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At the urging of CIS and some of its compatriots in the humanities at MIT, the School of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences has approved a new undergraduate minor in Applied International Studies. Students who adopt this minor will be expected to learn a foreign language and gain familiarity with its cultural dimensions. They will also be required to learn about the basic economic, political and cultural attributes that are unique to their area of focus, and will participate in a study abroad program. The Center anticipates that between 10 to 20 students per year will participate.

CIS Director Richard Samuels says he is “delighted that MIT has formally embraced the idea of educating its students for a future in an increasingly global economy and international research environment,” adding that the new minor is an important milestone for the Center.

“Over the course of nearly a quarter century since the world’s first program of applied area studies, the MIT Japan Program, was established at the Center, more than 1,500 MIT students have been given the opportunity to work and study under the MIT International Science and Technology Initiative (MISTI) umbrella in Italy, France, India, China, and Germany. The new Minor in Applied International Studies — the first such formal degree recognition for this work and study — is the next logical step in the international education of the world’s future leaders in science, engineering, and management.”

The Center’s conception of applied studies stresses the importance of cultural awareness and practical experience. Neither can be gained through classroom learning alone. According to

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Improved Responses to New Technologies
The program’s multidisciplinary panels of

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Prof. Samuels, the new minor “builds on two key principles: that lasting economic and social relationships in an international context are only possible for those who speak the language of a foreign country and are familiar with its culture, and that theoretical learning must be combined with hands-on experience.”

For more information, students can contact Bernd Widdig, Associate Director of MISTI and CIS Minor Advisor, at bwiddig@mit.edu, or they can visit web.mit.edu/misti/www/minor.html.

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experts and scholars will critically examine comparable past efforts to anticipate the effects of innovation. According to Prof. Oye, the IGERT program will try to improve responses to emerging technologies by engaging early and explicitly with pervasive uncertainty that is often under-recognized in technology assessment exercises.

Scientific and policy spheres typically come together only after lines of conflict are drawn, he says. Creators of new technologies focus on the immediate applications of technologies, while policy analysts assess the broader implications of technological change after controversies have arisen. By contrast, he notes, this program will bring scholars together somewhat in advance of controversies, at a stage when options are greater, interests are less entrenched, and policies are not yet locked into place.

Also, according to Prof. Oye, decision makers typically base strategies on unstated expectations regarding the nature and effects of technological change. Because forecasting errors are endemic, policymakers and analysts often rely on implicit

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Salvatore Scaturro, an MIT engineering student, teaches students during a MISTI China internship in 2002. Study and work abroad programs are a key part of the new minor in Applied International Studies.

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What would it take to make Jerusalem “merely” a city again? This deceptively simple question is at the heart of a new initiative sponsored by CIS and the Departments of Urban Studies and Planning (DUSP) and Political Science. The project, Jerusalem 2050, brings together a multi-disciplinary team of scholars to search for answers.

Jerusalem 2050 is the result of a visit to MIT more than a year ago by two peace activists from the greater Jerusalem area, one Palestinian and one Israeli with long connections to MIT. These activists, frustrated by the continuing failure of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, wanted to look at new avenues for peace in the region. From discussions they had with CIS and others on campus, the idea developed of imagining a peaceful mid-century Jerusalem. The question arose: What changes in social, special, economic, and political institutions would make Jerusalem a place of peace by 2050?

Cities Against Nationalism Seminar

To address this question, organizers of CIS’s Cities Against Nationalism seminar series — a working group that brings faculty and graduate students together each week to discuss the root causes of violence, as well as strategies for advancing a vision of peace in various cities around the world — decided to include Jerusalem in their discussions, especially the question of why some of the dozens of renewal projects that have been attempted in Jerusalem over the years have succeeded while others have not.

The Jerusalem 2050 project also asks scholars from Jerusalem to explore new possibilities for overcoming the cycle of hatred and violence that has long plagued the city. Despite profound historical grievances, residents of that city share common practices and everyday institutions that go back centuries.

Design Competition in the Works

The culmination of the Jerusalem 2050 project, which is led by Professor Diane Davis of DUSP, will be a juried, international competition in which applicants will be invited to submit comprehensive designs for a Jerusalem in 2050 that is shared by Israelis and Palestinians. The designs will conceive political and social institutions as well as plans for urban infrastructure and public spaces. By combining the Cities Against Nationalism working group with the design competition, Jerusalem 2050 seeks to enlarge the theoretical understanding of civil conflict while also offering possible solutions.

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assumptions and forecasts to reduce vulnerability to criticism. This program seeks to change that by explicitly identifying areas of uncertainty and developing strategies for coping with them, he says.

Graduate Student Funding

Beginning in the fall of 2004, the NSF grant will also provide funding for an integrated curriculum that expands research on emerging technologies. Prof. Oye and his colleagues are in the process of developing new courses that will train students to evaluate the various benefits and consequences of innovation. Students will also be encouraged to grapple with ethical questions, since technical change has important economic, political, and environmental effects.

Also planned are seminars that will broaden the work of the multidisciplinary panels and core courses.
Naomi Chazan is the first Robert E. Wilhelm Fellow at the Center for International Studies and Professor Emerita of political science and African studies at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. During Professor Chazan’s three-term parliamentary career, she served as Deputy Speaker of the Knesset and as a member of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. Dr. Chazan has been involved in the Geneva Initiative, a two-track diplomatic effort to lay the groundwork for a negotiated settlement to the Arab-Israeli dispute. She recently spoke to précis about the status of the conflict.

précis: There is growing support among Israelis for unilateral disengagement. Some believe this is a chance for real and lasting peace. Do you agree?

NC: A unilateral withdrawal does not promote peace. In the medium term and the long run it might be very problematic, if not dangerous. A unilateral withdrawal is a form of compulsion because it means that Israel is determining the boundaries — actually dictating the form of the disengagement. Another problem is that whenever there is disengagement there is also an annexation, and that complicates the possibilities for negotiation. A third problem is that if you pull out but don’t transfer power you create a power vacuum, especially in Gaza. This probably means a great deal of anarchy and runs the risk of strengthening the Islamic extremists, primarily Hamas.

It’s very difficult to oppose disengagement, because it’s a form of ending the occupation. But unilateral steps that are the antithesis of agreements and negotiations have very profound, built-in dangers. The whole operation is based on the assumption that there’s nobody to talk to and nothing to talk about, and I don’t think that’s the case.

précis: If withdrawal is inevitable, how do you propose to negotiate a settlement?

NC: From an Israeli perspective, withdrawal is inevitable if Israel is going to survive. It’s as simple as that. I think the big change in the last six months is the growing realization that that’s true. You can’t have it all and hope to continue to exist as a democratic state with a Jewish majority. It’s not going to work. So there’s a new consensus that Israel is going to have to withdraw. Therefore, the questions are: how much, to where, and when? It’s a different order of debate than it was in the past.

Given that the debate has shifted, the question is how to link it to negotiations. I think you can do the negotiations ahead of time — the entire permanent settlement, as was done in the Geneva Initiative. What Geneva proved was that it’s possible to negotiate a permanent settlement and then break it down into an implementation timetable. That’s one way of doing it.

The second way of doing it is linking withdrawal to some kind of agreement on the Palestinian side. But this is an internal contradiction. The United States is actually talking about a “coordinated unilateralism,” which I find to be an oxymoron. If it’s unilateral, it can’t be coordinated. If it’s coordinated, it’s not unilateral.

précis: There is tension between the ideas of negotiation and unilateral withdrawal. Is there a split in the peace camp between those who oppose disengagement completely and those who want to negotiate the withdrawal?

NC: The mixture runs deeper than your question intimates. The idea of unilateral steps came from the peace camp. It didn’t originate in present government circles at all. Quite the contrary. The hawks in Israel were very much opposed initially to unilateral steps. It was the so-called doves who raised the idea as a way of...
disengaging Israel from the occupied territories and from a situation where they felt that there was nobody to negotiate with.

But as happens with these ideas — which are half-baked ideas — the government took it and interpreted it its own way. So you find a lot of people that say, “I’m for unilateral withdrawal but it has to be along the 1967 boundaries.” As soon as you have to explain in politics, then you’re in trouble. The originators of the idea were for the general tactic but against the way it’s being carried out. As somebody who opposed unilateral withdrawal in principle, I’m in a different place entirely. I think unilateralism is really only possible when no other prospect for negotiation exists at all. And I don’t think all the prospects for negotiations have been explored to date, and therefore it’s extremely problematic.

précis: So you oppose the principle but assume that withdrawal is inevitable.

NC: My analysis is that the trend is toward unilateral withdrawal, especially from Gaza. My position is that I’m opposed to it. So there are two questions. First, how can you prevent clearly negative results from unilateral withdrawal from taking place? Alternately, how you can prevent the unilateral steps from being carried out? In either case, you have to convince those who are very skeptical today that the negotiating option is a real option and is much better for the Israelis, Palestinians, and the stability of the Middle East. That requires domestic political activity, and a great deal more international lobbying, which is very difficult in an American election year.

précis: You say that convincing skeptics requires a lot of political action on the ground. Is it difficult being in Massachusetts while all of this is going on in Israel?

NC: Yes. The answer is yes. The advantage of being in Massachusetts is that you can start a thought and finish it. You can actually think, and it’s not bad to think. When you’re in the midst of it, you don’t have that luxury. And because of the complexity of the issues, one needs to think and think strategically if one’s going to make the right decisions. So if you ask, “Is it hard?” Of course it’s hard. But it’s also healthy.

CHAZAN ON THE WEST BANK BARRIER

On February 10th, Naomi Chazan delivered a lecture as part of the Bustani Seminar series, which invites scholars, journalists and other experts to discuss the politics, culture and economic development of the Middle East. (The series, which is sponsored by CIS, is chaired by Philip Khoury, Professor of History and Kenan Sahin Dean of the School of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences.)

Among the topics covered by Dr. Chazan in her talk, “Israeli Peace Options: Thinking Outside the Box,” was the barrier being erected by the Sharon government to separate Israel from the West Bank. She asserted that the barrier (which is as tall as 20 feet in some places) constitutes a de facto annexation of territory, since its route lies to the east of the 1967 borders.

According to Dr. Chazan, the barrier is counterproductive to Israeli security. It gets in the way of future talks because it annexes territory to satisfy Israeli settlers in the West Bank, she said. More broadly, she argued that unilateral actions like building the barrier are acts of compulsion that make it more difficult to negotiate in good faith. She said that because she believes that negotiations offer the best chance to settle the conflict, she is concerned that the current Israeli policy will only contribute to further delay in the peace process.
action that had caused it and the UN so much trouble in the past. Immediately after the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq unilaterally destroyed tons of nerve agent, biological toxins, and missile components before inspectors had even entered the country. Iraq then concealed much of that destruction — especially the evidence that it had in the past had an offensive biological weapons program. In fact, the destruction of the biological materials was a key element in Iraq’s concealment of that program. It has also caused serious problems in verifying Iraq’s disarmament of chemical weapons and long-range missiles as well as biological weapons since then.

Iraq had 12 years of experience with the verification process to learn not to take any important actions unilaterally. The most obvious conclusion that could be drawn was that Iraq had something to hide. Perhaps something had been buried at that dumpsite that contradicted Iraq’s biological declarations. Perhaps Iraq had wanted to remove whatever it was that it did not want us to see before inspectors started monitoring their activity. Even if it had not removed anything, its actions had aroused the suspicions of the inspectors and it would have been very hard for Iraq to prove it had not done so. Iraq was backing itself into a corner where it might have been forced to try to “prove the negative.” The videotapes Iraq took of its excavation would have done nothing to reassure the inspectors, who did start monitoring the excavation site and using what they learned in the verification process.

During the next month, Iraq bombarded UNMOVIC with letters suggesting new procedures and initiatives for resolving the remaining disarmament issues. Part of this campaign was undoubtedly a response to the U.S. build-up of troops in the region.

The trouble was that none of these initiatives addressed the central issue: how much poison had Iraq produced. Only by addressing that question could Iraq convince the international community that it was not holding secret stocks of chemical or biological weapons. Two examples stand out, but both fall short of addressing
the core issues, Iraq suggested very similar initiatives for verifying how much anthrax and VX had been dumped at two different sites in the desert. In the anthrax initiative, Iraq proposed sampling a grid pattern in and around the anthrax dump site, which included samples taken at various depths below ground level. The DNA found in each sample would be analyzed to determine how many spores of anthrax were present and then the total amount of anthrax in the area would be estimated. Iraq had even performed a preliminary study using this method as an illustration of the concept.

However, there were tremendous technical difficulties with this procedure. For instance, Iraq had not only dumped liquid slurries of weapons grade anthrax in the area, but had also dumped anthrax contaminated production waste at the same site. Also, even if it could be estimated how much of the original anthrax remained detectable after 12 years, there were significant indications that the anthrax had leaked out into a much wider area. These technical objections would have significantly reduced the importance of this evidence in the eyes of the international community, and even if these technical difficulties had been overcome the procedure would still not have addressed how much anthrax had actually been produced; the central issue for the material balance. 

**Iraq’s VX Initiative**

Iraq’s VX initiative proposed a similar procedure for measuring the quantity of VX degradation products at that dumpsite. It too had significant technical challenges and did not address the issue of how much VX Iraq had produced. As a consequence, it did not address the corresponding question of how much of the VX precursor chemicals, the chemicals Iraq was forced to import before it could start production of VX, it had used. Answering that question would then imply how much VX Iraq might clandestinely produce in the future.

Of course, some of these initiatives were productive. For instance, Iraq started the process of explaining the differences between the amount of chemical poisons the earlier documents said it used and how much the Iraqi declarations claimed had been used. Iraq also indicated that it had new documentation on its unilateral destruction of short-range rocket warheads filled with chemicals. UNMOVIC, if it had been given time, would certainly have followed up on all these issues. While this increased activity did seem to indicate a change in attitude on Iraq’s part, it was a case of too little, too late.

**Did Saddam Cooperate?**

Some supporters of the 2003 war in Iraq wish that they could say Saddam had been totally uncooperative. Other supporters insist that any lack of cooperation was a cause for enforcing UN resolutions and going to war. They argue that Iraq’s concealment of its purchasing network, key to smuggling in military equipment and equipment that could have been used to produce weapons of mass destruction, was an early example of a lack of cooperation that should have triggered military action.

Opponents of the war insist that inspections were working and inspectors were making significant headway both in disarming Iraq and in verifying that Iraq’s weapons-making potential had been eliminated. Inspectors were supervising the destruction of Iraq’s Al Samoud II missile; arguably Iraq’s premier weapons system. Not only was Iraq destroying this missile itself, but Iraq had voluntarily provided all the information needed for the international community to judge the system should be proscribed.

To the extent that Saddam was cooperating, he was doing so to stave off a U.S. invasion. The original announcement in September 2002 that he was allowing inspectors back into the country was the minimal diplomatic maneuver that could possibly deflect the growing momentum for a new and more powerful inspection regime backed up by military force. It is clear, from the backlog of Iraq’s semi-annual declarations handed over to the UN before the new resolution was passed, that Saddam believed the international politics with which he had balanced

While this increased activity did seem to indicate a change in attitude on Iraq’s part, it was a case of too little, too late.
France and Russia against the U.S. and UK had not changed significantly.

After inspections started under 1441, Saddam seems to have made the calculation that he should convince the international community that he no longer had the capability to manufacture new weapons of mass destruction, but to still conceal the status of WMD from before the 1991 Gulf War. To do this, he allowed inspectors full access to all the sites UNMOVIC requested, including very sensitive sites. However, he did not at first provide any significant new information regarding old weapons. His new narrative declarations, for example, were simply cut-and-paste renditions of the old declarations and did not help resolve any of the old issues.

Some may question this conclusion because they doubt a country would try to conceal the fact that it did not have proscribed weapons. They would argue that Saddam was risking not only the continuation of sanctions but an actual war if he did supply all the information the world community needed to verify his disarmament. However, Saddam might have had some very good reasons for concealing his lack of WMD.

The U.S. military believed they would be hit with either chemical or biological weapons as they passed a number of chokepoints on the road to Baghdad. Part of the reason they believed this seems to have been intercepted radio communications that appeared to be giving orders for their use. If true, it would be an indication that Saddam was trying to deter the U.S. from attacking by the threat of chemical or biological weapons. The fact that this did not deter the coalition should have a tremendous effect on future proliferators; it might have been a key factor in Libya’s decision to abandon its WMD. Saddam would also want this “virtual” deterrent because of regional rivals, such as Iran or Israel.

However, there is a principle in the theory of international relations, known as the Security Dilemma, which states one country’s deterrent is often viewed as a threat by another country. Therefore, while Iraq might have viewed its virtual arsenal as the best defense, his adversaries — including the U.S. — viewed it as an offensive weapon.

From early February 2003, Saddam must have realized that the U.S. was not going to be deterred by his virtual arsenal. The build-up of troops in the area seems to have impressed him and his regime tremendously. At this point, Iraq increased its efforts to cooperate with UN weapons inspectors. Saddam proposed a number of interesting initiatives in response to UNMOVIC chairman Hans Blix’s call for creative and proactive cooperation.

The fact that none of these initiatives would have solved any of the remaining disarmament issues probably says more about how governments work than about Saddam’s cooperation. It is possible that Iraq’s National Monitoring Directorate, the organization set up in 1991 ostensibly to interact with UN weapons inspectors, could not adapt to the new political environment of openness and cooperation. After all, the directorate had originally been set up with the goal of concealing Iraq’s entire biological weapons program. It must have been very hard for them to not only cooperate with inspectors but to admit that they had been lying for 12 years. We know that in the past it was hard for them to admit lying: one of the most senior National Monitoring Directorate officials broke down and cried when a UNSCOM inspector scientifically proved to her that she had been lying about the bacterial growth media Iraq used.

This excerpt is reproduced with permission from Jane’s Information Group — Jane’s Intelligence Review.
As U.S. military forces entered Baghdad last April, embedded reporters sent back startling news that more than 170,000 antiquities and works of art had been looted from the Iraqi National Museum. To security analysts, this was cause for concern because it undermined the effort to convince world opinion that the U.S. invasion would help restore Iraqi heritage. To art historians in Iraq and around the world, it was a catastrophe. The National Museum was a window on some of the world's oldest civilizations, holding irreplaceable collections of Mesopotamian and other treasures.

But was the situation as bad as news reports made it seem? How much was taken, and by whom? It was Col. Matthew Bogdanos's job to find that out during his investigation of the looting last year. For eight months, Bogdanos — a Marine reservist with a degree in classics whose civilian job is as an assistant district attorney in Manhattan — led a team of military officers and U.S. customs officials in an attempt to track down and recover stolen items. He discussed his findings in a talk at a Security Studies Program event in January.

Task Force Findings

Chief among Col. Bogdanos’s findings was that the 170,000 figure was inflated and misleading. Many of the items, he claimed, were never really missing. For instance, he said the museum’s enormous collection of rare and ancient manuscripts had been moved to a separate bunker before the war began, and members of the community around the bunker took turns guarding thousands of ancient documents from looters during and immediately after the major combat phase of the war. A similar story surrounds the “secret place” several blocks from the museum where senior staff members had hidden more than 8,000 smaller artifacts.

According to Col. Bogdanos, the 170,000 figure was confusing because all of the “items” were counted the same way. Thus the priceless Warka Vase counted as one item while a commonplace necklace with sixteen beads counted as sixteen. The failure to distinguish among different works of art underscored the confusion in the early days after the fall of Baghdad, he told an attentive audience in the Wong Auditorium.

Assessing Responsibility

Col. Bogdanos denied reports that U.S. soldiers had participated in the looting. He said his task force compared fingerprints at and around the site to every available database of servicemen and found no matches. He did say, however, that members of the media apparently tried to smuggle out small items.

Critics have claimed that the United States failed to plan for the protection of the museum’s enormous collection of rare and ancient manuscripts had been moved to a separate bunker before the war began, and members of the community around the bunker took turns guarding thousands of ancient documents from looters during and immediately after the major combat phase of the war. A similar story surrounds the “secret place” several blocks from the museum where senior staff members had hidden more than 8,000 smaller artefacts.

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SSP SHORT COURSE ON ELECTRONIC WARFARE

This winter, a group of Security Studies Program graduate students, faculty, and researchers were given a two-day introduction to electronic warfare (EW) by visiting instructors from the Air Force’s 563rd Flying Training Squadron at Randolph AFB, Texas.

This short course covered a range of topics, including the history of electronic warfare, the physics of radar tracking and radar jamming, and the inventory of EW assets in the U.S. military. The instructors discussed a range of current controversies in the electronic warfare community and offered ideas on possible fixes.

For more information on what was included in the course, contact SSP Assistant Director Magdalena Rieb (mrieb@mit.edu; 617.258.7858).
At a packed IAP Starr Forum event in Killian Hall on January 8, the controversial Iraqi exile and scholar Kanan Makiya applauded the war in Iraq and urged the U.S. to “stay the course”—but also criticized some aspects of the U.S. occupation.

Makiya, who is disliked in anti-war circles for having advocated the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, stressed the need for the United States to remain committed to democracy building in the Middle East.

Makiya, an MIT-trained architect, is now a professor of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at Brandeis University and an advisor to the Iraqi Governing Council. In 1989, prior to the first Gulf War, he published *Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq*, under the pseudonym Samir al-Khalil. The book vividly documented the atrocities of the Ba’ath regime.

During the January forum, Makiya said that these horrors provided the moral justification for last year’s invasion. But while he called the U.S. force in Iraq an “enabling occupation,” he also chided Bush administration officials for limiting Iraqi participation, and he urged the United States to rapidly replace American forces with trained Iraqis.

Makiya also repeated his controversial support for “radical de-Ba’athification.” Because Iraq needs to break with the past, he argued, members of Saddam’s party should be suspended from public life, at least temporarily. At the same time, he acknowledged that the process of de-Ba’athification “didn’t work out very well” last year, saying that “too much was based on hearsay.” A commission should have been created to carry out the process on a case-by-case basis, he said.

Makiya also stressed the need to create an effective, permanent constitution. Iraqis are deeply suspicious of interim documents, he said, especially given that, after the fall of the Hashemite monarchy in 1958, a series of “interim” laws failed to prevent the rise of the Ba’athist party.

After the first Gulf War, Makiya obtained a cache of documents detailing the operations of the Ba’ath Party and created the Iraq Research and Documentation Project at Harvard University to catalogue them and additional papers he and others have collected since. He has also formed the Iraqi Memory Foundation to record interviews with survivors and witnesses of the brutality of Saddam’s regime. He said he would like to see these interviews broadcast in Iraq during the former dictator’s trial.

The January forum, which was moderated by Political Science Professor Kenneth Oye, also included remarks from Hassan Mneimneh, co-Director of the Iraq Research and Documentation Project. ■
What is the law on torture? How can the United States deal with terrorist suspects without breaking domestic and international prohibitions? While these questions are debated publicly, many analysts ignore the details. SSP graduate student Benjamin Friedman does not.

Terrorism has prompted a new debate about torture. The debate is not academic. There is evidence that the United States knowingly returns terrorist suspects to states that torture them. Some suggest that U.S. interrogators should torture terror suspects outright. This paper looks at the legality and wisdom of torture, abuse short of torture, and deporting suspects to countries where they will be tortured. The aim here is not to reach a conclusion on how our country should proceed, but to help the reader to do so.

The U.S. government cannot torture anyone anywhere under current laws. Both U.S. and international law prohibit torture. We probably cannot knowingly send people to other countries to be tortured. But the legality of subjecting captives to abuse short of torture — sleep deprivation, standing for long periods, exposure to extreme hot and cold temperatures, threats, slapping, pushing, placing hoods over heads, withholding food and drink — is less certain. One can make a strong case that no law prohibits U.S. agents from subjecting prisoners who lack constitutional protections to these practices.

The U.S. Constitution limits torture in several ways. Torture probably violates captives’ Fifth and Eighth Amendment due process rights, although some scholars hold that judicial supervision and a showing of probable cause to believe a suspect is a terrorist is due process enough. The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment also precludes torture. Some U.S. courts, however, have said the amendment may allow the use of force to gain information needed to save lives.

There is then some room to argue that the U.S. Constitution might permit torture in extraordinary circumstances. But these arguments would face an uphill battle in court — one that the government would be loath to make for political reasons. An easier route to justifying torture is to simply argue that terrorists are not protected by the U.S. Constitution.

Surprisingly, the applicability of the Constitution remains unsettled. The Constitution applies to U.S. citizens in the United States in times of peace. But change these three conditions, and legal ambiguity results. The Bush administration argues that terrorists, even U.S. citizens captured in United States, are enemy combatants without constitutional protections. These claims will soon be tested in the Supreme Court. The war on terrorism, especially when conducted abroad, sits in a legal gray area between war and peace, where constitutional protections are uncertain.

Prohibitions on Torture

International law also forbids the United States from torturing. Our courts enforce international law; treaties are one form of international law. Article VI of the Constitution makes U.S. treaties “the supreme law of the land.”

One treaty forbidding torture is the Geneva Convention, which protects prisoners of war from torture as well as far less severe treatment. But terrorist prisoners are not necessarily prisoners of war. The government has resisted that label.

The other treaty prohibiting torture is the Convention against Torture and other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The Convention’s legal status is complex. The United States ratified the Convention with the understanding that that treaty is not self-executing. This means that the Convention is a U.S. commitment to pass laws to effect the prohibitions the treaty expresses, rather than the legal prohibitions themselves.

In 1994, Congress implemented the Convention against Torture, passing a law that prohibits Americans everywhere from committing torture. American agents who torture can be punished with prison — and, if the captive dies, death.

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The law, 18 U.S.C. § 2340A, provides:

(1) “torture” means an act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical control;

(2) “severe mental pain or suffering” means the prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from —

(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering;

(B) the administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality;

(C) the threat of imminent death; or

(D) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality.

In short, torture is government sanctioned application of severe pain or suffering. What conduct fits this criterion? In ratifying of the Torture Convention, the U.S. Senate noted, “Such rough treatment as generally falls into the category of ‘police brutality,’ while deplorable, does not amount to ‘torture.’ The term ‘torture’ in United States and international usage, is usually reserved for extreme, deliberate and unusually cruel practices, for example, sustained systematic beating, application of electric currents to sensitive parts of the body, and tying up or hanging positions that cause pain.”

Abuse, Not Torture

The legality of physical abuse short of torture is uncertain. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A only deals with torture proper. Moderate physical abuse of prisoners is banned by the U.S. Constitution, but most terrorist suspects who are not American are unlikely to get constitutional protections. The Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment attempts to ban lesser abuses. But because the Convention it is not self-executing, it does not prohibit U.S. agents from subjecting captives to this treatment.

The other potential source of a ban is customary international law. Although some courts
in the United States and Europe have said otherwise, there is no universally accepted norm of customary international law forbidding abuse of prisoners short of torture. The Convention is evidence of a customary international law norm against cruel inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, but the convention never defines what this treatment entails. State practice determines customary international law, and abuse of prisoners is widespread internationally. The United States officially understands this obligation to be consistent with the Fifth and Eighth amendments. But the amendments might not reach terrorists. In sum, it seems possible that abusing prisoners who lack U.S. citizenship is legal as long as they are not tortured.

**Changing the Law**

The United States could legislate to allow its interrogators to torture suspected terrorists, as long as the suspects were not protected by the U.S. constitution. The ban on torture comes from international and domestic law. Under U.S. law, both treaties and customary international law are akin to federal legislation. And like any legislation, later contradictory legislation trumps international law. Courts will try to interpret laws not to contradict international law or prior legislation. But where Congress clearly intends to contradict international law, it can legally do so, although other nations won’t like it.

Torture is banned by several layers of law, but abuses short of torture are fair game. U.S. interrogators can deprive prisoners of sleep and food, put bags on their heads to disorient them, make them stand for long periods, expose them to cold or hot temperatures, let them wonder about their fate to sow fear, and even slap, shake and shove them. If Congress changed the law, U.S. forces could torture suspects without Constitutional protections and send suspects to other nations to be tortured.

**Torture and National Security**

That is what the law on torture is. What the law ought to be is another matter. Why torture?

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**SEMINAR XXI EVOLVES IN WAKE OF 9/11**

Since the September 11th, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, interest has grown in Seminar XXI, the Center’s already well-attended executive education program for senior members of the national security policy community.

Since 1986, Seminar XXI has provided an opportunity for its fellows — policy makers and military and intelligence officers — to sharpen their analytical skills by engaging with leading scholars of international security affairs. Furthermore, they’ve been able to do this without having to take time off from their demanding jobs, since the program’s monthly sessions are held at locations in and near Washington, D.C.

But while Seminar XXI has always included sessions on terrorism and political Islam, it has necessarily focused more intently on these topics since 9/11, adding speakers and allotting more discussion time to them during each of the last two years’ programs.

Seminar XXI now has more than 1,000 alumni/ae. Program faculty come not only from MIT but from other leading universities and research centers around the world, providing participants with a range of intellectual approaches toward defense policy and international relations.

“The program seems to be flourishing,” says Prof. Robert Art, Security Studies Program Senior Fellow, Herter Professor of International Relations at Brandeis University, and Director of Seminar XXI since 2000. According to Prof. Art, the number of applications for the program has increased dramatically since 9/11, and this year’s applicant pool was the largest in the program’s history. (More than 70 fellows were admitted.) This comes as no surprise, he says, given the renewed attention to national security in the wake of the terror attacks.

Under Executive Director Tisha Gomes, Seminar XXI has also increased the program’s online capabilities. Whereas stacks of monthly course materials used to be mailed, course readings, bibliographies, summaries and program news are now distributed electronically.
Torture is cruel and illiberal, especially when done to people who have not been convicted of a crime. The only possible justification for torture is to save lives. The argument is utilitarian: torture one to save the many. This logic is especially salient in the so-called ticking-time-bomb scenario, where a terrorist has information that can stop an attack and time is short. Almost everyone would agree that were a terrorist captured with information about a nuclear weapon hidden in Boston, we should use any necessary means to extract information to stop the plot. But agreement on that hypothetical case does not create agreement about what the law should be.

There are three approaches our government can take to torture. The first is to outlaw torture without regard to danger and punish violators. This is nominally U.S. policy. The second approach is to outlaw torture but to secretly sanction the practice or quietly permit rendering. This approach is advocated by Mark Bowden in a recent *Atlantic Monthly* article. The third approach is to explicitly authorize torture in certain circumstances. Alan Dershowitz has advocated judge-issued torture warrants in ticking-time-bomb cases. Some say there is another approach to torture: to assert that it is beyond the law; a part of the war on terror, which is in a gray area between the rules of war and laws of the United States. But this position fails logically. Torture is banned by several layers of law. There is no legal twilight. Congress can accept this prohibition or create a new standard. But it cannot simply ignore the law.

**Three Possible Approaches**

The first approach, the absolute ban on torture, primarily rests on two insights. The first is that torture is unnecessary. Studies show that people react better to pain than they expect. Proven and legal methods of interrogation extract information effectively without torture. Sensory deprivation, solitary confinement, and drugs are often effective. Skillful interrogators can crack even the hardest terrorist through guile and by instilling uncertainty and dislocation.

The second insight is the slippery slope idea. Any law or policy allowing torture might permit it to become widespread. Who knows what suspect knows of a ticking time bomb? We could torture every prisoner based on this logic. The idea that danger can justify torture has no limiting principle. All tyranny claims danger as justification. Both terrorists and weapons proliferation will last for the foreseeable future. If we allow their combination to limit civil liberties, the sacrifice may be permanent.

One problem with the absolute ban on torture is that it deprives interrogators of their best tool: fear. According to the Kubark Manual, a CIA interrogation guide written in 1963, the most effective interrogation technique is not pain, but the fear of pain. If the United States cannot torture or send terrorists to their home states to be tortured, terrorists will understand that they have little to fear from our interrogators and be less likely to cooperate.

Some argue that the absolute ban on torture is unfair to those on the front lines. Most people who advocate this policy admit that they would expect interrogators to torture if a ticking-time-bomb scenario arose. But they place the moral dilemma society dodged on interrogators who are left to face legal sanction for actions many deem just.

The second position on torture, to legally ban but tacitly allow it, differs from the first position only slightly. Advocates of this position say that interrogators should break the law and torture, but should not be held responsible for their acts. This argument says that the war on terrorism is a unique circumstance that requires special unwritten rules, but that formalizing these rules would be impossible or dangerous to civil liberties. They argue that hypocrisy is the best solution for democratic nations fighting terrorism.

This approach to torture is undemocratic. As Alan Dershowitz points out, off the books policies are resistant to the debate that makes democracy function. We cannot approve of or
oppose hidden policies. Gaps between law and morality corrode the rule of law.12

Although there are times when society permits illegality (examples include sodomy, underage drinking, and euthanasia), society’s opinion will not be uniform. The point of law is uniformity and objectivity. By eschewing legal sanction, the wink and a nod policy of permitting torture becomes unsustainable by definition. Unwritten codes degenerate into subjectivity. The interrogators who break the law stick out their necks. Their sponsors cannot assure them cover. A wink from some will not stop indictment from others. Ask Jack Kevorkian.

The final approach to the torture is to authorize it in special circumstances. Congress could broadly authorize torture in the war on terror, but politics makes this unlikely. Alan Dershowitz’s suggestion is more realistic. He advocates allowing interrogators to stick a needle under a suspected terrorist’s fingernails to extract information if the government can convince a judge that there is probable cause to believe the suspect is a terrorist with information about a coming attack.13 Dershowitz’s stated goal is to limit torture. He argues that the purist position against torture is unrealistic because it does not allow for torture in ticking-time-bomb scenarios. Because everyone knows that in such a situation moral imperatives would lead to torture, the purist position will lead interrogators to identify time bomb scenarios themselves and expose themselves to prosecution while politicians stay pure. This system will lead to more torture than a system requiring judicial discretion. Judicial oversight will assure that torture is only used in the true ticking time bomb case.

The objection to torture warrants is that they will create abuse despite judicial discretion and legitimate illiberal behavior. Any system of legal abuse, no matter how well-supervised, might bring overuse. No one explained this danger better than Justice Jackson, in the famous case about the detention of Japanese citizens in World War II, Korematsu v. United States. He argued that the court was better off ignoring the abuse of rights than validating that abuse with a new principle:

The principle then lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need. Every repetition imbeds that principle more deeply in our law and thinking and expands it to new purposes.

Jackson’s logic can be applied to torture, rendering, or cruel and degrading treatment. We have seen that these practices are illegal, probably illegal and probably legal, respectively, for suspects not protected by the constitution. But even legal acts are not necessarily wise or consistent with liberal principles. Defining classes of people outside constitutional bounds is dangerous to liberties. Some courts have argued that short of a true state of war, all U.S. actors are constrained by the constitution no matter whom they capture. That position may seem naïve, but it may be a pragmatic method to minimize the invasion of liberties.

As we consider policies acknowledged even by their defenders as antithetical to democracy, a broader debate about the tension of liberal laws and illiberal acts becomes urgent. There will always be justifications for trading liberty for security. But national security is broader than safety; it includes the defense of principles. In perilous times, it is worth repeating the trite notion that our strict constitutional protections were drafted by pragmatists who knew danger and the conflict between liberty and security.

Benjamin Friedman is pursuing a master’s degree in the MIT Security Studies Program and a law degree at Georgetown University.

Notes

3 See http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/ts_search.pl?title=18&sec=2340a
10 Bowden, 58
11 Ibid, 60
12 Dershowitz, 153.
13 Ibid, 144.
Since 2001, CIS has partnered with the Harvard School of Public Health and the Friedman School of Nutrition Studies and Policy at Tufts University, in an innovative program to highlight the study of humanitarian crises.

The collaboration — known as the Inter-University Initiative on Humanitarian Studies and Field Practice, or HSI — has offered students the opportunity to earn a certificate in humanitarian studies while continuing their degree studies in other programs. HSI brings together specialists from a variety of disciplines to teach students from MIT, Harvard and Tufts about the ways in which post-Cold War conflicts affect civilians.

Addressing a Need

After the Cold War, brutal images from Somalia, Bosnia, and Afghanistan led scholars and policymakers to ask how industrial states and international institutions could stabilize war-torn nations. But stability was not enough. It quickly became clear that humanitarianism was a complex business, involving knowledge of local politics, massive migrations, and human rights violations. Those who responded were often vulnerable to attack.

The Inter-University Initiative is designed to offer graduate-level classroom instruction as well as field training in humanitarian response. HSI students take a number of courses in humanitarian emergencies before completing a three-month field placement under the auspices of a non-governmental organization. This practical experience is crucial, since it offers participants real-world insights into the realities of humanitarian work.

Extraordinary Students

According to Carolyn Makinson, Executive Director of CIS and a member of the Initiative’s steering committee, it is the students who make the program unique. Makinson says she is especially impressed with the “extraordinary range of previous field experience that the student participants bring to the program and share with each other.”

The current group of students includes doctors, researchers, officers from non-governmental organizations, and graduate students in architecture and urban studies.

Australian pediatrician Annie Sparrow became interested in the program after spending time in a refugee camp for Afghans, Iranians, and Iraqis. “I realized I needed an education in the humanitarian field, rather than trying to re-invent the wheel all by myself,” Sparrow recalls. “HSI sounded exactly like the program I was looking for, and is not offered anywhere else. The cross-university initiative means we are able to receive and benefit from an enormous wealth of information and experience.”

Friday Seminars

Although the initiative is a collaboration between Tufts, Harvard, and MIT, CIS acts as host for the program’s Friday afternoon seminars on the theory, history, and modern practice of humanitarianism — seminars that feature a diverse group of guest speakers as well as program faculty. Recent talks held in the Center’s 7th floor conference room focused on the treatment of landmine victims and the psychology of trauma.

CIS Associate Director Stephen Van Evera and Sharon Stanton Russell, Chair of the Steering Group of the Inter-University Committee on International Migration and Director of the Mellon-MIT Inter-University Program on Non-Governmental Organizations and Forced Migration, are members of the HSI faculty.

For more information on the Humanitarian Studies Initiative, contact Program Coordinator Estrella Alves at estrella.alves@tufts.edu, or Sarah Anderson of CIS at sarahwa@mit.edu. The program’s website is: www.humanitarianstudies.org.
WHY MIT DECIDED TO GIVE AWAY ALL ITS COURSE MATERIALS VIA THE INTERNET

BY CHARLES M. VEST

The great landmarks of higher education in the United States — the establishment of land-grant colleges in the mid-19th-century and the GI Bill at the close of World War II — spread knowledge and opportunity across our landscape on an unprecedented scale. As we have progressed from World War II to the age of the World Wide Web, we have built a system of higher education that is the envy of the world, and we have developed the Internet as a universal medium for rapidly distributing and finding information.

Since the middle of the last century, graduates of our cutting-edge institutions have transformed the colleges and universities where they became faculty members by bringing with them the class notes, syllabi, and other materials they had used as students. They based their teaching on those materials — shaping, expanding, and improving them to fit their new contexts and students. Today at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, we plan to speed up that process to Internet time, by making the primary materials for nearly all of our 2,000 courses available on the World Wide Web, accessible to anyone anywhere in the world, through our OpenCourseWare initiative. A faculty member at a new engineering university in Ghana, a precocious high-school biology student in suburban Chicago, a political scientist in Poland, a literature professor in upstate New York, or an executive in a management seminar down the hall at MIT will all be able to use the materials our professors rely on in teaching our full-time students. Together they will build a web of knowledge that will enhance human learning worldwide. That is the goal of MIT’s OpenCourseWare.

Ten years from now, I expect that OCW will have become firmly planted in MIT’s educational landscape. More important, it is my sincere hope that the idea will have taken root at many other universities and colleges around the world, and that they too will be supplying knowledge freely and openly to anyone, anywhere in the world.

I believe that we can achieve that goal within such a time frame. After all, it was in only in the fall of 1999 that Robert A. Brown, MIT’s provost, asked a faculty committee to provide strategic guidance on how the institute should position itself in the distance, or e-learning, environment. At first many members of the group assumed that their work would lead to an “MIT.com” venture. But after a year of analysis, market research, and development of business scenarios, the committee concluded that a revenue-generating distance-education model was not viable for MIT.

However, the group did not abandon the idea that MIT had something special to offer. The committee members went back to the drawing board and — convinced that open software and open systems were the wave of the future — came to a very simple conclusion: We should use the Internet to give our teaching materials away.

I instantly recognized the simplicity and brilliance of that idea. It seemed to me that it would be a way to advance education, by constantly widening access to our information and inspiring other institutions to do the same with theirs.

We now have more than 500 courses available online, with 200 more scheduled for posting (in spring 2004).

Impact at MIT

As Bob Brown has said, MIT will be a very different place once all of our courses have been posted online. In fact, OCW has already had an impact on our campus.

In the first 500 courses, we have published teaching materials from more than a third of

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our 950 faculty members. In doing so, OCW staff members worked with faculty members to transcribe lecture notes, deal with intellectual-property issues, and provide assistance with graphics and Web design. A significant portion of our professors have told us that they are already using OCW materials — the lecture notes, syllabi, problem sets, and exams of their colleagues within their own disciplines and others — to prepare for their classes, do research, and help their students.

An MIT structural engineer, for example, discovered the work of a colleague in ocean engineering and incorporated that material into a book on wave vibration. Over time, we expect that such collaborations will spur innovations in all kinds of interdisciplinary education and research. And by digitally archiving our faculty’s course materials, we are preserving a record of MIT’s continuously evolving curriculum.

Our alumni also are very enthusiastic about OCW and the opportunities it offers them to stay current in their fields. I have been touched by how many of them tell me that they are able to keep building on their MIT education even years after graduation, and that, because of OCW, they have never been prouder of the Institute.

Although it is too early to tell what the long-term effects of OCW will be here at MIT, we hope that our classes will become more interactive, our students will come to class better prepared, and our faculty members will use classroom time in ways we have yet to imagine. I have no doubt that the way our professors teach, our students learn, and our alumni connect with MIT will be profoundly influenced by OCW in years to come.

But the real payoff of what we hope will become the open-courseware movement will be its effect on educators and learners around the world. Our goal is to create a model that other universities can follow and improve. Ultimately, we believe that the trend toward open knowledge will help bring people of all backgrounds together and promote greater mutual understanding among nations.

Feedback about OCW

Since we announced OCW, we have received more than 13,000 e-mail messages from around the world endorsing our vision and the potential benefits of sharing knowledge freely. A typical message came from Andrew Wilson, an online student in Britain: “There can be no greater hope for humankind than the belief that wisdom generated through increased learning will ultimately lead to a better world. With OCW, MIT has taken an ethical stand against the belief that knowledge should only be accessible to those who can pay for it or are in proximity to it.”

In November 2003, we asked 21,500 random visitors to the OCW Web site to complete a brief survey. Of the 1,220 responses, 99 percent said that OCW will have a positive impact on education around the globe; 95 percent said that they would return to the site; and 35 percent of the respondents who identified themselves as faculty members said they would use OCW for “planning, developing, or teaching a course,” as well as to enhance their understanding of specific subject matter.

Those results support the anecdotal evidence we have gathered via e-mail messages from visitors to the site. As the OCW concept spreads to other colleges and universities, we expect that access to the work of faculty members from diverse disciplines and institutions will increase by an order of magnitude the benefits to educators and learners who otherwise would not have access to such materials, whether for reasons of geography, cost, or culture.

Future Challenges

Naturally, we have difficulties to overcome.
Can the decision makers of the world’s leading educational institutions use what we are doing on our campuses to improve the lives of people around the world? History has proved that education and discovery are best advanced when knowledge is shared openly.

Foundation. We are committed to sharing all we have learned about putting course information online so that other institutions will be able to achieve similar results much less expensively.

We must also recognize that people in the developing world — who may benefit the most from the open sharing of knowledge — are hindered by a lack of Internet access and connectivity. We must not let that problem obscure our vision of the future, but rather take it as a challenge.

In fact, our challenge is simple: Can the decision makers of the world’s leading educational institutions use what we are doing on our campuses to improve the lives of people around the world? History has proved that education and discovery are best advanced when knowledge is shared openly.

The beauty of working in higher education is that our task is never done. Our agenda must evolve to shape the future, and to respond to new challenges and opportunities. I believe the idea of open courseware is one such opportunity that we must seize during the next decade.

This article appeared in the January 30 issue of The Chronicle of Higher Education. It is reprinted with permission.

Charles M. Vest, president of MIT since 1990, last December announced his plans to leave his post by the fall of 2004. The OpenCourseWare homepage is at http://ocw.mit.edu/index.html.

Iraq Looting

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um, despite urgings to do so by concerned art historians before the war began. Some in the audience leveled this criticism as well. But Col. Bogdanos rejected claims that the Army could have done more to secure the museum after it entered the city on April 9, 2003. He said most of the looting occurred between April 8, when museum staff fled, and April 12, when they returned to assess the damage.

Col. Bogdanos also showed slides indicating how the museum had been converted into a defensive stronghold. As a result, he asserted, U.S. forces would have been highly vulnerable had they moved more quickly.

Recovery Tactics

Whatever the case during the war, the investigation team was left to put the pieces back together — literally — in its aftermath.

Members of Col. Bogdanos’s task force adopted a number of tactics in their effort to recover looted and stolen items. For one thing, they offered full amnesty to any Iraqi who returned items, working in conjunction with religious leaders to convince citizens that the offer was genuine. But this program took time to bear fruit. Iraqis were skeptical: art thieves during Saddam’s rule had routinely been put to death. The task force also conducted more than 50 raids and seizures. Most of these followed tips from locals who knew where looted materials were kept. As a result, Col. Bogdanos reported that more than 4,300 pieces were recovered as of January 2004, and about 9,000 remained missing.

Going forward, Col. Bogdanos said he hopes that international organizations will provide increased resources for tracking the transnational antiquities black market. He also said that the Baghdad museum will not be fully restored without close monitoring of the illicit art market and rigorous enforcement of international law.
In March, graduate student Boaz Atzili presented his paper, “Good Fences can Make Bad Neighbors: State Weakness, Border Fixity, and the War in Congo,” at the International Studies Association (ISA) in Montreal, Canada.

In February, graduate student Dan Breznitz gave a seminar to the management forum of the Office of the Chief Scientist in Israel entitled, “What (if) Can Israel Learn From International Comparisons for Science and Technology Industrial Policy?”

Professor of Political Science Nazli Choucri was recently elected to the European Academy of Sciences. Members are elected on the basis of “distinguished and unique contributions to modern science and technology.” Choucri was chosen for “outstanding and lasting contributions to Political Science and leadership in the forefront of research and education.”

Department of Urban Studies and Planning Associate Professor Diane Davis, Acting Director of the Program on Human Rights and Justice, spoke in March on “State Implosion, Social Fragmentation, and the Dark Side of Police Reform: The Case of Mexico” at the Security and Democracy in the Americas Conference at New School University.

On February 27, SSP graduate student Vanda Felbab-Brown served as discussant for Robert Jervis’s presentation, “Signaling and Perception,” at the MIT Work in Progress Colloquium. On April 30, she presented her paper, “Drugs, Thugs, and Narcs” at the New England Political Science Association conference in Portsmouth, N.H.

SSP Senior Advisor Jeanne Guillemin was a featured speaker at the National Governors Association meeting on March 15. The theme of the meeting was “Homeland Security and Defenses Against Bioterrorism.”

Kenneth Keniston, CIS Affiliate and Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Human Development in the Program in Science, Technology, and Society, was active in forums on Indian governance this spring. He was a keynote speaker at the German-American Conference for Young Leaders in Delhi, and attended a planning meeting in Bangalore for a new research project on the costs and benefits of information and communication technologies for E-governance. With Indian colleagues, Professor Keniston just received a grant from the government of India for a pilot comparative study of six “E-governance” projects in India this summer.

On April 1, CIS Executive Director Carolyn Makinson and CIS Senior Research Scholar Sharon Stanton Russell, along with co-authors William Seltzer, Jennifer Leaning, and Saira Malik, presented their paper, “A Demographic Study of Forced Migration: The 1947 Partition of India,” at the annual meetings of the Population Association of America (PAA) in Boston. Russell also served as the discussant for the session on “Demography of Asian Americans and Asian Canadians.”

CIS Affiliate Thomas L. Neff also spoke in April, at the World Nuclear Association Mid-Term Meeting in Madrid, Spain. His topic was the historical background and future implications of Bush Administration proposals for dealing with nuclear weapons proliferation.

In late January, Ford Professor of Political Science Barry Posen gave a talk at Columbia University on “European Union Security and Defense Policy: Causes, and Implications.” On February 11, Prof. Posen gave a talk at the Mershon Center, Ohio State University. The
topic of his talk was: “European Union Security and Defense Policy: Causes, and Implications.” On March 17, he appeared on WBUR’s “On Point,” on the topic of, “Iraq War: One Year After.”

Professor Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Director of the Program on Human Rights and Justice, was elected to the Executive Council of the American Society of International Law in April. He recently contributed to panel discussions at the Harvard Law School, the Kennedy School of Government, Jawaharlal Nehru University, the Indian Society of International Law, the Madras Institute for Development Studies, the Institute for Development Studies-Sussex, and the World Social Forum in Mumbai. He also published short articles in The Nation and The Hindu.

Sharon Stanton Russell, Chair of the Steering Group of the Inter-University Committee on International Migration and Director of the Mellon-MIT Inter-University Program on Non-Governmental Organizations and Forced Migration, has been appointed a member of the Centre Advisory & Review Group (CARG) of the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalization and Poverty at the University of Sussex, England, for 2003-2008. Last October, she participated in the “International Conference on Migrant Remittances: Development Impact, Opportunities for the Financial Sector and Future Prospects,” co-sponsored by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the World Bank, and the International Migration Policy Programme (IMP) of the United Nations. In January, she was among the international participants in the Ditchley Foundation Conference, “Charity or Self Interest: Motives Underlying our Approaches to Refugees and Immigrants,” held at Ditchley Park, Oxfordshire, England.

Eugene Skolnikoff, Professor of Political Science Emeritus and CIS Affiliate, was in Malaysia from February 16 to March 4 on a Fulbright Grant, visiting the Institute of Malaysian and International Studies (IKMAS) at the Universiti Kebangsaan (National University). He advised scholars at IKMAS on initiating science policy research. He also spoke on the topic, “Choosing the Future Science, Technology and Public Policy.”

In February, CIS Associate Director Stephen Van Evera spoke for the MIT Model UN association on terror and U.S. security. Prof. Van Evera also presented a faculty seminar at Connecticut College on “Myths and the Arab-Israel Conflict: Time for New Narratives.” Later that month, he spoke for the Tufts EPIIC forum on America and the World, discussing “Dilemmas of Empire and Nation-Building.” In March, he appeared on WBEZ Chicago’s public affairs talk show “Odyssey,” which is produced by our former political science colleague Delia Boylan. The topic was Europe and the terror threat.

SSP Research Fellow Sanford Weiner and graduate student Gregory Koblentz co-taught a joint MIT Professional Institute/ National University of Singapore course on “Combating Bioterrorism: The Organizational Response” at the National University of Singapore, from February 18-20, 2004.
New Faces

JoAnn Carmin, Assistant Professor of Urban Studies and Planning, joined CIS as an affiliate in the fall. Her new co-edited volume, *EU Enlargement and the Environment: Institutional Change and Environmental Policy in Central and Eastern Europe*, focuses attention on key environmental and institutional changes associated with eastern expansion of the European Union. Looking at four central themes — capacity changes and limitations, the EU’s mixed messages and conflicting priorities, non-state actor roles and developments, and the exchange of ideas and information — the volume shows that enlargement will change the EU, not just make it bigger, and that EU officials and programs are improving some aspects of environmental policy in CEE countries even as they are making others less sustainable.

This spring, Mercedes Stephensen joined CIS from the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, where she is pursuing her Master’s of Strategic Studies. Mercedes is a Canadian Department of National Defense Master’s of Arts Scholar and holds a Steinhauer Award of Distinction. She has studied and worked in national defense and journalism at the Pentagon, the Cato Institute, and Georgetown University and served as the President of the Society for Military and Strategic Studies from 2001-2004. Mercedes is a national political commentator and broadcast consultant in Canada on security and defense issues and most recently coauthored a national report on the state of the Canadian Forces. Mercedes’ research into Canadian involvement in Ballistic Missile Defense, Canada-US relations and nuclear proliferation forms a basis for her research at MIT.

Also this spring, SSP welcomed Dr. Chunchi Wu to the program. Dr. Wu will be working closely with the Technical Work Group as a visiting scholar, researching outer-space arms control and missile defense. Her research interests also include US national security strategy as well as nuclear and missile proliferation. Dr. Wu is trained as an analyst in international relations, and has been engaged in research on arms control, nonproliferation and regional security at the Center for American Studies of Fudan University, one of the top universities in China, since 1997. Her first book, *Deterrence Theories and Missile Defense*, was published in 2001 in Chinese. She has also published papers, articles and reports concerning export control, missile defense, outer-space arms control, China-US relations, South Asian security and China’s foreign policy.
Publications

JoAnn Carmin, CIS Affiliate and Assistant Professor of Urban Studies and Planning (co-editor with Stacy D. VanDeveer)


Diane E. Davis, Acting Director, PHRJ

*Discipline and Development: Middle Classes and Prosperity in East Asia and Latin America* (Cambridge University Press, 2004).

Hugh Gusterson, CIS Affiliate and Assistant Professor of Anthropology and STS

*People of the Bomb: Portraits of America’s Nuclear Complex* (University of Minnesota Press, forthcoming).

Kenneth Keniston, CIS Affiliate and Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Human Development in the Program in Science, Technology, and Society (co-editor with Deepak Kumar)


Gregory D. Koblenz, SSP Graduate Student


Gabriele Watson, PHRJ Research Fellow, (editor)

*Race to the Bottom, Take II: An Assessment of Sustainable Development Achievements of ECA-Supported Projects Two Years After OECD Common Approaches*, Rev. 6 (ECA Watch, September 2003).

Cindy Williams, SSP Senior Research Fellow, (editor)