Putting the Pieces Together Again: Digital Photography and the Compulsion to Order Violence at Abu Ghraib


Brian Johnsrud
Modern Thought and Literature
450 Serra Mall, Building 460
Stanford, CA 94305-2022
Fax: (650) 725-1838
Email: johnsrud@stanford.edu

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Putting the pieces together again: digital photography and the compulsion to order violence at Abu Ghraib

BRIAN C. JOHNSRUD

This essay considers the release of the Abu Ghraib photographs in the context of psychoanalytic trauma theory involving repetition, memory, temporality and narrative formation. The American response to the photographs, especially from military investigators, revealed their urgent investigative need to 'plot' and temporalise the event on an axis of idiosyncratic mistakes in judgement. The response among many Iraqis, however, was to encode the event as a repetition, a latent cultural memory in a long durée of traumatic historical encounters between the Middle East and the 'West'. Psychoanalysis as a critical method is useful in examining the relation between repetition and memory and the compulsion to 'bind' the energy of individual and historical trauma by narrating, sequencing and organising. The challenge presented to the US Abu Ghraib inquiry team – and also to this study – is a uniquely digital one: an over-abundance of photographs in the form of digital media encoded with metadata. The military investigation's response was to time-stamp images to frame the plot sequence, followed by the clicking of the 'Save As . . .' button: a mnemonic act of re-naming, categorising, hyperlinking and culturally archiving the digital images in accordance with their role in the plot.

INTRODUCTION

In 1981, Jacques Derrida was invited to speak to a group gathered in Paris to discuss the state of psychoanalysis in politics and other institutions. He began his early morning lecture with a critique of a formal document, the International Psycho-Analytic Association's proposed constitution of 1977. To a crowd familiar with ideas of the unconscious, latent or subliminal, he exposed something conspicuously missing in the report's geographical summary of human rights abuses: the mention of Latin America, Argentina in particular. Rather than passing over the unnamed absence as perhaps a meaningless, secretarial oversight in the constitution's production, Derrida denounced the silence as an ethical-political refusal to name Latin America (1998, 89). Moreover, his critique legitimised a psychoanalytic reading that analyses the ‘archive’ of legal documents, charters and other media typically dismissed as administrative jargon (1996). Within these and other texts, a narrative inevitably unfolds from the impulse to put things together and arrange them in a meaningful way. What remains excluded from these constructed discourses monitored by the archons, masters of the archive, often speaks more forcibly than what is explicitly stated.

The release of the Abu Ghraib prison photographs in early 2004 and the subsequent investigations tell a story of the abuse and torture inflicted upon the prisoners. However, the cultural reception of the photographs, their appropriation and transmission, weave an accompanying tale of compulsively repeated re-naming, categorisation, ordering and a manipulation of time and plot in and around the torture. Psychoanalytic criticism and its contributions to narrative studies and the construction of the cultural archive lend a unique voice to the macabre account of how power is exercised to structure and frame media like photographs. Specifically, Freud’s work – such as Beyond the Pleasure Principle and its study of trauma, memory and repetitive compulsion – laid a foundation for subsequent studies examined in this essay that are essential for understanding why the Abu Ghraib photographs are unique as ‘new’ media. This is not to say that this article will employ Freudian psychoanalysis, per se. Rather, Freud's most enduring and interdisciplinary theoretical groundwork is his contribution to trauma theory, and his expositions on repetition compulsion and ordering continue to inform the work of influential scholars from varying fields such as Cathy Caruth, Peter Brooks, Dori Laub and Judith Herman. This article outlines how digital information embedded in the photographs and the cultural ordering inserted into that metadata categorised the memory of Abu Ghraib for Americans and Iraqis. The forces driving this tale are hidden, but not inaccessible – obscured, but made more recognisable with a formal clarity also sought by trauma theory informed by the psychoanalytic method.

THE TEMPORAL PLOT OF PHOTOGRAPHIC NARRATIVES

Before films had sound, narrative captions and written dialogue aided the construction of meaning in the
mimetic scenes. If a film is reduced to its photographic stills without accompanying captions, the sequential order promises (at the very least) a skeleton plot suturing the stills together in a meaningful way. In Peter Brooks’ (1984) work on narratology, he recounts how photographs are used as evidence to piece together the events of a murder in Michelangelo Antonioni’s 1966 film Blow-Up. The investigator-photographer in the film has the ‘objective’ evidence, but (as always) the photographs conceal a tale that demands human intuition to reveal and make sense of it. The missing element that lies hidden, waiting for analysis, is the plot, the ordered structure of events in a narrative determined within time (1984, 10). A forensic timeline seems to promise the investigative codex for criminal acts that are often framed by (previous) motive and intent, (present) actions at the scene of the crime and (future) acts up until the investigation. Similarly, Brooks’ notion of plotting – or ‘emplotment’ (Ricoeur 1985) – is a sort of detective fiction driven by the temporal sequence of events accumulated to be exchanged between author and reader, an economic dance of desire fuelled by expectation, repetition, flashbacks and anticipated retrospection. Brooks’ portrayal of narrative desire returns to Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle to align his psychoanalytic work with Freud’s theories of trauma, repetition and mimicry. Brooks’ narratology is not intended for universal application and has been critiqued along these lines in terms of gendered desire (Winnett 1990). Brooks nevertheless draws our attention to what lies within and throughout the ebbs and flows of narrative desire, namely the more pervasive drives toward ordering, sequencing and temporal emplotment as forms of perceptual understanding of life.

Brooks is particularly astute to draw on Freud’s (1920) discussion of repetition compulsion to describe the momentum that binds narratives into meaningful ‘bundles’ (1984, 101). Yet these bundles in a narrative need not be in a temporal sequence necessarily: the rhythmic intensity of William Faulkner’s novels or Toni Morrison’s Beloved, for instance, resonates from their a-temporal presentation of events. When an author or artist presents a temporally unhinged work, the delayed compulsion to order the whole is transferred to the audience (although a consensus upon the ‘proper’ order need not be reached). An audience’s structuring afterthoughts – or after-plots – begin this piecemeal task by arranging the text’s original sequence of events as presented by the author or artist who disobeyed a linear-temporal plot. Ten years after publishing Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud acknowledges such ordering as ‘a kind of compulsion to repeat [...] so that in every similar circumstance one is spared hesitation and indecision’ ([1930] 1961, 46). In other words, with an ordered plot, there are no unexpected twists, turns or flashbacks to confound or disarm the audience.

If the compulsion to repeat accompanies trauma, as Freud describes, the compulsion to order may also contribute to a similar psychoanalytic understanding of the perception and recreation of past events. In Paul Haggis’ film In the Valley of Elah (2007), a father (played by Tommy Lee Jones) is left to investigate his son’s murder, which takes place immediately after his return from a military tour of duty in Iraq. As the film progresses, the brutal murder is associated with the traumatic violence Jones’ son experienced (committed?) in Iraq, presented in scrambled digital images and videos found on his cell phone. The investigative plot is bound to Jones’ struggle to order the testimonies and physical evidence of the crime, which took place on American soil, alongside the slow unfolding of incriminating digital media from Iraq that preceded the murder. Like Blow-Up, Haggis’ film lures the audience into a race to order the events, to recreate the binding energy that naturally sequenced the original action and which professes to offer a revelation of intent, action and the protagonist’s appropriate response.

Unlike Blow-Up, the ending of Haggis’ film leaves the audience to make sense of the cell phone’s fully retrieved media as an after-plot. Should the violence in Iraq be viewed as a precursor to the murder by fellow soldiers and understood as motivated by the effects of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)? The differing character of the media in these two films effects their relations within the texts. In Blow-Up the print photographs are taken by a professional photographer and accidentally document a crime. The digital images taken from the soldier’s camera in Higgin’s film are captured with a cell phone – a device primarily intended to verbally narrate a tale – which produces images not ideal for print, but to be disseminated to other electronic devices. The differences between print and digital photography are paramount to this study, particularly how the latter accommodates the repetition and ordering compulsion at an individual and cultural level.

A NEW (IM)PERMANENT DIGITAL ORDER

About three months after the media release of the Abu Ghraib photographs, The Business reproduced an alleged memo from US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld dated 24 May 2004, banning the use of cell phones with cameras, digital cameras and camcorders by American troops and military personnel in Iraq (ABC-News, 23 May 2004). Peculiarly, the memo only reports the ban
of digital media, which highlights a unique capability of
digital photography that Rumsfeld may have feared. How
did the Abu Ghraib photographs' digitalness separate
them from earlier instances of incriminating print
photography taken during war? The digital nature of the
Abu Ghraib photographs made them particularly
susceptible to compulsive ordering and the narrated
after-plots of so many military and government officials,
journalists, media specialists, and other organic and
digital communities.

The majority of American soldiers serving abroad in the
past decade have had access to digital imaging
technology: personal or government issued cameras,
surveillance equipment or camera accessories in other
digital equipment, such as cellular phones. The
omnipresence of digital cameras is both a result of and
contributor to the 'documentary impulse' and an 'old
urge to produce happy snaps', as described by Abu
Ghraib documentary filmmakers and authors Philip
Gourevitch and Errol Morris (2008, 196). Initially, these
impulses and urges were described by many of the 372nd
Company MP (Military Police) officers as creating
personal and legal evidence of their innocence, a digital
testimonial to the violence ‘around’ them that would both
document the abuse as well as qualify them for veteran
benefits conferred to those with diagnosed PTSD
(Gourevitch and Morris 2008, 134). However, the
impulse to document is not necessarily accompanied by
the re-use of physical documentary material, as attested
to the dozens of home videos and travel footage never
revived from dusty storage cabinets for household
viewing. Rather, a curious of occurrence of documenting
for documentation's sake is exasperated by the seemingly
limitless capacity of digital media.

In much the same way, visual artist Chris Ware recently
produced a scene for the television series This American
Life recounting a documentary obsession that overtook
fifth- and sixth-grade elementary students with fake
cardboard video cameras.¹ The compulsion to film and
narrate events, which in this case can never be ‘replayed’
besides in human recollection, leads to a disturbing
scene: a fight breaks out on the playground and, rather
than intervening in favour or against the brawl, a crowd
of students with faux cameras circles the ensuing
violence, enraptured with documenting and narrating
the events. While playground skirmishes often remain
uninterrupted by the adolescent onlookers, the tale that
Ware illustrates is qualitatively different; the cameras
simultaneously create an emotional distance from the
violence while also allowing an excuse to fully participate
through intense ‘professional’ observation. The
submission to the impulse to document violence, despite
the urgent need to set the camera aside and mediate, is a
familiar narrative in the testimonies of the Abu Ghraib
MPs interviewed by Errol Morris.

Of course, the digital remnants of the documentary
impulse at Abu Ghraib are what have allowed the torture
took place there from (at least) late 2003 to early
2004 to become so widely known and witnessed today.
The digital evidence is vast, including over 1400
recovered images and videos, a portion of what was
initially a much larger collection. As the investigation
ensued and new investigative reports were continually
drafted, the number of ‘relevant’ photographs
Diminished exponentially and repetitive photographs
taken within seconds or minutes of each other were often
discarded. The semi-automatic, mass firing of the shutter
is a technological advancement of digital photography.
Digital memory liberates the shutterbug prudence of
earlier amateur print photography that demanded
restraint for the sake of limited film and the processing
expenses that precede a visual result. In exchange, the
over-abundance of digital images documenting an event
needs to be reduced to meaningful bundles in much the
same way that human memory selects and prioritises
especially momentous ‘snapshots’ of events.

Theorists of cultural memory emphasise what is
remembered and forgotten, and Barbie Zelizer argues
that ‘Discussions of photographic memory thereby
become at some level discussions of cultural practice – of
the strategies by which photographs are made and
collected, retained and stored, recycled and forgotten’
(2004a, 161). The selective elimination of photographs as
‘memories’ of the torture at Abu Ghraib was not
explained when the investigative reports narrowed the
‘relevant’ digital evidence from 1325 photographs and
93 videos in a forensic report in June 2004 to
approximately 280 photographs and 19 videos in a
second report issued a month later. As this essay will
continue to illustrate, the prioritisation of ‘objective’
digital images over subjective human memory in the Abu
Ghraib investigations is a staggering testimony to the
degree to which the creation of digital media has
established itself as an authoritative replacement for
cognitive memory-making, with digital images imbued
with legitimacy as an objective tale more ‘accurate’ than
subjective mnemonic reconstructions. Even as the
photographs were being taken, Gourevitch and Morris
report, Spc. Sabrina Harman ‘seemed to conceive of
memory as an external storage device. By downloading
her impressions to a document she could clear them
from her mind and transform reality into artifact’ (2008,
113). This sentiment serves as a testament to claims
made by scholars of cultural memory that ‘never before
has remembering been so compulsive, even as rote memorization ceases to be central to the educational process. We can no longer keep in our heads is now kept in storage’ (Gillis 1994, 14).

The important difference between human and digital memories is the permanence of human memory traces.

In relation to trauma, Freud’s stance was resolute in the debate still present in psychology regarding imperishable memory traces. Two main theories explain why some memories inevitably fail to be recalled: (1) memory decays and the mental imprints ‘fade’ with time as a biological process, or (2) memory traces are permanent, and a failure to recall information is due to memory consolidation, displacement, interference or other factors. With a greater understanding of the many memory ‘blocking’ or ‘mixing up’ factors that inhibit remembrance, the theory of inevitable biological memory decay has incredibly few advocates in psychology today (Lewandowski, Oberauer and Brown 2009; Loftus and Loftus 1980) compared to its peak in the early and mid-twentieth century. Of course, Freud’s early opposition to the decay hypothesis stems from his understandable disavowal of any proposition that traumatic neuroses would eventually ‘cure itself’ by biologically fading with time ([1920] 1961, 27–28, 42–43). Freud’s response to the failure of memory is that memory traces are often transmitted to unconscious systems, and the bypassing of consciousness can make memory traces all the more formidable and enduring ([1920] 1961, 27).

DIGITAL MEMORIES

While discussing the memory and psychoanalysis, Derrida pondered, ‘Does it change anything that Freud did not know about the computer? And where should the moment of suppression or of repression be situated in these new models of recording and impression’ (1996, 26). If many of the roles of cognitive memory are relinquished to digital memory, the formidable individual latency and social permanence of memory traces ceases to exist, and the ‘Save As...’ button for a particular cultural memory is equally as accessible as the ‘Delete’ button. Of course, any photographic record or external memory object invested with the sole responsibility for cultural remembrance has the potential for inevitable decay or intentional manipulation, just as human cognitive memories are inevitably reconfigured and manipulated over time (Dijck 2007, 37). Digital memories, however, offer complete mnemonic mastery, an immediate interference or destruction employed with an agency not yet possible for human memory. The power invested in the Abu Ghraib photographs as digital memories, from the moment they were created to their appropriation by others, allows for memories to be ordered, structured and engineered with a magisterial ease never before possible.

The frantic rush by the military investigators to select, order and frame the digital memories of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib was part of another desperate attempt to match the speed in which the photographs were digitally circulated in order to pre-empt the framing of events by other non-military actors. Donald Rumsfeld expressed urgent concern over the public release of the photographs which took them out of the control of ‘the criminal prosecution channels that they’re in’ (BBCNews 7 May 2004). When discussing the transmission of colonial terror in Colombia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Michael Taussig emphasises the ‘coils of rumour, gossip, story and chit-chat [through which] ideology and ideas become emotionally powerful and enter into active social circulation and meaningful existence’ (1984, 494). The active social circulation of the Abu Ghraib photographs consisted of digital gossip and chit-chat via televised and online news, blogs, Facebook and eventually Twitter.

Moreover, the subsequent digital circulation mirrored the initial dissemination of the photographs in medias res at Abu Ghraib. Spc. Charles Graner immediately showed the images from his camera to other soldiers by displaying them in his camera’s viewfinder, printing and posting them on the prison walls, emailing and burning CDs, and even changing his computer screensaver in the Tier 1A office to the ‘human pyramid’ photograph taken on 7 November 2003 (Fay 2004, 63, 78). However, by showing the images to the prisoners as a form of further humiliation, Spc. Graner denied the subjects one of the benefits of digital photography. The instantaneous preview in the viewfinder and its allowance for negotiation (Dijck 2007, 104) grants an agency to intervene and revise the photographic memory not previously available to the photographic subject. The ephemeral nature of digital photographs and the ease with which they can be permanently deleted and re-taken in a manner more pleasing to the subject is an empowering advantage that underscores the mocking, disempowering act of showing the photographs to the Abu Ghraib detainees, as if to say ‘Look at how easily I have shot you, without your permission, and how effortlessly I could delete this impermanent memory trace’. Literal interrogation was the only real negotiation extracted from the use of digital photographs-as-memories at Abu Ghraib, where one of many uses of the photographs included threats of
disgrace by showing their humiliating depictions to other inmates and generally deploying them as leverage to extricate information from the detainees (Maass 12 May 2004).

The (ab)use of violent photographs in the Iraq war is not unprecedented. In the Boer War (1899–1902), the Boers circulated pictures of dead British soldiers as a morale-boosting activity (Sontag 2003, 64). However, in her critique of the reprehensible events and documenting of those events which took place at Abu Ghraib, Susan Sontag marks a qualitative shift in the employment of war photography (now mostly digital) as ‘less objects to be saved than messages to be disseminated, circulated’ (2004, 4). The circulation of digital photographs creates the conditions for an image like those from Abu Ghraib to ‘become simultaneously more public even while it conquers ever-more intimate and personal subject matter’ (Phelan 2009, 376). The transmission of memories from an individual to cultural level has become a pressing subject as the list of Holocaust survivors decreases, and generational ‘post-memory’ studies (Hirsch 2001) need to be supplemented with an understanding of how advances in media technologies as material culture affect how knowledge is recorded, categorised and transmitted as memories of the past (Radley 1990; Bowker 2008). Digital photography transforms the role previously cast for individual memory’s ‘intimate and personal subject matter’, in Peggy Phelan’s words, to a cultural stage with the staggering momentum produced by digital transmission. In such a way, the repetitive compulsion that Freud attributes to those suffering from traumatic neuroses is simulated in the exponential forwarding of images to others, exemplified in the inflow of horrific images on blogs and in email inboxes of many with friends or family members at war. As stand-ins for individual memories, these images are continually transmitted until they surface and become codified as iconic images and manifest cultural memories, ready to be compulsively ordered and manipulated in a manner made possible by their digital nature, a process Marianne Hirsch (2001) has similarly observed with photographs of 9/11.

A (RE)TURN TO PSYCHOANALYSIS IN NEW MEDIA STUDIES

It is important to emphasise how discussions of new media, especially those concerned with framing and mnemonic practices, can benefit from psychoanalytic theory; or, rather, how a psychoanalytic epistemology already implicitly or explicitly influences communication and media studies. Some of the first scholars to describe new media emphasised the ‘remediation’ and repetition of ‘old’ media (Bolter and Grusin 1999). Garde-Hansen, Hoskins and Reading have similarly described this process in an impressive string of alliteration as ‘reformulating, reformatting, recycling, returning and even remembering other media’ (2009, 14). In this description alone a compulsive desire for repetition surfaces in the text in a form that Brooks would attribute to the ‘inescapable middle’ (1984, 100) that recycles or returns to fixed points (or letters) in the narrative. A kind of compulsive repetition, it seems, drives the creation of new media, satisfies its consumption and transmission, and even infiltrates academic discussions about its repetitive nature.

The innovative communication and media studies mentioned here are particularly adept at describing how new digital media is created, received and transmitted, often without pausing to consider why. This essay could conclude with how the digital photographs at Abu Ghraib were handled, as those with a particular aversion to psychoanalytic theory may prefer. However, there is an urgent need to understand the why. If there is truly a rising new digital memory ‘culture’, new media studies need to contemplate why has it been so ‘naturally’ adopted and with such frenetic enthusiasm in many parts of the world. In other words, what compulsion – aside from a repetition of the ‘old’ and familiar – drives the success of new media; conversely, how do new media satisfy individual and cultural desires? Garde-Hansen and colleagues’ collection describes digital memory culture as ‘a longing for memories, for capturing, storing, retrieving and ordering them’ (2009, 5, italics mine). The form of cultural desire or ‘longing’ described here is well suited for analysis alongside Freud’s description of repetition and ordering compulsion and Brooks’ psychoanalytic description of a drive to ‘plot’. Moreover, if digital media frees us from a ‘passive approach to the passage of time’ (2009, 7), a descriptor equally suited for many PTSD symptoms, then digital media also allows the active manipulation of temporal events in digital photographs, one which dominated the treatment of the Abu Ghraib photographs as forensic evidence in subsequent investigative reports.

IN AND OUT OF TIME: PLOTTING METADATA

The argument that photographs cannot ‘speak’ for themselves or create an objective, meaningful testimony without narratives has had a number of advocates in the past decade, particularly among those interested in war photography (Sontag 2003; Hoskins 2004; Morris 10 July 2007). Gourevitch and Morris also insist ‘photographs cannot tell stories. They can only provide evidence of stories, and evidence is mute; it demands investigation.
and interpretation’ (2008, 148). Carried to its extreme, however, this argument denies photographs of any objective claims and initiates a contemporary ‘rhetoric of iconoclasm’ (Mitchell 1986, 3). Yet communication and media studies in particular often insist that photographs must at least be classified or ordered within an interpretive frame if they are to be meaningfully understood (Entman 2004; Griffin 2004; Goffman 1986; Zelizer 2004b; Anden-Papadopoulos 2008), and US military investigators exhibited an immediate and noticeable desire to re-order and frame the Abu Ghraib photographs. The following section includes a review and integration of largely psychoanalytic theories of photographic testimony and narrative analysis. By examining the implementation of order, we can critique how structuring power is wielded at larger institutional and cultural levels, while simultaneously underscoring how occupying forces assigned a plot and order to the photographs and the implications this has for Iraqis, none of whom were included in management of the investigative process.

Tony Perucci (2009) examines the previously under-emphasised temporal dimension of durational torture in the Abu Ghraib photographs. In the process, he constructs a fixed time-line of events in order to frame them in a manner which exposes an underlying ‘plot, dramatic unfolding, and even character development – or rather, the decomposition of character and identity’ (2009, 342–43). While his investigation yields unique results, his method repeats the initial response to the photographs by military investigators. Perucci constructs a narrative derived from the observed data he extracts from the photographs, but which ultimately derives from the metadata encrypted in the digital files. In this way, arguments for ‘voiceless photographs’ are often silenced by what lies within digital photographs, a new variety of photographic communication in the form of ‘objective’ metadata.

Brent Pack was the first military investigator assigned to manage and ‘make sense’ of the Abu Ghraib photographs. Pack initiated his assignment working under the assumption that ‘the pictures spoke a thousand words, but unless you know what day and time they’re talking, you wouldn’t know what the story was’ (Gourevitch and Morris 2008, 265). His task, then, was to ‘listen’ to the EXIF (exchangeable image file format) embedded metadata speaking from within the 280 ‘representative’ digital photographs he selected from among the over 1400 estimated original images that were recovered. Using forensic software called Encase®, Pack ordered several terabytes of data, including digital photographs, documents and emails into a timeline to frame the instances of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib. Each digital photograph’s metadata divulges the make and model of the digital camera, the time the photograph was taken according to the camera’s internal clock, as well as other technical descriptions of the file (Figure 1).

FIGURE 1. A selection of Brent Pack’s timeline, depicting the infamous ‘scarecrow’ photographs taken of Abdou Hussain Saad Faleh, nicknamed ‘Gilligan’. In the boxes are abbreviated versions of the EXIF embedded metadata Pack included with each photograph. Reproduced with permission.

Once the timeline was complete, Pack created a photograph log in which he numbered the photographs and categorised them accordingly into what he perceived as either (1) criminal acts, such as physical injury, forcing detainees into sexual acts or humiliating positions, or dereliction of duty (e.g. allowing detainees to hurt themselves) or (2) standard operating procedure, such as enforcing stress positions, binding detainees into a position nicknamed a ‘Palestinian hanging’ or sleep deprivation. This process was aided by his particular interpretive frame constructed from previous military experience, Pack admits, but once the images are...
structured in chronological order he believes that ‘the photograph depicts what it is’ (Gourevitch and Morris 2008, 267). Being able to wield numeric representations from code drawn from digital photographs is the first of five principles Lev Manovich describes as differentiating ‘new’ from ‘old’ media (2001, 27–30). And for his adept command of new media, the embedded metadata produced at Abu Ghraib, Pack was honoured with the Timothy Fidel Memorial Award for excellence in computer forensics in 2006.

Pack’s report and timeline were instrumental for the authors of the ‘Fey/Jones Report’, the third in a series of six official investigative reports charted by the US government. The first report, conducted by Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba in March 2004, listed 13 different acts of ‘intentional abuse’ of detainees by military police. Many of the now well-known examples of abuse are not listed in the report, including rape and the violent use of military dogs. Six of the 13 acts include photography or, remarkably, list taking photographs as the sole abuse. Notably, one of the 13 acts is photographing the body of a dead Iraqi detainee, although the torture that presumably lead to his death is not included in MG Taguba sections.

The Fey Report tells a story, but to remarkably unfamiliar with the narrative flow of cause-and-effect, motive and action, and an illuminating retrospection that one expects from both detective novels and investigative reports. Instead, Fey’s categorised list of incidents is the tale driven by organised, numbered metadata. The story of the Fey Report’s incidents is a-temporal and lists incidents that occurred at Abu Ghraib with disregard for any causal relationships that draw attention to the repetition of torture. However, the report is still fundamentally ordered. Occasionally a break in the structure occurs, the ‘indeterminate shuttling or oscillation’ described by Brooks, where an incident is placed seemingly irrespective of time, photograph number or plot. Perhaps this is a testimony to the ‘unclassifiable’ nature of photographs that Barthes characterises, or it may be that photographs of traumatic events share the often ineffable and unclassifiable quality of trauma itself.

Yet even if time were an objective category, whose time would order the Abu Ghraib photographs? The individual cameras’ time? The Baghdad time stamp that Pack inserted into the timeline? The protracted time of prisoners held in captivity for days that felt like weeks or...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incident Number</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Photos mentioned in Fey Report</th>
<th>Alleged photos never found</th>
<th>Photos exist but were not mentioned&lt;sup&gt;A&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>20 Sep 03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Two MI soldiers beat and kicked a cuffed detainee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>7 Oct 03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unauthorized interrogation and alleged assault of a female detainee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>25 Oct 03</td>
<td>![36-41]&lt;sup&gt;B&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Three naked [male] detainees handcuffed together and forced to simulate sex while photographed and abused.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>27 Oct 03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Detainee claim of MP abuse corresponds with interrogations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Oct 03</td>
<td>![54-55]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Abuse and sodomy of a detainee (chem light incident).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>14 Nov 03</td>
<td>![C]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MP log-detainees were ordered ‘PT’d’ By MI.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>4 Nov 03</td>
<td>![C5-21, D5-11, M65-69]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CIA detainee dies in custody.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>20 Oct 03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Detainee was stripped and abused for making a shank from a toothbrush.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>4 Nov 03</td>
<td>![C1-2, D19-21, M64]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Detainee forced to stand on a box with simulated electrical wires attached to his fingers and penis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>7-8 Oct 03</td>
<td>![C24-42, D22-25, M73-77, M87]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Naked ‘dog pile’ and forced masturbation of detainees following the 6 NOV 03 riot at Camp Vigilant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>27 Dec 03</td>
<td>![D37-38, H2, M111]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Photo depicting apparent shotgun wounds on detainee’s buttocks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>29 Nov 03</td>
<td>![D37-38, M111]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Photo depicting a detainee in his underwear standing on a box.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>18 Nov 03</td>
<td>![C22-23, D28-36, D39, M97-99, M105-110, M131-133]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Photo depicting detainee on the floor with a banana inserted into his anus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>26(?)&lt;sup&gt;?&lt;/sup&gt; Nov 03</td>
<td>![M115-129, M134]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MI/MP abuse during an interrogation of Iraqi policeman.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Civilian interrogator forcibly pulls detainee from truck and drags him across ground.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>30 Nov 03</td>
<td>![M115-129, M134]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MP log entry- detainee was found in cell covered in blood.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>12(?)&lt;sup&gt;?&lt;/sup&gt; Dec 03</td>
<td>![ID]&lt;sup&gt;D&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Detainee involved in attempted murder of MPs claims retaliatory acts upon return to the hard site.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Dec 03</td>
<td>![ID]&lt;sup&gt;D&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Withholding of clothing, bedding, and medical care.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>5 Nov 03</td>
<td>![M88-96]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Detainee forced to stand on boxes, water is poured on him, his genitals are hit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Oct 03</td>
<td>![D37-38, M111]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Detainee’s chin is lacerated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Possible rape of a detainee by a US translator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>24 Nov 03</td>
<td>![ID]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MP CPT beat and kicked a detainee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Dec 03</td>
<td>![M88-96]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Photo depicting detainee in stress position on chair.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 1. Reproduced incident numbers, dates and descriptions from the first category of abuses in the Fey Jones Report. The centre three columns detailing photographs have been added. Footnotes: (A) These incidents are limited to the photographs available to me that have been matched to the incidents in other reports or testimonies. It is unclear why there is no mention of these photographs in the Fay report. (B) Category ‘C’ were taken with Harman’s camera, ‘M’ with Graner’s, ‘D’ with Frederick’s and ‘Z’ from a camera with an unknown owner at the time of the report. (C) Photographs were not matched with the events with total assurance, and those photograph numbers were excluded from the report. (D) No photographs exist, but other photographs were later used in order for witnesses to identify the guilty parties.
months? As Perucci (2009) notes, the time most relevant to the torture may not be that of synchronised individual shots at all, but the duration in-between those times that amplifies the detainees’ discomfort, humiliation and pain. Repetition equally alters any tidy linear time constructed from the photographs. The Fey Report, for instance, repeats the tale of a ‘Detainee 6’ in incidents 18, 19 and 40 and his fellow Syrian prisoner, ‘Detainee 14’, in incidents 12 and 28 without explanation for the reiteration. The forces of compulsive repetition, ordering and categorising at work in the military investigative reports are not mutually exclusive or complementary, but often are overlapping, intersecting and intertextual.

Altogether, psychoanalytic and narrative methods are not intended to create a definitive assessment of the Abu Ghraib investigative team’s conscious or unconscious motivations. Nor should the psychoanalytic method simply indulge in its own compulsion to order until any inconsistencies in the appropriation of the Abu Ghraib photographs are neatly ironed out or ‘cured’. Rather, psychoanalytic criticism advocates an analysis irrespective of an abundance of explicit, objectively meaningful data, an analysis enriched by the exploration of fleeting, uncertain and even absent forces, such as dreams. Psychoanalysis is particularly constructive when examining elements that are missing, lacking, discretely absent or merely overlooked in the archive, what Freud described as the ‘concealed things [. . .] from the rubbish-heap’ ([1914] 1955, 222). When analysing military investigations in particular, which are often initiated despite missing or conveniently destroyed evidence yet still manage to end with a ‘coherent’ narrative to be stored in the cultural archive, psychoanalytic methods are especially beneficial.

**PLUCK FROM THE MEMORY A (CULTURALLY) ROOTED SORROW**

Often the most striking absence from investigative reports, journalism and media accounts, academic writing and general American reactions to the release of the Abu Ghraib photographs is the prisoners who suffered the abuse. By saying this, I agree with scholars like Peggy Phelan who have begun to seriously question the narrative of everyday Americans’ traumatic experience of Abu Ghraib (often paralleled to the national trauma of 9/11), which overshadows the actual detainees who were tortured and humiliated further by the release of the photographs (2009, 373). Co-author of *Standard Operating Procedure*, Philip Gourevitch, gathered testimonies largely from those who experienced violence in his first book about the 1994 Rwandan genocide (1998). However, *Standard Operating Procedure* gathered testimonies almost exclusively from Americans rather than the detainees at Abu Ghraib. To date there has been no independent Iraqi investigation of the abuses at Abu Ghraib. The immediate appropriation and framing of the photographs was controlled largely by Americans, and Robert Entman (2004) has illustrated the incredible cascade effect that initial media reports have in creating lasting and authoritative interpretive frames. The American management, ordering and framing of the abuses at Abu Ghraib were then digitally bound, shipped and returned to Iraq via television and online news, blogs and various communicative channels on the Internet.

The import/export exchange facilitated by an invading culture is by no means singular to this war or even this century. The US occupation of Iraq shares many practices with traditional nineteenth century colonialism, among them the establishment of a colonising order. Timothy Mitchell describes the ‘enframing’ techniques employed during the European colonisation of Egypt in the early nineteenth century, which sought to inscribe in the native Egyptian social structure a new conception of space and time. The ‘effectiveness’ of the horrific disciplinary methods and abuses inflicted upon Egyptians was not measured by the methods’ weight or extent, but by their ability to ‘infiltrate, re-order, and colonise’ (1988, 35, my italics).

Examining the American response to the Abu Ghraib photographs allows for a glimpse at a larger practice of non-traditional colonial ordering of Iraqi experience, trauma and cultural memory. Mitchell describes new colonial methods of manufacturing the Western experience of the real for Egyptians in the nineteenth century. Due to the ‘state-building’ practices of occupying forces, the new experience of the real becomes codified in:

[. . .] a state defined in no other terms than the ordering of what was orderless, the coordinating of what was discontinuous. In the new order, the disordered was transformed, the dispersed was articulated, forming a unity of the whole whose parts were in mechanical and geometric coordination. (1988, 38)

New media such as digital photography similarly creates its own categories and coordination for structuring the ‘real’. The uses and abuses of new media by ruling powers can be viewed alongside the US military’s understanding of how memory ought to be created through the physical structure of Abu Ghraib.

When Abu Ghraib was first chosen as the site to develop a US-run compound in 2003, the site’s history and
cultural memory – for both Americans and Iraqis – was the biggest obstacle. Ironically, the inhumane abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib under Saddam’s rule was among the list of justifications for the American invasion of Iraq. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that Lane McCotter reported continual resistance from US officials as he struggled to defend the merits of reinstating the infamous site as Iraq’s flagship detention facility in 2003 (Gourevitch and Morris 2008, 17–20). For many Iraqis, the last image of Abu Ghraib before the US-led invasion recalled Saddam freeing the Iraqi prisoners in October 2002 after his ‘re-election’. Thousands of family members and friends gathered outside the prison to receive their loved ones, and the facility was subsequently looted and stripped until its original function was recognisable. Months later, McCotter approached the inoperative prison shell as devoid of history or symbolic strength, believing, as Gourevitch and Morris report, ‘the buildings alone were mute’ (2008, 17). However, Abu Ghraib as a site of Iraqi cultural memory was (and remains) far from speechless. To deal with the ‘problem’ of Abu Ghraib’s symbolic importance for Iraqis, McCotter ordered the reconstruction team to include the ‘old death house’ – the site formerly used as torture chambers and holding cells for those condemned to death – within the prison’s new perimeter wall. McCotter decided that he would appease the Iraqi need for a memorial site by letting ‘the Iraqis turn it into a museum or an Iraqi memorial’, he said (Gourevitch and Morris 2008, 19).

The space partitioned by US forces to contain traumatic Iraqi cultural memories of violence is an apt metaphor for the measuring, legislation and control of what should be remembered and how. The site that McCotter designated as a memorial and allowed to be confined within the compound has never been used for this purpose, in part because of the limited resources currently available to rebuild and refurbish already existing museums and cultural sites of memory damaged during the invasion. Despite the mnemonic power of sites imbued with historic cultural significance, they nevertheless remain subservient to the power of those dominating and attempting to structure their symbolic weight. Here a ‘site’ is a broad term, first applied to ‘collective’ memory by French historian Pierre Nora (1989), and can apply to monuments, cityscapes, landscapes, museums, books and photographs.

Increasingly there are new, digital sites of memory such as videos, computer animations and websites. Of particular concern here is how physical sites of memory at Abu Ghraib and the torture photographs (as digital sites of memory) were stripped of any Iraqi cultural memory inconvenient for US military operations. The symbolic layers of these sites were renovated and remodeled without regard to Iraqi symbolic agency, often by inserting an American cultural memory of the torture and trauma at Abu Ghraib, returning the sites to Iraqis in newly structured bundles. As McCotter’s colleague in the prison reconstruction at Abu Ghraib, Gary Deland, commented, ‘You’re not just fixing wires. You’re changing an entire culture’ (Gourevitch and Morris 2008, 24).

Some Americans critics commenting on the Abu Ghraib photographs have rewired the cultural memory of the photographs to align with exclusively American history, tagging a form of critical metadata onto each photograph to suit different categories of temporal depth. For instance, when President George W. Bush called the Iraq war a ‘crusade’, the American memory of a crusade as a noble undertaking was pitted against a Middle Eastern memory of the Crusades as religious genocide. In this way many wars – especially in our age of digital memory – are becoming ‘mnemonic battles’ (Zerubavel 1997, 98). Within the first few years of the Abu Ghraib photographs being released, a number of critics anachronistically compared them to American lynching photographs from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century (Sontag 2004; Apel 2005; Sante 11 May 2004). Art historian Stephen Eisenman similarly sees in the Abu Ghraib photographs the history of Western art to such a degree that in the prisoners’ postures he imagines modern Muslims ‘transported – hooded and shackled, to the marble altar of Pergamon in Berlin, the collections of the Louvre in Paris and the crossing of St Peter’s Basilica in Rome’ (2007, 11). Yet Eisenman is also right to question the ‘short-circuited analysis’ in such comparisons that inevitably obscure the subjects, purpose and deep historical roots in the prison photographs (2007, 39). But whose ‘historic roots’ or cultural memory is revealed in the photographs: that of US soldiers as agents of torture, Middle-Eastern prisoners as subjects or the Iraqi prison as a site?

**THE STRUGGLE FOR A ‘PRETTY PICTURE’**

What is stunning about all the scholarly depictions mentioned above is the degree to which these American critics ‘uncovered’ a repetitive mnemonic frame for the abuses at Abu Ghraib confined exclusively to the narrative events depicted in the released digital photographs. Slavoj Žižek argues that the Abu Ghraib detainees – by suffering the humiliated tortures inflicted by American soldiers, were ‘effectively initiated into American culture’ (2004). Žižek was referring to what he believes is a uniquely sadistic American culture, but the American response to the photographs may equally be
an Iraqi initiation into a digital culture of power, appropriation and order. The initial Iraqi reaction was to encode the event as a repetition, a latent cultural memory (similar to that described in Freud’s *Moses and Monotheism*) in a *longe durée* of traumatic historical encounters between Saddam’s forces and the Iraqi people or between the Middle East and the ‘West’, spanning back to the Crusades. While a search for the ‘origin’ of any act of violence can continue ad infinitum, Iraqi and other Middle Eastern cultural memories during the war targeted much earlier ‘primal scenes’ that plot the Abu Ghraib torture as a repetitive compulsion of hundreds of years of Western violence targeted at the Middle East.

Before continuing along this line of inquiry, a caveat: cultural relativism has struggled to flourish within psychoanalysis. When slipping into his varying disciplinary ensembles, Freud is most awkward in his anthropologist’s field khakis. Like many psychoanalysts and psychoanalytic theorists who followed him, Freud’s method often consists of studying the particular in order to apply it universally. Any sort of universalism is difficult to defend in a discipline such as anthropology where, for the past century at least, there are very few claims about human behaviour, cognition, perception that can be successfully applied to all peoples.

A comparison between American and Iraqi receptions of the Abu Ghraib photographs would be an exceedingly laborious (if not impossible) undertaking, which would demand a survey of cultural perceptions of time, space, memory, image and reality, all within an ostensibly infinite amount of respective cultural sub-groups. That lofty goal is not attempted here, and the limitations of psychoanalytic theory in relation to cultural relativity would make it ill-suited as the primary critical method in such a comparative task.

Rather, psychoanalytic theory does support a concerted look at how the interaction with narrative metadata is encouraged by new media and has been implemented by both Americans and Iraqis since the photographs were released in 2004. In so doing, the narrow focus on the digital photographic image and how that affects the subsequent transmission of meaning-making is aligned with Sontag’s claim that our problem ‘is not that people remember through photographs, but that they remember *only* through photographs. This remembering through photographs eclipses other forms of understanding, and remembering’ (Sontag 2003, 89, my italics). Indeed, when confronted about the horrific acts depicted in the Abu Ghraib prison photographs, Donald Rumsfeld’s aloof response was framed in photographic
Putting the pieces together again

Similarly, when McCotter and Deland first arrived at Abu Ghraib in 2003, they confronted a similarly unattractive picture portraying the shattered physical structure of the prison. McCotter describes the beautification process of making the cells ‘bright with new paint’ until they became ‘the best in all of Iraq’ (Gourevitch and Morris 2008, 8). Six years later, Abu Ghraib – renamed the Baghdad Central Prison – faced a similar makeover to conceal the unwanted memory of the American occupation. Rather than bright whites, the cells and corridors were reintroduced to the press with a palette of subdued pastels with ribbons, streamers and plastic flowers lining the hallways (Figures 2–4). The new interior creates a much ‘prettier’ picture, especially according to the compulsive, Western ideal of neat, ordered beauty Mitchell describes as imposed upon nineteenth-century Egypt.

When the renovated prison was opened to the press for a day-tour in February 2009, there was a conspicuous absence to ensure the appearance of order: all 400 prisoners were placed out of sight ‘behind a shuttered and heavily guarded metal gate covered with blue sheets’ (Dagher 21 February 2009). The scene staged for reporters imitated a still-life painting, void of human presence, an artistic genre that Norman Bryson describes with reference to psychoanalytic theory as ‘the world minus its narratives or, better, the world minus its capacity for generating narrative interest’ (Bryson 1990, 30). The prison depicted as such appears anti-narrative, outside of time and a site seemingly void of memory. Yet the torture photographs remain imprinted in American, Iraqi and global cultural memory, and their recollection invokes the ghosts of Abu Ghraib who remain woven into the still life canvas of the Baghdad Central Prison.

CONCLUSION

Today, the Baghdad Central Prison is an entirely Iraqi-run facility, and the unnamed ‘ghosts’ haunting the halls are not just the off-the-record detainees once housed there, but also the spectres of the unrepresented torture and the responsible US and allied troops. In 2008 the Iraqi government announced plans to resurrect McCotter’s plan to convert the old death house at Abu Ghaib into a museum documenting Saddam’s crimes. However, the abuses committed by US guards will not be mentioned or depicted. After all, the US guards and their

photographic legacy have already been digitally ordered, structured and depicted. In the ‘distorted mimesis’ of colonial relations described by Taussig (1984, 495), the space McCotter created for an Iraqi memorial will now be lined with reversed ‘colonial mirrors’ (1984, 495), whose reflections will be confined to the abuse of and by Iraqis. Nevertheless, the spectacle of shame was distinctive for the Americans convicted of crimes at Abu Ghraib. Their scaffold was a digital one, suspended in what Jon McKenzie describes as a ‘vast socio-technical infrastructure’ (2009, 340). For McKenzie, the spectacle of torture at Abu Ghraib was performed on scaffolds erected at multiple sites, in cells and corridors and ‘through television, computer, and other media networks, by which it reaches a global audience’ (2009, 353).

This essay has explored some of the ways digital photography is being narrated, understood and framed within the ‘metadata’ of cultural memories. The digital compulsion to repeat – copy, paste, backspace, return, ‘Fwd’, hyperlink – supersedes the compulsion to order, ensuring that new structures of meaning are continually built and torn down, narrative frames sequenced and disjointed within the cultural archive. In this way, the most enduring memorial of the torture at Abu Ghraib is the continual digital transmission and recoding of the cultural metadata lying beneath each photograph.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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NOTES

[1] Available to view streaming online within certain regions at the time of this writing: <http://www.sho.com/site/thisamericanlife/previous_episodes.do?episodeid=127176>.

[2] It should be noted that many of the prisoners at Abu Ghraib were not Iraqi, and the photographs recall varying cultural memories of torture and violence not only for different nationalities but also for each individual. The focus on Iraqi cultural memory here does not necessarily exclude Arab, Muslim or other identities, but instead emphasises the geographical site of the prison and the abuses that took place therein.
REFERENCES


Gourevitch, P. 1998. *We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.


