

Problem Set #2 Solutions

Course 14.451 – Macro I

TA: Todd Gormley, tgormley@mit.edu

Distributed: February 23, 2005

Due: Wednesday, March 2, 2005 [in class]

1. Dynamic Programming – Analytic Solution

Assume the following problem for the social planner:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\{c_t, k_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} U_0 &= \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \mathbf{b}^t U(c_t) \\ \text{s.t. } c_t + k_{t+1} &\leq f(k_t) \quad \forall t \geq 0 \\ c_t &\geq 0, k_{t+1} \geq 0 \quad \forall t \geq 0 \\ k_0 &> 0 \text{ given} \end{aligned}$$

where U_0 is the lifetime utility of the representative agent, k_t is physical capital per unit of labor at time t , and c_t is consumption per unit of labor at time t . Assume that the labor supply of the agent is simply fixed at 1, and assume the following functional forms:

$$\begin{aligned} U(c) &= \ln c \\ f(k) &= A(1-\mathbf{t})k^{\mathbf{a}} \end{aligned}$$

where $\mathbf{a} > 0$, and A is some constant greater than zero that captures technology in the economy. And finally, you should think of \mathbf{t} as some government tax on output. And as most governments do in our world, this one throws the tax revenues in the ocean. ☺

(a) Re-express the above problem in the form of a dynamic programming problem. (i.e. Write out the Bellman Equation)

The above problem can be re-expressed as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} V(k_t) &= \max_{c_t, k_{t+1}} \{ \ln c_t + \mathbf{b}V(k_{t+1}) \} \\ \text{s.t. } c_t + k_{t+1} &= k_t^{\mathbf{a}} \end{aligned}$$

Notice that I've ignored the non-negativity constraints. By our Inada conditions, we know these will never bind. Dropping the time subscripts, and plugging in for the constraint, we have the following:

$$V(k) = \max_{0 \leq k' \leq (1-\mathbf{t})Ak^{\mathbf{a}}} \{ \ln(A(1-\mathbf{t})k^{\mathbf{a}} - k') + \mathbf{b}V(k') \}$$

- (b) Now, using a guess of $V(k) = E + F \ln k$ for your value function in part (a), solve for the optimal policy rules for consumption and capital.**

The FOC is:

$$-\frac{1}{A(1-t)k^a - k'} + \frac{bF}{k'} = 0$$

Solving this, we have our policy function for capital:

$$k' = \frac{bF}{1+bF}(1-t)Ak^a$$

Using our budget constraint, we find the policy rule for consumption:

$$c = \frac{1}{1+bF}(1-t)Ak^a$$

- (c) Plug your policy rules from part (b) into your original dynamic programming problem from part (a) to solve for the constants E and F . (This will take a bit of math on your part).**

Our Bellman equation can be written as:

$$V(k) = \max \{ \ln c + bV(k') \}$$

Plugging in with our guess $V(k) = E + F \ln k$ and our optimal policy rules $c(k)$ and $k'(k)$ from part (b), we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned} E + F \ln k &= \ln(c(k)) + bE + bF \ln k'(k) \\ E + F \ln k &= \ln\left(\frac{1}{1+bF}(1-t)Ak^a\right) + bE + bF \ln\left[\frac{bF}{1+bF}(1-t)Ak^a\right] \end{aligned}$$

Okay, now here comes the fun part. With a little algebra, we can reduce this down to the following expression:

$$(1-b)E + F \ln k = -\ln(1+bF) + (1+bF) \ln((1-t)A) + bF \ln\left[\frac{bF}{1+bF}\right] + a(1+bF) \ln k$$

Notice that we have a $\ln k$ on each side of the expression. The only possible way for both these to drop out is if their coefficients are the same. i.e.

$$F = a(1 - bF)$$

$$F = \frac{a}{1 - ab}$$

Now, plugging this into our expression, we have:

$$(1 - b)E = -\ln\left(1 + b\left(\frac{a}{1 - ab}\right)\right) + \left(1 + b\left(\frac{a}{1 - ab}\right)\right) \ln((1 - t)A) + b\left(\frac{a}{1 - ab}\right) \ln\left[\frac{b\left(\frac{a}{1 - ab}\right)}{1 + b\left(\frac{a}{1 - ab}\right)}\right]$$

Hopefully you can now see that we can solve for E . Doing this, and with a bit more manipulation, we have the following:

$$E = \left[\left(\frac{1}{1 - ab}\right) \ln(A(1 - t)) + \left(\frac{ab}{1 - ab}\right) \ln ab + \ln(1 - ab) \right] (1 - b)^{-1}$$

- (d) What is the fraction of disposable income that the agent saves each period? How does it depend on b , and what is the intuition for this?**

Plugging $F = \frac{a}{1 - ab}$ into $k' = \frac{bF}{1 + bF}(1 - t)Ak^a$, we see that:

$$k' = ab(1 - t)Ak^a$$

Thus, our savings rate is ab . When b is higher, the agents save more. The intuition is clear: Higher b implies the agent is more patient and values the future more. Thus, the agent saves more in order to consume more in the future.

- (e) How do higher taxes affect the agent's happiness? What does better technology do for happiness? (1-2 sentences only... I just want to make sure you check that your answer makes intuitive sense before moving on).**

Looking at our value function now that we've solved for E and F , it should be clear that higher taxes reduce the value of future utility for the agent for any given k , and more technology improves it.

2. Dynamic Programming – Numerical Solution

Write a program in MATLAB to solve the Dynamic Programming problem from part 1A using numerical iteration as I showed you in recitation last week. If you would like your solutions to match up closely to mine, feel free to use the following guidelines:

- (i) Use a state vector of 50 possible states.
- (ii) Center your state vector around the steady state of the economy using values in a range 10% above and below the steady state.
- (iii) Stop the iteration when the absolute difference between all points of your old guess and new guess at the value function are less than .01

Finally, assume the following conditions:

$$A = 1$$

$$a = 0.35$$

$$b = 0.9$$

$$t = 0.3$$

- (a) Using your numerical program, plot your value function $V(k)$ and policy functions $c(k)$ and $k'(k)$. Submit these graphs along with your MATLAB code.
- (b) Now, again using MATLAB, plot your analytical solutions for the value function and policy functions from Question #1. Do your answers match up?

FOR SOLUTION: Download the MATLAB programs I've placed online. You need to put all the files in the same folder on your computer. Then, execute the "growth.m" file to see the solution.