The CARNIVORE system
By Max Van Kleek
CARNIVORE is a Internet wiretapping "diagnostic tool" developed
by the FBI in 2000, that enables the FBI to wiretap any data passing
through any of the major commercial Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
in the United States. The implications associated with this broad
move to dramatically improve the FBI's internet wiretapping abilities
has raised the considerable concern, particularly by individuals and
organizations seeking to preserve online free speech and privacy,
such as the Center for Democracy and Technology, and the ACLU. Although
the government insists that individuals' privacies are protected under
the new system by requiring a high court order from the Dept of Justice
before the system can be used, the mere potential for the government
to have a near-omniscient view of traffic across US ISPs has left
many people uneasy.
The CARNIVORE system is, in many ways, similar to conventional data-tapping
technologies known as "sniffers" to eavesdrop general network
traffic. Sniffers, originally designed to help system administrators
detect and diagnose network problems, were soon adopted one of the
most indispensable tools in system crackers' software toolboxes. Crackers
use sniffers most frequently to grab data packets not intended for
them, in order to try to capture others' personal and system data.
The data collected is then usually used by crackers to either impersonate
legitimate users, or to gain illegal access to computer systems by
exploiting weaknesses in them.
Although the intention of CARNIVORE is to facilitate law enforcement
rather than defeat it, CARNIVORE's most basic functionality is essentially
identical to these other sniffers. But CARNIVORE goes much further
than most crackers' sniffers, and has the potential to be a lot more
devastating if abused. In addition to raw Net traffic monitoring,
CARNIVORE has FBI-brewed data analysis algorithms that identify, target
and isolate sought data. The FBI's public page describing the system
says that these algorithms give the system "a unique ability
for the system to determine which communications may be legally intercepted,
(e.g., email) and those which may not (e.g., online shopping )"
which, they claim, the system uses to isolate only the data which
the DOJ has authorized to be surveilled. However, reviewers of the
public Carnivore Review document suspect that this will be difficult
for investigators to configure properly, and will be extraordinarily
easy to misuse. This would mean that investigators could "accidentally"
capture more data than is legally permitted.
What further distinguishes CARNIVORE from traditional sniffer systems
is that the system will be deployed ubiquitously, across all major
Internet access points in the US. This means it will
be able to able to track almost ANY data that crosses US hosts on
the Internet -- from email exchanges, web page accesses to private
one-on-one communications. This presents an unprecedented opportunity
to track people, and their data and interactions online, and, among
other things, makes the system a particularly tempting target for
external attack.
Even within the government, misuse of the system could damage our
digital rights to privacy. Misuse could result from elasticity in
the laws surrounding the system -- particularly statements such as
"court orders are required except in the case of emergencies",
where the term 'emergency' is left undefined - might leave room for
the government to make frequent "special cases". Even if
the system is properly used by the government, investigators might
find it increasingly convenient to use CARNIVORE whenever a case arises,
and thus start to increasingly rely on it as a primary mode of investigation.
The DOJ might then become more liberal with granting permission to
use the system, thereby successively sacrificing individuals' privacy.
While CARNIVORE aims to arm law enforcement officials with a tool
to help combat crime in the new digital society, the price that individuals
might have to pay for its services could be high: personal privacy.
Taking into account the risks associated with abuse of the system,
and the dark Orweillian future that might eventually result from an
increasing reliance on electronic surveillance, CARNIVORE is not a
system for the future.