Cyberpolitics in International Relations

by Nazli Choucri

Nazli Choucri, professor of political science at MIT, describes in her book that cyberspace is “a venue of unprecedented opportunity, a source of vulnerability, a disturbance in the familiar international order, and a venue of potential threat to national security.”

continued on page 6

The Right to Kill?

by Graham Denyer Willis

Across political and social thinking, the idea that the state has the right to kill its own citizens is rarely contested. From Hobbes to Weber and Mbembe, it is explicit or implied that states decide the conditions under which citizens can, and indeed should, die in order to preserve sovereignty.

continued on page 10

précis Interviews Cindy Williams

Cindy Williams, principal research scientist at the MIT Security Studies Program, discusses with précis the U.S. budget deficit, including military spending, DOD personnel costs, sequestration, and President Obama’s recently proposed budget.

Williams holds a PhD in mathematics from the University of California, Irvine. She is co-author, with Gordon Adams, of Buying National Security: How America Plans and Pays for its Global Role and Safety at Home (Routledge 2010).

continued on page 2

China and Japan on Uninhabited Isles

The tense, unusual standoff between China and Japan over uninhabited islands in the East China Sea, and the lack of an obvious resolution to the situation, were apparent during a panel discussion.

continued on page 4

Bombing Heard Round the World?

Just a few blocks from where the Boston Marathon bombing suspects allegedly murdered an MIT police officer, a panel of experts convened for a conversation on the global context of the bombing.

continued on page 11

Sizing Up Japan, After the Disaster

“When we talk about crises, they are instruments, or tools,” Richard Samuels reflects. “They’re not independently transformative. They’re tools in the service of people with preferences...”

continued on page 16
**précis:** How much of a responsibility does military spending bear for the budget deficit and debt issues the U.S. faces?

**CW:** Increased military spending after 9/11 was a major factor in running up the national debt. The $1.4 trillion already spent on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is widely reported. But most people don’t know that even the non-war part of the defense budget rose by nearly 50 percent in real terms. That rise in spending added another $1.4 trillion to defense budgets over the years. Since none of that new spending was offset by taxes, it all went straight into the federal debt. And of course we now owe interest on all of it, which compounds every year. So I’d guess defense spending accounts for at least a quarter of today’s $12 trillion debt held by the public.

**précis:** If we continue to wind down our foreign wars, will that sufficiently address the Defense department’s share of the budget deficit?

**CW:** At about $90 billion this year, spending for the wars is about half of what it was a few years ago, when combat operations in Iraq were at their peak. But the Department of Defense (DoD) is finding it hard to rein in its non-war spending. The department likes to advertise that it cut almost $500 billion from its budget last year. But that figure measures what they saved over a ten-year period in comparison to a ten-year budget they hoped for but were never going to get. The actual drop in funding from 2012 to 2013 was only a few billion dollars, but the department is finding it hard to make ends meet even with that tiny haircut. The main reason is that some costs inside of their budget—especially the costs of pay, health care, and new weapons—keep growing much faster than inflation. Of course, all of this is complicated by the fact that the department has to be cut down by about 10 percent if Congress doesn’t rescind the Budget Control Act that Congress passed in 2011.

**précis:** There seems to be a debate over whether defense spending is good for the economy or trades off with more productive spending or social spending. Which argument do you think is most compelling and why?

**CW:** Probably the most fun thing about defense economics is how fast the subject of military spending can turn a belt-tightener into a Keynesian. The bottom line is that lots of military spending—especially in the non-war budget—pays for American jobs. The debate these days is mostly about how many jobs, and how good they are. I think the best work on the subject was done last year by researchers at U Mass Amherst. They note that defense workers generally earn more than, say, teachers or workers in the alternative energy sector. As a result, they find that military spending leads to fewer jobs than public spending in other areas—because the money is spread around to fewer people.

Of course, that thinking skirts the other question you are asking—whether the military is the best place to invest public R&D money for future payoff. My own answer is no. But others would argue that since non-military R&D projects can be a tough sell politically, we should be happy to take R&D investments where we can get them.

**précis:** One contributor to expanded defense budgets that you’ve identified is defense procurement cost overruns. Is this a result of short-sightedness or of lobbying and the so called “military-industrial complex”?

**CW:** It’s both. The military is plagued by two types of weapons cost growth. The
first is what you might call “generational cost growth.” We used to say that costs would double between generations. Now they triple or even more. To a large extent, that cost growth comes because the capabilities improve from one generation to the next. Unfortunately, the tripling in unit cost does not buy enough added capability for the service to agree that it only needs one-third as many units!

The other type of cost growth is what happens between a new system’s first formal cost estimate and the final cost to deliver it to the field. There are several reasons for that cost growth. One of the most common is the low-balling of initial cost estimates by people who hope that once the system gets started, it will be hard to turn off. Cozy relationships between lobbyists and Congress and between contractors and program offices—the so-called “iron triangle”—exacerbate that problem. Another is related to expecting too much of immature technologies; if you don’t know how to make something work, it’s hard to estimate what it will cost. The services also have a history of starting production before developmental testing is finished. That kind of concurrency between development and production is an invitation to expensive redesign as problems are discovered in systems that were already produced.

**précis**: Does more intelligence spending offer a cheaper substitute to maintaining forces abroad in terms of managing threats and reassuring allies?

**CW**: Most of the U.S. intelligence budget—including that of the CIA—falls somewhere in the defense budget. During the past decade and a half, intelligence spending rose even faster than the rest of the defense budget. Yes, intelligence is important, but its budget can be trimmed significantly and still be vastly larger than it was before 9/11.

**précis**: Why does the U.S. have such high personnel costs and are they above average compared to other developed countries’ militaries?

**CW**: It’s hard to get a good comparison of personnel costs from one country to another, because different countries offer different benefits to everyone and provide soldier benefits in diverse ways. For example, we offer college tuition as a big perk for military service. In Western Europe, college tuition is generally cheap enough that it wouldn’t be seen by potential recruits as an attractive inducement to join up. On the other hand, we offer very little to help service members get settled into new jobs when they leave the military. In contrast, for anyone who serves in the French armed forces for four years, France provides a full year of pay while they make a plan for the future, identify a new employer, and get started in a new job. What we can say is that U.S. military personnel costs are very high compared with a decade or so ago. Beginning in about 2000, military cash pay shot up much faster than pay in the private sector and greatly outstripped the consumer price index. At the same time military health care spending more than doubled in real terms.

**précis**: Will the recent “Obamacare” health care reforms begin to control some of this spending?

**CW**: Not really. Obamacare will expand access for Americans who today find it hard to get coverage. But military retirees and their families can get coverage under the DoD system, called Tricare, that is cheap or free to them—so Obamacare won’t attract them. In fact, a major factor pushing DoD’s health costs up is that military retirees with other coverage options have moved into Tricare because it’s so much cheaper for them than any other coverage they can get. The only way to make other insurance choices look better to military retirees is to raise the Tricare premiums significantly, which Congress has so far refused to do.

**précis**: Is the political resistance to cutting personnel and pay driven by personal, political, or strategic concerns?

**CW**: I’d say it’s all of the above. Nobody wants to shortchange the service members and families who have contributed and sacrificed so much during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan—especially when such a small fraction of the youth population volunteers for service. There is a big political factor here too. For years, the Bush administration and then the Obama administration have asked Congress to slow down military pay raises and increase the share of health care costs borne by military families and retirees. But Congress—often of the opposite political stripe from the President—voted against those measures, claiming the high road in looking out for the nation’s men and women in uniform. Concerns about filling the ranks with the right people can also play a role, though in recent years the strategic concerns are not much in play; with the wars coming to an end and high jobless rates in the private sector, recruiting and retention are very good right now.

**précis**: Do pay and benefits cuts mean military personnel have to take a step back in terms of their quality of life or are they more about limiting future growth?

**CW**: Mostly it’s about limiting future growth. Military pay climbed so fast in recent years that limiting across-the-board raises to the level of GDP inflation would save the government a bundle of money while still holding troops’ buying power steady and keeping them well ahead of their private-sector counterparts.

**précis**: One suggestion you make for cost savings in line with DoD requests is scaling down personnel and units like army brigades, carrier groups, and tactical air squadrons. How do you reduce army personnel by 20% without having to fire people?

**CW**: You don’t—not if you want to do it quickly. The Army typically loses nearly 20 percent of its troops each year to separations and retirements anyway, and has to replace them through recruiting. So in theory, the service could just stop or slow recruiting for a couple of years and be done with it. But the Army brings nearly all of its soldiers in at the entry level—as privates in the enlisted force or second lieutenants in the officer corps; they don’t hire experienced people in as sergeants and majors. That means that if the Army

continued on page 18
China and Japan Remain Miles Apart on Uninhabited Isles

Peter Dizikes, MIT News Office

The tense, unusual standoff between China and Japan over uninhabited islands in the East China Sea, and the lack of an obvious resolution to the situation, were apparent during a panel discussion at MIT, as a Chinese diplomat and a former Japanese diplomat held firm to their countries’ positions, while adding that they hope to end the dispute.

The question of who should possess the five tiny islands—the Diaoyu Islands, in Chinese, or the Senkaku Islands, in Japanese—is a long-running one. But it has flared up again recently, starting in September, when Japan bought three of the islands from a private owner, apparently to prevent them from being purchased by the nationalist former mayor of Tokyo. China has contested Japan’s actions, claiming its own historical right to the property; the two countries have since been engaged in a tense standoff marked by military patrols at sea, as well as public demonstrations at home.

“Diaoyu Islands belong to China and I think there is ample evidence of that,” said Liu Weimin, minister counselor at the Chinese embassy in Washington, adding, “China did not start [the] crisis.”

Liu emphasized that “China is committed to peaceful dialogue,” and noted that “nobody wants a military conflict in this area.” The dispute, he said, was “not the full picture of Sino-Japanese relations.” Nonetheless, he added, “Japan should refrain from taking provocative actions.”

Representing the Japanese point of view, Yukio Okamoto, a former high-level diplomat and political advisor, politely but firmly differed.

“I agree with most of [what] he said, except the core issue, of the islands belonging to China,” said Okamoto, who served in Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1968 to 1991, and is spending the current academic year as a Robert E. Wilhelm Fellow at MIT’s Center for International Studies.

“We don’t want any military conflict,” Okamoto said, but added, “Whenever we talk with China … the talks are always a zero-sum game.”
Concern, But No Resolution in Sight

The event, “On the Rocks: China and Japan in the East China Sea,” was part of the Starr Forum series held by CIS, and took place in front of an audience of more than 200 in MIT’s Bartos Theater.

The naval patrols that both countries are engaged in were the subject of considerable discussion by the panelists, who emphasized the disastrous effects that any military action, even if triggered by a misunderstanding, could have.

“The current standoff in the islands is inherently dangerous,” said M. Taylor Fravel, an associate professor of political science at MIT and an expert on China’s territorial disputes in recent decades. He added: “The probability of some sort of incident occurring is growing and growing.”

Of China-Japan relations, Fravel said, “They’re probably the worst they’ve been in a decade.”

But why exactly do China and Japan care so much about the islands in the first place? Some observers have speculated that material matters, such as nearby natural resources, may be helping to drive the conflict. In that vein, Richard Samuels, the Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT and director of CIS, quoted Alexis Dudden, a historian of Japan at the University of Connecticut who has noted that, “In world politics, islands everywhere increasingly contain the oceans that surround them, rather than the reverse.”

Samuels also noted that domestic political dynamics could be driving the standoff, adding, “There is concern in Japan that the Chinese Communist Party is not in full control of the People’s Liberation Army, and there is concern in China that Tokyo now has tilted very hard in the direction of nationalist excess.”

Mike Mochizuki, an associate professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University, acknowledged that this may be a factor, but added that “nationalism itself cannot explain” the dispute, which he called “multicausal” in nature.

Resolution of the standoff may well require outside intervention, although the path to that remains unclear. Okamoto suggested that Japan could refer the matter to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague, but pointedly noted that China does not belong to the ICJ.

U.S. diplomats have been engaged with the issue, and Samuels suggested that one path forward would lead through Washington.

“Both countries are watching carefully to see if the United States can prevent a fight between China and Japan, and each is eager to know, if a fight breaks out, whether the United States will be willing and able to stop it,” he said. “So there’s a lot at stake for all the parties in this dispute.

“Still, there was one thing everyone agreed upon. For the moment, “Both sides don’t have a perfect solution,” Liu acknowledged.

Reprinted with permission of MIT News.
CYBERPOLITICS, a recently coined term, refers to the conjunction of two processes or realities—those pertaining to traditional human contentions for power and influence (politics) surrounding the determination of who gets what, when, and how, and those enabled by a constructed domain (cyber) as a new arena of human interaction with its own modalities, realities, and contentions.

Created with the Internet at its core, cyberspace is a fact of daily life. Until recently, this arena of virtual interaction was considered largely a matter of low politics—the routine, background, and relatively non-contentious. Today cyberspace and its uses have vaulted into the highest realm of high politics. It has become a venue of unprecedented opportunity, a source of vulnerability, a disturbance in the familiar international order, and a venue of potential threat to national security.

Many features of cyberspace are reshaping contemporary international relations theory, policy, and practice. Among these are: temporality (replaces conventional temporality with near instantaneity); physicality (transcends constraints of geography and physical location); permeation (penetrates boundaries and jurisdictions); fluidity (sustains shifts and reconfigurations); participation (reduces barriers to activism and political expression); attribution (obscures identities of actors and links to action); and accountability (bypasses mechanisms of responsibility).

Individually, each feature is at variance with our common understanding of social reality. Jointly, they create powerful disconnects that impinge upon, if not contradict, the concept of sovereignty and the vertical structures of power and influence. So too, the traditional systems of international relations generally framed in hierarchical power relations—bipolar, multipolar, or unipolar structures—may not be congruent with these new cyber features with the increasing diversity of individual, groups, and non-state voices and influence in an international context characterized by decentralization, localization, and diverse asymmetries in modes of leverages, power, and influence.

In short, the dramatic expansion of cyber access worldwide, the growth in voicing, global civil society, and the new economic and political opportunities afforded by cyberspace are critical drivers of the ongoing realignments. And, most important of all, they have already assumed constitutive features of their own. At the same time, however, some of the emergent features of the 21st century state system are reflected in the cyber domain as well (See Figure 1 on page 8).

International Relations
The expansion of cyber access has already influenced the Westphalian state-based international system in powerful ways. Among the notable impacts are the following:

1. New challenges to national security, from sources of vulnerability without precedent (cyber threats), new dimensions of national security (cyber security) coupled with uncertainty, fear, and threat from unknown sources (attribution problem).
2. Novel types of asymmetries shift traditional power relations and create new opportunities for weaker actors to threaten stronger ones, for various uses of cyber-anonymity, for new cyber venues of political, industrial or military activity, and for expansion of criminal activities—to note only a few examples.
3. Diverse forms of cyber conflicts and contentions create new challenges to the stability and security of the state system, such as the militarization of cyberspace, the conduct of cyber warfare, threats to critical infrastructures, undetected cyber espionage and so on.
4. Empowerment of new actors—some with clear identities and others without—but all with opportunities for growth. Among these are national entities that exercise access control or denial, non-state commercial entities with new products and processes, agents operating as proxies for state actors, new novel criminal groups often too varied to track and too anonymous to identify—over and above the emergence of new and unregulated markets.

5. Unprecedented and unexpected power of institutions for cyber management, largely private entities created specifically to enable and manage cyber interactions (such as Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers and Internet Engineering Task Force), or to help support cyber security (such as Consortium for Electric Reliability Technology Solutions).

6. Significant push back by traditional international institutions (such as the International Telecommunications Union) that question the legitimacy of the new institutions for management of cyberspace.

7. New demand for cyber cooperation to contain the growth of cyber conflicts further reinforced by a growing push for framing global cyber norms.

8. Increased density of decision makers for cyber domain with unclear mandates and overlapping job descriptions create new ambiguities that obscure responsibility, question legitimacy, and enhance uncertainty.

9. The new coupling of politics in the traditional and cyber domains shape new strategies based for cross-domain leverage and bargaining that are seldom consistent with conventional practice (such as the Stuxnet—the computer worm that attacked Iran's nuclear reactor).

10. The transformative effects of cyber access permeate all levels of analysis in international relations—the individual, the state, the international system, and the global system—including transnational and non-state actors, for profit and not for profit.

**Re-Visiting “Levels of Analysis”**

The impacts of cyberspace are already apparent at all levels in international relations. To summarize the most obvious:

**The Individual: New Power—New Possibilities**

Cyberspace enables and empowers the individual in unforeseen and diverse ways. Cyber interaction allows self-definition as well as the individual-framing of political stances. By participating in cyber venues, individuals achieve new freedoms. The individual—alone or in groups—can seriously threaten established authority in unprecedented ways (as in early phases of the 2011 Arab revolts).

Clearly cyber-based interactions do not replace traditional forms of interest articulation and aggregation, nationally or internationally. However, they serve as effective conduits of challenge to the established order. Note the recent Wikileaks episode, for example. The state is not likely to accept, or even accommodate, such trends.

**The State System: New Challenges—New Opportunities**

The state remains the basic unit of organization for the international system—the major actor in international politics. While the creation of cyberspace provides new opportunities, it also creates uncomfortable situations often seen as sources of threat.
Cyberpolitics in International Relations
continued from previous page

On the one hand, states have not hesitated to use cyber venues for the delivery of social services—with varying degrees of success that depend on the reliability of cyber access, the clarity of purpose, and the specificity of operations. While we would expect industrial states to excel in the use of cyber venues, we already observe leapfrogging initiatives by the other states. In addition, the relatively strong positive relationship between the performance of e-government and the perceptions of government effectiveness signals that something is indeed happening on the ground.

On the other hand, states have not been slow to control access to cyber venues and, when possible, to prosecute presumed offenders. Many governments have used cyber venues to exert their influence and extend their reach and to pursue their own security by increasing the insecurity of their critics or detractors. Some go to great lengths to limit the exposure of their citizens to messages deemed undesirable. In response, we have seen the construction and growth of anonymous proxy networks to provide structural intermediation of routing mechanisms that mask the identity of sender and receiver (such as the TOR system with its software that enables anonymity and inhibits surveillance).

All of this contributes to the push for a new and more comprehensive view of national security—one that extends beyond traditional concerns to include the cyber domain. The state must now protect the security of its own cyber systems and capabilities, as well as defend against uses of cyberspace to undermine its sustainability, stability, and security. Recognizing that cyberspace is a war-fighting domain, the world’s major power, the United States, has created the U.S. Cyber Command to centralize command of cyberspace operations and coordinate defense of U.S. military networks. Several other countries have followed suit.

The International System: Density of Decision Entities
The increased density of decision makers, noted earlier, is accompanied by a remarkable expansion of governance structures to manage information and communications technologies and to support development objectives. With the growth of international organizations and trends in the new global agenda (notably the Millennium Development Goals), institutional linkages within and across both state and non-state bureaucracies and agencies are increasingly complex. Although states are the stockholders in international governance, non-state actors and other stakeholders resort to cyber venues
for interest articulation and aggregation decision forums. Various non-state groups have been accorded observer status or otherwise allowed to participate in international forums, with no decision-making capacity, but may well influence the outcomes. A major challenge to traditional international relations, theory, practice, and policy lays in the fact that cyberspace—with its ubiquity, pervasiveness, and global reach—is managed almost entirely by the private sector. This reality can only be understood in the historical moment when the dominant power, the United States, delegated to the private sector the operational management of cyberspace. The decision was made by the sovereign that initiated, conceived, designed and constructed cyberspace. We are now observing some push-back from different actors and agents around the world. This too may be anticipated by traditional theory, but with little insight about the potential outcome.

What does international relations theory have to say about this? U.S. dominance in the Internet’s construction and management is entirely consistent with realist theory, which focuses on state power and national security, as is the challenge from ascending states. The push-back is consistent with institutional theory, which concentrates on coordinated and routinized international behavior. Constructivists might say that all of this is in the eye, and interpretation, of the beholder.

Overall, we expect that, in the short run, uneven patterns of cyber access will continue to reflect the distribution of power in the international system. Over time, the diffusion of cyber capabilities worldwide will expand political participation, enhance politicization of both idiom and action, and increase competition for influence and control over the management of cyberspace. In the long run, these pressures will shape new ways of exerting power and leverage, create new structures and processes, and frame new demands for cyber norms—all of which will reflect the demography, capability, and values of the emergent cyber constituencies.

The Global System: All-Encompassing Commons
In principle, the global system refers to the Earth, its population, geological and geopolitical features, all life-supporting properties, and, now, to cyberspace as well. We have already seen the politicization of both the natural environment and the man-made cyber arena. And we hardly expect that to change on short order.

Almost all international institutions have extended their reach and performance by using cyber tools and capabilities. Little in this trend is surprising, except perhaps the speed at which the use of cyber access is taking shape. What is clearly novel for international relations theory, policy, and practice is the provision of public goods at the global level, a trend that is not created by cyberspace. An immediate follow-up concern, then, pertains to the rules and institutional mechanisms for such provision. But when cyber venues are used to pursue global objectives via international institutions, a whole new set of challenges emerges. Yet to be seen is the extent to which this shapes who gets what, when, and how—as well as who decides on each of these issues.

All of this rests upon, and strengthens, the vertical linkages—connecting global and local—transmitting information, communication, and knowledge building to and from the grass root. Some of these linkages are converging to reinforce the notion of a global civil society. Not surprising, this reinforces nascent calls for international agreements on operational goals and global cyber norms.

New Imperatives
Despite a growing literature on cyber-related issues in the study of international relations, a consolidated body of knowledge has yet to develop. There is no common consensus on the effects of cyberspace on international relations or what constitutes data, analysis, cases, comparisons, or any of the usual tools of inquiry in the social sciences. Nonetheless, we point to three knowledge-building imperatives or essential activities for consolidating and expanding our knowledge of cyberpolitics in international relations.

continued on next page
These are to (a) formulate the domain ontology (to establish knowledge coherence and organization by identifying an internally consistent method for determining, identifying, and connecting different facets of the issue in question in an empirically verifiable way); (b) leverage knowledge networking, (to help reduce barriers to knowledge access by drawing on the power of collaboration), and (c) expand multilingual capabilities (to allow people to express themselves in their own language and idioms and likewise for others to understand and to engage in their own language and idioms).

The Future of Cyberpolitics

The future of cyberpolitics can be framed by the intersection of two traditional dimensions of world politics: (a) state sovereignty versus private authority, and (b) international conflict and violence versus cooperation and collaboration. Shown in Figure 2, this frame yields different stylistic models with different normative underpinnings, different assumptions about international relations, and different expectations of interactions among decision entities. As model types, these futures can be used to signal possibilities and potentials, not to generate specific predictions. One model, called the garrison state, is a future defined by high sovereign control over cyber venues in a world with a great deal of conflict and violence. It may well reflect the values of countries like Saudi Arabia, Myanmar, North Korea, and China.

Another is cyber anarchy, also a future of conflict and violence, but one dominated by private authority. In many ways, this future approximates the proverbial Hobbesian state of nature, the war of all against all.

A third model, is the global cyber commons, anchored in international cooperation and coordination in a world controlled by non-state actors, agents, and entities. This future is shaped by norms and requires only shared understandings to sustain effective Internet and other cyber operations.

Figure 2: Potential futures of Cyberpolitics in international relations. Source: Choucri, Nazli. 2012. Cyberpolitics in International Relations. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, p. 235.

Another is cyber anarchy, also a future of conflict and violence, but one dominated by private authority. In many ways, this future approximates the proverbial Hobbesian state of nature, the war of all against all.

A third model, is the global cyber commons, anchored in international cooperation and coordination in a world controlled by non-state actors, agents, and entities. This future is shaped by norms and requires only shared understandings to sustain effective Internet and other cyber operations.
JUST a few blocks from where the Boston Marathon bombing suspects allegedly murdered an MIT police officer, a panel of experts convened on May 1 for a conversation entitled “Marathon Bombing: The Global Context.”

Who is to blame for the intelligence gap between Russia and the United States before the bombing? Was the bombing an act of religious fundamentalism? Will this event make Boston into a more monitored city, like London, with cameras on every street corner? The panel explored these and other questions on Wednesday.

Moderated by Ford International Professor of Political Science and Center for International Studies director Richard Samuels, five MIT professors and scholars provided several contexts surrounding the bombers’ ideology and theorized about the policy impacts the bombing might have in the weeks, months, and years to come.

MIT history professor Elizabeth Wood best summed up the purpose of the Starr Forum talk: “Unless we understand the perpetrators of violence as individuals situated in history, as individuals situated in causes that are larger than their own biographies, we cannot understand what happened last week at the Boston Marathon.”

How much did being natives of the Caucasus region influence the Tsarnaev brothers? Wood and Carol Saivetz, a research affiliate at the MIT Security Studies Program, explored this question, describing the past century of Chechnya’s tensions with Russia, highlighting how the Tsarnaev family lived through each turbulent decade.

Wood’s slide, “Tsarnaev Chronology: A Tale of Two Brothers,” detailed the family’s moves throughout the region since 1944, when Stalin deported thousands of Chechens to work camps. The family’s move to Dhagestan in 2001, when the boys were eight and fifteen years old, was a result of the violence in the second Chechen War, Wood said.

Bakyt Beshimov, a visiting scholar at CIS and a native of the Caucasus region, certainly links the Tsarnaevs’ mindset to their homeland. He watched every video, read every internet post, and listened to every song that inspired Tamerlan Tsarnaev. “His inner search was, in my view, affected by the struggle in his own country, jihadism in the Caucasus and the global Islamic radical ideology,” said Beshimov. “This mindset puts many Chechens into a vicious circle of revenge.”

Several panelists conjectured that the bombing might justify crackdowns and human rights abuses in Russia, particularly ahead of the Winter Olympics in Sochi next year. Then there were the questions of what precedents the Boston response will set in cities around the globe.

Bakyt Beshimov, a visiting scholar at CIS and a native of the Caucasus region, certainly links the Tsarnaevs’ mindset to their homeland.

CIS research associate and assistant professor at Boston College Peter Krause PhD ’11 mused, “Is a lockdown something we’re prepared to do again and again? What about domestic drones for national security or the government reading our email?”

“I’m not going to counsel one way or another on the [issue of] over- or under-reaction,” Krause said. “I’m confident about this: that understanding when and why these things happen is going to lead to better answers as a society…and I’m encouraged by the people who are here today.”

Reprinted with permission of MIT Alumni Association.
MONTHS ago an important Department of Justice (DOJ) White Paper was leaked to the press. This document outlined, in concise and prescriptive wording, when the DOJ believes that the government of the United States has the legal authority to kill an American citizen.

Yet as much as this appeared an overstep in state power, the White Paper was nothing but business as usual—at least in theoretical terms. Across political and social thinking, the idea that the state has the right to kill its own citizens is rarely contested. From Hobbes to Weber and Mbembe, it is explicit or implied that states decide the conditions under which citizens can, and indeed should, die in order to preserve sovereignty. These conditions range in both scale and act, from when governments make declarations of war, to the process and finality of capital punishment, and the open secret that certain populations within states are left to die, or left to kill each other, because states deem them less important. In practical terms such state violence ranges from concealed and diffuse, as in the American Ghetto, to shocking and acute, as in Guantanamo.

If the DOJ proclamation raised concerns about too much central power, it can also help us think about states with the opposite problem: a dearth of central power. Much closer to home, many states have little ability to make these kinds of proclamations or to back them up, a fact that raises big theoretical questions about sovereignty in the contemporary world. Many states that we would never otherwise declare failed fit within a new category of states where central authority is plastic or “negotiated”.

At the heart of this empirical problem are major cities. In recent decades, many major cities in the developing world, from Rio de Janeiro to Johannesburg have been torn apart by violence. Market-oriented and non-revolutionary organized armed groups—violent entrepreneurs—have exploded across borders, following illicit supply chains and feeding off easy access to guns in order to fortify urban territories. Cities as disparate as Caracas, Nairobi and Jakarta are wrapped up in the throes of vertiginous urban violence.

A Decentralized Right to Kill

The nature of sovereignty and these conditions of violence can be made legible by looking at who, other than the state, has the ability to regulate violence. Recent experiences in Mexico, El Salvador and Brazil, have shown decisively that some states have little or no capacity to decide who should live and who can die within their borders. Instead, as my own dissertation fieldwork in São Paulo, Brazil, examines, non-state armed groups often regulate the conditions of life and death. These are groups like El Salvador’s Maras, São Paulo’s Primeiro Comando da Capital, Mexico’s Zetas, and the Sixth Division under Don Berna in Medellin. As these groups consolidated control or established truces with other groups or the police, we observe radical and cyclical oscillations in the respective homicide rates of cities.

This problem is not far from the American doorstep. In March of 2012, the two dominant and transnational Mara groups in El Salvador—the Salvatrucha and Barrio 18—agreed to end decades of bloodshed that had engulfed not only both groups, but society in general. The leadership of the two organizations, both of which are located within the prison system, sought concessions from politicians for better prison conditions as a bargaining chip. One year later, the result has been astounding. The homicide rate has declined by around 60%—no small feat for a place that had a homicide rate of 14 per day in 2009.
It is now public knowledge that these two Mara groups are behind the relative peace. They have spoken openly about it and, in contrast to other countries, public security figureheads have struggled to take credit for the decline. Most understand that the sustainability of this relative peace depends very little, if at all, on public policy, good policing or state willingness. That El Salvador is now somehow safer—even as other types of violence, including kidnapping, extortion and other economic crime continue to increase because they are the economic life line of the Maras—has come to pass in spite of the public security system, not because of it. In some sense, peace depends on non-state armed groups agreeing to be civil.

Regulating Life and Death: the Three ‘Logics’ of São Paulo
In São Paulo, Brazil, the dynamics are similar, if more obscured. The existence of the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC)—a powerful prison-based non-state armed group—has redefined how, and how many, people die in this mega-city of nearly 20 million residents. This is much to the chagrin of a public security system and its leaders who, until December of last year, were loathe to admit that the organization existed at all. But the street-level influences of the PCC are inescapable, particularly for those who work within the public security system—the police themselves.

Based on ethnographic fieldwork carried out in São Paulo with police homicide and other specialized detectives since 2009, my research examines the decentralization of organized violence that exists in the absence of a state monopoly on the right to kill in the city. I identify and trace three distinct and antagonistic logic of death that exist in São Paulo, as channeled through three groups: The PCC, police who kill civilians, and the police that investigate both of them. Each of these three groups, I argue, regulate death in contradictory terms.

Police Who Kill Civilians
In this city, as in other Brazilian cities, police kill civilians at a rate of at least one per day. They are at once juries, judges and executioners. As jury and judge, often in very violent and uncertain circumstances, beat cops make snap decisions about when to kill. As executioners, they carry out that sentence with their own hands, as an act of unbridled state power. These killings are systemic, being positioned within the public security apparatus as an important, if not necessary, facet of everyday police work. Until just recently, the law gave these police the decisive upper hand. Individuals killed by police were formally categorized post-mortem as having committed a crime against both society and the state. The act of resisting arrest legitimized deadly violence on the part of police, who could position their actions as necessitated by resistance to the state, very broadly and subjectively defined. In death, the ‘criminal’ was eternally implicated, justifying the actions of the police who themselves became the victim.

Many police see these killings as central to the practice of policing in a city where the monopoly on violence has fragmented. Immediately following such a killing, the structural logic of this violence echoes in statements like “menos um” (one less), “bandido bom é bandido morto” (a good thief is a dead thief) and, to the police who killed, “parabéns!” (congratulations!) with pats on the back. Chronically burdened by a never-ending tide of crime, many police see all criminals as an irrevocable scourge to be permanently eliminated, at any cost.

One of the reasons that police feel so strongly, however, is because the influence of crime—with the PCC as its masthead—threatens their own lives. Police come from and often continue to live in the same kinds of subaltern urban spaces that the PCC now controls. Many have grown up alongside today’s criminal element, continuing to live on the same streets and sharing the same grocery stores, bars and corner markets. Worse still, in these communities the law of the PCC supersedes the law of the state, meaning that police are forced to set aside their identities and roles as police officers if they hope

continued on the next page
to survive. For police themselves, there is no doubting why community members dramatically underreport crime to the police stations in these areas—there is a much more localized and improbably functional form of order.

The PCC
As others and I have detailed elsewhere, the PCC is a formidable force of order in the city of São Paulo. Emergent from the violence of the São Paulo prison system, the organization formed as a means of self-protection for members. In its genesis, and before it was the drug-oriented urban-scale protection racket of today, the sole objective of the PCC was to eliminate what it described as the violence and injustice of the medieval conditions within the prison system. In doing this, it succeeded. The PCC today controls 135 of the 152 prisons in São Paulo state with its own form of governance and morality. Sexual violence and the use of drugs that ‘destabilize’, such as crack, are prohibited. A self-protection rationale subsists deeply within an organization that values security at all costs. Even as it made the leap from the prison system to the poorer parts of São Paulo ten years ago, and, today, as it continues to spread to other Brazilian states and even into Paraguay and Bolivia, this rationale remains a powerful backdrop.

Part of ensuring security for the organization’s ‘own’ means punishing people for doing things that threaten the organization and its affiliates. In my fieldwork I have collected a variety of data from sources such as seized PCC notebooks and pen drives, homicide cases files and the process of investigation of those cases, police conversations with PCC members, as well as my own conversations with residents of PCC controlled communities. This data points to a particular form of authority and punishment, carried out via local and ad-hoc ‘tribunals’. Punishment can be differentiated into two categories: Punishment for ‘baptized’ members, and punishment for residents of the communities controlled by the organization. Members can be killed for any number of reasons, from failure to pay monthly dues, to stealing money or drugs, or for lying about important matters. The punishments are tabulated in notebooks, and include a host of personal details and include justifications for the reasons why. In the community, however, residents are also punished for committing crimes without the explicit approval of the organization. Community members seen to have carried out a crime without the blessing—implicit or explicit—of the PCC are punished by death. Murder occurs when the organization says so. An illegitimate killing is punishable in the same terms.

Homicide Detectives
Make no mistake, São Paulo’s public security system has its peculiarities. One such peculiarity is that homicide detectives are responsible for investigating two types of deaths: Intentional homicides and police killings of civilians. In terms of homicides, detectives carry out investigations of thousands of incidents every year, ranging from crimes of passion to bloody multiple homicides. Most of these killings, though, are of young men from poorer parts of the city. A large majority of these are found in public spaces with gunshot wounds. Police detectives have little doubt that these kinds of homicides are deeply intertwined with the influences of the PCC. Even cases that appear unrelated are often traced to things like used car sales, which has become a key money laundering racket for the organization in recent years. A 2012 report from the public prosecutor pointed out that the resolution rate—cases closed but not necessarily proceeding to trial—was 29.5%. Put differently, much less than one in three cases ever make it from body on the street to defendant in the courtroom.

When it comes to police killings of civilians, these detectives are responsible for investigating and arresting police that have killed illegitimately. This illegitimacy is of course subjective, but the routine nature of these killings makes this work predictable. Squeezed between the two other logics of death, these detectives search for when the story doesn’t add up. When they arrest police, which happens many times each year, they often do so continued on page 19
SHARON Stanton Russell, 68, died peacefully on February 27, 2013, after a prolonged illness. A prominent and pioneering academic in the field of international migration who advised governments around the world, she was a senior research scholar at the Center for International Studies at MIT.

Russell also served as director of the Mellon-MIT Inter-University Program on Non-Governmental Organizations and Forced Migration from 1997 to 2005 and chair of the Steering Group of the Inter-University Committee on International Migration (IUCM) from 1999 to 2005. Her research and publications focused on global migration trends and policies, the relationship of migration to development, and forced migration. Her publications include “International Migration: Global Trends and National Responses;” “Migration Patterns of US Foreign Policy Interest;” “Migrant Remittances and Development;” International Migration and International Trade; International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, and Demography and National Security, co-edited with the late Myron Weiner. Russell had been a member of two United Nations Expert Groups on international migration and had consulted extensively on migration policy issues with private foundations and UN organizations. She was a member of the Centre Advisory & Review Group (CARG) of the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalization and Poverty, University of Sussex. She served on the Expert Panel on Global Population Projections (1998-2000) and the Roundtable on the Demography of Forced Migration (1999-2004), both convened by the Committee on Population of the US National Academy of Sciences.

Her early engagement in political causes led to a lifetime of strong advocacy for progressive policies. Her dedication to the advancement of opportunities for women and her belief in sisterhood were evident in her devotion to friendships, and her boundless enthusiasm for mentoring many young women whom she nurtured professionally. The importance of family and community was a value that Sharon held deeply. A loving wife, mother and grandmother, she possessed an inspiring generosity of spirit, always seeking to forge connections and embrace friends both new and old.

“Without Sharon’s constantly reaching out and advising on research, many people within the IUCIM context and outside—academics and practitioners alike—including myself would not have felt as welcome and supported in the migration, refugee and human rights research work at MIT and in the greater Boston area,” said Luise Druke, a fellow at the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative and a former human rights fellow at CIS.
AROUND the world, people watched in horror as an earthquake and tsunami struck Japan on March 11, 2011, soon followed by the slow-motion meltdown of a nuclear reactor in Fukushima. In the days and weeks that followed, many observers expected to see a wave of political or social change sweep Japan as well.

“At that moment, it looked like everything was up for grabs,” says Richard Samuels, a professor in MIT’s Department of Political Science. “The Japanese themselves defined the moment that way. There was a paroxysm of claims that everything would change.”

Instead, as Samuels reflects, there was “nothing on the scale that most of us expected.” After a hiatus, several of Japan’s nuclear power plants came back on line, and more are likely to do so before long. Long-standing limitations on the role of the military, lauded for its relief efforts, were not lifted. Much-discussed changes in government structures did not come to pass.

Precisely how this turning point failed to turn is the subject of a new book by Samuels, the first full-length scholarly analysis of Japanese politics since the devastating events of 2011. The book, titled 3.11, after the initial date of the event, is published by Cornell University Press.

And while it is focused on Japan, Samuels’ book may have an important lesson for observers of other countries at a time when states around the world seem beset by political, military and economic crises: Even during great upheaval, entrenched interests are hard to dislodge.

“Political entrepreneurs come into crises with preferences that don’t change as a result of a crisis,” says Samuels, the Ford International Professor of Political Science and director of MIT’s Center for International Studies. Consider that in all of Japan, he adds, “There was only one political leader in the entire drama who changed his view about an important policy issue, and that was the prime minister, Naoto Kan, who became anti-nuclear.

Three Issues: Energy, Security and Government

Samuels’ book is a detailed study of Japanese policy debates since 2011 regarding three issues in particular: energy policy, national security and local government. While the salience of energy policy would seem obvious to anyone who followed the aftermath of the earthquake and tsunami, the importance of the other issues might not be immediately apparent to outsiders.

However, Samuels notes, the Japanese military became a major player after 100,000 troops were deployed in the relief effort, probably the most visible military activity Japan has undertaken since World War II.
Meanwhile, the question of local government came to the fore as local officials reacted more quickly and more effectively to the emergency, in some ways, than the central government did. Local officials, through their actions to help those most affected, “created a whole new sense of solidarity,” Samuels says.

In all of these areas, Samuels thinks, the politics were contested among three factions: those who wanted to use the disaster as an impetus for significant change, those who wanted to stay the course, and those who wanted to return to policies of the past. But the political lines of division varied in each case: On nuclear power, left-leaning activists wanted change in the direction of renewables, while the faction wanting military changes was further to the right, and wanted greater muscularity.

By itself, “Going forward or staying the course is not necessarily a left or right position,” Samuels says.

When it came to nuclear energy, for instance, Japan’s anti-nuclear activists, who had been “quiescent,” saw the problems at Fukushima as an obvious reason to end the country’s dependence on nuclear power. But a better-established group of people wanted to stay the course—including the influential nuclear-energy industry, which warned of potential economic and environmental problems if the nuclear plants remained offline (as they did for several months in 2011).

“The advocates of nuclear power went into hyper-drive and said this is not a sustainable path,” Samuels recounts. Massive anti-nuclear popular protests failed to gain long-term traction, and public confidence in the government’s ability to find a new energy solution dwindled. Kan, who decided to oppose the continued use of nuclear power, resigned in August 2011.

Before long, Samuels observes, “It was back to the pre-3/11 system.”

**Crises as Tools**
Similar inertia took hold in the military sphere, where Japan’s postwar policies have long been circumscribed by Article 9 of its postwar constitution, which limits the activity of the armed forces.

“When we talk about crises, they are instruments, or tools,” Samuels reflects. “They’re not independently transformative. They’re tools in the service of people with preferences, and those preferences are remarkably sticky.”

Reprinted with permission of MIT News.
Interview with Cindy Williams

continued from page 3

stops recruiting for a year, four years from now there will be nobody there with four years of experience. That cohort will remain empty for the next thirty years. So the better strategy for the Army is to encourage the right people to leave at a variety of ranks and years of service. It can encourage that by threatening to fire them, or it can actually fire them, or it can actually fire them. But leaders hate doing that to people who stepped up and served when the country needed them. In the last big downsizing, the services got money from Congress to pay people to volunteer to leave. In a study a few years ago, analysts at Rand found that the Army used that money very effectively, so that people it wanted to lose walked away and those it hoped to keep stayed in. Congress would be smart to make that “voluntary separation pay” available again.

précis: Will a reduction in threat perceptions or in troops overseas allow the political process to accept some changes in personnel procedures?

CW: It’s hard to say what will happen on the personnel side. The service chiefs are just about beside themselves right now, because those costs are eating up the money available for force structure, readiness, and equipment. I think they will push Congress hard to accept some slowdowns in the growth of pay and benefits.

précis: How do military officers, react to the prospect of cutting personnel costs?

CW: I recently wrote one of two reports on future defense spending for the Hamilton Project. The other was written by Admiral Gary Roughead, the former Chief of Naval Operations. The two of us did not collaborate on our reports. But it’s uncanny how much they overlap, both in world view and in recommendations for spending cuts. Among other things, the two papers are in complete agreement about the need to slow down the growth of pay and benefits for military personnel.

précis: Now that sequestration has officially begun, what is actually happening and where is this immediately being felt within the military?

CW: The biggest impacts this year seem to be in cutbacks to training for units that are not already deployed or soon headed to a theater deployment. The Air Force is cutting back on flying time; the Navy is returning some of its ships to port; and the Army is cutting back on field training and exercises. If they continue, some of the changes will be hard to unwind. For example, Air Force pilots must fly a certain number of hours each month. If they do not, they have to re-train before getting back into the cockpit at a later date. That re-training will create turbulence within the force and cost money.

Another example is the Navy’s decision not to send the USNS Comfort—one of two hospital ships—out on its mission to Central and South America previously scheduled to begin in April. Over the spring break, we visited the Comfort in port in Norfolk, VA, on a field trip with SSP graduate students and military fellows, and I can tell you the ship is an amazing example of U.S. soft power. The fact that it is sitting at home will be noticed by people abroad who hoped to take advantage of its extensive modern medical facilities.

précis: Do you think the path of reductions will maintain an even distribution across service branches or not?

CW: For decades, defense leaders have distributed money among the services according to the same formula year after year, regardless of the security environment or the military strategy. Now the department says it wants to rebalance toward Asia. Most observers think that such a strategy favors maritime forces, but DoD has yet to rebalance its budget in the direction of the Navy. If it doesn’t do so, it’s hard to see how it can claim to match its budget to its strategy.

précis: Since the President’s recently proposed budget does not meet the Budget Control Act’s targets, how will this play out with Congress and how might this impact US grand strategy?

CW: It’s hard to say. The Department of Defense rightly points out that both chambers of Congress give defense a stake in the budget resolutions they passed this year. So I suppose it is conceivable that the House and Senate will come to an agreement that spares defense from the cuts currently mandated by the Budget Control Act. On the other hand, the way the House and Senate plans offset the mandated defense cuts are vastly different—largely through entitlement cuts in the House version and through tax increases in the Senate version. Finding a compromise between those two versions is likely to be just as hard this year as last year. If a compromise can’t be reached, then Defense will face the same problems with its 2014 budget as it did this year with the 2013 budget.

To be honest, I think the cuts in some form are here to stay. It’s easy enough to say that “Congress never intended for the Budget Control Act cuts to take effect, because everyone was sure that the threat of those cuts would force Republicans and Democrats to compromise on higher taxes and lower spending in other areas.” But the truth is that if you’re not at least toying with the idea of committing suicide, you don’t play Russian roulette. Defense cuts are on the table because defense is where the money is, and because the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are soon to be over.

Even if the Budget Control Act itself is overturned—and even if defense is spared major cuts next year—the fiscal pressures facing the federal government are so significant, and the other choices for addressing them so unpalatable that defense will ultimately become a big bill payer for deficit reduction. That does not mean that the administration has to give up on plans to rebalance toward Asia, though. Even after a sizeable budget cut, the U.S. military will still be by far the strongest in the world, with lots of room for strategic reallocation.
because witnesses’ versions are out of sync with the police story, the person killed isn’t viewed to be a criminal or they come across video evidence. While these police don’t themselves pull the trigger, they have their own normative outlook on when killing is appropriate. In an environment lacking technology and accountability, this outlook drives their deductive reasoning. Detectives have much discretion, allowing them to lean heavily on their own moral borderlines to make sense of when death is legitimate or not. Hunches, backed up by evidence, come to define when someone must be held to account for killing another. These borderlines are strong and informed by both their own identities as police and their desire to centralize violence and mitigate their own insecurity. As one detective told me just after arresting three police for executing a man on the side of the highway, “Corrupt police make it harder for the rest of us.”

Beyond the Monopoly

David Simon, a journalist and co-creator of the HBO series “The Wire,” is one of the only researchers to have studied homicide detectives. He describes a much different environment in Baltimore, a city with its own major struggles with violence. Yet even in this American city, troubled as it is, there is no rivalry between the state and other notions of legitimate death. In the end, he writes “…only a cop has the right to kill as an act of personal deliberation and action.”

Here we can make a clear distinction. When it comes to the state’s right to kill, there are states that can decide, more or less unilaterally, when to kill their own citizens. Rightly or wrongly, they carry out this death through a number of institutions, each with their own checks and balances. The DOJ White Paper is a reflection of such a reality. But, on the other hand, there are many states in the world today where the right to kill is fractured. In these places the state rarely has the final (or even primary) say in who can and cannot die. Who must die and who can live is a product of different forms of governance and security in a polity. It is in these kinds of states—places that are not subsumed by conventional notions of how states should work but are far from failed—that I seek to advance a new way of thinking about security, democracy and the very integrity of the state itself.

SSP Hosts First Congressional Seminar

“National Security in a Time of Austerity,” was the the seminar for senior congressional and executive branch staff held April 3-5, 2013, and hosted for the first time by the MIT Security Studies Program. The seminar was a project of the Frankel (MIT) Global Policy Fund. Thirty-two Hill staffers attended the three-day event which started with a luncheon address from Admiral Gary Roughead, Distinguished Visiting Annenberg Fellow at the Hoover Institution and former CNO. The event was capped by a dinner featuring Dr. David Chu, President and CEO of the Institute for Defense Analyses and former Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.

MISTI’s Global Seed Funds Winners

A total of 97 faculty international research projects have received $1.99 million in funding from the 2012-2013 MISTI Global Seed Funds competition. These projects were selected from among 196 proposals submitted by faculty and research scientists from 22 departments across the Institute. MISTI Global Seed Funds (MISTI GSF) was established to enhance the internationalization of MIT research and education. Since 2008, the program has awarded $6 million to 304 projects.

CIS Summer Study Grant

The Center announced sixteen recipients of its summer study grants. The grants are being awarded to doctoral students in international affairs at MIT. Each will receive up to $3,000 for summer studies, which may be used for fieldwork, archival research, or home-based research and write-up. Criteria for the awards include the importance of the research question, the quality of the research proposal, and strong letters of support.

Rebecca Ochoa Receives SHASS Award

Rebecca Ochoa, from CIS Headquarters, received an Infinite Mile Award from the School of Humanities, Arts, & Social Sciences (SHASS). The School's Rewards and Recognition Program recognizes individuals (and teams) who make contributions to the organizations within SHASS, as well as exceptional contributions that benefit the entire School and the Institute. Award recipients represent the best of SHASS employees. Rebecca received the award in the category “Unsung Hero” for her strong work ethic and leadership skills along with her outstanding work in event planning, videography, and training.
Starr Forums

The Center hosted multiple Starr Forums, including: “Iran and the Nuclear Issue,” with Barbara Slavin (Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center) and Jim Walsh (MIT); “On the Rocks: China and Japan in the East China Sea,” featuring Mike Mochizuki (George Washington University), Charles Glaser (George Washington University), Taylor Fravel (MIT), Yukio Okamoto, (Wilhelm Fellow at MIT CIS) and Liu Weimin (Chinese Embassy, Washington); and “Marathon Bombing: The Global Context,” with Stephen Van Evera, (MIT), Elizabeth Wood, (MIT); Carol Saivetz, (MIT), Bakyt Beshimov, (MIT); Peter Krause, (Boston College); Jeanne Guillemin, (MIT); and Silvia Dominguez, (Northeastern University).

SSP Wednesday Seminars

The Security Studies Program’s lunchtime lectures included: Magnus Petersson, Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, on “Service Member, Veteran, and Family Wellness: What Is It, and Why Should We Care?”; Gonul Tol, Middle East Institute, on “Turkey and the Arab Spring: Challenges and Opportunities”; Eugene Gholz, University of Texas at Austin, on “The Budget Implications of the U.S. Military Defense of Persian Gulf Oil”; and Klaus Scharioth, Former German Ambassador to the U.S., on “Why Europe Matters for the U.S.: The Future of the Transatlantic Relationship.”

CIS Audits UAV Drone Use

Since the onset of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States has dramatically increased the development, acquisition, and use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). As these systems have grown, a chorus of skeptics has raised questions about the tactical, ethical, and strategic implications of this technology. These critics have questioned whether the purported technical benefits of UAVs outweigh potentially problematic ethical and strategic questions they raise. While these concerns are no doubt integral to developing a better and more responsible UAV program, it is important to distinguish between issues related to the technology itself, and those related to how it is employed. Full text of the Audit is available here: http://web.mit.edu/cis/editorspick_drone_audit.html

Wood’s “Putin” Piece Among Most Read

Elizabeth Wood, MIT professor of history and director of the MIT-Russia Program, has been recognized for writing one of the top ten most read articles in Slavic journals for the year 2012. BRILL Publishers made the announcement and is allowing free access to the top ten articles from May 1 – July 1, 2013. The title of her article is “Performing Memory: Vladimir Putin and the Celebration of World War II in Russia.”
People


PhD Candidate Noel Anderson was awarded a SSHRC Doctoral Fellowship and was accepted into the Tobin Project’s fellowship and forum in National Security. He presented a paper, “The Systemic Dimensions of Intrastate Conflict,” at the 2013 International Studies Association conference in San Francisco (April 3–6), and a co-authored paper (with Alec Worsnop), “Not All Intrastate Violence is Civil War: Varieties of Violence and Common Support in Civil War Research,” at the Harvard-MIT-Yale Political Violence Conference in Cambridge (April 27).

Raphael Dorman-Helen Starbuck Professor of Political Science Suzanne Berger received MIT’s Gordon Y. Billard Award, which honors “special service of outstanding merit performed for the Institute” and is awarded annually to MIT’s leading scholars. She also discussed the Production in the Innovation Economy (PIE) project, which she co-chaired, in the MIT News.

Assistant Professor of Political Science Fotini Christia moderated a talk with guest speaker Dr. Jonathan Fine “Contrasting Secular & Religious Agenda Terror and Guerrilla Warfare: From Che Guevara to Osama bin Laden” (February 19, 2013) co-sponsored by the MIT Security Studies Program and MISTI MIT-Israel. Her book published in the fall 2012 was featured in an article “What Really Drives Civil Wars?” in the Boston Globe.


Research by Associate Professor M. Taylor Fravel was featured in the Washington Post “WorldViews” article, “The Study That Shows Why China and India Probably Won’t Clash Over Border Dispute” (May 3, 2013).

PhD Candidate Brian Haggerty presented a paper on “Ceasefires and Shifting Power: Revisiting the Commitment Problem and Third-Party Intervention in Civil Conflict” at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association (April 13), and was profiled in “Policy Matters in the Middle East” on the MIT Political Science News.
page. He will be a summer associate in national security research at the RAND Corporation, Washington D.C., for summer 2013.

PhD Candidate Jason Jackson presented “Ragged Bazaar Merchants or Captains of Industry? Contesting Cultural Categories of Capitalist Legitimacy in India” at the Business History Conference (March 2013); “Preference Formation Under Uncertainty: Contesting Cultural Categories of Capitalist Legitimacy in India”; “The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment: Constructing Economic Interests and Policy Preferences in Post War India and Brazil” at the International Studies Association conference (April, 2013). He will be presenting the latter two projects at the Institute for Global Law and Policy at the Harvard Law School (June 2013), at the mini-conference on ‘Economic Culture in the Public Sphere’ at the SASE Annual Meeting in Milan (June 2013), and at the Industry Studies Association conference (May 2013). He will also present “The Elephant Chasing the Dragon: Promises and Perils of Horizontal Learning in the New Political Economy of Law and Development” (with Jonathan Andrew and Charles Maddox) at SASE Annual Meeting in Milan (June 2013).

PhD Candidate Sameer Lalwani spoke on a panel for the “Book Launch of Talibanistan” at the New America Foundation in Washington, D.C., January 2013. He received a World Politics and Statecraft Fellowship from the Smith Richardson Foundation for field research and accepted a Pre-doctoral Fellowship for the 2013-2014 academic year at the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at George Washington University.

Associate Professor and Director of MIT International Science and Technology Initiatives (MISTI) Chappell Lawson, received the James A. and Ruth Levitan Award for Excellence in Teaching. This award, given by the School of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences, recognizes instructors who have demonstrated outstanding success in teaching undergraduate and graduate students, and who have been nominated by students for work above and beyond the classroom.

Political Science Department Chair and Deputy Dean of the Sloan School of Management Richard Locke’s new book, which examines and evaluates various private initiatives to enforce fair labor standards within global supply chains, was featured in MIT News and The New Yorker. An excerpt from his book was adapted into the lead essay of the May/June 2013 Boston Review, “Can Global Brands Create Just Supply Chains?” kicking off a debate on corporate responsibility. He also discussed labor and global supply chains in the media: NPR’s To the Point, Business Insider, The Globe and Mail, Radio New Zealand (RNZ), the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, Salon, the Economic Policy Institute, AFSCME: Forum, Opinio Juris, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Toronto Star.

PhD Candidate Nicholas Miller presented two papers at MPSA in April in Chicago: “Enlightened Self Interest? US Disaster Aid and Political Support in the UN,” with Chad Hazlett; and “Questioning the Effect of Nuclear Weapons on Conflict,” with Mark Bell. The latter paper has been accepted for publication in the Journal of Conflict Resolution, while another of his papers, “The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions,” has been accepted for publication in International Organization.

Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science Melissa Nobles was profiled in MIT News, “Taking Full Account of the Past” (May 2013).
CIS Administrative Staff Rebecca Ochoa was awarded an “Unsung Hero” Infinite Mile Award by the MIT School of Humanities, Arts, & Social Sciences.


In April, Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science Roger Petersen received the Distinguished Book Award from the Ethnicity, Nationalism and Migration section of the International Studies Association for his book Western Intervention in the Balkans: The Strategic Use of Emotion in Conflict (Cambridge University Press, 2011).

Ford International Professor of Political Science and Director of the MIT Security Studies Program Barry Posen was featured on “Outlining A New Foreign Policy” on NPR’s On Point (January 23, 2013). He also participated with SSP Research Associate Carol Saivetz in the MIT Center for International Studies Starr Forum “The Fate of the Reset: a roundtable discussion on the future of US-Russian Relations,” (February 14, 2013).

PhD Candidate Miranda Priebe was awarded a predoctoral fellowship with the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School for the 2013-14 academic year.


PhD student Amanda Rothschild presented a paper “Lemkin’s Forewarning: The Perverse Consequences of Expanding the Use of Force,” at the Midwest Political Science Association conference (April 11-14). She was also selected from a pool of 1,000 graduate students worldwide as one of 100 “Leaders of Tomorrow” for the 43rd St. Gallen Symposium, “Rewarding Courage.”
SSP National Security Fellow Lt. Col. **Stephen Russell** (US Air Force) was selected for promotion to Colonel.

CIS Director and Ford International Professor of Political Science **Richard Samuels** chaired and moderated “The Institutionalization of the U.S.-Japan Alliance in the 21st Century” (February 19, 2013) with guest speaker Dr. Shingo Yoshida, the Starr Forums “On the Rocks: China and Japan in the East China Sea,” (April 12, 2013), and “Marathon Bombing: The Global Context” (May 1, 2013). He also gave talks on his new book, *3.11: Disaster and Change in Japan*, at Harvard University, George Washington University, the University of Texas, Texas A&M University, Princeton University, Washington University, and MIT. The research from his book was also featured *The Japan Times*.

Associate Professor of Political Science **David A. Singer** presented “The Family Channel: Migrant Remittances and Government Finance” at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at the Ohio State University. He also participated in a roundtable discussion on “Bringing IPE Together: Connecting Trade, Capital, and Immigration” at the Midwest Political Science Association annual conference.

PhD Candidate **Joseph Torijian** won an International Research & Exchange Board (IREX) Individual Advanced Research Opportunity Fellowship and will be studying in Russia for eight months in the Soviet archives.

SSP Research Associate **Jim Walsh** was on a “Counterproliferation,” panel at the Asan Institute Nuclear Conference (February, 2013). He spoke at MIT Center for International Studies Starr Forum on “Iran and the Nuclear Issue,” (March 11, 2013), did an interview with the *Globalpost.com* on “How Do You Solve a Problem Like (North) Korea?” (February 12, 2013) and also made 28 national and international television appearances on the North Korean situation for CNN, Fox, and the BBC among others.

Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow **Rachel Whitlark** accepted a Pre-Doctoral Managing the Atom /International Security Research Fellowship at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for the 2013–14 academic year. She was also awarded a Moody Research Grant from the Lyndon Baines Johnson Foundation as well as a Research Grant from the Harry S. Truman Library Institute.

SSP Principal Research Scientist **Cindy Williams** presented “Making Defense Affordable,” and was a speaker and panelist at roll-out event “Budgeting for a Modern Military,” hosted by the Brookings Institution’s Hamilton Project, Washington, D.C., February 22, 2013. She also delivered a lecture “National Security in a Time of Austerity,” at the Boston Committee on Foreign Relations, Boston, MA (March 14, 2013).

**Published**

**Lena Andrews**, PhD candidate

Published
continued from previous page

Priyanka Borpujari, Elizabeth Neuffer Fellow

"Outrage Over the Culture of Rape in India," *Boston Globe*, January 6, 2013.

Fotini Christia, Assistant Professor of Political Science


Michael M.J. Fischer, Professor of Anthropology and Science and Technology Studies


M. Taylor Fravel, Associate Professor of Political Science


Sameer Lalwani, PhD Candidate


Richard Locke, Political Science Department Chair and Deputy Dean of the Sloan School of Management


John Park, Stanton Junior Faculty Fellow


Col David Pendall, National Security Fellow (US Army)


Barry R. Posen, Ford International Professor of Political Science and Director of the MIT Security Studies Program


Harvey M. Sapolsky, Political Science Emeritus Professor

“Iraq: The Mistake was Staying,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, March 18, 2013.


Richard Samuels, Ford International Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for International Studies


Mahsa Rouhi, CIS Affiliate


Joshua Itzkowitz Shifrinson, PhD Candidate


Jim Walsh, SSP Research Associate


Cindy Williams, SSP Principal Research Scientist

“Yes, America Can Rebalance to Asia With a Smaller Military,” The Diplomat, January 19, 2013.


Fourth is a cyber grand bargain, characterized by a high degree of international cooperation and managed by sovereign states. With some refinements and alterations, this future may well be consistent with the original United States vision of the Internet, shared by Europe, Japan, and other democracies.

We do not expect the future of cyberpolitics to conform to any model in its pure form, but we suggest that each model highlights different contingencies and thus helps inform our overall expectations.

End Note
If twenty-first century international relations theory is to address cyberpolitics as an important aspect of contemporary reality, it cannot ignore the fundamentals of cyberspace—and its distinctive properties of temporality, physicality, permeation, fluidity, participation, attribution, and accountability. We have come to the end of an era in which cyberspace is separate from the real international relations of the 20th century. Cyberspace is now integral to the world we live in.

The immediate challenge for theory, policy and practice is to consider, clarify, and converge on matters of concepts and metrics—or at least on some rules of thumb—that can best address the objective and subjective for cyberpolitics in international relations. All of this will become more and more central to the fabric of world politics as the twenty-first century unfolds.