The anthrax letter attacks in the fall of 2001 provided a vivid demonstration of the increasing threat posed by biological weapons. Since the signing of the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972, the number of states believed to be pursuing biological weapons programs has tripled, from four to 13. But while a handful of political scientists have addressed the military threat posed by biological weapons, none has developed or applied a theoretical framework that allows for a comprehensive assessment of the threat posed by biological weapons to international security.

This lack of rigorous analysis contrasts sharply with a rich literature on the impact of nuclear weapons that has developed since the dawn of the nuclear age in 1945. Although not as sudden and dramatic as the nuclear revolution, the effects of the biotechnology revolution may be just as profound. As Harvard Professor of Molecular and Cellular Biology Matthew Meselson has noted, every major technological advance in history has ultimately been exploited for military purposes, and the revolution in biotechnology could allow even small states to develop the means to destroy life on a massive scale.

In the 1990s, a number of factors shifted biological weapons from the margins of international security affairs to center stage. First, revelations about the nature and extent of the Iraqi and Soviet biological warfare programs dispelled the myth that biological weapons are of limited military utility and therefore do not pose a significant threat to the West. Second, the increasing diffusion of advanced biotechnologies, which are widely used in civilian industries, has made biological weapons more accessible and potentially more powerful than ever before. Third, states and terrorist groups pursuing an asymmetric strategy to neutralize the conventional military superiority possessed by the United States may increasingly turn to biological weapons. Given the relatively low financial, scientific and industrial barriers to producing biological weapons, the vulnerability of Western societies and armed forces to these weapons, and the weakness of the international biological weapons control regime, biological weapons are...
ASSESSING THE THREAT
Continued from previous page

weapons may become the strategic weapon of choice in the twenty-first century. Thus, there is a pressing need to better understand the impact of the spread of this type of military technology on international security.

Biological weapons and offense-defense theory

Offense-defense theory, which has helped bring the security implications of conventional and nuclear military technologies into focus, also provides a framework for assessing the impact of biological weapons, for analyzing how this threat shapes states’ behaviors, and for formulating policies that could be adopted to reduce this danger. According to offense-defense theory, the security competition between states will be most severe when offensive military operations are perceived as being easy, and when offensive weapons cannot be distinguished from defensive ones. Robert Jervis writes that under these conditions, “There is no way to get security without menacing others, and security through defense is terribly difficult to obtain.” As a result, arms control will fail, secrecy will be tighter and more dangerous, and arms racing will be more intense.

My research indicates that biological warfare strongly favors the offense, and that it is difficult to distinguish between offensive and defensive programs. Biological weapons are cheaper and easier to produce than the defenses against them. They are also well suited to surprise attacks. This offensive advantage is bolstered by several characteristics of biological weapons: the range of potential agents available to the attacker, the difficulty for a defender to determine in advance what the threat agents are, the lack of effective treatments for many agents, the length of time required to develop new pharmaceuticals once a threat is identified, and the difficulty in detecting a biological attack in time to administer an effective treatment. States also find it difficult to distinguish between offensive and defensive biological warfare programs due to the dual-use nature of biotechnology, the similarities between offensive and defensive research, and the need for defensive programs to conduct some offensive research. These findings are also reflected in the perceptions of biological warfare by decision-makers and scientists.

Unlike strategic nuclear weapons, however, the offensive power of biological weapons does not provide states with an effective strategic deterrent. Nuclear weapons act as a deterrent when they provide a state with the assured ability to inflict unacceptable damage against an enemy. Biological weapons do not currently provide a state with this capability. Since biological weapons rely on surprise for much of their effectiveness, states must shroud their programs in extensive secrecy. This need for secrecy restricts a state’s ability to communicate credible deterrent threats. In addition, the high degree of uncertainty associated with biological weapons reduces a state’s confidence in its ability to inflict unacceptable damage against an adversary. For these two reasons, biological weapons should be rated as poor deterrent weapons, especially compared to nuclear weapons.
Thus, states interested primarily in defending the status quo will not find biological weapons attractive, while dissatisfied states seeking an offensive capability will view these weapons more favorably. This finding has implications for the pattern of biological weapons proliferation as well as the nature of the doctrines of those states that develop these weapons. Since biological warfare strongly favors the offense and offensive and defensive biological warfare programs are very difficult to distinguish, offense-defense theory strongly predicts that efforts to control biological weapons will fail, secrecy surrounding these weapons will be extremely tight, arms racing will be intense, and status quo states will forgo or abandon biological weapons programs. Thus, the case of biological warfare provides a doubly-decisive test of offense-defense theory: the presence of the predicted behaviors provides strong support for the theory while the absence of the predicted behaviors weakens the theory.

These findings bode ill for a world where biotechnology is widely exploited for military purposes. Since these weapons are more effective as a means of attack than as a means of deterrence, states will likely view the development of biological warfare programs among adversaries with alarm. The security dilemma will provide incentives for even status quo states to engage in arms competitions and hinder arms control efforts. With the latent capabilities for biological warfare already widespread, the only impediment to the further proliferation of biological weapons will be a nation’s intentions. Since intentions are notoriously hard to gauge accurately, misperceptions and miscalculations are likely. As a result, arms control will fail, secrecy will be tighter and more dangerous, and arms racing will be more intense. In addition, these weapons will be actively pursued by states dissatisfied with the status quo. The proliferation of biological weapons and their enabling technologies will have a destabilizing influence on international security.

**Policy implications**

How can this outcome be avoided? The three key policies to reduce the dangers posed by biological weapons are to strengthen defenses against biological weapons, to enhance transparency of national biological warfare programs, and to reinforce the norm against the development and use of these weapons. Strengthening defenses against biological weapons will make these weapons unattractive and less likely to be used in future conflicts. This can be accomplished by shifting the offense-defense balance toward defense, investing sufficient resources in defense to offset the advantage held by the offense, or a combination of both of these measures. Strengthening defenses against biological weapons will require reinvigorated efforts in several areas including intelligence, research and development, and nonproliferation. Even if the United States is unable to dramatically reduce the advantage of the offense in biological warfare, the United States and its allies are wealthy enough to invest the resources necessary to neutralize that advantage.

It is important, however, that these efforts be accompanied by transparency measures so that these defensive programs are not misinterpreted by other states as threatening. This potential problem was highlighted by the recent controversy surrounding biological warfare research conducted by the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. Enhancing the transparency of national biological warfare programs would enable states to distinguish between offensive and defensive programs and make accurate threat assessments. This objective can only be achieved by a combination of cooperative means (such as confidence-building measures) and non-cooperative methods (such as espionage).

Norms against the development and use of biological weapons must also be strengthened to reduce the motivations of states to acquire these weapons or gain operational experience with them.
TALL TALES AND DECEPTIVE DISCOURSES

BY HUGH GUSTERSON

Weapons systems, treaties, and strategies come to seem right (or wrong) in the context of the stories we tell ourselves about them. Social scientists and historians call these stories discourses. Sometimes new discourses (like our discourse on civil rights) originate from below and eventually gain enough credibility that they are coopted by the government. Other discourses (like the discourse on deterrence during the Cold War) originate within the government, and within the tight circle of think tanks that speaks to the government and are then propagated outward through society by waves of speech-making and media dissemination.

From time to time there are sharp historical breaks as new stories and propositions become accepted with startling suddenness. Senior officials in the Bush administration are now trying to create this kind of radical shift in our discourse about nuclear weapons.

The Cold War saw the rise of an official discourse on nuclear weapons that is now looking more than a little tattered. Its chief assumptions were that the genie had escaped the bottle in a dangerous world, and that nuclear weapons could not be abolished — and anyone who thought otherwise was naïve or worse. That even though the two superpowers were inevitable rivals racing to improve their arsenals, they were rational enough to manage their competition in ways that would not cause a nuclear war; that the arms race could be channeled and disciplined, though not prevented, by arms control treaties; and that certain avenues of competition were destabilizing and should therefore be foreclosed by mutual agreement. These included a race to build defensive anti-missile systems and a race to put nuclear, anti-satellite, or anti-ballistic weapons in space.

After the Cold War, this way of looking at the world began to look increasingly outmoded. The Clinton administration attempted to strike up some new discursive themes, but its attempts were undercut by their own half-heartedness. For example, the administration made some vague remarks about moving toward a world without nuclear weapons, but it failed to negotiate any new arms reductions and it proclaimed through its Nuclear Posture Review that the United States would rely on nuclear weapons for its security for the indefinite future. Similarly, Clinton administration officials said that they supported the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty only to sponsor research and development programs that pointed in the direction of its erosion or demise. And President Clinton spoke of a new global order founded on strong international treaties and institutions only to wage war in Kosovo without U.N. approval and to walk away from an international convention on landmines.

The second Bush administration, on the other hand, has attempted to use the debate about ballistic missile defense to transform the official discourse on nuclear weapons and arms control. It has sought to dramatically redefine the U.S.-Russian relationship, the morality and effectiveness of deterrence, and the significance of arms control. If some of the statements made by administration officials had been uttered by President Clinton, they would have met with Republican derision.

The Bush administration has also appropriated some of the anti-nuclear movement’s rhetoric, only to use it in support of a further round of militarization.

It is now becoming axiomatic that leaders of “rogue states,” unlike the old Soviet leaders, cannot be deterred by nuclear weapons.

Hugh Gusterson is an associate professor in the Program on Science, Technology, and Society and a CIS affiliate. This article is excerpted from “Tall Tales and Deceptive Discourses” in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists; 57:6, Chicago; Nov/Dec 2001. Reprinted with permission of the publisher.
The new discourse, like its predecessor, starts with the assumption that the world is a very dangerous place, although the source of danger is no longer Soviet-style militant communism, but the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to “rogue states.” As Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz recently testified to Congress: “The short-range missile threat to our friends, allies, and deployed forces arrived a decade ago; the intermediate missile threat is now here; and the long-range threat to American cities is just over the horizon — a matter of years, not decades, away — and our people and territory are defenseless.”

Within the old discourse, military threats from abroad were used to justify nuclear deterrence. No longer. Remarkably, it is now becoming axiomatic that leaders of “rogue states,” unlike the old Soviet leaders, cannot be deterred by nuclear weapons. This axiom is being used to justify not only the development of missile defenses but also a new, earth-penetrating “mini-nuke” that would supposedly hold the leaders of “rogue states” personally at risk in their underground bunkers. Although there is no evidence to support it, and the argument seems plausible only within the context of racist assumptions about Third World leaders’ lack of rationality, the proposition that nuclear deterrence does not work on “rogue states” is now treated as self-evident by government officials.

Just as an earlier generation of government officials would have said, “nuclear weapons keep the peace” as if merely articulating the obvious, so our current officials simply claim as fact that leaders of countries like Iraq, Iran, and North Korea cannot be deterred by nuclear weapons. Thus, Richard Perle, an assistant secretary of defense under Ronald Reagan and a member of a Pentagon advisory board, said of Saddam Hussein, “I really don’t want to count on the rational judgment of a man who used poison gas against his own people.” And Paul Wolfowitz asked rhetorically, “If Saddam Hussein had the ability to strike a Western capital with a nuclear weapon, would he really be deterred by the prospect of a U.S. nuclear strike that would kill millions of Iraqis?”

Those who thought the answer to Wolfowitz’s question would be “Yes, of course he would be deterred,” would find themselves in disagreement with the editors of The New York Times, whose reaction has typified the extraordinary credulousness with which the media have received such claims. A May 2, 2001 New York Times editorial, repeating the new common sense, said: “By their nature, rogue nations, sometimes ruled by irrational dictators, cannot be assumed to respond to the Cold War deterrence of ‘mutually assured destruction.’”

The next day, Times columnist William Safire drove the point home, asking, “Why should we make it possible for some tinfoil dictator, unconcerned about retaliation, to hold an American city hostage?” What we see happening here — aided and abetted by a striking lack of skepticism in the media — is the creation of a new axiom for what Jonathan Schell has called the “second nuclear age.”

The flip side of the emphasis on new threats from rogue states is an insistence that the old threat, Russia, is no longer an enemy. For example, Wolfowitz told the Senate that “we are engaged in discussions with Russia on a new security framework that reflects the fact that the Cold War is over and that the U.S. and Russia are not enemies.” And George Bush, taking aim at the ABM Treaty, said that “Russia is not an enemy of the United States and yet we still go to a treaty that assumes Russia is the enemy, a treaty that says the whole concept of peace is based on us blowing each other up. I don’t think that makes sense any more.”

The truth is, of course, that Russia may no longer be the enemy it once was, but it is not exactly a friend either. Friends do not keep thousands of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert targeted against one another. Nor do they expel one another’s diplomats forty at a time. The new discourse overstates the transformation of U.S.-Russian relations so as to delegitimize the ABM Treaty the two countries signed in 1972 as a relic of the past, opening the way for construction of George Bush’s cherished missile defense system. Bush administration officials have even suggested that treaties in general have become useless fetishes, revered out of habit, and that the fast-moving world of today requires a more flexible approach than treaties allow. Condoleezza Rice, George Bush’s national security adviser, has said, for example,

continued on next page
There’s a good reason not to get into 15-year negotiations, which is what it has taken to create arms control treaties.” She also made the following remarkable statement:

“I was one of the High Priestesses of Arms Control — a true believer. Like so many others, I eagerly anticipated those breathtaking moments of summitry where the centerpiece was always the signing of the latest arms control treaty; the toast; the handshake; and with Brezhnev, the bear hug. For those precious few moments the world found comfort in seeing the superpowers affirm their peaceful intent. And the scientists would set the clock back a few minutes further away from midnight. Deep down we knew that arms control was a poor substitute for a real agenda based on common aspirations. …But along the way to the next summit something happened. History happened, 1989. So, while many of us were debating the implications of MIRVs [multiple independent reentry vehicles] on SS-18s and Peacekeepers like so many angels dancing on a warhead, the forces of history were making the old paradigm obsolete. “…We cannot cling to the old order like medieval scholars clinging to a Ptolemaic system even after the Copernican revolution. We must recognize that the strategic world we grew up in has been turned upside down.”

This futuristic rhetoric is one of the most striking features of the new nuclear discourse, and it signifies a bold theft of the disarmament movement’s rhetorical fire by the ideologues of the Pentagon. Cold War nuclear discourse was full of appeals for “caution,” “realism,” and “stability,” making a virtue of its distrust for radical measures, where the new nuclear discourse is all about futuristic weapons and bold measures. One might have expected to hear of the need for visionary thinking, the hopeful possibilities if only we can break with the assumptions of yesterday, from partisans of disarmament. Instead, we hear this discourse from Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Perle, and Paul Wolfowitz — veteran Cold Warriors all — who use it as a battering ram against the ABM Treaty.

“The ABM Treaty is a relic of the past,” President Bush said recently. “The days of the Cold War have ended, and so must the Cold War mentality, as far as I’m concerned.”

Paul Wolfowitz used similar language: “A 30-year-old treaty designed to preserve the balance of terror during the Cold War must not be allowed to prevent us from taking steps to protect our people, our forces, and our allies.”

Virginia’s John Warner, the ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, concurred: “The ABM Treaty has outlived its justification and foundations.” Likewise, his colleague, North Carolina’s Sen. Jesse Helms, said, “Russia must come to grips with the fact that the Cold War is over. It is time to scrap the ABM Treaty.”

This new rhetoric is more indebted to the logic of advertising than of strategic thinking. Advertisers use rhetoric glibly to create perceptions rather than to argue for truths, and they have learned that one of the easiest ways to discredit rival products, whatever their manifest virtues, is to make them seem old and outdated compared to one’s own. While it is arguably the thinking of Rumsfeld, Cheney, and Wolfowitz that is old and outdated, these creators of the new nuclear discourse have learned that by simply likening the ABM Treaty to mom and dad’s Oldsmobile they do not need to get their hands dirty with arguments about the precise relationship between the ABM Treaty and strategic stability.

Perhaps the most extraordinary achievement of these purveyors of the new nuclear discourse is to have appropriated anti-nuclear critiques of nuclear deterrence in the service of a new generation of weaponry. Officials who only a decade ago would have derided the naivete of disarmament advocates who criticized nuclear deterrence now sound like their erstwhile opponents. Paul Wolfowitz, for example,
striking a sentimental note, began his recent testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee by saying that, in Israel during the Gulf War, “We saw children walking to school carrying gas masks in gaily decorated boxes—no doubt to try to distract them from the possibility of facing mass destruction. They were awfully young to have to think about the unthinkable.”

Jesse Helms, a staunch defender of deterrence throughout the Cold War, told the Senate two months earlier that it was time to “dispense with the illogical and immoral concept of mutually assured destruction.” And Condoleezza Rice, recycling an argument often made by the anti-nuclear movement in the 1980s, said that “we need to recognize that just as peace is not the absence of war, stability is not a balance of terror.”

The new nuclear discourse holds out the hope that the United States and Russia can be friends. Also, that although rising military powers in the Third World may not be rational, we can be safe from their weapons of mass destruction, and indeed from the entire depressing logic of mutually assured destruction—if only we can let go of the ABM Treaty and build a new generation of defensive weapons that are almost within our technical grasp. Such weapons, being purely defensive, “threaten no one,” in the words of Donald Rumsfeld. “They bother no one, except a country...that thinks they want [to] have ballistic missiles to impose their will on their neighbors.”

“All discourses, especially government discourses, have something to hide, and this one is no exception. Although the Bush administration speaks of missile defense as a purely defensive technology designed to protect the United States from “rogue states” and not to change the balance of power with established nuclear powers, I have it on good authority from sources in the Clinton White House that, in their conversations out of public view, Pentagon planners are very interested in ways in which missile defense might be able to neutralize the 20 single-warhead missiles in China capable of hitting the United States, thus effectively disarming China.”

Although Bush administration officials like to tell the public that missile defense is not “a matter of gaining advantage over anyone,” they tell the Senate something different. Thus Wolfowitz recently testified that “the countries pursuing these [ballistic missile] capabilities are doing so because...they believe that if they can hold the American people at risk, they can...deter us from defending our interests around the world. They may secure, in their estimation, the capability to prevent us from forming international coalitions to challenge their acts of aggression and force us into a truly isolationist posture. And they would not even have to use the weapons in their possession to affect our behavior and achieve their ends.” In other words, ballistic missile defense is a new means to the old dream of the Cold Warriors: achieving nuclear superiority. Insofar as it is about doing away with deterrence, it is only about abolishing the ability of other countries to deter the United States. As British anti-nuclear activist Helen Johns put it, “Ballistic missile defense is the armed wing of globalization. It is a euphemism for plans to ensure U.S. military and economic domination of the planet.”

The new nuclear discourse puts the disarmament movement in an awkward position. Its traditional rhetoric about the possibility of reconciliation with Russia and the existential darkness of deterrence have been hijacked by today’s superannuated Cold Warriors as a way of justifying the abrogation of old arms control treaties, the construction of new weapons, and the militarization of space. Thus the movement is left either defending nuclear deterrence or arguing for nuclear abolition—a goal that strikes much of the public as no less idealistic than the Pentagon’s Buck Rogers scheme for missile defense. But unless the disarmament movement learns to tell a compelling new story soon, very soon, the tall stories being told by the Bush administration will become the stories for our age.
Roger Petersen, a new affiliate at the Center for International Studies, joined MIT’s Political Science Department in September 2001. Precis sat down with him in December to discuss his forthcoming book, Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth Century Eastern Europe, and his current research project.

précis: In your book, you take the motivations to participate in or support ethnic violence as inherent in human nature. What do you get from this Hobbesian view?

Roger Petersen: While I do think that human beings have an inherent capacity for violence, I wouldn’t exaggerate how much I see this capacity as a major part of my work.

In my first book, Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe, I refer very little to emotion or psychology. That book asked how weaker people — people with fewer arms and fewer numbers — sustain violence against a strong regime. In my primary case, Lithuanians rebelling against the Soviets, I found the answer in social norms and how norms operate within networks. In many situations people are calculating risk, but their calculations are affected by norms: loyalty to their families or their communities. In some situations I find that norms are the most important factor in explaining violence.

My second book, Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth Century Eastern Europe, is more about how stronger people beat up on weaker people. The powerful can commit violence when they want to, basically, so the question is why they do it against certain targets and at certain times. The key question here concerns motivation. One of the motivations for ethnic violence is emotion: [the fact] that people hate, resent, and fear. These emotions help simplify the complexity. Individuals often hold multiple identities and multiple goals. But at certain times individuals come to hold that “I am X; they are Y; Y should be the target of violence.” How does the world get that simple? I posit that human beings have the innate capacity to make things simple through emotion. The Understanding Ethnic Violence book tries to understand the processes and conditions when this phenomenon occurs.

précis: You explicitly question the assumption in many of the social sciences of stable preferences. Obviously, even people working within the rational choice tradition, people who make that assumption, realize that it’s a highly simplifying one. If you relax it, how do you deal with the complexity that results?

Petersen: Jon Elster once wrote that “The alternative to rationality is chaos.” He wrote that a long time ago. Now he doesn’t deal with rationality as much. In a similar fashion, I’ve come to believe that the alternative to rationality is not chaos. Emotions and norms are amenable to social science inquiry. Not only that, but they are so much a part of human behavior that explanations of many important events — violence for example — are incomplete without their inclusion.

précis: You identify four emotions that can trigger ethnic violence: fear, hatred, resentment, and rage. How do these emotions become salient, and how do they result in violence?
**Petersen:** At its core, ethnic violence is a phenomenon that’s just a radical simplification of the world, in terms of who the enemy is, who the target should be, and what we should do against them. Should we try to humiliate it, kill it, or eliminate it? I took four families of theories already in the literature and highlighted how they come to see this phenomenon, this simplification, occurring. In each case, there’s an implicit idea about emotions. What I’m doing is making that idea explicit.

The ‘fear’ idea is related to the security dilemma literature. If you sense that you’re going to be attacked, then you will attack the source of that fear; you’re going to attack the most threatening group. A lot of people leave aside the emotional aspect, but in much of this writing there’s an implicit understanding that people’s emotion is affecting how information is processed and filtered.

Resentment is based on the social psychology literature, specifically, on how humans naturally think in terms of group hierarchies. When a stable hierarchy is disturbed, there’s often a reaction against it. Status reversals, for example, provide an emotion, a motivation, to use violence to recreate the pre-existing hierarchy. Under the power of this emotion, individuals essentialize group identities and become willing to participate or support ethnic violence.

Hatred is formed from ideas taken out of the cultural anthropology. The central feature here is the existence of culturally embedded schemas that inform the individual about the nature of the situation and the appropriateness of violence. While these schemas are usually latent, events can bring out active schemas, and then identify a target and simplify the world: we are X, they are Y, etc.

Rage is based on frustration/aggression. There’s a huge body of literature in social science on scapegoats. When goals become thwarted an emotion is subsequently generated that drives the individual to find a release through violence. In *Understanding Ethnic Violence*, I create four different narratives based on these emotional mechanisms. Each predicts a different pattern in terms of variation in timing and targets of violence. I then identify puzzling variation in a host of cases across Eastern Europe in the 20th century and see which one of these narratives best explains these puzzles.

**précis:** Of the four, which hypotheses proved predominant?

**Petersen:** All of them exist; they are all plausible. But in Eastern Europe resentment explains violence better than the others. In Eastern Europe, rural populations became urban, realized that they occupied a subordinate status, and were motivated by resentment to believe they should be dominant. They first eliminated the former empires, then they often used violence to subordinate urban minorities. What you’re left with is twenty-some nation-states all based on one dominant ethnic group.

To a great extent, I make a modernization argument. The most widely read work on modernization and nationalism is probably Ernest Gellner’s *Nations and Nationalism*. I largely agree with Gellner’s basic view, but his argument completely lacks microfoundations or mechanisms. I think that resentment provides this powerful theory with a micromechanism.

**précis:** You suggest that scholars are often too quick to assume that people follow leaders — that ethnic violence is orchestrated as a top-down project.

**Petersen:** Of course, leaders can affect violent outcomes. But the role of leadership is an empirical question; its power shouldn’t be automatically assumed. Secondly, I feel that leadership is difficult to incorporate in a broadly comparative research project on ethnic violence. I try to create systematic narratives that flow in a very general way that allows for

---

*At certain times, individuals come to hold that “I am X, they are Y; Y should be the target of violence.” How does the world get that simple?*

---

continued on next page
broad comparison across time and space. I posit paths that all deal with the same overall progression: recognizable structural changes affect information that in turn affect beliefs and create emotions that constrain and direct violent action. Often the chain doesn’t follow this general path. When it doesn’t, I look at leadership as a reason.

I would also add that my current project is more based on how elites try to use people’s emotion.

précis: That’s your Kosovo research. Why is Kosovo a good case for looking at elite manipulations of ethnic sentiment? Because it’s so fresh?

Petersen: One reason I’m looking at Kosovo is that some of my wife’s relatives are Kosovo Serbs, so I have access into this community that probably no other academic has. I did preliminary work there last summer, to see whether I could really do this kind of research. I found I could really get in.

The Kosovo Serbs are a group of at most a quarter of a million people. This relatively small size allows for manageable research. Also, Kosovo has been a major issue in the demise of Yugoslavia. Milosevic started out with Kosovo as his main issue — really a very popular issue — of establishing Serb rights, or dominance, against the Albanians. Finally, Kosovo is still a very active contest. Right now you’ve got 100,000 Serbs left in Kosovo, and 100,000 who own property but are across the line, and no one knows how it will exactly end up. Will Serbs accommodate themselves to the new political conditions? Will they try to obstruct any solution? Will the refugees return?

précis: In the introduction to your second book, you say that one test of the explanatory power of emotions as a root of ethnic violence will be an indication that politics do not matter as much as people think. If politics have little impact on ethnic violence, what does that mean for the prospect of policy proscriptions?

Petersen: Unfortunately, I don’t have many policy prescriptions. I do like nation-states, however. I think that culture and language are very important. Nation-states are good creations. They make sure culture is protected.

What people don’t want is outsiders establishing their dominance. Once peoples are assured that they will never be subordinated to others in their day-to-day lives, then international cooperation on a host of issues becomes easier. Eastern Europe is in the process of solving this issue. Unfortunately, a lot of bloodshed occurred while getting there.

précis: And the future of multi-ethnic states?

Petersen: People think it’s all about security, economics. Those are important things. But I think that at the core, there’s an idea about group respect and dignity embodied in the protection of culture. We have to find ways in which individuals can possess this dignity within multiethnic environments. This is difficult, because comparing your own group’s position with that of other groups is a very natural thing to do. These comparisons, in a multiethnic environment, will almost always concentrate on negative features. Each group tends to see the dominant position of other groups.

On a related note, globalization is really a threat to perceptions of dignity. One, it takes many important economic decisions from the hands of peoples. Two, with increased mass communication, you can turn on the television and see how badly you live compared to other people. Communication leads to comparison, and comparison can lead to ideas about dignity and lack of dignity, and lack of justice. I’m actually not very hopeful for the 21st century. I think it will be a tough century.
CIS FORUM CONSIDERS CHINA POLICY

“The question is not whether, but when and how force will be used to compel Taiwan to negotiate with China,” said Chas Freeman, co-chair of the US-China Policy Council and a former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, at a recent CIS public forum on US-China relations that drew a crowd of more than two hundred to the Wong Auditorium.

The aim of the event, which was held on February 25 as part of the CIS Forum @ MIT series, was to assess the economic and military threats that a rising China poses to the United States.

Agreeing with Ambassador Freeman that Americans should pay close attention to tensions in East Asia, MIT Prof. Thomas Christensen said that the chances of US military conflict with China were “too likely for comfort.” Others on the panel were more optimistic, however. Harvey Feldman, Senior Fellow for Asia at the Heritage Foundation, argued that the growth of economic integration between mainland China and Taiwan has persuaded the mainland to drop its antagonistic policies toward Taiwan and adopt a new one instead: ‘Come and make money.’

A rising China?

Taking a middle view was another of the high-level panelists, Harry Harding, Dean of the Elliot School of International Affairs at George Washington University, who said “the concerns about a China threat are greatly overstated, but they should be taken seriously.”

According to Professor Harding, there are a number of reasons why many in the United States regard China as a threat. Realists predict that any rising power (in this case, China) will cause the status quo power (the US) to feel relatively less secure, and spark a security dilemma. Countries that are economically interdependent can still come into conflict, because “clubs will always trump diamonds,” he explained. Others take the position that China presents particular concerns because of its communist history, authoritarian present, or what is perceived as its inherent aggression.

For Ambassador Freeman, a former Director of Chinese Affairs at the State Department, some Americans’ concerns over China—prior to September 11, 2001—were the result of post-Cold War “enemy-deprivation syndrome,” with the Chinese replacing the Soviets as enemy number one. China is also a convenient enemy for the US Defense Department, he said, because a China that credibly threatens the US with intercontinental ballistic missiles provides the best model for a US missile defense program.

An economic threat?

The panelists noted that concern about mainland China has also grown in some quarters in the US because of China’s huge economic growth, and predictions that that country’s economy will soon rival and surpass that of the United States. With a booming economy and a large population, China would be able to equip and command a large and powerful army.

Eric Heginbotham, a Ph.D. candidate at MIT and a visiting professor at Boston College, deflated those concerns. “China is a weak, developing state that is not now and will not become a peer competitor of the US in the near future,” he said. China’s GDP is one-tenth of the

continued on next page
US GDP, and GDP per capita in China is 2.5 percent of that in the US. Moreover, China’s current growth rate shows signs of slowing, and social and political problems are likely to challenge continued growth, he added.

Edward Steinfeld, Assistant Professor of Political Science at MIT, said that further economic growth in China is threatened by its weak institutions. “The enforcement of contracts in China is very problematic. If a firm is not sure whether it will get paid, it will stay local, where at least the manager knows people and local officials may help you out if you get in trouble.” Staying small prevents firms from developing proprietary processes, he continued, and “unless Chinese firms develop knowledge-based skills, they will not be competitive.”

**War over Taiwan?**

The group also discussed whether China could threaten the United States by destabilizing the Asia Pacific region — even if it does not become an economic superpower. The probable fault line is Taiwanese sovereignty, which has been a source of tension throughout the postwar period.

According to Ambassador Feldman, US policy — to dissuade Taiwan from declaring independence while arming Taiwan against a potential Chinese attack — contains “inherent tensions.” “The US could simply not tolerate the forceful inclusion of the democratic Taiwan into the PRC,” he said, “but it looks like, if the US will stay out of the way, the two sides will work it out.”

Professor Christensen was more skeptical. “The problems is that the Communist Party is in power, and there are no communists in China anymore. The Party has no source of legitimacy, except that it can produce some wealth and defend the national honor. If you think of it as a skyline, all the other buildings have collapsed — there is only nationalism left,” Chistensen said.

But Eric Heginbotham argued that the Chinese government fears nationalism. The state does promote an official nationalist program, like its list of 100 nationalist books, he said. “But Chinese authorities are scared to death of people in the streets. The government has a zero-tolerance policy for protests, and that includes nationalist protests.”

According to Ambassador Feldman, a nationalist response in China would likely require some sort of provocation from Taiwan. “The government now is the most pro-independence that Taiwan is likely to have, and they have not declared independence. Restraint from China will become stronger over time, as the trend toward economic integration moves forward.”

**CIS Forums**

In October, the CIS Forum @ MIT brought to campus leading experts on the civil war in Colombia, and the US military’s involvement in that country. More forums will be offered during the 2002-2003 academic year. “We will continue to draw attention to international issues we think are under-covered or call for more public discussion,” said Amy Tarr, coordinator of the events.
TOURISM AND THE POLITICS OF RETERRITORIALIZATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

BY WALEED HAZBUN

There may be no better place from which to observe the process of globalization than watching the rush of passengers through the transit lounge of an international airport. Viewed from the airport waiting room, people, currencies, and commodities from around the world seem to glide effortlessly across the globe unconstrained by the geographies of distance or the territorial borders of national economies and nation-states. At a glance, this perspective captures a common trope in the debate about globalization: that increases in the transnational mobility of capital are eroding the regulatory capacities of contemporary nation-states to govern their territorially-defined national economies.

For many political scientists this image serves as their foil. They emphasize, in contrast, the continuing capacity of territorial states to tax firms, regulate their activities, and shape the nature of the global markets in which they operate. This perspective is also in evidence at the airport. As Walter Russell Mead observed, "from passport and customs control to air traffic control and international aviation agreements, the airport is one of the places in our society where the nation-state’s power is most keenly felt".

Shaped by these competing perspectives, much of the debate about globalization in the field of political science has been structured around assessing to what degree new patterns of global economic activity are eroding the capacities of nation-states to regulate economic activity and insulate their populations from the impact of global markets. One limitation of this debate, however, is that globalization is almost exclusively measured in terms of deterritorialization. Deterritorialization can be defined as the detachment of production systems, consumer markets, and cultural identities from specific (national) territories. Simply put, deterritorialization implies that as distances and national barriers become easier and cheaper to traverse, location and territoriality matter less to economic activity.

Deterterritorialization, however, is only one aspect of globalization. Globalization also leads to reterritorialization — where increases in the transnational mobility of people, capital, and information result in the increased relevance of place for global economic activity. For example, as firms increase their ability to access resources and to distribute their products across greater distances, they often seek to

continued on next page

Waleed Hazbun recently completed his Ph.D. thesis at MIT. In the fall of 2002, he will begin teaching in the Department of Political Science at the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland.
place themselves in specific localities in order to capture locational rents and spatially-defined positive external economies. These rents and externalities are economic benefits generated by such features as regional specialization, unique locational assets, and intense inter-firm relationships requiring geographic proximity. Examples of this process include the emergence of regional economies, production based on locational branding, the financial centers of world cities, and high-tech clusters such as Silicon Valley.

In contrast to the erosion of the territorially-based powers of nation-states associated with deterritorialization, the reterritorialization of economic production increases the influence of state, societal, and transnational agents that are able to exert control over the reterritorialization process. Thus, to incorporate the politics of reterritorialization into their studies of globalization, international political economy scholars need to begin analyzing the different and changing configurations of control over the specific territorially-defined resources and institutions that generate locational rents and positive external economies.

**Reterritorialization and the construction of tourism spaces**

Despite the fact that most students of globalization are probably frequent international travelers and have logged many hours in transit at international airports, international tourism remains one of the most overlooked sectors in the vast political science literature on globalization. The international tourism industry is one of the largest and fastest growing sectors of economic activity in the world. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, international tourism receipts grew at an average annual rate of about 9% and by 1999 totaled over $450 billion a year. The global tourism industry also operates literally on the leading edge of globalization by continually transferring consumer tastes, cultural practices, and business people into new spaces across the globe.

What does this have to do with tourism development? Several years ago, while wandering through the vast shopping arcades of Amsterdam’s Schiphol Airport, I realized that the new trend in airport design, which might be called the ‘shopping-mall-with-planes’ model, could be viewed as a type of reterritorialization. As nodes of transnational flows, airports had long been designed as efficient, frictionless air travel gateways. Over the last decade, however, most airports have increasingly added more diverse shops, restaurants, cafés, and facilities for many types of business and entertainment activities. As a result, airports now promote the reterritorialization of capital inside and nearby their facilities. Firms in and near these new model airports are able to exploit the rents and positive external economies generated by the flow of business and leisure travelers, and the increasing size of the staffs working at airports. This led me to the idea that states could promote reterritorialization through the production of tourism spaces.

In my Ph.D. dissertation, I explore the politics of international tourism development in the Middle East. I use the concept of reterritorialization to construct a framework for analyzing the political impact of the expansion of tourism development in the region. States in the Middle East turned to tourism development, I argue, because it seemed to offer the most feasible means for them to promote reterritorialization within their territories.

In the 1980s, as most states in the Middle East were facing economic crisis and pressures for economic liberalization, the global tourism economy was shifting from patterns of development characterized by deterritorialization to patterns characterized by reterritorialization. Deterritorialization in the global tourism industry was represented by the widespread development of highly standardized, low-cost beach tourism facilities. I refer to this type of tourism development as “Fordism on the beach.” Not only were Fordist techniques of production and organization used to mass produce these facilities, the expansion of international mass tourism beginning in the 1950s was intimately connected to post-war Fordist industrialization and the rise of the European welfare state. Standardized beach tourism first developed along the northern shore of the Mediterranean and then spread across its southern shore — in large part because specif-
ic national locations did not matter for this highly generic form of tourism. Additionally, international tour operators were facing increased competition to find less crowded and lower cost destinations.

By the late 1970s, however, the expansion of the market for standardized beach tourism across the Mediterranean began to wane. In the 1980s and 1990s, the distances tourists were able to traverse increased, tourist tastes became more sophisticated, and tourism markets became more highly segmented. Most resort tourists were increasingly drawn to multifunctional tourism resorts and theme parks, which offered more services and activities. At the same time, specialized niche markets expanded leading to the rise of ecotourism and adventure travel and the expansion of cultural and heritage tourism markets. This shift in international tourism patterns also led to the growth of organized tours exploring the rich cultural and natural heritage of regions such as the Middle East and North Africa.

To understand the politics of reterritorialization in the tourism sector, I formulated a model of how locational rents and positive external economies are generated through tourism development. The production of tourism spaces allows property owners to extract rents from tourists and from the developers of tourism facilities while generating positive external economies in and around these sites. To enhance and localize the generation of these external economies, states can provide public goods such as marketing, infrastructure, and tourism site development. Furthermore, the clustering of tourism firms and facilities around a tourist site or within a multifunction tourism resort allows the developer to intensify the generation of economic externalities within a bounded space while capturing a greater share of these externalities.

Since the 1980s, reterritorialization in the field of tourism development has increasingly involved the construction of “places” and the commodification of natural geographies and regionally-specific cultural experiences and practices. As specific places become more valuable as tourism spaces, the competition over control of these spaces and access to the economic benefits they generate also intensifies. By constructing and asserting control over these tourism spaces, private firms and state institutions are able to drive the reterritorialization process and control the generation of rents and external economies, which draws more tourists, tourist spending, and investment capital.

Tourism development also involves the generation of symbolic representations ranging from international advertising campaigns to the plaques narrating tourism sites. These images and words are read by international tourists as well as domestic visitors. Influence over how

continued on next page
these representations are constructed can be used, for example, to sustain nationalist mythologies or represent subaltern identities. As a result, with control over economic, cultural, and ideological resources at stake, the spaces visited by tourists are not defined only by natural landscapes, architectural remains, or indigenous cultural practices, but are themselves political constructions, the product of historical and contemporary political struggles over the nature of the tourism development process.

Tourism development and state building in the Middle East: Two cases

My dissertation fieldwork explored two national cases with differing configurations of territorial control. Located on the southern shore of the Mediterranean sea, state policy in Tunisia has long focused on developing mass beach tourism. Jordan, which witnessed a tourism boom after its 1994 peace treaty with Israel, is primarily a destination for cultural and archaeological tourism focusing on its Biblical and pre-Islamic past. Both states attempted to promote tourism development as their new “engine of economic growth” in the wake of economic and politics crises in the late 1980s. The two cases complement each other because in each case the conditions and consequences of tourism development differed. Put together, they map out a territorial theory to explain the impact of reterritorialization on patterns of state building based on the configuration of patterns of territorial control, i.e. either centralized or fragmented.

In the case of Tunisia, I found that centralized state control over the territorially defined resources and institutions driving the reterritorialization process allowed the state to extend its control over the process of international tourism development. With the promotion of desert tourism in the south and the development of more multi-functional tourism complexes along its coast, Tunisia was able to diversify its tourism product, augment its tourist image, and spread the benefits of tourism development. By promoting tourism, the Tunisian state beginning in the late 1980s was able to suppress or deflect pressures for increased political liberalization while accessing foreign exchange, locational rents, new tools to represent their claims for legitimacy, and stronger private sector allies.

In contrast, in Jordan I found that, as a result of historical patterns of state building and the nature of tourism resources in the country, the state had limited territorial control over tourism spaces. State administrative control over territorial tourism assets, tourism firms, and tourism development organizations was fragmented between different state institutions, organized both regionally and functionally. In both the southern port city of Aqaba and along the shore of the Dead Sea, the rival objectives and interests of the numerous government organizations, each with partial territorial control over these regions, prevented and delayed Jordan from effectively developing them for tourism. Furthermore, near the ancient rock-carved city of Petra, Jordan’s major tourist attraction, societal actors such as indigenous populations and local private land owners have been able to assert their local territorial control over tourism spaces to obstruct or exploit the plans of state authorities and authorized private firms.

Tourism development in Jordan has often required the technical and financial assistance of experts and international organizations to help convert cultural and natural features into tourism spaces able to generate rents and externalities and sustainable economic development. These agents — such as archaeologists, environmental activists, heritage preservation organizations, and international development agencies — often have rival interests and conceptions of the goals and value of tourism development. Thus, in contrast to the Tunisian case, tourism development in Jordan has led to struggles involving the state, private firms, and local communities resulting in either the creation of political cleavages in society, or else the erosion of state autonomy and capacity by the assertiveness of local societal actors. As a result, the state’s efforts to control the tourism development process have been constrained, limiting its ability to use tourism flows as a means to gain resources for state building.
CIS LAUNCHES PROGRAM IN HUMANITARIAN STUDIES

Flood, famine, disease, war — each of these problems demands expert attention. But when these crises overlap and intensify each other, a comprehensive kind of expertise is required.

“Humanitarian emergency management requires several different skill sets: medical knowledge, political understanding, environmental sensitivity, economic planning. No single program teaches all of these,” said Professor Stephen Van Evera, Associate Director of CIS.

Until now. The Center for International Studies recently joined with the Harvard School of Public Health and the School of Nutrition and Science Policy at Tufts to organize a certificate program in Humanitarian Studies and Field Practice. Van Evera, CIS Senior researcher Sharon Russell, and CIS Executive Director Bill Keller secured approval for the program from MIT’s Dean of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences, Philip Khoury, and the first group of students entered the joint program in the fall of 2001.

“Usually, people who find themselves managing humanitarian calamity are medical personnel who know epidemics but not the political issues, or are political types who know civil wars but are uninformed on the medical, environmental, and long-term economic issues,” said Professor Van Evera. “Jennifer Leaning, a medical doctor and professor at the Harvard School of Public Health, had the idea to create a program that would prepare students to deal with all these aspects of managing humanitarian interventions. This new program allows students to obtain a certificate attesting to the broad range of skills needed.”

The three universities complement each other, according to Dr. Russell, who directs CIS’s Mellon-MIT Program on NGOs and Forced Migration and is one of the program’s core faculty members. “MIT has great political science and security studies folks, with an academic focus. Harvard School of Public Health and Tufts are two wonderful professional schools. The combination makes a great package for a certificate program in humanitarian studies and field practice.”

The humanitarian studies program will draw on long-standing strengths at the Center. “Civil war — its causes, prevention, and the recovery therefrom — is something we’ve studied a lot here at CIS,” said Professor Van Evera.

And according to Russell, there is a synergy between the humanitarian studies certificate program and the Mellon-MIT Program on NGOs and Forced Migration, which includes students and faculty from several Boston-area universities. In fact, all three participating universities have received generous grants from the Mellon Foundation during the past decade.

Several courses offered or planned by CIS faculty are pertinent to certificate students, including Barry Posen’s course on humanitarian intervention in the 1990s, Roger Petersen’s course on civil war, and Balakrishnan Rajagopal’s course on human rights.

The certificate program will enroll up to twenty students per year. Students will complete five core courses in the field of humanitarian intervention, including a year-long seminar on field practice issues taught jointly by faculty from all three universities, and a three-month field placement. This supervised internship, which will be coordinated with an NGO, will give students practical experience in humanitarian response.

For more information on this program, please contact Estrella Alves, Program Coordinator, at estrella.alves@tufts.edu, or see the website at www.humanitarianstudies.org.
“A strike is not an atomic bomb,” said Antonio D’Amato, the president of Italy’s confederation of manufacturers (Confindustria), during a January 30th visit to the MIT Faculty Club. Unions have held much sway over Italian policy in the past, he asserted, but the government shouldn’t fear protest and should move forward with much overdue pro-market reforms. D’Amato issued a strong call for resolute action, even if reform requires breaking with established patterns of consensus-based policy making. Despite the fact that the unions in Italy were at that moment conducting a general strike to protest proposals like his, D’Amato expressed confidence that the Berlusconi government has the will and the popular support to pass such measures. “The truth is that Italians are tired of the incapacity to resolve many of the problems that afflict the country, and they demonstrated it at the last election,” he said.

First on D’Amato’s reform wish-list was greater labor market flexibility. D’Amato praised the ‘neoliberal’ positions associated with Margaret Thatcher for restoring economic competitiveness and an entrepreneurial spirit to the British economy. By contrast, D’Amato pointed out, Italy is the only country where changing layoff procedures requires a constitutional amendment. Confindustria’s president ironically compared work contracts in Italy to old-time marriages. “Marriages can be rescinded, as one can separate from his wife, but labor contracts cannot, as companies cannot fire their workers,” D’Amato said.

Due to a strongly protective labor law and courts that have systematically sided with workers, in the past twenty years it has become practically impossible for Italian companies with more than 15 workers to fire their employees. Indeed, Italy is the only country where companies that lose court challenges are forced to restore workers to their jobs rather than compensate them financially. This exceptional rigidity, D’Amato argued, is at the root of many distinctive and not-always-positive traits of the Italian economy: an over-representation of small-sized companies, an abnormally large submerged economy, and a dysfunctional labor market that penalizes youth, women, and(...)

Unions have held much sway over Italian policy in the past, he asserted, but the government shouldn’t fear protest and should move forward with much overdue pro-market reforms. D’Amato issued a strong call for resolute action, even if reform requires breaking with established patterns of consensus-based policy making. Despite the fact that the unions in Italy were at that moment conducting a general strike to protest proposals like his, D’Amato expressed confidence that the Berlusconi government has the will and the popular support to pass such measures. “The truth is that Italians are tired of the incapacity to resolve many of the problems that afflict the country, and they demonstrated it at the last election,” he said.

First on D’Amato’s reform wish-list was greater labor market flexibility. D’Amato praised the ‘neoliberal’ positions associated with Margaret Thatcher for restoring economic competitiveness and an entrepreneurial spirit to the British economy. By contrast, D’Amato pointed out, Italy is the only country where changing layoff procedures requires a constitutional amendment. Confindustria’s president ironically compared work contracts in Italy to old-time marriages. “Marriages can be rescinded, as one can separate from his wife, but labor contracts cannot, as companies cannot fire their workers,” D’Amato said.

Due to a strongly protective labor law and courts that have systematically sided with workers, in the past twenty years it has become practically impossible for Italian companies with more than 15 workers to fire their employees. Indeed, Italy is the only country where companies that lose court challenges are forced to restore workers to their jobs rather than compensate them financially. This exceptional rigidity, D’Amato argued, is at the root of many distinctive and not-always-positive traits of the Italian economy: an over-representation of small-sized companies, an abnormally large submerged economy, and a dysfunctional labor market that penalizes youth, women, and...
workers in less-developed regions. More flexibility, D’Amato contended, would result in larger enterprises, less tax evasion (meaning more fiscal resources for the state), and fairer competition. Freeing firms to hire and fire — and to offer monetary compensation for failed labor ‘marriages’ — would make the labor market more transparent and would create new jobs, especially in the high-unemployment South.

In addition, D’Amato pleaded for a reform of Italy’s pension system, which he portrayed not only as fiscally unviable, but also unfair. As in other European countries, the current system benefits older workers, who are already employed and relatively privileged. Italy’s pension system also feeds the submerged economy (as young pensioners take jobs on the black market), and redistributes resources from peripheral workers to the more central elements of the workforce. Because unions have been too responsive to the specific interests of their members — most of whom, D’Amato pointed out, are retirees — the consensus-based reforms undertaken by prior governments accomplished too little.

D’Amato also called for a substantial reduction of indirect labor costs, or social charges. Workers in Italy are paid less but cost more than their British counterparts, he said, adding that lowering taxes on employers would create more jobs and help bring to the fore the submerged economy.

A variety of economic and demographic changes (ranging from increased economic openness to post-industrialism and aging) have demanded reform for some time. What is new, D’Amato said, is that in the wake of the 2001 legislative elections, reform has become politically feasible.

Unlike Italy’s last two governments (which needed to appease the Refounded Communist Party on the left wing of their social-democratic coalition), Berlusconi’s right-wing government controls a large majority. The clear victory of the Forza Italia/Alleanza Nazionale coalition gives Berlusconi’s government the opportunity to decide and rule on controversial issues, even without the support of the Lega Nord. Consensus is important, D’Amato argued, but it is for the government to govern. For the first time in a long time, with Berlusconi the Italian government has the parliamentary majority and the political mandate to do so, and it should use them. When asked to comment about the importance of consensus, D’Amato added that strikes are a rather blunt weapon, especially in light of the substantial weakening experienced by Italian unions. During January’s strike, between 25 and 50 percent of workers walked out, compared to 80 to 100 percent strike rates twenty years ago, he said.

D’Amato spoke from a clearly partisan perspective: that of the manufacturing interests he represents and of the Berlusconi government he supports. For example, when praising Thatcher’s reforms, D’Amato made no reference to their impact on fiscal revenues and public services. Still, the president of Confindustria argued a very tight case, and raised issues we can’t afford to ignore. Recent comparative research has confirmed that the link between labor market rigidities and job creation holds even across different ‘varieties of capitalism’, and pension reform haunts many European governments — though politicians facing imminent elections, like those in France and Germany, are trying hard to sidestep it.

To many in the audience, D’Amato’s candor signaled that Italian politics, long known for opacity and innuendo, has indeed changed. “Finally, we have an Italian who speaks in a clear, direct, and decisive mode. We’re not used to this,” said Professor Modigliani.
Précis is pleased to introduce endnotes, brief updates on the people at the Center for International Studies and the research they produce. If you have news or a publication you’d like to announce, please email precis@mit.edu.

Diane E. Davis, who joined MIT’s Department of Urban Studies and Planning last fall as an associate professor, is a new affiliate at CIS. Last summer, Davis was named a Carnegie scholar and awarded a two-year, $96,000 grant for her project, “Public Versus Private Security and the Rule of Law: The Transformation of Policing in Mexico City, Johannesburg, and Moscow.”

Hugh Gusterson, Associate Professor of Anthropology and Science Studies, was program chair for the annual meeting of the Society for Social Studies of Science (4S) in November 2001.

Kenneth Keniston, Mellon Professor of Human Development in the MIT Program in Science, Technology, and Society, and Director of the MIT India Program, recently returned from a semester of field work in India, where he was examining issues related to information technology and development. He has been featured prominently in several articles in *The Times of India*, in which he argues that the “information technology for the masses” movement should focus less on the elite sector and more on average citizens and their needs.

MISTI, the MIT Science and Technology Initiative, has named two new associate direc-

---

**KELLER NAMED PRINCIPAL RESEARCH SCIENTIST**

William W. Keller, the executive director of the Center for International Studies, was named an MIT Principal Research Scientist in January 2002.

“After putting so much effort into administration of the Center over the past several years, the formality of becoming a part of the research community here is very nice,” Keller said. “I’m delighted to have received this recognition.”


Keller said that the study of innovation in Asia is a natural progression from his earlier research on security and multinationals, and Samuels’ work on Japan. “Diffusion of information, research, and technology are closely related to proliferation of various types of weapons. My next project will likely focus on the relationship between globalization, international security, and internal security.”

Before joining CIS in 1997, Keller taught at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, and served as deputy director of the Center for Trade and Commercial Diplomacy there. He also has government experience, having worked from 1987 to 1995 at the Office of Technology Assessment. Keller earned his Ph.D. in government from Cornell University.
tors: Patricia Gercik, Managing Director of the MIT Japan Program, and Bernd Widdig, a lecturer in Foreign Languages and Literature at MIT and Director of the MIT Germany Program.

Paul Njoroge, a founder of CIS’s MIT African Internet Technology Initiative (MIT-AITI), was named a 2002 Rhodes Scholar. MIT-AITI, a CIS-based project to teach web programming courses in Njoroge’s native Kenya, began in 2000. Along with three other MIT students and alumni, Njoroge spent July 2000 at Strathmore College in Nairobi teaching a Java course.

Professor Richard J. Samuels, Director of the MIT Center for International Studies and Ford International Professor of Political Science, will serve as chairman of the Japan-United States Friendship Commission for the next three years. The Commission, which was established by Congress in 1975 and is accountable to the Congress and the President, administers a trust fund to support Japanese studies and policy-oriented research in the US, as well as cooperation between the two nations on cultural and public affairs.

Professor Emeritus Eugene B. Skolnikoff gave the Branscomb lecture at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government on Dec. 17, 2001: “Research Universities and National Security: Can Traditional Values Survive?”.

The MIT Program on Human Rights and Justice has announced that it will issue fellowships to outstanding professionals, academics and activists working at the intersection of human rights and topics of social and natural sciences and engineering as they relate to human rights and justice issues. Proposals for human rights research relating to the global economy and science and technology are especially welcome. For more details on the fellowship or to apply, contact the PHRJ at phrj@mit.edu, or call 617-258-7614.
New Books by CIS Authors

Demography and National Security
Edited by the late Myron Weiner, professor of political science and a former director of CIS, and Sharon Stanton Russell, a senior research associate at the Center, this volume addresses how changes in demographic variables influence threats to a country’s political stability and security, how governments respond to demographic threats, and how governments attempt to change demographic variables in order to enhance national security.

Berghahn Books, 2001

Political Demography, Demographic Engineering
The late Myron Weiner and Michael S. Teitelbaum discuss how “an evolving and more complex set of changes in the size, distribution, and composition of populations has become the basis for a new look at the security effects of changes in the size, distribution, and composition of populations. This book is an attempt to lay out the new look, to take issue with some of the prevailing views on the political consequences of population change, and to suggest where the concerns are realistic and where they are not.”

Berghahn Books, 2001

Culture and Inflation in Weimar Germany
Bernd Widdig, associate director of MISTI and a lecturer in foreign languages and literature at MIT, investigates the effects of inflation on German culture during the Weimar Republic. He argues that inflation, with its dynamics of massification, devaluation, and the rapid circulation of money, is an integral part of modern culture and intensifies and condenses the experience of modernity in a traumatic way.

University of California Press, 2001

Crisis and Innovation in Asian Technology
William W. Keller, executive director of the Center for International Studies, and Richard J. Samuels, CIS Director and Ford International Professor of Political Science, introduce and edit a collection of essays on the impact of the Asian financial crisis on technologic development in the region.

Other Publications by CIS Affiliates

Thomas J. Christensen, Associate Professor of Political Science


Andrea Gabbitas, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science

Kelly Greenhill, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science

Hugh Gusterson, Associate Professor of Anthropology

Gregory D. Koblentz, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science

Sarah Kenyon Lischer, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science

Barry R. Posen, Professor of Political Science


Jonathan Rodden, Assistant Professor of Political Science

Bishwapriya Sanyal, Department Head and Professor of Urban Studies and Planning

Eugene B. Skolnikoff, Professor Emeritus of Political Science
If you want to subscribe...

Subscriptions to précis are free to the community. Please send your address or any comments to us at:

MIT Center for International Studies
Attn: précis
292 Main Street, Building E-38-600
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307

visit CIS on the Web
HTTP://web.mit.edu/CIS/index.html