadow of the Cold War were becoming less acceptable. The war in Vietnam progressively eroded the nation’s faith in its government, leading many faculty members and students to believe that universities were no place for government-sponsored research in the interest of national security.

… the biggest challenge in writing the book was trying to “communicate the feeling and responses of people of that time to a newer generation more familiar with Vietnam than World War II.”

Donald L.M. Blackmer
CIS Responds to September 11 Anniversary

A year after the tragic events of September 11, 2001, several CIS faculty and affiliates gathered to take stock of the war on terror and the nature of the threats we still face. Two events, organized by the CIS Starr Forum and the Security Studies Program (SSP), posed difficult questions about U.S. policy after September 11. Panelists challenged — and in some cases supported — U.S. actions, and gauged the effects of these actions on different regions around the world.

On September 9, the CIS Starr Forum (named for the Starr Foundation, whose recent $10 million grant to the Center is funding public events as well as other activities and programs) sponsored a discussion in Killian Hall entitled “Responses to 9/11: The U.S., Europe, and the Middle East.”

Van Evera argued that Iraq does not present an imminent threat, and that we should not launch a war with Iraq that could drain resources and efforts from the war against Al Qaeda.

An “F minus” from Van Evera

One of the panelists, Stephen Van Evera, Professor of Political Science at MIT and Associate Director of CIS, gave the U.S. administration an “F minus” for its response to the crisis. Professor Van Evera criticized the Bush Administration for fighting an all-encompassing war on terror rather than focusing on Al Qaeda, a proven and immediate threat to the United States. He argued that Iraq does not present an imminent threat, and that we should not launch a war with Iraq that could drain resources and efforts from the war against Al Qaeda.

Professor Van Evera also contended that while the United States succeeded in destroying the Taliban and avoided a large unilateral intervention in Afghanistan, the U.S. made a serious mistake by not committing its own troops to fight in Tora Bora, allowing the Al Qaeda leadership to escape. Furthermore, Professor Van Evera argued that the Administration’s homeland security efforts are inadequate. He argued that the government has failed to take steps to seal U.S. borders, and that it has done a poor job of public diplomacy.

But in perhaps his strongest criticism of the evening, Professor Van Evera said that, in “the single worst failure of the U.S. government in modern times,” the Administration had failed to deal with the problem of Soviet “loose nukes.” The current timetable for securing Russian materials, the year 2018, is far too late, he argued. The United States is spending only $1 billion per year on the problem despite the fact that Russia and the states of the former Soviet Union are the most likely sources from which Al Qaeda could get nuclear materials.

Europeans Fear U.S. Unilateralism

Suzanne Berger, Raphael Dorman and Helen Starbuck Professor of Political Science at MIT and a leading expert on French and Italian politics, spoke on European reactions to September 11 — which she observed close up, while on sabbatical in Paris for the 2001-2002 academic year.

In her talk, Professor Berger focused on opposition in Europe to what is seen as U.S. unilateralism. We need our allies in Europe in our ongoing effort to combat terrorism, Professor Berger argued, and pushing them away as a result of unilateralist policies would be a mistake.

According to Professor Berger, Europe’s immediate reaction to last year’s attacks was an
“enormous wave of sympathy.” On September 12, the lead editorial of Le Monde, one of France’s most influential newspapers—and a frequent critic of U.S. policies—was: “We Are All Americans.” Nevertheless, support of the U.S. began to wane after only four days, she said. Some in Europe began to voice doubt over whether the attacks were unjustified or even whether they were actually perpetrated by Al Qaeda. Many saw September 11 as an attack on globalization and its effects, or as an expression of disagreement with the U.S. role as the sole superpower (what the French call the “hyperpower”).

At the same time, there has been a European “failure to read the American mood,” Professor Berger said. Many Europeans, alarmed at the proliferation of American flags in the U.S. after September 11, did not understand that the wearing of the colors of the flag by government and military personnel as well as ordinary citizens was not a call to arms but an expression of solidarity and sorrow, a way for Americans to deal with the loss that they felt after the attacks.

Wariness in the Middle East

Jeremy Pressman, a recent graduate of MIT’s Ph.D. program in Political Science and a post-doctoral fellow at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, spoke about reactions to September 11 in the Middle East. Many in that region felt that the United States had this kind of attack coming, given its unilateralist meddling in the world. Some even claimed that the attacks were invented by the CIA or other quarters of the U.S. government. At the same time, he said, many of those who felt antipathy toward U.S. policy nevertheless felt sympathy for the victims of the attacks.

Many in the region feel that they are being viewed as being on the wrong side of the war on terrorism, according to Pressman, and the attacks sparked a debate in the Arab world about the fundamental nature of Islam: Is the religion being used as an excuse for the attacks, or is the religion itself driving fundamentalist extremism?

Pressman was critical of President Bush’s June 24, 2002 speech, which he said gave Israel too free a hand to deal with the Palestinians. And regarding a war with Iraq, he said that while the Arab League has declared that “an attack on one [Arab state] is an attack on all,” the position of the Arab states is actually more nuanced; they want to see whether the United States is serious about its commitment to reinvent Iraq before they risk losing political capital by backing or standing by during a U.S. attack.

Security Studies Seminar on 9/11

On the anniversary of September 11, the Security Studies Program held a seminar at CIS on “The War on Terror a Year Later.” Professor Van Evera reiterated the critical evaluation of the U.S. war on terror that he had shared with the Killian Hall audience on September 9, but Professor Harvey Sapolsky, Director of SSP, disagreed, saying that the United States succeeded in chasing Al Qaeda from Afghanistan, removing the Taliban from power, cementing Pakistan as a cooperative ally, demonstrating its capacity to project power in difficult places, and leaving a small footprint.

Professor Sapolsky said he also believes that the United States will take the war to Iraq, that the Democrats and Great Britain will sign on, and that the other allies will have to support the war because they cannot afford to sit it out. It is

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time to liberate Iraq and bring democracy and modernization to the Middle East, he added.

Professor Sapolsky also claimed that the war on terror may have what he sees as a positive side benefit of getting Europe to better provide for its own security and allowing the United States to pull out of the European continent.

Non-State Actors, WMD Questions

In her talk, Professor Nazli Choucri said that September 11 focused the world’s attention on the non-state actors who had received little attention prior to the attacks. Issues of religion and individuals, which had formerly been considered “low politics,” have quickly been transformed into critical factors in “high politics,” she said. Furthermore, the Middle East is undergoing a transformation due to the changing nature of borders in the region and the effects of globalization. In order to successfully combat terrorism, Choucri argued, we need to get a handle on these new factors.

In his remarks, Owen Coté, Associate Director of SSP, said there has been a disconnect between U.S. policy on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and its policy on Russian nuclear weapons. He criticized the fact that the Bush Administration has been preparing for war against Iraq in the name of stopping its pursuit of nuclear weapons, despite the fact that Iraq’s possession of WMD is essentially the same as it was at the end of the Gulf War in 1991. He added that it has been and will continue to be difficult for Iraq to build indigenous uranium enrichment capabilities under the strictures of UN sanctions and international scrutiny. Echoing Professor Van Evera’s comments two days earlier, Coté said that the most likely route to nuclear materials is through Russian fissile materials, the leakage of which the United States has failed to take serious action to try to prevent.

To view or listen to the September 9 CIS Starr Forum on the events of 9/11, see the webcast at MIT World: http://web.mit.edu/MITWorld/.
CIS EXPERTS ON THE LEGACY OF SEPTEMBER 11TH

Because of the events of September 11, 2001, we now have a renewed sense of vulnerability to attacks by nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and “dirty” bombs. Incomprehensibly, little has been done to protect us from these weapons. Instead of shoring up the Biological Weapons Treaty, the Bush administration spurned it. Hundreds of tons of bomb materials lie in poorly secured conditions in the former Soviet Union, but the U.S. and G8 are acting slowly to provide aid to secure them. The recent spiriting away of Yugoslav uranium by the U.S. and Russia was made possible only due to funding by Ted Turner’s foundation. The mind-set of the U.S. remains a cold war one: it will be attacked by a nation (Iraq) armed with nuclear-tipped missiles. In reality, as the 9/11 and anthrax attacks have already shown, the threat is from unsecured biological, chemical, and nuclear materials that will be used against us.

— Allison Macfarlane, Senior Research Associate, Securities Studies Program

Apart from all that it meant to those who lost dear friends and family, and apart from all that it meant for our renewed sense of America as a community, 9/11 was also a terrifying challenge to the academy. It tested the relevance of the knowledge we generate and the quality of the recommendations we make. It reminded us with painful urgency of our responsibilities as educators and public intellectuals.

— Richard J. Samuels, CIS Director

The U.S. federal budget picture changed substantially in the wake of the September 11 attacks, in part due to large increases in spending for defense and homeland security. The Congressional Budget Office now anticipates that the government will run in deficit rather than in surplus for the next several years, thus increasing the fiscal pressures that economists anticipate as baby boomers become eligible to retire around 2011. Part of the spending increase came from emergency legislation passed within weeks of the attacks...in addition to the emergency measures, the Bush administration requested an increase in the budget for the Department of Defense of nearly $50 billion for fiscal year 2003. The planned increase will bring overall spending for national defense to $396 billion, substantially higher than average spending for defense during the Cold War...Although President Bush hopes that the planned new department for homeland security will not add to federal costs in 2003 and beyond, it almost surely will.

— Cindy Williams, Senior Research Fellow

September 11th reminds us of our vulnerability to attack by groups and nations for which the threat of devastating retaliation is not an effective deterrent. We cannot credibly threaten to destroy equivalent symbols of importance to them or to kill vast numbers of innocent civilians in their home cities. Instead, we have to embark on the difficult task of preemption, making judgments about the potential actions of movements and leaders about which we will always know too little.

— Harvey M. Sapolsky, Director, Security Studies Program
Since 1981, the MIT International Science and Technology Initiatives program (MISTI) has exposed more than 1,200 talented MIT science, engineering and management students to countries with which they will engage professionally, through paid internships with corporations and research institutions in Japan, China, Germany, France, India, and Italy.

Until now, there has been no formal means of bringing these MISTI graduates together once their study and research experiences abroad have ended, to provide guidance to potential and new recruits, offer constructive suggestions about the program, and help raise funds. In October, however, MISTI chose 17 students who will do just that during the current academic year, as the first MISTI student “ambassadors.”

These students will help make more visible to the MIT community the program’s commitment to international education. According to Professor Suzanne Berger, MISTI Director, “At MIT, we recognize that educating tomorrow’s leaders is to prepare them for this planetary perspective with first hand experience in foreign societies. At MIT, we do this through MISTI.”

The new MISTI Ambassador Student Program, which will be administered by MISTI Associate Directors Patricia Gercik and Bernd Widdig, each year will accept applications from students who have participated in a MISTI internship in a company or research lab, or who were placed by MISTI at a foreign university. The ambassadorships will last one year, with the possibility of a one-year renewal.

Each of the MISTI country programs is represented. This year’s ambassadors for MIT China will be Virginia Corless, Jeff LeBlanc, Jean Lu, Salvatore Scaturro and Xiaomin Mou. For MIT France they will be Kathryn Kaminski, Ana Ramos and Diana Cheng; for MIT Germany they will be Madleina Scheidegger, Kushan Surana and Marek Polonski; for MIT Italy they will be Matthew Bilotti and Danielle Guez; for MIT Japan they will be Christine Robson, Joyce Wu and Nini Duh; and for MIT India the ambassador will be Gergana Bounova.

“These are the best people to promote MISTI to those who don’t know about it,” says Sean Gilbert, coordinator of the MIT China program.
The post-Cold War era ushered in a new wave of optimism about an end to world wars and a possible reduction in global-scale violence. As the new millennium loomed large, heightened expectations about world peace and global political stability captured the imagination of those who scarcely a decade earlier concerned themselves primarily with war-making among superpowers and their satellites. Shifting rhetorics and rising expectations were further fueled by the so-called third wave of democracy that continued materializing in the post-1989 world. As democratization and globalization reached ever further corners of the globe, long-standing claims of political scientists that democracies do not fight each other took on greater significance. For many security analysts, new forms of regional and international economic cooperation between countries committed to a common project of liberalization also promised to reduce the likelihood of widespread global conflict.

But now, from the vantage point of a new millennium, and in a post-9/11 world, initial optimism seems muted. Few would counsel that the threat of armed conflict is on the wane, at least insofar as violence and armed coercion still continue as facts of life. Even as a tentative peace settles in among previously contending geopolitical superpowers struggling over spheres of influence, those countries and regions that lay in the interstices of this larger power structure — and whose fates not that long ago seemed overdetermined by the economic or political competition between Cold War antagonists — are beginning to implode with greater frequency. This is especially the case in countries where liberalization of the economy has proceeded more rapidly than the expansion of citizenship rights and the consolidation of newly democratic institutions. In those places with particularly vulnerable political and economic conditions, the strong arm of the state is directed inwardly as much as outwardly, as is increasingly evident in Central and East Europe, Latin America, Africa, Central and East Asia, and the Middle East. In many of these locations, specialized paramilitary forces and police now replace the national military on the front lines of violent conflict, while citizens arm themselves both offensively and defensively as vigilante groups, militias, terrorists, and even mafia organizations seeking to counteract or bypass the state’s claim on a monopoly of legitimate force. These developments not only suggest that further study of the origins and larger political impacts of these new patterns of armed force might take us far in explaining the potential obstacles to world peace, and even the erosion of democracy and citizenship rights in the contemporary era; they also shed light on a potential paradox that few were prepared to consider during the celebratory dawn of the initial post-Cold War euphoria: as the probability of world war diminishes, the likelihood of “internal” war and subnational violence may be

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increasing, at least for certain countries of the world.

What seems to have changed, in short, is not the likelihood of militarized coercion and armed conflict so much as its character and scope. In those regions of the world where violence seems most prevalent, the predominant forms of war-making and the means of coercion appear markedly different than in the immediate past; and with the terrain of experience shifting so dramatically, old theories and long-standing analytic points of entry must be called into question, even if the persistence of conflict is not. Today we see a large number of armed conflicts in which the main protagonists comprise not nationally conscripted standing armies waging war in the name of sovereign nations but states acting against their own peoples. We also see popularly constituted or clandestine armed forces who frequently act on behalf of subnational groups (often defined in terms of ethnicity, language, region, or religion) and whose claims to national sovereignty themselves are problematic. What seems to be most under contention, then, are not the interstate hegemonies or globally contested geopolitical balances of power that led to large-scale wars in previous decades, but the legitimacy, power, and reach of national states, especially as seen from the point of view of those populations contained within their own territorial jurisdictions.

The stakes and terms of these conflicts also are different than they were when nations primarily fought each other. Many of these more “irregular” armed forces — ranging in form from paramilitaries and the police to vigilantes, terrorists, and militias — derive their charge and calling from civil society; and if they do answer to the state in some fashion, it is generally not to the national executive or the military defense establishment but to locally organized law enforcement agencies (as in the case of police) or more clandestine security apparatuses (as with specialized paramilitary forces). These latter agencies may be closely articulated with the national executive and national defense ministries, to be sure. But historically, police, militias, and paramilitary personnel have operated under different organizational, political, and disciplinary dynamics than have conventional armed forces. Moreover, to the extent that many of these alternative armed forces comprise previous military personnel, especially in the context of the transition from authoritarian rule, they may carry with them traditions, techniques, and networks (not to mention arms) that still link them to national defense ministries although they are formally separate from national armed forces. As such, their relationships to the military, the state, and even civil society may differ in ways that are not well articulated in the conventional literature on armed forces.

The military as a key national institution is not about to disappear; nor in all probability will the nation-state and interstate or international conflicts, including those in which nations cooperate regionally or globally to fight against particular regimes. But developments in recent years, especially when compared to the period starting with World War I to the end of the Cold War in 1989, do suggest a fundamental transformation in what we have generally considered war-making, and in the type of coercive violence being deployed by citizens and the state. To the extent that so many different forms and agents of internally directed violence now seem to proliferate, it is time to reexamine conventional views about warfare, armed force, and their larger implications. We must be prepared to consider the possibility that nation-states, in addition to losing their monopoly over the means of coercion, may also be in the position of losing the incentives, will, or means to establish universal social contracts with their own peoples, as occurred during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when national governments conscripted citizens to fight on their behalf.

This excerpt has been reprinted from the introduction of Diane E. Davis and Anthony Pereira, eds., Irregular Armed Forces and Their Role in Politics and State Formation (London: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming), with permission from the publisher.
INCENTIVES FOR NUCLEAR RESTRAINT IN RUSSIA

BY DAVID CORTRIGHT AND ANDREA GABBITAS

This excerpt is taken from David Cortright and Andrea Gabbitas, “Incentives for Nuclear Restraint: The Role of Inducement Strategies In Controlling Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” Chapter 8 in Alistair Millar and Brian Alexander, eds., Uncovered Nukes (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s Inc., forthcoming). David Cortright is a Visiting Fellow of the Institute for International Peace at the University of Notre Dame and the President of the Fourth Freedom Forum in Washington, D.C. Andrea Gabbitas is a Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at MIT.

Various means are available to states for controlling and reducing nuclear dangers. Denial strategies include export control regimes, the imposition of sanctions, and the use of military force. Coercive strategies, such as threats to cancel or block foreign aid or to use military force, can increase the costs of pursuing unsavory nuclear policies. Persuasive strategies are also available and can be used effectively in nuclear arms control. In this piece we examine the role of incentives as instru-

ments of bargaining leverage for nonproliferation and disarmament purposes. Our goal is to identify strategies that the United States could employ in reducing the danger of uncontrolled tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in Russia.

The United States and Russia both face conflicting national interests that affect their policies on tactical nuclear weapons. While both states have an interest in reducing the threat posed by these weapons, each has revised its security doctrine in recent years to give increased importance to the role of tactical nuclear weapons — as an active element of counter-proliferation policy in the United States, and as compensation for reduced conventional military capability in Russia. While Russia has expressed greater interest in strategic nuclear reductions, in part because its nuclear capabilities are shrinking as weapons reach the end of their service life, it has not adequately reined in or secured its vast arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons, which may number upwards of 20,000 weapons. The United States has been reluctant to accept deeper cuts in strategic nuclear forces or to eliminate its remaining tactical weapons, especially the 1,350 nuclear weapons that remain in Europe as part of NATO. Nonetheless, even in the absence of a strong political commitment to reduce the number of tactical nuclear weapons, it is important to develop strategies that can advance these objectives. These weapons present a significant danger, and in the wake of September 11, there is a new urgency in both the United States and Russia to keep nuclear materials out of the hands of terrorists. However, negotiations have not yet touched on the specific problem of tactical nuclear weapons. We believe that the demonstrated availability of effective strategies can improve the feasibility and political viability of arms reduction policies and help to mitigate this danger.

The Applicability of Incentives to the Russian Case

Incentives theory provides several important insights into what kinds of inducements might be most successful in convincing Russia to reduce its TNW arsenal.

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the application of inducements more difficult since states are more likely to respond positively to inducements when the change sought is in the non-security arena. Since Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons fulfill a security need, inducements that are targeted to improve Russia’s security situation are likely to be most successful. However, it is difficult for one state to credibly provide security for another. Given that Russia still claims a need for tactical nuclear weapons to mitigate its conventional inferiority to other regional powers, the United States will have to make Russian reductions in these weapons more attractive to Moscow by offering Russia significant enough inducements to change its decision calculus. Political assurances and an improvement in Russian security will be a key part of any inducement strategy.

Positive inducements that address Russia’s economic weakness could also be offered. Strengthening its economy is another of Russia’s top priorities and thus significant benefits could be offered in this area. Although this is not the main reason that Russia seeks to keep its tactical nuclear weapons, economic constraints have limited the resources that Russia is able to devote to the dismantlement of nuclear weapons, thus providing some incentive to keep even weapons that are outdated or unnecessary. Russia also is likely to have trouble paying its external debt in the coming years, which will affect the nation’s economic stability and its ability to accept foreign investment. Therefore, economic inducements could offer significant enough benefits to Russia to make cooperation on TNWs attractive. However, if the relationship with the United States were to sour, it is unlikely that economic inducements alone would induce Russian cooperation.

Additionally, an inducement strategy must take into account Russia’s desire to maintain its great power status. One of the main impediments to an agreement on tactical nuclear weapons is the seemingly incompatible demands of the United States and Russia. Given that Russia has between two and thirteen times the number of TNWs of the United States, Washington feels that Russia should take steps to reduce its TNWs unilaterally, in order to bring them down to numbers that approximate those held by the United States. However, Russia is unwilling to reduce its TNWs without U.S. concessions because it fears looking weak.

The second factor that will affect the success of inducement strategies is the positive relationship that has grown out of U.S.-Russian cooperation after September 11. This event has had a significant effect on the type of instruments that are available in persuading Russia to give up its tactical nuclear weapons. Prior to September 11, the relationship between Washington and Moscow was rocky. The United States was engaged in a series of policies that Russia saw as negatively affecting its security, including NATO enlargement and the potential U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty. Additionally, the United States was highly critical of Russia’s war in Chechnya while Moscow opposed U.S. military action and stringent sanctions against Iraq. However, the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks created an unanticipated alignment of U.S. and Russian interests. Issues that had been bones of contention before September faded from the foreground. The United States withdrew from the ABM treaty with only minor Russian grumbling, and it is taken as a given that the next round of NATO expansion will include the Baltic states. The United States responded to Russian help in the war on terrorism by encouraging a closer relationship between Russia and NATO and offering U.S. strategic aid.
nuclear reductions. Each state is responding to the other’s cooperative efforts with concessions of its own.

This evidence of positive reciprocity in the current U.S.-Russian relationship indicates that inducements are likely to be the most useful tool for persuading Russia to reach agreement on tactical nuclear weapons reductions. Additionally, the history of U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War further suggests that Russia will react positively to an inducement strategy. Therefore, the United States should offer Russia targeted incentives that will encourage Moscow to respond in kind in order to maintain the benefits of the new cooperative relationship. Furthermore, a more positive relationship should increase Russia’s security, perhaps allowing Russia to concentrate its forces on greater threats and reducing its need for tactical nuclear weapons to counter the West’s military potential.

However, the lessons of positive reciprocity should also be a caution to the United States. Although cooperation immediately following September 11 appeared to be reciprocal, since December, the United States has pursued a more unilateralist strategy which has ignored many of Russia’s concerns. This has caused domestic opposition to Putin’s pro-American stance to spread. Many in the Russian elite have begun to argue that the United States is responding to Russian cooperation with aggressive policies that pursue U.S. interests at Russia’s expense. Despite U.S. actions, Putin has continued to respond with cooperation. However, if the United States does not begin to respond more positively to Russian concessions, Putin could be forced to backtrack from cooperation with the United States. This situation would make an agreement on TNWs much more difficult to accomplish.

Third, since September 11, the United States and Russia have begun to perceive a common terrorist threat to their national security. Fearing that terrorist groups could become armed with weapons of mass destruction, the two states have agreed to cooperate in the area of nuclear materials security. According to their Shanghai Joint Statement on Counterterrorism, Bush and Putin plan “to enhance bilateral and multilateral action to stem the export and proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological materials, related technologies, and delivery systems as a critical component of the battle to defeat international terrorism.” Both leaders acknowledge the dangers that stem from the Russian nuclear complex and are working together to mitigate these dangers. Increased cooperation on nuclear issues will increase the interaction and trust between the states. This could potentially reduce some of the barriers to prior cooperation, such as secrecy about facilities and components, and make verification of the proper allocation of U.S. disarmament funding or arms agreements increasingly possible. A more cooperative relationship in this area could spill over into strategic or tactical nuclear weapons reductions.

Finally, the potential for inducement strategies to work is benefited by Russia’s current desire to strengthen its relationship with the United States. As noted by Foran and Spector, the value of the political relationship alone may be a sufficient incentive for cooperation. Although Russia is unlikely to reduce its TNWs only to improve its relationship with the United States, it is clear that Putin highly values a more positive relationship. The numerous concessions that Russia has made in the aftermath of September 11 (especially given the failure of a partnership to develop out of Russia’s prior concessions) show that a U.S.-Russian partnership is more highly valued than nearly all other non-vital Russian interests. Thus, there is currently a window of opportunity for U.S.-

Since December, the United States has pursued a more unilateralist strategy which has ignored many of Russia’s concerns.

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Russian cooperation. If an inducement package of sufficient value were offered to Russia, a deal might be struck. However, as was the case with North Korea, the ability of the United States to offer this package may be limited by political will rather than by opportunity.

**Conclusion**

Inducement strategies have proven to be an important part of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Inducement theory and past cases where incentives were employed offer lessons that can be applied to the challenge of controlling tactical nuclear weapons. In fact, history suggests that incentive strategies could play a positive role in the case of Russian TNWs. The case of Ukraine demonstrates that a combination of economic assistance and political assurances can be effective in encouraging nonproliferation. Additionally, Foran and Spector argue that incentives for nuclear restraint are more likely to succeed under several conditions — when the sender and recipient are on friendly terms, when nuclear capability is not vital to a recipient’s national security, and when the benefits offered by a sender match the perceived value of nuclear capability and the recipient’s prior investment in the nuclear program. Many of these conditions are present in the case of controlling Russia’s TNWs. Furthermore, Russia’s current interest in a cooperative relationship with the United States appears to follow a GRIT strategy centered around positive responses to U.S. policy moves, making it more likely that U.S. carrots could produce further Russian cooperation, even in different issue areas. Among the incentives that might be successful in persuading Russia to limit TNWs are the removal of U.S. TNWs from Europe, a single cap on tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, guarantees of non-deployment of nuclear weapons in new NATO member states, giving Russia a lead in the Russia-NATO partnership, early and favorable accession into the WTO, and a debt for disarmament swap. By taking into account Russia’s main concerns — security, economic stability and international prestige — the proposed incentives could be successful in persuading Russia to cooperate further in the arena of arms control for tactical nuclear weapons.

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**CIS CO-SPONSORS BOSTON PAN-AFRICA FORUM**

With CIS sponsorship, the Boston Pan-African Forum (BPAF) met in June to discuss the creation of a long-discussed “United States of Africa” and to make advances toward that goal, building on the Africa Union treaty of June 2000. The treaty has thus far been ratified by 45 African states and will replace the Organization of African Unity within the year.

The June BPAF program brought Marcia Thomas and Tetteh Kofi to CIS. They both took part in earlier meetings in Ghana which laid the groundwork for a Pan-Africa Parliament and an African Economic Community. Ms. Thomas is the Executive Director of “United Support Artists for Africa,” which produced the “We Are the World” record. She has supported grassroots development projects in Africa for more than a decade. Dr. Kofi, a native of Ghana, is a professor of economics at the University of San Francisco, specializing in commodity economics. He was one of five experts who drafted the economics section of the National Plan of Action for the National Summit.

The Boston Pan-African Forum is an organization founded five years ago by Emeritus Professor of Political Science Willard Johnson as an outgrowth of TransAfrica, which Johnson played a part in founding in 1977. Its mission is public education about the African world and the fostering of mutually beneficial relationships between the United States and African countries and peoples. For more information on the BPAF and its programs, see www.bpaf.org.
Ghanaian MIT undergraduates Victor Mallet and Baafour Asiamah-Adjei would like to return to Ghana eventually, but opportunities in their home country are limited, due to its weak business climate. Instead of leaving for good, as many of Ghana’s young and well-educated do, the two students decided to do something to improve Ghana’s economic opportunities.

Inspired by MIT’s $50K Entrepreneurship Competition, in March 2000, Mallet and Asiamah-Adjei began to discuss setting up a similar competition for students at Ghanaian universities. By January 2001, the Ghana New Ventures Competition (GNVC) was underway, with award money set aside for the winners to use toward the implementation of their business plans.

Support from CIS
Professor Richard J. Samuels, Director of The Center for International Studies, recently announced a $5,000 grant to the GNVC—one-fifth of the organization’s sponsorship money for the coming year. The CIS funds will go toward organizing and running 10-12 panels which will convene in Ghana at the beginning of 2003. These panels will provide teams of students—prospective entrepreneurs—with information on how to start and run a business and how to develop a strong business plan. Mentors will guide each team through the process, and the winners of this year’s competition will receive $7,500 toward the founding of their businesses.

Early Successes
Mallet and Asiamah-Adjei founded the GNVC to create an enabling environment for entrepreneurship in Ghana. By creating a seminar series for entrepreneurship education and giving startup funding to business plans with good prospects for success, the GNVC set out to provide university students with the necessary tools for starting successful businesses in Ghana, investing in their country, and laying the groundwork for other profitable ventures to follow.

During its first year, the GNVC received $10,000 in support from MIT’s Media Lab, a Ghanaian radio station, and Mark Davies, the owner of a successful internet café in Ghana. A huge success right away, the GNVC received sixty applications for potential business projects after only two weeks. Half of these proposals were selected for the competition and the workshop, which included notable speakers such as Dr. Paa Kwesi Nduom, the Ghanaian Minister for Economic Planning and Regional Cooperation.

The 2001 winner was Strategic Accounting Solutions, which proposed to set up accounting services available to the many small businesses located in the central market area in Accra, Ghana’s capital. Other projects proposed fitness centers, agricultural services, and laundromats.

Future Plans
Mallet says he hopes that the GNVC “will become recognized as the place to go to start a new company in Ghana.” He graduated in 2002 with a degree in chemical engineering, and worked in Ghana on this year’s competition before starting a job with the Boston Consulting Group this fall. He will continue to make trips to Ghana to work on the GNVC. The program’s co-founder, Asiamah-Adjei, is a senior in mechanical engineering, and will continue to work on the project from MIT.

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Every modern U.S. administration has evolved a special relationship among the three top foreign policy figures — president, secretary of state, and national security adviser. The first part of the 21st century features a low-key president catapulted into high-octane leadership, a universally-admired secretary of state, and an extraordinarily articulate national security adviser. Occasionally — as now — a vice-president or secretary of defense plays a pivotal role. But, in general, the chemistry that dominates the drama is that of the core triangle.

History provides an intriguing backdrop to the process as it unfolds in real time.

The history of this relationship is not long. The National Security Council and its staff were invented in 1947, and the national security adviser (NSA) was formally hatched in 1953 with the title of Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The NSA concept is relatively new. But competitive behavior at the top is not. Thomas Jefferson was at odds with his vice-president, Aaron Burr; Abraham Lincoln often struggled with his ambitious secretary of state, William Seward; and Franklin Roosevelt increasingly ignored his secretary of state and dealt directly with fellow Ivy-Leaguer Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles.

The Beltway triangle comes in two models. Under my Model A, activist presidents prefer a tractable secretary of state, along with a potent NSA to enforce the presidential will. Conversely, Model B features a less assertive White House, a muscular secretary of state, and a relatively invisible NSA. In short, reducing complexity to S(strong) vs W(ek): $P^S = N^S + S^W$, but $P^W = N^W + S^S$. How does this square with the half-century record? Harry Truman was a simple man, but a better president than comparisons with his outsized predecessor Franklin D. Roosevelt made it seem. But because Truman lacked the usual Washington quotient of affect, he not only tolerated but positively encouraged two potent secretaries of state — the towering World War II Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, and the formidably mustachioed — and brainy — Dean Acheson. By the way, according to a 1930s report, White House assistants were supposed to have a “passion for anonymity.” Today this is a joke. But who can name the first proto-National Security Adviser (Sidney Souers)? This demonstrates an early Model B.

Dwight Eisenhower, like Truman, was brighter and more decisive than he appeared to the naked eye. As a former army general, however, he was accustomed to delegating authority. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles (though not his successor, the gentlemanly Christian Herter) was determined to dominate the foreign policy machinery, repelling all boarders with his sharp bureaucratic cutlass. (His clout was nicely illustrated when, as a junior State Department apparatchik, I had to move out so top arms control negotiator (and presidential candidate) Harold Stassen could squeeze into my little office as part of his punishment for upstaging Dulles in Geneva.) Again, does anyone know the names of Eisenhower’s Model B NSAs? (Robert Cutler, Dillon Anderson, Gordon Gray). 1961 changed everything. A great sucking sound was heard as both policymaking and information flowed unimpeded into John F. Kennedy’s White House vortex.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk let it be known that his goal was to “get foreign policy off the front pages.” That reflected Rusk’s modesty and unencumbered personality. But it was clearly not the aim of either the new president or his youthful staff.

Harvard Dean McGeorge Bundy had been recommended to Kennedy as perhaps the
Harvard Dean McGeorge Bundy had been recommended to Kennedy as perhaps the brightest person in the United States, which may have been close to true.

NSA Walt Whitman Rostow confided plaintively, “We want State to take responsibility, but we can’t get them to do it”). We see a slightly amended Model A.

It would be difficult to find anyone more hands-on than Lyndon Baines Johnson or his national security advisers Bundy and then Rostow. At the same time, Rusk’s paradigm of behavior was the stately General Marshall, who waited to advise the president until others had left the room. Rusk remained a baffling, Buddha-like figure to the hard-driving White House staffers who never left the room, and Model A once again had no real competition.

In the first Nixon administration, the president and his NSA Henry Kissinger set out to completely dominate the national security apparatus. A cats-cradle of inter-agency committees was established, with NSA Kissinger chairing each one of them. Despite president-elect Nixon’s declaration that Harvard Professor Kissinger would operate quietly in the background, a media star was born.

During the Nixon years, an underweight State Department decided to set up its own gaggle of advisory committees. As an MIT professor, I was appointed to one of them. Secretary of State William Rogers hosted a lunch for the members, and I was seated next to him. I was astonished to note his deep tan and unlined visage, which stood out among his whey-faced staff. It was public knowledge that he was being systematically excluded from the top table by the White House, and often went home early. The sensible “Rogers Plan” for the Middle East in 1971 was one of his few attempts to escape from his gilded policy cage, and Kissinger relates in his memoirs how that plan was quickly squashed. Kissinger also confesses to mistreating Rogers, thus managing to enjoy both sin and confession. In the pre-Watergate Nixon administration, Model A was ascendant.

In 1973, post-Watergate Nixon appointed Kissinger to secretary of state. For a while, the latter also managed to hang on to the NSA position, leaving his deputy, retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, to manage things in the West Wing basement (the NSA now occupies a splendid first floor corner office). But the administration switched from Model A to B when, thanks to the web of deceit in which the Oval Office was entangled, the United States found itself with a weak president, an NSA without sharp elbows, and a stronger-than-ever secretary of state.

President Gerald Ford, a decent man lacking an outsize ego, was America’s only appointed president. For these, and other, reasons he relied heavily on Secretary of State Kissinger. Brent Scowcroft was Ford’s NSA, and the State-dominated Model B still ruled.

The Carter administration saw the re-emergence of Model A, with a president engaged to the point of extensive marginal comments on papers that percolated upward. NSA Zbigniew Brzezinski, like Kissinger brilliant and articulate, quickly dominated the process. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance didn’t throw in the towel as Rogers had under Nixon, but he was badly out-pointed (as was his short-term successor Edmund Muskie). In 1980, Vance did what few cabinet officers do when they feel stiffed on policy. He resigned over the Iranian hostage rescue mission, against a background of prior indigni-

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ties and frustrations. Sadly gone now, Vance represented that *rara avis*, an uncomplicated man of principle.

Brzezinski, being a gentlemen, treated Vance with courtesy, but believed that only he had what it took to formulate the big strategic concepts — which he largely did. Vance, also being a gentleman, forbore to complain publicly. Early in my NSC service, as Brzezinski, his staff assistant, and I were showering in a West Wing locker room after a tennis game, Zbig was having trouble covering a Sunday talk show. When I innocently suggested that Vance undertake the chore, the look from the other two naked bureaucrats spoke volumes about my naïveté.

The Reagan Administration is hard to analyze given its parade of NSAs (Richard Allen, William Clark, Robert McFarlane, John Poindexter, Colin Powell, and Frank Carlucci) under a president disengaged from the details of policy. After an unedifying start with State Secretary Alexander Haig Jr., the decision-making model became even murkier with Irangate, when NSAs McFarlane and Poindexter cut the state and defense secretaries out of major decision-making with the seeming assent of an inattentive president (Model A minus?). When the dust of scandal had settled over a weakened presidency, Secretary of State George Shultz played a somewhat stronger hand, producing a kind of Model B minus.

President George H.W. Bush brought Brent Scowcroft back as NSA, and James Baker made a strong Secretary of State. But given Bush’s long experience in foreign affairs as well as Scowcroft’s, the balance was narrowly tilted back toward Model A White House primacy, continuing after Lawrence Eagleburger replaced Baker.

The Clinton administration presented the unusual spectacle of a triangle in which, for a time, none of the three was particularly proactive. Other than trade issues, the President chose not to focus on foreign policy, despite campaign rhetoric foretelling drastic changes in U.S. policy in China and the Balkans. His first NSA was the self-effacing Anthony Lake, in the Scowcroft mold (Tony Lake had in fact resigned from Kissinger’s NSC staff in 1970 over the bombing of Cambodia). Secretary of State Warren Christopher, who had served as Vance’s Deputy in the 1970’s, was a fine, cautious lawyer, even more unassertive than Vance.

When the lively, outspoken Madeleine Albright took over from Christopher it looked as if State might take the lead. But as Clinton became more involved in diplomacy in the Middle East and Northern Ireland, while managing military attacks in the Gulf, Bosnia, and Kosovo, his sturdy NSA Samuel Berger helped put the White House once more in the lead.

Current history, both global and bureaucratic, is still in first draft. For a definitive take on the Bush II triangle, stay tuned.
CIS WELCOMES NEW EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

On September 1, 2002, CIS welcomed its new Executive Director, Dr. Carolyn Makinson. Dr. Makinson came to CIS from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, where she had been the Program Officer for Population since 1988.

At the Mellon Foundation, Dr. Makinson was responsible for dispensing grants totaling $20 million a year in reproductive biology, forced migration, and other areas of population policy. Her extensive work in the area of refugees and forced migration makes her a natural fit with CIS, where this area of study has been a research focus for many years.

Dr. Makinson, who holds a Ph.D. in sociology from Princeton University, is accomplished in both the policy and academic aspects of international studies. Her publications include articles on population policy, demography, child and infant mortality, and teenage fertility, and she has done work in the Near East and Africa. Makinson has volunteered as an affiliate of the International Rescue Committee in Rwanda and Guinea, as well as Save the Children in Mozambique. In 1999, she held the position of Visiting Lecturer of Public and International Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University.

Makinson is excited about her move to CIS. “I’ve been a great admirer of the Center for International Studies from afar, and in particular of its Inter-University Committee on International Migration,” Makinson said, “so I’m thrilled that I’m going to be an ‘insider’ and a member of the Center’s team.” (The Mellon Foundation funds the program on migration, which is chaired by CIS.)

CIS is equally thrilled to have attracted Makinson. According to CIS Director Richard J. Samuels, “Carolyn brings broad skill, long experience, and great energy to MIT in equally remarkable doses. I expect us all to be infected with her enthusiasm for improving international studies.”

Dr. Makinson succeeds Bill Keller, who was with CIS for five years. Dr. Keller has accepted a senior faculty position at the University of Pittsburgh, where he will direct the Center for Security Studies.

FORDEN MAY BECOME WEAPONS INSPECTOR IN IRAQ

The U.N. has not sent weapons inspectors back to Iraq, but if a team does go, one of its members may very well be Geoffrey Forden, a Senior Research Associate in CIS’s Security Studies Program.

Dr. Forden, a physicist and strategic weapons analyst, received General Training for weapons inspectors during the summer of 2000. He has taken a leave from CIS for the 2002-2003 academic year to become Chief of the Multidiscipline Section in the United Nations Division of Analysis and Assessment, which he describes as “a small section of analysts who look at patterns that develop across Iraq’s WMD programs.”

Dr. Forden, who performed the first unclassified, independent technical analysis of the Airborne Laser, conducted research at the Fermi National Laboratory, the Congressional Budget Office, and the U.K.’s Rutherford Laboratory before joining CIS in 2000.
Dan Breznitz, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science, received a $7,000 grant from the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) to organize and host the History Collaborative Research Network of the SSRC’s program on the Corporation as a Social Institution. Breznitz also presented his work on the development of high-tech industry in Israel and Ireland to the Business History Conference Annual Meeting in April and the Israeli Economic Association Annual Meeting in May.

Thomas J. Christensen was promoted to full professor of Political Science in July. He briefed Vice President Cheney at the White House in preparation for Chinese Vice President Hu Jintao’s visit and then attended a dinner in Hu’s honor on May 1. In June, Christensen was a speaker on a panel titled “How to Reduce the Differences and Frictions between China and the United States on the Sensitive Issue of Taiwan?” at the 11th US-China Dialogue at the Potantico Conference Center in New York, sponsored by the National Committee on US-China Relations. In August, he spoke on “China’s Strategic Vision Beyond Taiwan” at the Conference on China’s Strategic Vision, organized by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the U.S. Department of State. On September 13, Christensen spoke at the Secretary of State’s Open Forum Distinguished Lecture Series at the U.S. Department of State on “The Challenge of China’s Future.” He was then presented with a Distinguished Service Award for Outstanding Contributions to International and National Affairs by the Secretary’s Open Forum.

Owen Coté, Associate Director of the Security Studies Program, spoke at the Joint Forces Staff College on September 26, 2002. His talk was entitled “The Sources of Innovation in Military Doctrine.”

Kelly Greenhill, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science, was awarded an Olin Predoctoral Fellowship at Harvard University for 2002-2003. She was also the recipient of a Moody Research Grant from the LBJ Library Foundation.


Yinan He, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science, presented her paper, “Cold War, Historical Mythmaking and Sino-Japanese Reconciliation,” at the Conference on Contemporary China-Japan Relations: Conflict & Co-operation sponsored by the East Asia Institute of National University of Singapore on August 1.

Professor Philip S. Khoury, Dean of the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in spring 2002. Khoury was also appointed the first holder of the Kenan Sahin Deanship in the School of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences.

Gregory Koblentz, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science, was awarded a predoctoral fellowship in national security at the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University for the year 2002-2003.
Alan J. Kuperman, recipient of a Ph.D. in Political Science, completed his dissertation, “Tragic Challenges and the Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: How and Why Ethnic Groups Provoke Genocidal Retaliation.” Kuperman became an Assistant Professor of International Relations at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University – Bologna Center in Italy this fall.

Chappell Lawson, Associate Professor of Political Science, was recognized as a Hoover National Fellow by The Hoover Institution at Stanford University for the year 2002-2003. Lawson was also recently chosen as holder of the Class of 1954 Career Development Chair and selected as a Term Member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Ali Lejlic, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science, received the Krupp Foundation 2002-2003 Academic Year Dissertation Research Fellowship through the Harvard University Center for European Studies for his dissertation: “Politics and National Identity.”

Sarah Lischer, recipient of a Ph.D. in Political Science, completed her dissertation entitled “Catalysts of Conflict: How Refugee Crises Lead to the Spread of Civil War.” She has received a Post-Doctoral Fellowship at the Belfer Center at Harvard University, where she will be working with the International Security Program and the World Peace Foundation Program on Intra-State Conflict. Lischer also gave a talk in June at the annual meeting of the Academic Council on the United Nations System in Lisbon, Portugal: “Refugee Crises as Transnational Security Threats.”

Mike Lynch, Research Affiliate, gave a lunch-on talk at the International Association for Energy Economics annual conference in Aberdeen, Scotland in June.

NEW WORKING GROUP ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Seeking to explore the relationship between civilians and the military, Professors Roger Petersen, Chappell Lawson and CIS Director Richard Samuels recently organized the Security Studies Program’s Working Group on Civil-Military Relations. The group, which met twice in spring 2002, aims to bring together faculty, research associates, and graduate students with varying experience, theoretical perspectives, and methodological preferences to explore topics in civil-military relations.

In its initial meetings, the group drew on the existing literature in the field to extract a series of fundamental questions about how civilian and military leaders share control of the military, and, by extension, related portions of the state. It hopes to combine the regional expertise and government experience of its members to develop and refine models of civil-military relations, and, ultimately, to produce comparative case studies on the United States, East Asia, South Asia, Latin America, Africa, and Eastern and Western Europe.

The group has outlined a template for comparison that will guide its case studies. The template may also become the starting point for a book or working papers derived from the group’s work. For more information, or to join the Working Group on Civil-Military Relations, contact samuels@mit.edu.
Allison Macfarlane, Senior Research Associate, spoke at the 1st International Professional Meeting of Independent Technical Security Analysts in Chicago on “Military Plutonium: Ten Years Later and Not Much to Show for It” and at the Workshop on Radiological Hazards Posed by Nuclear Power Plants and Spent Fuel at MIT on “Potential Implementation of Dry Storage in the United States,” both in July. She also appeared on Wisconsin Public Radio’s Kathleen Dunn Show in August on volcanism and Yucca Mountain’s nuclear waste.

Bruce Mazlish, Professor of History, was appointed a member of the Kluge Center Scholars Council of the Library of Congress. Mazlish also gave a lecture to the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization in April: “What Is New About Globalization? An Historian’s Perspective.”

Thomas L. Neff, Research Affiliate, traveled to Moscow in January for two days of meetings with Minister of Atomic Energy Alexander Rumyantsev regarding nuclear weapons reductions and related issues. He then met privately with the Minister on his first state visit to the U.S. in May. Neff has also recently taped several programs for television on dealing with weapons of mass destruction in the context of regional conflicts and terrorist threats.

Navy Commander Sam Perez, former SSP Military Fellow, was recognized for his work in helping to save the injured at the Pentagon on September 11. After dragging one man to safety, Cdr. Perez returned to the burning building to try to free others who were trapped.

Barry R. Posen, Professor of Political Science, was awarded a 2002 Research Fellowship by the German Marshall Fund of the United States. In June, he was a panelist on the topic of “Redefining American Military Power in the New Security Environment” at the 2002 Current Strategy Forum at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Posen and Professor Ted Postol were featured in the WBUR radio documentary “Fighting the Next War” in January, and in March, Posen spoke on “The Next Step in Afghanistan” on WBUR’s “On Point” hosted by Tom Ashbrook.

Ted Postol, Professor of Science, Technology and National Security Policy, gave three talks on ballistic missile defense. On September 9, 2002, he spoke at Carnegie Mellon, at an event sponsored by the Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility. On the 18th, he was at the Burchard Scholars Dinner. On September 24, he made a presentation at the MIT Alumni Meeting.

Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Assistant Professor in Urban Studies and Planning and Director of the Program on Human Rights and Justice, was awarded the Ford International Assistant Professorship starting in July. Last year, Rajagopal was a panelist or a chair of 11 events and delivered six major papers, including at the International Institute for Judges at Brandeis University, an international conference on law and sociology at Porto Allegre, Brazil, and at the University of Toronto Legal Theory Faculty Colloquium.


Jonathan Rodden, Assistant Professor of Political Science, traveled to the University of Bremen, Texas A&M’s Conference on Fiscal Decentralization and Development, the World Bank’s Annual Economists’ Forum, Stanford University, and the University of Washington last spring to give presentations on “Reviving
Leviathan: Fiscal Federalism and the Growth of Government” and related topics.

**Professor Richard J. Samuels**, Director of the MIT Center for International Studies and Ford International Professor of Political Science, was named Outstanding Advisor of the Year, “for dedication and commitment to freshmen advising and the first-year experience.”

**Bish Sanyal**, Professor of Urban Studies and Planning, will be chairing a national committee to contemplate the implications of September 11 for planning education in U.S. universities. Sanyal will also chair a global effort with four other universities (Australia, the Philippines, Kenya and Brazil) and the Cities Alliance (a consortium of international authorities chaired by Nelson Mandela) to conduct an international study on housing for low-income urban residents.

**Professor Harvey Sapolsky**, Director of the Security Studies Program, spoke on “Science, Universities and Military Transformation” at a symposium on the Revolution in Military Affairs and the Research University at the University of Kentucky’s Patterson School.

**Stephen Van Evera**, Professor of Political Science, was promoted to full professor in July 2002. He and **Professor Barry Posen** were mentioned in “The War on What?” — an article by Nicholas Lemann in the September 16, 2002 issue of *The New Yorker* — as “realist” thinkers opposed to a U.S. invasion of Iraq.

**Cindy Williams**, SSP Senior Fellow, received a grant for her project, “Transforming the Rewards for Military Service.” Williams will host a meeting in December with scholars working on this project. The group is working continued on next page

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**POLITICAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT NAMES ROOM AFTER MYRON WEINER**

On October 10, friends and colleagues of the late Professor Myron Weiner gathered outside the Political Science Department’s small conference room (on the fourth floor of Building E53) to mark the renaming of the room in his honor.

Professor Weiner, who died in 1999 at the age of 68, was an internationally respected expert on refugees and political change in developing countries and left an enduring personal and professional legacy. He was the author and editor of 32 books on, among other things, international migration, political demography, democratization, and ethnic conflict. His 1991 book *The Child and the State in India: Child Labor and Education Policy in Comparative Perspective*, a stinging analysis of India’s child labor practices, influenced education and labor policies in that country.

Professor Weiner, who was a consultant to the National Security Council, the World Bank, the U.S. Department of State, and the Agency for International Development, was Head of the Political Science Department from 1974-77 and Director of CIS from 1987-92 (as well as acting director of the Center in 1995-96). He was also a co-director of CIS’s Seminar XXI Program.

Joshua Cohen, Head of the Department said, “Myron Weiner was a distinguished scholar and a special person. He inspired his students and colleagues to be imaginative and humane social scientists who subject their analyses to the discipline of reason and evidence.”
on a book that will evaluate the military’s changing needs for personnel and the potential reforms that can be made in military pay and personnel policy to best meet these needs. The book is due out next year.

Elizabeth A. Wood, Associate Professor of Russian and Soviet History, became the director of the Women’s Studies Program at MIT in January 2002. She has been the holder of the National Research Competition Fellowship from the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research (2000-2002), with which she has been completing her book manuscript, “Performing Justice: Agitation Trials in Revolutionary Russia.” In January, Wood gave the Paul Beik Lecture in History at Swarthmore College on “The Trial of Lenin: Legitimating the Revolution through Political Theater, 1920-1923.”

Tim Wolters, Ph.D. Candidate, was awarded a prize in a student paper competition sponsored by the League of World War I Aviation Historians for his paper “The Sopwith Fighters, 1914-1918: The Process of Integrative Synthesis in the Development of a Complex Technology.”

David Wright, Senior Research Associate at SSP, spent a week in Beijing this summer giving a series of lectures on arms control and technology at a Summer School on Arms Control at Tsinghua University. The week was organized by physics Professor Li Bin, who was an SSP fellow from 1994-5.
New Books by CIS Authors

Building the Fourth Estate: Democratization and the Rise of a Free Press in Mexico

Chappell Lawson, associate professor of political science, has written this examination of the role of print and broadcast media in Mexico’s democratization over the last twenty-five years. Lawson finds a relationship between changes in the press and changes in the political system of Mexico, showing that media opening had important political consequences.

*University of California Press, 2002*

Inventing America: A History of the United States, Volumes 1 and 2

Pauline Maier, William R. Kenan, Jr. Professor of History, and Merritt Roe Smith, professor of the history of technology and director of the Science Technology & Society program, along with Alexander Keyssar and Daniel Kevles, have completed this two-volume history of the United States focusing on the theme of innovation. The volumes seek to reconfigure American history by integrating technology and science into the usual mainstream discussions of politics and society. Both volumes are accompanied by CD-ROMs that include source materials, video clips, and innovative graphs.

*W.W. Norton, 2002*

Global Inc.

History Professor Bruce Mazlish, has conceptualized and written the preface to this historical atlas of multinational corporations written by Medard Gabel and Henry Bruner. The book gives visual representation to the new Leviathans of our time — the multinational corporations — in a form equivalent to some of the atlases devoted to historical empires and nation-states. The intention is to portray both the static and dynamic aspects of these powerful institutions.

*New Press, forthcoming (2002)*

Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints

This volume, edited by Jonathan Rodden, professor of political science, along with Gunnar Eskeland, and Jennie Litvack of the World Bank, develops an analytical framework for considering the issues related to soft budget constraints, including the institutions, history, and policies that drive expectations for bailouts among subnational governments. It examines fiscal, financial, political, and land market mechanisms for subnational discipline in each of 11 case study countries.

*MIT Press, forthcoming (2002)*
Other Publications

**Thomas J. Christensen, Professor of Political Science**


**Peter C. Evans, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science**


**Geoffrey Forden, Senior Research Fellow**


**Andrea Gabbitas, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science**


**Kelly M. Greenhill, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science**


**Ali E. Lejlic, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science**


**Allison Macfarlane, Senior Research Associate**


**Bruce Mazlish, Professor of History**


**Barry R. Posen, Professor of Political Science**


**Jeremy Pressman, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science**


**Program on Human Rights and Justice**

Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Assistant Professor in Urban Studies and Planning


Bishwapriya Sanyal, Professor of Urban Studies and Planning


Eugene Skolnikoff, Professor Emeritus of Political Science


Edward S. Steinfeld, Associate Professor of Political Science

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