CIS recently received two significant grants, one for research on forced migration, the other for efforts to monitor the spread of weapons of mass destruction. These awards demonstrate both the quality and diversity of work at the Center.

**Mellon Funds for Forced Migration Work**

In June 2003, The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation approved a grant in the amount of $360,000 for continuation of CIS’s activities in support of research and training in the field of forced migration. The grant funds the Mellon-MIT Program on Non-Governmental Organizations and Forced Migration, which makes small grants to students, faculty, and other scholars at member institutions of the Inter-University Committee on International Migration, in partnership with NGOs, for the purpose of stimulating applied research on issues of concern to NGOs actively engaged in fieldwork with refugees and internally displaced populations.

The Mellon Foundation grant also supports other activities of the Inter-University Committee: The International Migration Seminar Series at MIT; publication and dissemination of the Rosemarie Rogers Working Paper Series; specialized workshops that promote interaction between NGOs and the academic community; and activities that promote public awareness of resources in the Boston area for study and understanding of forced migration.

According to CIS Research Affiliate Sharon Stanton Russell, director of the Mellon-MIT Program, the program offers grants to scholars (ranging from $4,000 to $6,000 for graduate...
NEW GRANTS
Continued from previous page

students and up to $10,000 for faculty or senior researchers) for field research projects designed and conducted in collaboration with NGO’s on

issues concerning refugees and internally displaced populations. Further information is available at http://web.mit.edu/cis/www/migration.

MacArthur Grant for Tracking WMDs

In August 2003, the Security Studies Program received a $1.1 million grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation for research on new technologies for reducing the dangers posed by nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The project is in keeping with SSP’s long-standing commitment to integrate political and technical analyses of key national security issues. Professor Theodore Postol is the Principal Investigator.

“This grant from the MacArthur Foundation will allow us to preserve what is already the leading university-based technical security group in the country,” said SSP Assistant Director George Lewis. “Under it, we will continue our extensive ongoing research, education and outreach programs on issues including ballistic missile proliferation and ballistic missile defenses; reducing the dangers posed by existing nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism; and space weaponization. We also will launch a new initiative on nuclear dangers in South Asia.”

Continuation of support for the MIT-chaired Inter-University Committee on International Migration will enable Boston-area graduate students like Stacy Heen of the Fletcher School at Tufts (center, seen here doing field work in Cameroon) to share research results with MIT students affiliated with CIS and the Migration program.

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At a CIS Starr Forum on November 2, 2003, Rep. Mike Honda (D-CA) and Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA) expressed concern over what they see as growing restrictions on civil liberties resulting from the administration’s war on terrorism.

Recollecting his own family’s experience in a World War II internment camp for Japanese-Americans, Honda called on fellow policymakers to do what is “principled, proper, and right.” One of a minority of House members to vote against the Patriot Act, he warned of the dangerous consequences of anti-Arab sentiment combined with increased police powers. Honda said that the current situation reminded him of the persecution of Japanese-Americans after Pearl Harbor, persecution that led to the forced internment of thousands.

Congressman Frank, who also voted against the Patriot Act, responded to Rep. Honda’s comments with both criticism of the Administration and optimism for the future. Frank acknowledged that the traditional law-enforcement principle of deterrence is inappropriate for committed terrorists like those who conducted the attacks of September 11. “Deterrence doesn’t work,” he said, “against people that are about to kill themselves.”

But despite the need for increased measures that will help prevent terrorism, Rep. Frank warned that excessive powers in the Justice Department threaten basic American civil liberties. He criticized Attorney General Ashcroft for ignoring congressional recommendations that increased security be subject to judicial oversight and reasonable standards of probable cause. The Patriot Act, he said, further restricts the rights of immigrants because it extends the principle of guilt by association. At the same time, Rep. Frank said, most members of the House have tried to distance themselves from the Patriot Act and are unlikely to pass successor legislation.

This Starr Forum, which was moderated by former CIS Director Professor Kenneth Oye, also included remarks from Merrie Najimi of the Arab American Anti-Discrimination Committee and Margie Yamamoto of the New England Japanese American Citizens League, a co-sponsor of the event.
The subject of migration and development is high on the international agenda. It has become a prominent theme in debates within the European Union and in the work of international organizations, and the United Nations General Assembly has taken up the topic once again. Thus, it is timely to consider the characteristics of the current policy discussion. What is its scope? Where is it taking place? How does it manifest itself? And what aspects of it warrant "reframing"? A review of the sources noted in the sidebar below prompts several observations about the character of the broad discourse on migration and development.

Themes and Trends

First, the discussion in the literature tends to be not only state-centered but also developed country-centered. In part, this is a function of the audiences to which these documents are directed, and the nature of the organizations by which they have been commissioned. This is not to fault them; they are doing what they are supposed to do. However, one study poses a trenchant question about the motives of developed countries: "Can partnership with developing countries be real if preventing further migration is the principal European migration policy goal?"1

The motivation may be unpalatable, but if the intent is to promote greater consistency between migration policies and development policies and to engage developing countries as partners in this process, we may be well advised to ignore the motivations and applaud the objective. That said, the perspectives of, and policy options available to, developing countries are too often lacking in the discourse, and greater attention to these would be a welcome part of any "reframing." Further, at least some of the voices in the discussion of migration and development raise the important point that policy on trade (an important two-way relationship) is critical to development, and a much larger and more powerful tool than aid, so the subject is not absent from current policy discourse. In practice, however, trade policies of high-income countries are too often inconsistent with their policies to promote development in low-income countries, in part because trade policies are especially sensitive to domestic political forces.

Second, the broad discussion also frequently suggests that the subject of migration and development is "new" or has been neglected or marginalized until now. It is true that the salience of migration and development in multilateral organizations and international agendas has grown dramatically in recent years. But this

 SOURCES ON MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

The discussion of migration and development is wide-ranging. This broad scope is also reflected in the papers from the April 2002 Copenhagen conference on The Migration-Development Nexus. Other recent examples of the current policy discussion include the UN Population Division’s International Migration Report 2002 (UN 2002), the recent Communication from the European Commission (Commission of the European Communities 2002), reports from the remittances project launched in 2000 by the Multicultural Investment Fund of the Inter-American Development Bank, the latest volume of Global Development Finance (World Bank 2003), and various internal UN reports. These are just some of the institutionally-based examples of the discussion. In addition, there are a number of studies — published in journals, or in progress — by individual researchers that form part of the discourse.
should not obscure the fact that there is a body of literature on various aspects of the subject that goes back at least a decade or two. As we move forward in the policy discussion and in new research directions, we should not lose sight of the findings of previous studies, lest we “reinvent the wheel.” Of course, some “old issues” are still with us. For example, we are not finished with understanding the “migration hump” (the relationship between income and the propensity to emigrate). Among other open questions, even if countries are better off in absolute terms (by per capita income and other measures of development), what happens to the propensity to migrate if their relative position with regard to other countries has declined with widening disparities in income between countries?

Third, there is room for more explicit and nuanced discussion of what we mean by “development.” In much of the policy discussion, the term is not operationalized or defined. Recognizing that “development” appears on both sides of the equation — i.e., as both a dependent and an independent variable — a reframed discussion would benefit from considering not only changes in levels and distribution of per capita incomes, but also political and social dimensions of development, including, for example, democratic institutions, transparency, an active civil society, and equitable access to political participation.

Fourth, the integration of migration in external policies and programs, noted by the European Commission as “…a new field of action for the [European] community cooperation and development programmes”2 along with the growing attention to migration in globalization debates and in regional processes linked to the Berne Initiative are likely to open new opportunities for research and insights into the complexities and outcomes of these efforts in the realm of migration and international relations.

Finally, new evidence provided by the UN Population Division indicates that 60 percent of international migrants (people living outside their countries of birth or nationality) are now in the more developed countries, whereas two decades ago more than half of all international migrants were to be found in the less developed countries. Admittedly some of this apparent population redistribution is the result of reclassifications following the breakup of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. However, this shift reminds us that the changing demographic factors underlying migration (including changes in rates of natural increase, overall population growth, and labor force size) will require continual reframing of the policy discussion about migration and development, albeit in ways that may not be readily foreseen.

**Toward Prescriptive Policies**

Remittances have long been a central factor in the relationship between migration and development. Arguably one of the most salient, and welcome, features of the current policy discussion is the participation of new voices from institutional actors, notably multilateral and commercial banks, non-bank financial institutions, and migrants’ “hometown associations.” Their engagement has led to greater attention to — and some progress toward — reducing the transaction costs of sending remittances, increasing the volume of flows through official channels, and developing new instruments (such as remittance-backed bonds), to facilitate leveraging remittances for development purposes. So, what is there to “reframe?” Much of the current discussion lacks an adequately updated and expanded knowledge base from which to derive meaningful, prescriptive guidance to developing countries about what policies are likely to enable them to make the best uses of remittances. To provide such guidance, we need more and better empirical, multivariate analyses to explore the efficacy of various policy mixes.

For example, how do remittance flows, utilization, and effects interact with — and differ under — alternative approaches to macro-economic stabilization via fiscal and monetary con-

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“Can partnership with developing countries be real if preventing further migration is the principal European migration policy goal?”
controls, exchange rate regimes, trade, and institutional reforms in financial sector and state-owned enterprises? A better understanding of the relationships between remittances and economic policies would help inform the decisions of developing countries and strengthen their “agency” in dialogue with developed countries, although we should also bear in mind that there are, inevitably, limits to what we can expect policies to accomplish.

Maximizing the Benefits of Return

The policy discussion about migration and development also addresses “circular” or “return” migration, concerning which there are three points that invite reframing. First, one thread of the current discourse focuses on the strategy of linking development assistance to the willingness of developing countries to take back (“readmit”) migrants who originated from these countries, when a developed destination country seeks to return them. A recent example is the Communication from the EU Commission to the Council and the European Parliament in December 2002, which postulated that, “...presenting a global development package to developing countries will encourage them to enter into readmission agreements.” Such language reflects the highly politicized nature of some types of returns and of EU thinking about migration and development.

In all likelihood, this approach will not go away any time soon, in part because it is viewed (at least by some) as serving to reassure domestic constituencies that migration is being “managed.” But in linking development assistance and readmission, all concerned would be well-advised to study and consider the consequences — at the household, community, and national levels in countries of origin — of state-initiated returns, both planned and unplanned. For example, there are deportations of irregular migrants, rejected asylum-seekers, unwanted migrant workers (such as those expelled from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States), and those suddenly displaced by wars. It will be difficult to evaluate the efficacy of EU efforts to link development and readmission until and unless there is sufficient funding devoted to development per se. Of the 934 million Euros programmed for external aid in 2000-2006, only 13 percent is allocated to “development,” and that for only two countries, Morocco and Somalia. The major share of the budget is allocated to “management of migration flows” (read strengthening border control and mitigating illegal or irregular migration).

Second and more generally, in the past various studies have suggested that “return migrants do not fare well in the labor market. In many cases, their unemployment rate is higher than [that of] non-migrants.” Given the many forms of return now taking place, from deportations to “brain gain,” it is time to revisit the experiences of returnees, disaggregating them by types of return.

Third, the increasing efforts on the part of governments in origin countries to reach out to their migrants abroad raise a number of issues that need to be explored. The subject and implications of dual citizenship are already on the agenda, but there are further, related topics that need to be addressed. For example, what are some of the challenges to governance posed by transnational communities? Do migrants abroad have the same “standing” in decisions about their home countries as those who have remained behind? “Who decides who decides?”

Conclusion

As the discussion of migration and development proceeds, it is to be hoped that at least some key issues will be reframed along the lines proposed here. Within the high-income countries, greater coherence between trade and development policies — and more attention to
the implications of the former for migration — is warranted. More and better research is called for to strengthen our understanding of the relationship between migration and both income and other indicators of development, as well as to expand the knowledge base from which to derive guidance to developing countries seeking to make the most effective use of remittances. We need to assess carefully the risks and benefits of various forms of return migration and to address the myriad issues associated with governing transnational communities. Such reframing offers the potential to strengthen the partnerships between origin and destination countries.

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3 Ibid, p. 5.

On June 19, 2003, the MIT Japan Program convened its sixth annual Japan Workshop for U.S. and Japanese business leaders at the International House in Tokyo. The symposium, entitled “The Changing Geopolitics of East Asia,” attracted a range of scholars, businesspeople, and diplomats to explore Asian security issues and the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance, and featured a keynote talk by the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Howard H. Baker, Jr., the former Senate Majority Leader.

The topic was a timely one. As CIS Director Professor Richard Samuels noted before the meeting, “Today, with difficulties on the Korean peninsula more apparent than ever, the United States and Japan continue to depend upon one another to ensure peace and stability in the region. Clearly, the most important of our most deeply held national interests overlap.” But according to Professor Samuels — founding director of the MIT Japan Program — shared interests alone are not enough to sustain the alliance, and “resentment on both sides about possible consequences of their dissolution. Despite early post-Cold War predictions, the basic pillars of U.S. security in the region have remained intact. But recent tension with South Korea and Japan threatens these partnerships, and the effects of North Korea’s nuclear development are ominous. While some optimists contended that it is high time to eschew old alliances and adopt unapologetic unilateralism, others worried that alliances are more important than ever, especially given the unpredictability of Kim Jong Il and the rise of Islamic extremism in Southeast Asia.

The second panel directly addressed the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance, and how the shifting security landscape might affect the relationship. Some said that even though the alliance apparently lost its raison d’être with the fall of the Soviet Union, the dual threats of a nuclear North Korea and a “rising” China may help convince the Japanese that continued U.S. presence is necessary to maintain regional stability and peace. Others noted that Japanese officials face a skeptical public and may be inclined to bargain with China and South Korea in order to restrain the United States. While Japan enjoys the protection of the American military, they said, it is nervous about unchecked U.S. power, especially given the current vogue for more assertive foreign policy.

In his closing remarks, Professor Samuels warned that opponents of the United States in Asia have a number of ways of thwarting Washington, despite its military dominance. Rather than take on U.S. power directly, they will seek to subvert it by tying it down with multilateral rules and regimes, he said. Worse, “America will be a convenient scapegoat for domestic and regional troubles — even those not of its own making.” Tepid Japanese support for the war on Iraq bodes poorly for the North Korean dilemma, he added, since policy makers in Tokyo are loath to be “boxed in” by American policy.

While Japan enjoys the protection of the American military, it is nervous about unchecked U.S. power, especially given the current vogue for a more assertive foreign policy. Persistent asymmetries in the alliance suggest that there is no room for complacency about its future.”

The first panel in Tokyo focused on “The Security Architecture of East Asia” — the current strength of existing alliances as well as the
Cindy Williams and Barry Posen spent the 2002-2003 academic year as German Marshall Fellows in Brussels, Belgium, working on a range of issues related to European security. Both spoke to précis this Fall.

Cindy Williams

précis: Tell us about the work you did while you were abroad.

CW: I was trying to get a better understanding of military personnel policies and military pay policies in several European countries, for comparison with U.S. personnel and pay policies. The idea was that there could be reforms that have been used in Europe that could be of interest to the United States. Also, that there could be things that the United States has done that might be of interest to other countries.

I was also looking at the wave across European militaries of transitioning from conscription forces to all-volunteer forces. Some people call that transition itself “professionalization,” although professionalization should mean more than just dropping the draft. I got interested in the question of how that’s happening: What political pressures are making that happen? How are countries faring as they go through the transitions, and what’s stopping the countries that have decided not to make the transition? What factors are keeping them from wanting to drop the draft? You may know that the U.S., and NATO as well, put pressure on Western and Eastern European countries to drop conscription, because it’s seen as a roadblock to the kind of transformation the United States would like to see to begin to close the “capabilities gap.”

précis: Perhaps you can talk about some of the pressures against the movement toward an all-volunteer force. I imagine that cost is an important constraint.

CW: Economists who look at this question think that cost is a reason to get rid of conscription. With a smaller military that has no conscripts you can have a better military for the same cost. So over the long term, cost should be a factor in favor of an all-volunteer force. The problem that I see arising in Europe is that in the transition it’s substantially more expensive. Going through the transition from a largely conscript force to an all-volunteer force costs more than it does at either end of the transition. And in European countries it’s been a big surprise that the costs are as high as they have been.

précis: What are other factors working against conscription?

CW: Two factors are probably the biggest in encouraging countries to drop the draft. One is the example of the United States, which owes a fair amount of its military power and capability to the fact that it went to an all-volunteer force in the 1970s. The other thing that’s pushing European countries in this direction is that increasingly, the polities are objecting to having to serve. Eighteen and nineteen-year-old men are becoming conscientious objectors, if that’s permitted, or in other ways are just walking away from being drafted. Along with that goes a political discourse that’s anti-military and anti-draft. If you look at the situation in Germany, where they haven’t dropped the draft, there’s pressure to do so from some people who want a strong military and think that dropping the draft is the way to do it. And there’s also pressure from the left, from people who are anti-military and anti-war. So you end up with some peculiar coalitions.

You also end up with peculiar coalitions of people trying to cling to the draft. By and continued on next page
large, the reasons that are cited in Europe for keeping the draft are social, and have to do with notions of citizenship in a democracy: the draft is a good thing, in that it socializes young people to the notion of service to their country, that it’s a fundamental obligation of citizenship to serve in your military. That was a good argument for countries 15 years ago or even 10 years ago, when they had large enough militaries so that most young men did serve. But now, militaries are downsizing and most young men don’t serve. And then you get into questions of equity: some people will have to serve and some people won’t be called to serve. So can you still call it a fundamental duty of citizenship?

précis: Is there a tension between “Europeanization” and the idea that one gains a shared sense of national sacrifice through conscription?

CW: I don’t think that’s what’s happening. There are people who say that one day there will be a single European military, or people will join each other’s military. I’ve not seen that. The more important driver is that Europeans by and large don’t see themselves as threatened. They don’t see their borders threatened, and therefore they don’t see the need for conscripts.

That gets to a critical point: What are the threats that a European should be afraid of? For years, even after the Cold War ended, there was still a notion that territorial defense was an important mission of militaries in the countries of Europe. Now the notion among the NATO members is that requirements for territorial defense can be set aside, and future missions will be “out of area.” To the extent that territorial defense is not important, you might not want a conscript military whose basic purpose is being able to defend your territory. I think those who see that the future doesn’t have to look like the past sometimes worry that territorial defense could become important again and would like to keep some form of conscription. Conscription means that you rotate a lot of people through the military. A sizable number of conscripts means a sizable reserve, and the conscripts and reserves together form the core force needed for territorial defense.

précis: Did the events in the Middle East last year affect perceptions about European defense and the draft?

CW: One of the sticking points between the United States and countries that cling to the draft in Europe is that, by and large, countries that still have conscripts don’t ask those conscripts to serve outside their countries. Typically there’s a legal basis for that; the law says conscripts cannot be sent on missions outside the nation’s borders. It’s certainly a sticking point between the United States and Germany. The U.S. sees European militaries as not as capable as they would be if they gave up the draft. Not as capable, but also not ready to take part in the kind of operations that the United States would like its partners to be involved in, specifically in Afghanistan and Iraq.

précis: You opposed the war in Iraq and found yourself in Europe during the buildup to the war. Did you ever find yourself inadvertently defending U.S. foreign policy in the midst of what must have been tremendous criticism?

CW: I wouldn’t say defending U.S. foreign policy. I did spend some amount of my time trying to explain it as well as I could. There are parts of U.S. foreign policy that aren’t about Republicans or Democrats; there’s the very fact of U.S. power that makes the U.S. behave in some ways. I spent some time talking to people about that, but I wouldn’t say that I was an unthinking defender of U.S. foreign policy.
I don’t think people expected that of me. Europeans are fascinated and I think pleased to find that there is such a wide range of diversity among American scholars. They enjoyed hearing a diverse range of views.

**Barry Posen**

**précis:** Tell us about the work you did last year.

**BP:** Mainly, I was doing research on the European Union’s Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the EU’s nascent effort to get into the hard side of security. The initiative in one form or another has been underway for a while—a little less than a decade. But the real action started relatively recently. I’m not a person who does a lot of fieldwork, so I had to feel my way. One of the things I did was to interview people who are involved. I tried mainly for middle-level people.

Even though NATO’s been in Brussels for years, it was isolated from the European Union. NATO didn’t have many dealings with the EU and the EU wasn’t involved in security affairs. Now that the EU has gotten into the security business in a small way, it and NATO make many bows in the direction of cooperation. You’re starting to get some interactions between the two organizations, both formal and informal.

At the same time, you’re starting to get some autonomous research capacity. Little autonomous research shops that are interested in security that are nested in Brussels reach out to each other and reach out to institutions. There’s a meeting circuit, and I participated in it, sometimes as a presenter. After a while, a particular group will get to know each other, the barriers will come down and people will argue in a way that is revealing of their true interests or true preferences.

Another thing I did was to give a lot of talks around Europe. One talk was based on the article I just published in International Security, which is a bit of an in-your-face U.S. preeminence kind of a piece. I wanted reactions. It was also a good way to get people riled up—to get them to say things that might be useful to me about their expectations for the future.

**précis:** How was that talk received?

**BP:** With interest. People listened politely. There are a lot of fairly hardheaded people in Europe who didn’t have much of a problem with the overarching message about American military preeminence and its likely duration. It wasn’t a pleasant message, but for a good many people it wasn’t a surprising message. People would question whether it was sustainable. The usual question was: Can you sustain this economically? My answer was that this level of preeminence was produced under the Clinton defense budgets. So you might say that the Bush defense budgets are unsustainable, and they may be, but the Clinton budgets generated most of these capabilities.

The thing that endeared me to the audience was the section of the article about where the United States has problems and some of the different ways that some of these problems may be addressed. One way is to get some cooperation from allies. If you need high-quality, reliable presence for low- to mid-intensity combat, the wealthier European states are a good place to find it. You just can’t find a lot of it, because the fact is you have to run very hard to produce those capabilities. The British and French spend a lot on defense and produce very valuable forces, but they’re not gigantic.

**précis:** What was it like being in Europe in the buildup to the Iraq war, in an atmosphere of severe criticism of U.S. foreign policy?

**BP:** It didn’t feel that funny, really. The people that you run into in Brussels, if you’re interested in the Union or NATO, even from countries that were critical of the United States, maintain a certain style of comportment. So you don’t get into many table-pounding arguments. Sometimes you almost wish you could.

Also, it was obvious to people there that I opposed the war. I made no secret of it. That made it easier for people to tolerate me. And I think people wanted my views for precisely
that reason. I had a game I used to play where I would ask people, "Who would you like me to be right now? Me, or would you like me to try and tell you what I think the Bush people would say? Because I could play that role for you if you think it will help." Often, people wanted me to play that role. They usually encounter people in officialdom who represent that view, and there is some diplomatic rounding off of the edges. I could offer a somewhat starker, maybe more ferocious version. I worked to try to be fair to the Bush administration, because I thought there were some things that the Europeans didn't get. I made it my business to try and get them to get it.

Among the things I wasn't sure that they got was just what a big change September 11 had made in the United States in terms of public support for a more activist and marshalling foreign policy. The second thing that people didn't quite get was that there emerged a consensus among the mainstream of the foreign policy and defense policy elite of this country — Democrat and Republican — that we have this capability, and we like it, and we want to keep it, and we're going to use it, because it's not using it that got us into trouble. I was trying to explain to people that you're dealing with a very powerful energy source now, and I wouldn't be counting on this to pass very soon. I think I did a reasonably good job explaining this to people and I think that they appreciated it in the end, even though it was not necessarily a pleasant message.

**précis:** Do you sense that the European Union Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) is an effort to balance the United States?

**BP:** It's a more complicated story than that. Most of the larger members of the European Union are members of NATO. Many of these countries are die-hard supporters of NATO and they're not necessarily the ones leading the charge in the Union to try and develop ESDP. But neither are they doing much to get in the way, and in some cases they have facilitated the ESDP — like the UK, for instance.

My take on the ESDP is that when the history of the passing of the [American] unipolar moment is written, this will be one of the chapters. These are the early pages of the chapter, and balancing per se is the motive of only some, and I would say mainly France. Others participate for different reasons that are not quite balancing, but have to do with varying degrees of discomfort with U.S. power. It's not quite a competition, but it can become one. For now it's something else. It's a kind of insurance policy.

**précis:** Insurance against whom?

**BP:** There are fears that the Americans will exit. You want to be ready with something else in the event that the Americans can and do exit. The Americans can say, "NATO, nice while it lasted." The Americans, in some sense, did a little "micro-exit" at a time when the Europeans had nothing in the early 1990s and so there was no solution set for the Balkans except for NATO. The Europeans had nothing organized to work collectively outside the NATO umbrella. NATO was the command structure they had. The Western European Union had some tiny bit of planning capability but it wasn't much. So had they wanted to do something firmer prior to 1995, they couldn't have or it would have been very improvisational. And that's a scar.

The flip side, the less stated version, is the idea that someday they may wish to exit — and you can't exit if there's nothing to exit to.
The Americans may take Europe more seriously if it can show that it can stand on its own two feet. This is reflected in varying kinds of statements, sometimes circuitous and weird ones: “The Americans won’t take you seriously until you live up your NATO force goals.” Well, why would they take you seriously after you lived up to their force goals? If you look at the magnitude of military disparity, you’re not going to produce so much military capability that they’re going to take you seriously because they need you more or love you more. There’s just not that much you can do. Even if the Europeans did everything they can do, it’s only so much. The harder-nosed version is that the Americans aren’t going to take you seriously unless you think that you don’t have to take them seriously. Which is a horse of another color.
**CIS STUDENT FACILITATES RELIGIOUS “TRIALOGUE”**

In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, CIS graduate student Heather S. Gregg and the Lutheran chaplain at MIT, Johanna Kiefner, initiated a project aimed at breaking down religious stereotypes and establishing cordial ties between different religious communities at MIT. The project, dubbed “The MIT Triadogue,” brought together students from the Muslim Student Association (MSA), Hillel (the Jewish student union), and the Lutheran Episcopal Ministry (LEM), one of the Christian groups on campus.

In the fall of 2002, the Triadogue provided participants with foundational information on each of the three religious traditions: their beliefs, their practices and diversity. Each of the three groups introduced to the larger group their tradition’s approaches to religious law, the role of women, and the role of community.

Last spring, the focus was on “faith in action”: worship services, social outreach, and other projects that the three MIT religious groups initiate in order to apply their beliefs in the real world. LEM facilitated a guided church service that explained the different components of a typical Sunday service. The MSA focused on the role of prayer in the Muslim faith and invited students to observe a Friday prayer service on campus. Hillel discussed the role of food in Jewish life, and Triadogue members made Hamantaschen, special pastries made for the festival of Purim, to deliver to a Jewish retirement community in Brookline.

Although these Triadogue events, which drew anywhere from 15 to 30 participants, sometimes touched on difficult subjects, including the ongoing strife between Israelis and Palestinians, most of the interactions were focused on learning about other traditions and were not overtly political, according to co-organizer Gregg, who successfully defended her dissertation this fall and has taken a job with the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica. Rev. Kiefner is hoping to continue Triadogue during the 2003-2004 academic year and can be reached at <jkiefner@mit.edu>.

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**SSP SEMINAR SERIES ON THE IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN WARS**

This fall, the Security Studies Program (SSP) launched a special seminar series to address the military strategies and political implications of current U.S. foreign policy. The series, “America's Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq: Plans, Problems and Prospects,” brings together a range of scholars and military officers to discuss elements of the two wars.

The talks address military strategy before and during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the controversy over Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, U.S. efforts to establish a democratic government in Iraq, efforts to build security in Afghanistan, and Saddam’s cooperation — or non-cooperation — with UN weapons inspectors.

Some of the speakers in the series — including Major General Karl Eikenberry, Colonel Kevin Benson, and Colonel Michael Trahan, U.S. Army — played key roles in the planning, conduct, and post-conflict phases of the two military operations.

On December 10th, a panel of SSP faculty members will discuss the causes and consequences of the Iraq war, the final seminar in the series.
Control in international strategy, especially with military power, is elusive at best. One reason political scientists have such difficulty analyzing strategy is that actions are not always what one would expect from a rational actor. Differences in individual perceptions, organizational routines and interests, and power may impinge on any desired strategy, altering its execution in ways that may seem incomprehensible at times.

Knowing this, decision-makers try even harder to control the execution of the strategy. In this they are in luck, since the same technology that allows military forces to respond more rapidly to changing information also allows decision-makers to remain in the loop, should they so desire. But this seems to pose a dilemma. There is an apparent tension between the desire to control the actions of the military forces and the desire to allow them to make the most of their information capabilities and respond rapidly. Which is correct?

The evidence shows that, in a war in which the U.S. pursues a strategy of compellance, strategic-level decision-makers tend to oversee military action even at very low levels to ensure the tactical actions do not interact with the strategy in undesirable ways. The more the strategy approaches the “brute force” end of the conflict spectrum, the more the strategic-level decision-makers tend to grant autonomy to the military. Within the military’s span of control, airmen tend to centralize control of airpower to allocate missions and even to do detailed planning of those missions that affect high-level objectives. But when the missions are mutually supportive ones, like close air support, airmen will release control of the missions to those close to the scene.

Defining Centralized Control

First, in any discussion of control of the military, it is essential to keep clear what kind of control one is talking about. To an airman, centralized control means there should be one commander prioritizing the use of air assets; airpower should not be broken up into packets that are each controlled by a different commander. To a soldier, it may mean that the rear headquarters is trying to direct the commander on the scene during battle, when the commander on the scene is in a better position to determine what needs to be done. To a civilian, it may mean civilian control of the military.

The difference is found in the levels of war, abstractions that prescribe different functions in war based on different viewpoints. The strategic level of war is the level where the overall aims of the war are determined. Here governments try to figure out how to incorporate military action into their overall grand strategy. The operational level of war is where plans are made to maneuver military resources to bring them into action at the right time and place on the battlefields (including in the air). This is the link between these battle actions and the strategic level aims. The actions themselves happen at the tactical level of war. This is where the military units actually do things that kill people and break things — or whatever it takes to put the right pressure on the enemy.

At the strategic level, wars have different natures, and the most fundamental job of the strategist is to figure out what the nature of the war is. The strategic level decision-makers may
give more or less independence depending on the portion of the “spectrum of coercion” they are trying to use. Coercion implies a coercer trying to influence a target in order to obtain an end state that would not otherwise occur. The influence may be an attempt to keep the target from doing something (deterrence), or to get the target to change its course — either stop doing what it is doing or take some new action (compellance). The “spectrum of coercion” therefore has deterrence on one end, progresses through diplomatic measures to compel, then to forceful measures to compel, and ends with pure brute force on the other end. The nature of every conflict will fall somewhere on that spectrum.

This calculation becomes even more muddied when the coercer uses force. Compellance can involve direct use of force and/ or actions that will result in the use of force if they are not halted — if the target modifies its behavior, the action is halted; if not, force is used. The more directly force is responsible for modifying the target’s behavior, the closer the compellance comes to resembling pure brute force. Brute force takes; compellance commands: “give it to me!” Brute force pushes; compellance commands: “Move!” Brute force halts the target by incapacitating it; compellance tells the target to stop. Of course, in each case, compellance either threatens force or applies some measure of force to convince the target it is serious, and promises 1) more pain if the target does not comply and 2) an end to the pain if the target complies. So the tricky part is, it is often hard to tell compellance from brute force — compellance can often become brute force if the target does not comply.

WWII
This was the case in World War II. The Allies’ demands of unconditional surrender ensured a high level of motivation on the part of both Germany and Japan. The U.S. knew it would have to fight to the end. In fact, Japan surrendered before the U.S. had to invade; Germany did not. Japan was compelled; Germany was defeated by brute force. However, in both cases, the U.S. and the Allies used all the effort they could muster, with the intent to eventually defeat the enemy through brute force. This is because the interests were high enough to warrant the massive destruction that accompanies the use of brute force. So we can say World War II took place at the brute force end of the spectrum. It is instructive to see how control of airpower was handled in this, the age of Total War.

For the most part, President Roosevelt and Gen. Marshall stayed out of the business of telling the airmen what to do. When the air plan for the war in Europe, AWPD-1, was offered by the airmen, it was passed without comment by these strategic level decision-makers. At Casablanca, when the RAF and the Army developed plans for the Combined Bomber Offensive, it was Gen. Ira Eaker who spoke for the United States. Eaker was not even the senior airman, much less a strategic level decision-maker (although he was arguably the most qualified to talk about the bombing campaign). The distinguishing characteristic of airpower control in this war was the absence of involvement by strategic-level decision-makers, with the exception of the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

With this freedom from intervention by strategic decision-makers, the Army Air Forces’ complaint was that there was in general not enough centralized control of airpower — under an airman. During the campaign in North Africa, Army Air Forces units had been split up in “penny packets” controlled by the ground commanders. The ground commanders used the aircraft to support their individual ground units, who were largely confined to geographical areas. This made it difficult for the allied air forces to coordinate an attack on the German army as a whole, not to mention defeating the Luftwaffe to gain air superiority. The doctrine document FM 100-20 specified that there would
be an air commander equivalent to the ground commander.

However, the amount of control the airmen wanted differed among different missions. When aircraft flew on close air support (CAS) missions, they developed ways to work closely with the soldiers on the ground to find targets. The centralized control of these missions, requiring a full day for scheduling a target, was ineffective at supporting the D-day invasion and even proved dangerous to friendly troops. Americans developed a method of scheduling a steady stream of aircraft over an armored column, with a VHF radio in the lead vehicle to assign targets as the aircraft arrived. Later, an airborne forward air controller took over this function. Thus, although the aircraft were still scheduled and routed by a centralized “Combined Operations Center,” they were often given targets on the scene. Strategic bombing was a different matter. The 20th and 21st Air Forces were basically micro-managed from Washington. The Japanese targets were picked and put into mission folders by Gen. “Hap” Arnold and his Committee of Operations Analysts (COA) in Washington.

Because the interaction among governments in World War II occurred toward the brute force end of the coercion spectrum, strategic decision-makers were able to give the military significant freedom to operate. The interests at stake were so vital that the decision-makers were able to give the military clear goals and accept a great deal of collateral damage. Although the Army Air Forces were free of intervention by strategic decision-makers in this total war, they imposed degrees of centralized control over their own forces that varied by operational mission.

Vietnam

In Vietnam, the U.S. government was determined to be more aggressive in its control over the military forces. It is probable this reaction was due to more recent events than World War II. In Korea, President Truman’s failure to subjugate Gen. MacArthur’s battlefield strategy to a prudent grand strategy had goaded China into the war. Then, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy was repeatedly frustrated at his inability to control the actions of his forces. The military’s failure to remove missiles from Turkey as he had directed left open the possibility that the U.S. would have to respond to a Soviet counterstrike against nuclear weapons if the U.S. chose to attack the Cuban sites. An errant U-2 flight over the Soviet Union at the height of tension came dangerously close to provoking military action. Then the Air Force failed to disperse its fighter aircraft after the president ordered them to do so.

In fact, it was in the immediate wake of these events that Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ordered the development of the World Wide Military Command and Control System to tie together all military and civilian communications and establish a centralized command and control system. With this capability, McNamara (who had seen the value of quantitative managerial methods in industry) hoped to be able to precisely control the application of military force and respond “flexibly” to any conflict. This was the policy that led to the source of the greatest argument over centralized and decentralized control in U.S. military history: the Vietnam War.

The conflict in Vietnam took place on a very different part of the coercion spectrum than World War II had occupied. In Vietnam, the U.S. tried to influence the North Vietnamese with a strategy described as “calibration.”
the target (North Vietnam), but to communicate to him that it was better for him to acquiesce than to face a determined U.S.

The difference was the interests involved. Vietnam was not the true focus of the Vietnam War for the United States. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson accepted the logic of containment laid out as far back as NSC-68, meaning that containment of the Soviet Union required confronting communism wherever it surfaced. They therefore felt compelled to honor all treaty obligations, including SEATO. But this set up a vicious cycle. To convince the Europeans, Japan, and Taiwan that U.S. commitments were credible, the U.S. thought it had to do whatever it took to honor the SEATO treaty. So while Kennedy initially avoided sending any combat troops, the level of involvement got ratcheted up gradually until Johnson eventually had over 500,000 in Vietnam to protect this credibility. The detailed attention McNamara and Johnson gave to the means involved in Vietnam blinded them to the fact that the means were gradually outstretching the ends.

Nowhere was this micro-management more visible than in the air campaign known as ROLLING THUNDER in 1965-1968. It was a campaign where the intensity of the bombing and the location of targets were gradually calibrated to put increasing pressure on Hanoi until it acquiesced. Accordingly, strategic level decision-makers chose all the targets and many of the tactics. The Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC), Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, chose targets in cooperation with his subordinate commanders and sent them to the Joint Chiefs of Staff who forwarded them to Secretary McNamara for consideration at the weekly Tuesday luncheon. No military member was present at this luncheon until late in 1967.

An Unnecessary Choice

Strategic level decision-makers tend to apply varying levels of control depending on the particular strategy. When the strategy calls for coercing the enemy with as little violence as possible, excess violence could work against the strategy. The closer the strategy falls to the brute force end of the coercion spectrum, the more they are willing to give the military autonomy.

Neither centralized nor decentralized control is the final answer to every situation. Strategy is just not a sanitized process or product. It evolves and emerges according to the actions it precipitates — some of which are within and some of which are outside the control of every actor involved, at every level. Strategy should therefore be developed with this in mind, and made robust enough to handle all levels of control as the situation warrants. Designing systems and doctrine without the knowledge of these trade-offs could leave decision-makers with no options but to go either centralized or decentralized — an unnecessary choice.

Major Michael Kometer, U.S. Air Force, was an electronic warfare officer on AC-130 Gunships. Currently a Ph.D. candidate in political science at MIT, he holds master’s degrees from the USAF School of Advanced Airpower Studies and the Georgia Institute of Technology, and a bachelor’s degree from the USAF Academy.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
FELLOWSHIP DATABASE, NEWS ITEMS ON UPDATED CIS WEBSITE

After months of planning, the Center for International Studies launched its expanded and refurbished website this fall. The site includes a new look for the homepage, links to useful websites (at MIT and elsewhere), a search function, comprehensive directions to Building E38, and, generally speaking, more detailed information about the Center and its activities.

The site also includes a “spotlight” on the homepage about people and programs at CIS, as well as a changing list of upcoming events — events pulled from the new CIS events calendar. (Center staff can now simultaneously post events on the MIT and CISWeb calendars.)

A major new component of the site is a searchable fellowship database that combines information culled by CIS, the Department of Political Science, and the Department of Urban Studies and Planning — the first time all three groups’ listings have been collected and made accessible online.

The fellowship database — found by clicking the button “Funding Opportunities” under the homepage heading “About CIS”, or by going to http://web.mit.edu/cis/dbssearch.html — offers students and researchers information on funding sources for tuition, travel expenses, and field research costs, as well as support for dissertation writing.

According to Deirdre Siddalls, manager of the database project, the database records, which will be updated regularly, have an international focus and include hyperlinks, proposal deadline dates, and award amounts and descriptions. “The idea is to make it easier and faster for students to identify appropriate, current grant opportunities, and, with one click, to hyper-link to each grantmaker’s latest award guidelines.”

To submit comments or questions about the database, or to comment on the CIS website changes, e-mail Dee at deesid@mit.edu. To suggest a spotlight or news item for the homepage, e-mail Amy Tarr, CIS Director of Public Programs, at attarr@mit.edu.

ANNUAL REPORT TO MIT NOW ONLINE

Each year, MIT publishes a President’s Report detailing the activities and accomplishments of the Institute’s departments and research centers during the previous academic year. Information on CIS that was published in the 2003 MIT President’s Report can be found on the Center’s revamped website, at http://web.mit.edu/cis/www.html.
This fall, SSP Senior Research Associate and Seminar XXI Program Director Robert Art has given talks about his book A Grand Strategy for America (Cornell University Press, 2003) at Tufts, Harvard, The Woodrow Wilson Center, the Cato Institute, and Georgetown. In addition, he has spoken about The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, a volume he edited with Patrick Cronin, at U.C. San Diego, The Naval Postgraduate School, and Stanford.

In June, SSP graduate student Vanda Felbabova presented her paper, “The Coca Connection,” to the Women in International Security Summer Symposium in Washington, D.C.

On May 14, Dean Philip S. Khoury presented the Dean’s Award for Distinguished Service to the School of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences to Professors Richard J. Samuels and Suzanne Berger for their leadership in international education and research at MIT. Samuels is Ford International Professor of Political Science and the Director of CIS. Berger is the Raphael Dorman and Helen Starbuck Professor of Political Science and founding director of the MIT International Science and Technology Initiatives (MISTI). Each received $10,000 stipends. This fall, Professor Berger’s book, The First Globalization: Lessons from the French, was awarded the French Senate’s Prix Européen du Livre d’Economie, and Professor Samuel’s book, Machiavelli’s Children: Leaders and Their Legacies in Italy and Japan, was awarded the 2004 Marraro Prize from the Society for Italian Historical Studies.

In September, Sarah Kenyon Lischer’s book manuscript, “Catalysts of Conflict: Refugees, Rebels, and Humanitarian Aid”, was accepted for publication by Cornell University Press. Lischer, who received her Ph.D. in Political Science from MIT in September 2002, now teaches in the Department of Government at Sweet Briar College in Virginia. Her article “Collateral Damage: Humanitarian Assistance as a Cause of Conflict,” was published in the summer 2003 issue of International Security.

Thomas L. Neff, a CIS Research Affiliate, traveled to Zelenogorsk in Eastern Siberia in June 2003 to visit the electrochemical combine there. The closed nuclear city, previously known by its postal address as Krasnoyarsk-45, plays a key role in destroying highly enriched uranium (HEU) coming from Russian nuclear weapons and turning it into fuel for U.S. nuclear power plants. So far, more than 8,000 Russian nuclear weapons have been turned into electricity used in the U.S., reports Neff, who was involved in the bilateral arrangement that made the conversion possible. Neff says that he has since proposed a “science, technology and medicine” initiative that would supply the West with specialized isotopes and other products, making possible beneficial research and applications that would otherwise be too expensive to pursue — as well as new business for Russian weapons facilities. Neff’s work was mentioned in a recent PBS special, Avoiding Armageddon, hosted by Walter Cronkite.

On leave this year, Professor Melissa Nobles is a Fellow at the Radcliffe Center for Advanced Study at Harvard University.

Barry Posen was recently named Ford International Professor of Political Science.

In June, Sharon Stanton Russell, a CIS Senior Research Scholar and Chair of the
Steering Group of the Inter-University Committee on International Migration, served as a temporary member of the Social Sciences and Population Study Section, one of the peer review groups convened by the Center for Scientific Review of the National Institutes of Health to evaluate investigator-initiated grant applications submitted to the NIH.


**New Faces**

This fall, Gracia McGovern joined MISTI as the MIT-Germany Program Coordinator. She replaced Sigrid Berka, who is on a one-year leave of absence. Gracia, who has taught German conversation and English writing at the secondary school and college levels, worked as a freelance German/English medical translator and interpreter in the Seattle area for 10 years. She was born in Rome and raised in Germany, and is conversationally proficient in Italian, Spanish and French, in addition to German.

Daniela Reichert is MISTI’s new MIT Japan Program Coordinator. As International Relations Coordinator for the German Rectors Conference, Daniela was in charge of fostering exchange between Higher Education Institutions in Germany and the Asia-Pacific region. Prior to moving to Boston with her family in the summer of 2002, she lived in Tokyo for five years, working in public relations in both the public and private sectors. Daniela holds an M.A. in Japanology and Sinology, and spent three years studying in Tokyo and in Wuhan, P.R.C. She is fluent in Japanese and Mandarin.

Gabrielle Watson has joined the Program on Human Rights and Justice as a Research Fellow. A former MIT urban planning graduate student (MCP, ’92), Gabrielle was, most recently, co-director of the Centro de Derechos Económicos y Sociales in Quito, Ecuador. She is the co-author of Advocacy for Social Justice: A Global Action and Reflection Guide (Kumarian, 2001), a book project carried out with Oxfam America and the Advocacy Institute. At the PHRJ, she will work on a project entitled “Promoting Export Credit Agency Accountability to International Human Rights Law.”

Shweta Saxena, a political scientist and freelance journalist from India, joins SSP this year as a researcher. Specializing in South Asian conventional and nuclear security issues, she completed postgraduate studies in International Politics from Delhi University. Her dissertation, “Confidence Building Measures between India and Pakistan — Beyond Simla Agreement,” forms the basis for her work at CIS.

Lt. Col. Raymond E. Coia, U.S.M.C., is one of this year’s SSP military fellows. A graduate of the Officer Candidate School, Lt. Col. Coia has served in Lebanon, Iraq, Kosovo, and Bosnia. From June 2001 to June 2003, he commanded the 2nd Reconnaissance Battalion, 2nd Marine Division. He has extensive experience in signals intelligence and political-military planning and has received a Bronze Star, among other service medals.

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Lt. Cmdr. Van Gurley is this year’s SSP Navy Fellow. Prior to his arrival at MIT, Gurley was the Assistant Operations Officer for the GEORGE WASHINGTON Carrier Battle Group. He participated in the initial Navy homeland defense operations in the wake of the September 11th attacks, and served in the Mediterranean, the Arabian Sea, and the Persian Gulf in support of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan and SOUTHERN WATCH in Iraq. Originally a submarine officer, he is now a Navy oceanographer.

Lt. Col. William Bruce Danskine is SSP’s Air Force Fellow for 2003-2004. He holds a Senior Navigator aeronautical rating as an electronic warfare officer, with over 3900 flight hours in the RC-135 global reconnaissance aircraft, and has participated in numerous reconnaissance missions, including in China, Korea, Iraq and the Balkans. Prior to the start of his National Defense Fellowship, Lt. Col. Danskine was Chief of the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Branch in the Intelligence Directorate of the U.S. European Command in Stuttgart, Germany, and authored the counterterrorism campaign plan for European Command. He has a broad background in electronic warfare, time-sensitive targeting, campaign planning and ISR sensor integration.

On September 21st, the MIT Japan Program co-sponsored a performance at MIT by the Kuruma Ningyo Puppet Theater. A 19th-century art form, Kuruma Ningyo, or “wheeled puppet theater,” features exquisitely crafted large-scale puppets manipulated by a puppeteer on a small wheeled seat. Performing with the puppets was distinguished Shinbunai singer Wakasanojo Tsuruga XI.

Guilliano Amato, twice a Prime Minister of Italy and currently vice president of the European Constitution Convention — the entity that drafted Europe’s new constitution, which is currently being considered for adoption by the European Union — spoke at an MIT-Italy event on October 3rd. Amato, who has headed center-left coalitions in Italy and is a member of the Italian Senate, said in his talk that Europe is unlikely to become a federal state, its members remaining unwilling to give up power on a variety of issues, from education to welfare to pension policies. At the same time, he said the EU has shown an impressive ability to achieve uniform regulations, thereby enhancing its commercial competitiveness.
Publications by CIS Authors

Robert Art, Director/Seminar XXI Program and SSP Senior Fellow


Suzanne Berger, Professor of Political Science


Geoffrey Forden, SSP Senior Research Associate

“Strategic uses for China’s Bei Dou satellite system,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (October 2003).

Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Ford International Assistant Professor of Law and Development and Director of the MIT Program on Human Rights & Justice


Sharon Stanton Russell, CIS Senior Research Associate


Gabrielle Watson, Fellow, Program on Human Rights and Justice

“Race to the Bottom, Take II: An Assessment of Sustainable Development Achievements of ECA-Supported Projects Two Years After OECD Common Approaches Rev 6,” ECA-Watch (September 2003).

Barry R. Posen, Professor of Political Science


Peter C. Evans, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Science


SSP Graduate Student Gregory Koblentz

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