Party Loyalty and the Election of U.S. Senators, 1871–1913

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What criteria did state legislators use when they elected United States senators prior to the 17th Amendment? The answer to this question has been subject to assumption and speculation since the U.S. Constitution was written. Yet very little, if any, systematic research has been done to inform such answers. The purpose of this paper is to set off along a path to being such a systematic answer, at least for elections that occurred from roughly Reconstruction (1871) to the ratification of the 17th Amendment in 1914.

A logical starting point in providing such an answer is partisanship. Accounts of historians and contemporary observers have focused on the role of party organizations in narrating the history of senatorial elections after the Civil War. We know from the research of Poole and Rosenthal (1997) that political party structured a significant portion of congressional roll call voting during this period; is it not a huge leap to suppose that party structured the voting of state legislatures, too, including voting for U.S. senators. Indeed, the role of political parties in the behavior of state legislators was an important topic in the very first systematic study of legislative party behavior by Lowell (1902).

This paper relies on the individual roll call votes of state legislators to explore the role that political party played in the election of U.S. senators between 1871 and 1913. In addition to the basic empirical motivation of understanding these elections better, pursuing this investigation is important for two reasons. First, the time between the Civil War and World War I was the high water mark of American political parties. While parties were strong in many places, they

were not uniformly strong, nor was this strength uncontroversial. Then, as now, the selection of individuals to fill important posts was the *sine qua non* of the parties. Studying how well the parties held their rank-and-file members together in the state legislatures provides key insights into how effective parties were during their heyday. Second, an assumption about party strength in state legislatures during senatorial elections was a key to Stewart and Weingast's (1992) analysis of the effects of statehood admission politics on national politics after the Civil War. Although it is true that party control of state legislative chambers was a powerful predictor of which party would win the Senate seat up for election at any given time, the loyalty of the rank-and-file in pursuing the plans of party leaders, or adhering to the hard-fought conclusions of the caucus, has not been established.

We find that party loyalty among state legislators was extraordinarily high during this period. Of the nearly 27,000 individual roll call votes we can study, in which we know the partisanship of individual state legislators, over 90% were instances of the legislators supporting the "party's candidate."[1]

Yet there was also considerable variability in party loyalty across states and across time. Kentucky Democrats and Massachusetts Republicans stand out as state legislative parties that regularly had difficulty holding the rank-and-file in check. Even New York, which Lowell grouped in a class by itself for the high degree of party loyalty in its state legislature, endured at least one breakdown in party regularity of historic proportions.

[1]We define the party's candidate as the Senate candidate who received the most votes by the party contingent in each chamber. One of the major questions that we hope to answer in this longer-term project is how an individual candidate became the "party candidate" since many of these elections began with multiple nominees from the majority party. For now, we are assuming that an individual who got a clear majority of the majority party in the chamber on a ballot was the de facto preferred party candidate. (We explain the sequential process of voting for U.S. Senate later in this paper.)

This paper is very preliminary. In that spirit, the remainder of the analysis is primarily descriptive, aimed at uncovering patterns that will be subject to closer scrutiny in the future. The first few sections explore the roll call data we have been collecting, starting at a highly aggregated level, and eventually drilling down to individual roll call votes. The goal in these sections is simply to describe patterns of party loyalty that arise in roll calls for U.S. senators. We are aiming at eventually analyzing the individual roll call votes of identified partisans in the state legislatures. To get there, we start at the highly aggregated level, by asking about the relationship between aggregate partisanship in a chamber (as reported by Dubin 2007) and the aggregate votes received by the leading senatorial candidates. We end by documenting party loyalty within each chamber's legislative parties, in each election for which we have a complete set of data.

The last sections of this paper take a different approach, by discussing the mechanisms that created party loyalty in the first place. State legislators were not born party loyalists. Party institutions, particularly the caucus, were the instruments that helped parties coordinate during most of this period. By discussing two New York cases, we begin along the path of understanding what transformed fractious collections of state legislators who shared a party label into voting blocs that almost always delivered the U.S. Senate seat to the majority party.

Background: U.S. Senate Elections before 1913

Procedural background — how senators were elected

This paper is part of a larger project in which we are examining Senate elections in all states from 1871 to 1913 (Schiller and Stewart 2004a, 2004b; Stewart and Schiller 2007). The data gathering and research are informed by the legal framework in which those elections were conducted. Senate elections prior to 1913 were covered by an 1866 law that was passed in

response to controversies that arose in Senate elections prior to the Civil War.[2] The procedure enunciated in the 1866 act provided for a two-step process. Each chamber was required to meet separately at noon on the second Tuesday after the state legislature had organized, to vote separately for senator. On the following day at noon, the two chambers were required to meet in "joint assembly" to canvass the votes. If a majority of members of each chamber favored the same candidate, he would be declared elected. If one or both chambers failed to elect a senator with a majority of votes, or if the two chambers produced different majority vote winners, then the joint assembly would vote to choose a winner, acting as a single body. If no candidate secured a majority of the joint assembly, House and Senate members were required to meet together and ballot at least once a day until a senator was chosen or their legislative session adjourned *sine die.*

Empirical background — the data gathering project

Our data-gathering project involves collecting data at two levels in state legislatures: aggregate outcomes and individual voting behavior. Specifically, we are gathering all the actual individual ballots in each Senate election, the district and the political party of each state legislator voting for senator (where available)[3] and election returns for each state legislator.[4]

We are nearing the end of gathering the roll call data and entering them into electronic databases. In doing the research for this paper, we have discovered that we are about 80% of the

[2]See Haynes 1906, chapter 2, for the background on why the law was adopted. The law may be found at U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 14, pp. 243-44.

[3] Political party information for state legislators is often fugitive and variable in coverage. At one extreme, according to the archivist at the State Library, North Carolina has no existing compilation of the party affiliation of legislators who served in the state House and Senate for this time period. At the other extreme, the Kentucky State Library contains a typescript volume in which party labels have been entered for all state legislators back to the 1790s.

[4] The state legislative election data augments data gathering efforts led by Samuel Kernell (UCSD) and Stephen Ansolabehere and James Snyder (MIT).

way to having this data completed, and should be finished by the end of the summer of 2008. Because we are not 100% finished in entering and cleaning the data, all results reported in this paper must be taken as preliminary.

The federal law that defined the election process requires us to separate the roll call votes into two major categories. The votes we label as "Separate ballots" are those roll call votes that were held on the first day of the voting process, when the two chambers met in their own chambers to cast ballots for senator. We have a total of over 57,000 individual roll call votes in separate balloting available to use in this analysis. The votes we label as "Joint ballots" are those that were held after the first day, in those cases where the two chambers had failed to settle on a common winner, and were forced into the joint assembly procedure. We have over 172,000 of these individual roll calls already entered. All told, we have approximately 230,000 individual roll call votes entered.

The data we will be using in this paper is a subset of these 230,000 ballots. First, we focus only on the first day of balloting, since the separate ballot is the best indicator of the degree of party unity that followed immediately on the heels of the state election that was held a couple of months before. This focuses us, first, on the quarter of the dataset that consists of the separate ballots.

Because this paper focuses on the partisan behavior of state legislators during this period, we should remark on the source of party information. The recent publication of Dubin's (2007) compilation of state legislative party compositions, along with the compilation available in ICPSR study 0016, suggests that it is easy to ascertain the partisanship of individual state legislators during this period. However, it is not at all easy or straightforward to carry the aggregate classification down to the individual legislator level, because the existing data often

relies on other sources that themselves only recorded the total party breakdown in the chambers, and not necessarily each legislator's own party affiliation.

Therefore, even under the best of circumstances, we have had to rely on a combination of sources to ascertain the partisanship of individual state legislators. The easiest legislature to work with is New York, because the partisanship of virtually every member is available through the *Tribune Almanac*, either through its listing of members, or inferring party membership using election returns. Kentucky is also easy, since the state's legislative reference library contains a volume in which a library researcher, decades ago, researched the partisan affiliation of individual Kentucky state legislators back to territorial days. More typical are states like Maine, Connecticut, and Vermont, in which state legislative manuals began recording party affiliation in the 1870s, and newspaper accounts can help fill in holes. Still, for many states, notably in the south, we are discovering that reporting on individual legislator partisanship may be so scattered that it will be virtually impossible to assign a definitive partisan label to each state legislator who served during the period from 1871 to 1913.

Table 1 reports on the current status of coding the individual partisanship of state legislators during this period. We have been able to gather individual-level partisanship for almost all state legislatures toward the end of the period but for some states, we are doubtful about gathering individual level partisan data for every legislative session included in our study. The starting point of any particular state's micro partisanship series varies with the quality of sources we have been able to consult. Because of the limitations of different state sources about partisanship, we have individual party labels for only about 60% of the "separate ballot" roll call votes

[Table 1 about here]

In states with very large or super-majority control of the legislature exists, we have noted a significant amount of inter-party conflict, leading away from the question of pure partisanship and towards the internal workings of state legislative parties. One clue as to the extent of intra-party conflict lies in the organizational roll call votes taken at the beginning of each legislative session, i.e. who would serve as Speaker or Senate President. All lower chambers and most upper chambers elected their presiding officer; presumably we can glean partisan and factional information from these elections. We have collected available data on these roll call votes and we have already noted in that in years when state legislatures had extended balloting for U.S. Senator, they also frequently had conflict over the organization of the chambers as well.

However, we will not be able to conduct our analysis on all our states in the sample because some states did not hold recorded roll call votes on organizational matters, or if they did, they did not print the entire list of voters. Fortunately, many states did hold these roll call votes and provide a detailed listing of members who voted for specific candidates for chamber offices. Table 1 also records those states for which we have been able to gather individual-level organizing votes, in anticipation of using this information in future research. We have already used these organizational votes to ascertain individual partisanship in one state legislature, Alabama. Right now, we have complete data for chamber organization votes for 20 of the states in our sample, which are drawn from all regions of the country, and partial data for 10 more.

The Macro View

Although the purpose of this paper is to begin an examination of the micro-partisanship in pre-1913 senatorial elections, it is useful to begin broadly. Table 2 presents one very broad view that uses the individual roll call votes for 15 states for which we have analyzed the individual roll call

data. Here, all we have done is, first count up the number of votes cast by identifiable Democrats and Republicans in all the elections for which we have data. Second, for each election, we have identified the candidate who received the most votes by a chamber's party contingent. For our purposes, we consider this to be the "party candidate."[5] We then sum all the votes cast for party candidates during this period, by members of that party.

[Table 2 about here]

From this broad perspective, we see a considerable degree of party loyalty among state legislators when they balloted for U.S. Senator. Summing all elections together, 93% of all ballots cast for senator were loyal party votes. Looking state-by-state, we see that there is variability in loyalty levels, however. These range from a low of 83% in Kentucky to a high of 100% in South Carolina. The variability is even greater when we disaggregate into chambers and, within chambers, by party. Kentucky's House Democrats, Wisconsin's Senate Democrats, and Massachusetts's House Republicans had loyalty levels that dipped below 80%. Thus, while there is not tremendous variability in party loyalty, there is enough to warrant further investigation.

Another highly aggregated way to explore party strength in the election of U.S. senators during this period is to examine the partisan control of the state legislative chambers, and ask about the partisanship of the eventual winner. As Table 3 illustrates, when we conduct this analysis, we see that Senate election results after the Civil War may be read off the partisan composition of the state legislatures. Overall, 87% of state legislatures in our larger data set were controlled by the same party in each chamber. In these unified legislatures, the party in

[5] In future research, we will use independent information, especially newspaper accounts, to identify candidates who were endorsed by party caucuses, and code them as the "party candidate." Our initial impression is that our data-driven technique always identifies the candidate nominated by caucuses, and therefore it is a valid first-cut technique to identify party-endorsed candidates.

control elected a co-partisan to the Senate 98% of the time. When the chambers were split, the aggregate results were a virtual toss-up.

[Table 3 about here]

The results reported in Tables 2 and 3 show that there was a high degree of partisan regularity after the Civil War in the election of U.S. senators, examined at a highly aggregated level. Does this macro partisan regularity correspond with micro regularity? Does this regularity vary across state? Across time?

We can begin exploring these questions by disaggregating slightly, to the individual election. If party loyalty at the individual level determined the dynamics of Senate elections, then there should have been a very high correlation between the votes received by partisan candidates and the partisan composition of the two chambers.

Figure 1 provides graphical evidence that party loyalty was likely very high in most instances, even with exceptions to this generalization. The *x*-axis of each graph reports the percentage of the indicated chamber that was composed of Democrats or Republicans..[6] The *y*-axis reports the percentage of the votes received by the top vote-getter among candidates of that party. (The data set used in this figure is the seat of all elections that are represented in Table 1.)

[Figure 1 about here]

As an example, take the first graph, labeled "House Democrats." The *x*-axis is the percentage of the state House of Representatives composed of Democrats. The *y*-axis is the percentage of votes received by the main Democratic candidate. Notice, first, that most of the data is tightly clustered along the 45-degree line, suggesting that in most instances, simple party loyalty was the decision-rule driving most voting. Overall, 75% of all observations in the graph are within 5% points of the 45-degree line; 83% are within 10% point of the line. At the same

[6] The data soure is Dubin (2007).

time, there are many observations that are significantly away from the 45-degree line. One set of these observations consists of states in which the lower House was virtually all Democrats, but in which the top Democratic candidate received significantly fewer votes than the size of the party contingent. Observations from Arkansas and Kentucky tend to dominate this cluster. Initial investigation suggests that these were cases in which inter-party factionalism caused the dominant Democrats to significantly fragment on the first ballot. The remaining deviations from the diagonal line represent a combination of factors, including a few cases of widespread abstentions among Democrats when they were in the minority.

As a general matter, then, the correlations between chamber partisanship and support for partisan senatorial candidates was high, but not perfect. It is also evident from Figure 1 that some state legislatures exhibited a higher correlation between chamber partisanship and votes for Senate candidates than others.

Table 4 attempts to quantify the degree to which balloting for Senate candidates followed or deviated from chamber partisanship. We use two measures as applied to 23 states. The first is the simple correlation between chamber partisanship and the votes received by senatorial candidates. (For this exercise, we have combined both chambers in a single state, but have analyzed each major party separately.) The second measure is the average difference between the fraction of seats held by party *p* and the fraction of votes received by the top voter-getter of party *p*.

[Table 4 about here]

Table 4 reveals there was significant heterogeneity among the states in how well changes in legislative partisanship mapped onto changes in the partisan fortunes of senatorial candidates. In some states (e.g., Indiana, Iowa, and New Hampshire among the Democrats) the state-level

correlation was very high and the deviation in partisanship was very low. We would be surprised to find much party disloyalty in these states in any individual election. On the other hand, other states (e.g., Arkansas, Kentucky, and Texas among the Democrats), the correlation was very low and the deviation very high. In these state, we would expect to find high degrees of inter-party factionalism.

Let us use the results in this table to roughly divide states into four categories:[7]

1. High correlation, low difference. States whose Senate election results tended to track the composition of the state legislature. These are likely states in which there are well-organized, competitive parties that organize state politics, and thus were able to agree on a single candidate via the legislative caucus and hold members to the party endorsement. Among the Democrats, Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming are such states. Among the Republicans, Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New York, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming are such states.. As one can see, there is considerable similarity across parties in this category.
2. High correlation, high difference. States whose Senate election results varied as the partisan composition of the state legislature changed, but whose results tended to be biased toward one party or the other. These might be states in which the minority party tended just to abstain. It may also be states in which significant third party activity, or persistent factionalism within the majority party, set an upper bound on the number of votes the party regulars could deliver to the official party candidate. Among Democrats,

[7] We created the categories by dividing the sample at the mean of the two variables. Thus, for instance, "high correlation, low difference" states are those with above-average correlations in the above table and below-average differences.

Arizona, Colorado, and Mississippi are examples, and among the Republicans, Arizona is an example.

3. Low correlation, low difference. States whose Senate election results tended not to change as the composition of the legislature changed, but whose results were not systematically biased toward one party or the other. These are most likely states dominated by a single party whose legislative party composition did not change much over time (thus no variation to be explained by a correlation), and whose election returns varied idiosyncratically. Among Democrats, these states included Michigan and Vermont and among the Republicans, Maine, Michigan, and Vermont were these types of states.
4. Low correlation, high difference. States whose Senate election results (measured in partisan terms) tended not to change as the composition of the legislature changed, but whose results tended to systematically favor one party or the other --- or exhibit extreme factionalism within a dominant party. For the Democrats, such states included Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Kentucky, Texas, and Wisconsin and among the Republicans, such states included Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, Texas, and Wisconsin. Again it is visible that the major parties shared similar partisan tendencies within the same state.

The high correlation/low difference states are those who tend to lie along the 45-degree lines in Figure 1. At the risk of committing an aggregation fallacy, these are the states we would suspect to show the highest degree of party loyalty in U.S. Senate elections, year in and year out. Many of these states are from the northeast and had a reputation for strong party organizations.

The Micro View

In the preceding section, we saw that election results followed a partisan pattern at the aggregate level, but that there was heterogeneity across the states in how firmly this regularity held. In this section we push the question of partisan regularity down to the level of the individual state legislator, asking about how often individual state legislators held to the party line, and examining where (and when) party irregularity broke down.

To conduct this analysis we need to know the party membership of individual state legislators. Although there are compilations that give the aggregate partisan composition of virtually all state legislatures during this period, these compilations are often based on sources that only report aggregate party memberships, and not the partisanship of individual legislators. Therefore, in this section we confine ourselves to the fourteen states listed in Table 1 for which we have been able (thus far) to gather and analyze individual partisanship for long periods of time (Alabama, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, South Carolina, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming).

In Table 5, we have summarized the degree of party loyalty among major party delegations, in both chambers, for these states. Table 5 reports elections by the year of the election and the seat up for election. (The seat is identified by the starting year of the term. In most years, the election year is also the starting year of the term. We designate special elections — i.e., elections to fill vacancies — with the letter "S" following the year. For instance, the seat designated as "1885S" in Illinois was the election to replace John A. Logan, who died in 1886.) We then separate the analysis by party (Democrats and Republicans) and by chamber (House and Senate).

[Table 5 about here]

For this analysis, we ignore joint balloting in multi-ballot elections, focusing only on the separate balloting that occurred in each chamber on the first day of the election. For each chamber-party delegation, we record the total number of votes cast by members of that party, the total number of candidate who received votes by members of the party (regardless of how many votes they received), and the "effective number of candidates" receiving votes, which is a measure constructed identically to the "effective number of parties" in comparative electoral research. (Laakso and Taagepera 1979). The measure, *Effective Number of Candidates (ENC)*, can be defined as follows:

$$ENC_{s,t} = \left(\sum_{i=1}^{C_{s,t}} f_{c,s,t}^{2} \right)^{-1}$$

where $f_{c,s,t}$ = the fraction of votes received by candidate c in state *s* in year *t* and $C_{s,t}$ = the number of candidates receiving votes in a legislature in state *s* in year *t*.

For instance, in the 1881 U.S. Senate election in Connecticut, House Democrats cast 69 votes, 67 for Democrat William W. Eaton, the incumbent, and two for Republican Joseph R. Hawley, the eventual winner. Thus, two individuals received votes from the Connecticut House Democrats; because Eaton's votes vastly outweighed Hawley's, the effective number of candidates is very close to one — 1.06.

Among the thirteen states represented in Table 5, we have examples drawn from among three of the four different types of states that were identified above. (None of these states were previously identified as "high correlation/high difference" states.) For instance, Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, South Carolina, and Wyoming were identified as "high correlation/ low difference" states above, because the aggregate partisan outcomes mapped very closely onto the aggregate partisan composition of the legislatures. Table

5 shows that in most years, the party delegations of these states held together, with only a handful of defectors. There were exceptions, of course, such as among the Connecticut House Democrats in 1891 and a run of divisive elections that split New York Republicans in the 1880s. Thus, even among the states that showed the greatest party regularity, an election could periodically come along to upset the partisan applecart.

One state in Table 5, Vermont, was earlier classified as a "low correlation/low difference" state. The time series for Vermont in Table 5 suggests that this puzzling classification is likely due to the lopsided nature of Republican majorities during this period. The Republican proportion of the two chambers never dipped below 71% in the House and 83% in the Senate. These exceptionally large majorities apparently encouraged petty and inconsequential disloyalty of all sorts. First, House Democrats defected to the Republican candidate with some frequency. (Senate Democrats were perfectly loyal, but there were only 13 Democratic state senators Vermont during the entire period.) Second, Republican House members frequently abstained, or were otherwise absent (it is unclear from the record which this is). Abstentions did not appear to be correlated with the size of the Republican majority. Therefore, the majority going to the winning Republican candidate was typically less than the Republican majority in the chamber overall, varying in random amounts from year-to-year.

Four states — Illinois, Kentucky, and Wisconsin — were previously classified as "low correlation/high difference" states. Looking at the micro analysis in Table 5, the presence of Illinois in this group is puzzling, since loyalty within the chamber parties was typically very high. Only the elections of 1897 and 1913 exhibited deviations from this loyalty. However, as with Vermont, Illinois witnessed occasional bouts of majority-party abstention, particularly in 1897 and 1913, and in 1885, most House Republicans boycotted the vote for U.S. Senator.)

Kentucky and Wisconsin, on the other hand, experienced periods of party fragmentation that resulted in no clear party candidate for the majority party. The result was a fracturing of majority party voting which produced a relatively small number of votes for the top majority party vote getter.

In Kentucky, this type of fragmentation occurred regularly from 1872 to 1890, but virtually disappeared afterwards. Wisconsin, on the other hand, experienced a few spectacular breakdowns of inter-party comity throughout this period. The worst instance was 1893, when the majority Democrats engaged in a three-cornered contest for the nomination in caucus. When the caucus failed to reach agreement by the time came to commence formal balloting in the legislature, the caucus voted that Democrats would split their votes in the legislature, thus preventing the election of a senator (*Chicago Tribune*, 1/24/1893, p. 2). The result was that the 50 House Democrats named 47 different candidates for senator, while the 25 Senate Democrats each named a different person as their choice of senator. Two days and almost 30 caucus ballots later, the Democrats settled on John Mitchell as their nominee, who was promptly elected when the next joint ballot was cast in the legislature, with only one Democratic defection (*Chicago Tribune*, 1/27/1893, p. 1).

Thus, using the individual roll call data, combining it with party information, we see a high degree of party loyalty in state legislatures in voting for a Senate candidate from the same party, but we simultaneously observe considerable heterogeneity in the ability of state parties to impose party loyalty on its members in the election of U.S. senators. In other words, when the party coalesced around a single Senate candidate, most members of the party voted for that individual. However, the amount of time it took to choose *the* party candidate for Senate, and the conflict that ensued over the choice, varied considerably across states. As we discussed here,

state parties like the Kentucky Democrats or the Massachusetts Republicans regularly failed to achieve party loyalty early in the Senate election process, and we have numerous anecdotal examples from other states that tell the same tale. We fully hope that once all of our state data is analyzed, we will arrive at a general explanation for the timing of party breakdowns as well as party repairs across states. To do so will likely rest on understanding the more systemic circumstances that surrounded the organization of parties in particular states.

Two crystallizing examples of a strong party organization that experienced party breakdown over U.S. Senate elections come from New York State. In the following section, we present case studies of two such elections in New York State, from 1881 and 1911, which illustrate the different ways in which party organization and institutions worked to influence the individual votes of state legislators.

Two New York Stories

The election(s) of 1881: Stalwarts and Half-Breeds

The presidential election of 1880 is known, among other things, for the division that erupted in the nomination struggle between "Stalwarts" and "Half-Breeds." Stalwarts were opponents of President Rutherford Hayes's policies of reconciling with the South and instituting civil service reform. Half-Breeds were moderates, favoring both reconciliation and reform. The dispute between the two factions came to a head in the 1880 Republican National Convention, which witnessed a three-cornered contest between former-president Ulysses S. Grant Grant (Stalwart), James G. Blaine, (Half-Breed), and John Sherman (neither faction). After a deadlock of thirty-five ballots, Blaine and Sherman threw their support to the "dark horse" James Garfield, thus defeating the Stalwarts.

Senator Roscoe Conkling, who had been elected by the New York legislative in 1879, was a leading figure in the nomination fight. He was a blistering critic of Hayes's policies and led the effort to bring Grant out of retirement. As a conciliatory measure, the convention chose Conkling's protégé, Chester A. Arthur, as the vice presidential nominee.

James Garfield carried New York (barely) in the 1880 presidential election. With this victory, Republicans also carried the statewide races and won a majority of votes cast for their state legislative candidates. The victory gave them unified control of both houses of the legislature which all but guaranteed the defeat of the incumbent Senator, Democrat Francis Kernan.

The canvas for the Republican Senate nomination in New York occupied an intense four day period preceding the January 13 Republican caucus in Albany (NYT 1/14/1881, p. 1; Brown and Smith 1922, pp. 254-55; Alexander 1909, pp. 464-65). The Half-Breed/Stalwart split infected the process of choosing a Republican senatorial candidate. When Republican legislators began caucusing, there were three candidates who were the major focus of speculation: Thomas C. Platt and Richard Crowley, who were Stalwarts, and a third candidate, Chauncey Depew, had previously run for Lieutenant Governor on the Liberal Republican-Democratic ticket.

Crowley had been Speaker of the Assembly and had served widely in the federal and state governments in many capacities. Platt had previously served in the U.S. House, but by 1880 he had become the president of the United States Express Company. Although both were recognized as Conkling allies, Half-Breeds believed that Platt would be easier to deal with. (In fact, Platt's conciliatory nature would earn him the nickname "The Easy Boss," in later years, as he came to dominate the New York Republican Party himself.)

Depew was Cornelius Vanderbilt's lawyer who had been a leader in the failed Liberal Republican movement in the previous decade. He entered the 1880 senatorial race to "split the machine," at the request of James Blaine and Whitelaw Reid (Alexander 1909, p. 467) Once he had secured a pledge from Platt that he would look favorably on Garfield's nominations, Depew withdrew.

Following a precedent from the 1869 senatorial election, House speaker George H. Sharpe held up committee assignments, hoping to pressure Republican House members to vote for Crowley in the party caucus. This tactic backfired, and was one factor frequently mentioned in post mortems of Platt's eventual victory. But the primary factor contributing to Platt securing the Republican party caucus nomination was his promise to a conference of Half-Breeds that he would support Garfield's appointments, even appointments that Conkling opposed (Brown and Smith 1922, p. 255; Alexander 1909, p. 468; Gosnell 1924, p. 26). Conkling went on to win election in the state legislature, garnering unanimous support among fellow Republicans in both the House and Senate.

Formally, Platt's election to the U.S. Senate was simple, though the politics underlying it were anything but. His unanimous nomination by the joint Republican caucus was predicated on the surprising alliance between the Stalwarts and Depew's followers. Certainly, there had been uncomfortable inter-party alliances before to secure a nomination, and there would be many afterwards. However, the events that would unfold over the next few months would cause the Stalwart-Half-Breed rift to intrude onto the floor of the legislature itself in one of the most dramatic political showdowns in American history.

To condense a long story, the conflict in New York began when President Garfield forwarded to the U.S. Senate the nomination of Judge William H. Robertson to be the collector

of the port of New York, a prime patronage appointment. Robertson had led the Half-Breed revolt within the New York convention delegation the previous year, and thus was Conkling's greatest intra-state rival. Conkling "thoroughly detested" him (Gosnell 1924, p. 26). Conkling fulminated over the nomination, publicly and within closed Republican caucuses in Washington, striking even his allies as being belligerent and childish. Platt brokered a "compromise" with the President that, in the end, still involved Robertson being appointed to the Custom House.

As Conkling's Republican Senate colleagues decided to support their president rather than Conkling, Platt proposed that they both resign in protest and seek vindication by being immediately returned to the Senate by the New York legislature (Platt 1910, p. 150). Platt figured that this plan would both absolve Platt of his promise to support Garfield's nominations and give Conkling political advantage over the president.

The public response to Conkling's histrionics over the Robertson nomination had been negative, and his decision to resign in protest only made matters worse. Even Stalwarts attacked Conkling's decision as childish and inimical to Republican Party unity. Platt suffered, as well, in the court of public opinion and party councils. Not only was he seen as trying to wiggle out of his promise to support Garfield's appointments, but the public initially perceived the dual resignations as being Conkling's idea, not Platt's. This consequently earned Platt the nickname of "Me Too."

The degree of the miscalculation was immediately apparent once word of the dual resignations reached Albany and the process of their "triumphant" vindications began. In an adroit piece of parliamentary maneuvering, two Half-Breed state senators managed to adjourn the Senate before Governor Cornell could formally convey the resignation letters to the legislature. This set back the clock that determined when the legislature would be required to

begin voting to fill the vacancies. In turn, this maneuver gave anti-Conkling Republicans more time to organize.

Conkling's and Platt's problems in the legislature began when legislative Half-Breeds, along with a small number of Stalwarts who were outraged at Conkling's behavior, refused to enter into a caucus to choose Republican nominees for the newly opened seats (Alexander 1909, p. 479). This defection meant that Conkling and Platt would have to press on with their efforts to regain their Senate seats without the endorsements of their party's caucus.

The first ballots in the two chambers of the state legislature were not good for the state machine. Platt received only 20 and Conkling 25 of the 78 Republican votes cast in the House on the first ballot. In the Senate, Platt received 8 and Conkling 9 of 25 Republican first ballot votes. At this point, the only ray of hope they had was the fact that the opposition had not settled on candidates that they could rally behind instead. For instance, on the first ballot in the House, Republicans voted for a total of 14 different candidates in opposition to Platt, and 17 candidates in opposition to Conkling.

The Democrats themselves were in an interesting position. The maximum degree of flexibility for the Democrats was illustrated in the caucus that was called to name two Democrats to stand for election to Platt's and Conkling's vacant seats. State Senator John Jacobs was nominated to receive Democratic votes in the race for Conkling's "short seat" vacancy, while former U.S. Sen. Francis Kernan was endorsed for Platt's "long seat" vacancy. It was traditional in such caucuses to treat the nomination as binding on participants. However, when a motion was about to be made to that effect, there was a disturbance in the hall, which allowed for a hasty adjournment motion which passed (NYT 5/31/1881, p. 1).

Thus, the Democrats had their nominees, but they were also free to try to get a better deal individually if they could find it. In the end, however, House Democrats ended up remaining loyal to Jacobs and Kernan when balloting began. Senate Republicans were much less loyal, splitting their support among six candidates for the "short seat" and nine different individuals for Platt's "long seat" vacancy.

Balloting to replace Platt and Conkling began on May 31 and dragged on for seven weeks and four days, well into the summer heat. No truly significant movements occurred in the balloting for a month, until two dramatic turns affected the outcome of the race. The first was when Platt was caught in the arms of a woman, not his wife, which led to his hasty withdrawal from the race on July 1. Platt's previous support splintered, never to unify again. On the next ballot after the revelations about Platt's extracurricular activities, half of Platt's supporters went over to Richard Crowley, but the other half split their votes among six other candidates.[8] By the time Platt's open seat was settled on the 48th ballot, Platt's erstwhile supporters were divided among ten different candidates.

However, the more dramatic event was the attack on President Garfield on July 2. The assassination, which hinged on the issue of patronage, drew national indignation toward anything having to do with patronage, especially patronage in New York. (Recall that the assassin, Charles Guiteau, is reported to have shouted, "I am a Stalwart of the Stalwarts . . . Arthur is President now!") Depew withdrew his name from consideration and worked to help bring together a conference of Republicans on July 8. At that meeting, they agreed to split the two seats, allowing the Half-Breeds to choose one nominee and the Stalwarts the other. The

[8] The last ballot before the Platt revelations was the 32nd, in which Platt received 27 of the 99 Republican ballots cast. The leader at that point was Chauncey Depew, with 50 votes. In the 33rd ballot, the 27 Platt voters split their support among Richard Crowley (12 votes), Alonzo B. Cornell (5), Orlow W. Chapman (2), Platt (2), Charles Daniels (1), Charles H. Adams (1), and Charles North (1).

agreement also stipulated that the first faction to come up with a nominee would be allowed to claim the long term. As a consequence, the Half-Breeds reached agreement first, choosing Warner Miller for the long (Platt) term; the Stalwarts chose Elbridge Lapham for the short (Conkling) term. However, the former supporters of Conkling and Platt refused to enter into the agreement, and so the balloting continued.

The next significant break occurred on July 17, when Speaker Sharpe threw his support behind the two compromise candidates. This quickly resulted in the election of Miller the next day, who won without the support of the diehard machine supporters.[9]

However, diehard Conkling supporters continued to support him, making resolution of the short term vacancy more difficult. Finally, on July 22, during a Republican conference meeting, Sen. Edwin Halbert, who was the most stalwart of the Stalwarts and a consistent vote for Conkling, declared the need to resolve the election and his willingness to go over to Lapham. A vote was taken, Lapham was formally nominated by the caucus, and he was formally elected in that evening's joint ballot in the legislature, with all Republicans, regardless of prior affiliation, supporting him.

The immediate result of these machinations was the election of two middle-level party functionaries to the U.S. Senate. The long-range result was more substantial for the history of party politics in New York. Conkling retired to New York City, where he entered private law practice, stayed away from politics, and died seven years later. Platt, on the other hand, beat a tactical retreat, and set about gaining control of New York Republican politics, in the wake of the vacuum left by Conkling's retirement.

[9] Among the 27 Republicans who had supported Platt until his withdrawal, for instance, only 6 supported Miller on the final ballot. All but one of the anti-Platt faction voted for Miller.

From our perspective, the 1881 episode to fill the vacancies left by the resignations of Platt and Conkling illustrate the conditions under which parties could fail to coalesce, even in a state with a strong machine tradition, and yet the loyalty of party members in ensuring that the opposite party did not grab the nomination. Loyalty to the Conkling machine kept a core of 27 New York Republicans unwilling to support any compromise candidate, even in the face of denying New York any voice in the U.S. Senate. That part of the controversy involved the political fate of the "big boss" in New York Republican politics no doubt added to the difficulty in sealing a deal. Indeed, it seems likely that had Conkling himself not ascented to the eventual election of Lapham, New York would have gone short one U.S. senator for the rest of the Congress.

The election of 1911: The vexing rise of Progressivism

The Senate election of 1911 provides a glimpse into the efforts that party organizations made to accommodate internal divisions, so that the majority party could gain control over election efforts. The most important contextual dynamic of the 1911 senatorial election, the last held before the institution of the popular election of senators, was the Progressive split within the Republican Party. This split divided Republican votes in the 1910 general election, producing bare Democratic majorities in both legislative chambers. (This is even though the Democrats easily beat the Republicans in the aggregate popular vote for both chambers.).

On the Democratic side, the opportunity to elect a United States senator for the first time in nearly twenty years was hampered by a reform split of their own. The New York City delegation, swollen under consolidation, controlled the joint Democratic caucus; therefore

Tammany boss Charles Murphy was presumably in the driver's seat.[10] However, a sizeable contingent of upstate Democrats, led by Sen. Franklin Roosevelt and supported by Gov. John A. Dix, refused to go along. This break in the ranks gave rise to a three month fight over the election (NYT 1/3/1911, p. 1; 1/7/1911, p. 5; 1/14/1911, p. 1; 1/15/1911, p. 2; 1/16/1911, p. 1; 1/18/1911, p. 1).

The Tammany candidate was William F. "Blue-Eyed Billy" Sheehan, who had previously served as Speaker of the Assembly and Lieutenant Governor, and now continued to be active in party politics (NYT 1/12/1911, p. 1). The reformers supported Edward M. Shepard, who had run two unsuccessful campaigns for mayor of New York as a reform Democrat---first for mayor of Brooklyn before consolidation and later for mayor of the consolidated city.[11]

The New York press heavily covered the three-month contest. The extensive coverage revealed a number of strategies employed by both sides. It is likely that these strategies had been employed before, although their use was not so thoroughly documented.

Patronage as a tool for winning over pivotal Democratic legislators was of limited use, since the national administration at the time was Republican. Instead, both sides made active attempts to marshal public opinion (NYT 1/18/1911, p. 1). On the one hand, Murphy's forces actively orchestrated constituent telegraphs from upstate constituents in favor of Sheehan, attempting to sway the insurgents. Pro-insurgent telegrams came in, too, but the most active pro-Shepard efforts appear to have been made by upstate newspaper editors.

The public phase of the canvas began as legislators flooded into Albany in the middle of January, as the legislature convened. Charles Murphy's arrival in Albany on January 11 was

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[10] From the subsequent events that unfolded, the extensive New York *Times* article on 31 Dec. 1910 (p. 3) that trumpeted "Murphy Controls Senate Election" through his iron grip on the entire party was overwrought.

[11] The first New York *Times* account of the race notes the endorsement of Shepard by a large number of upstate Democrats; the headline of the article noted that "Tammany men [are] silent." (NYT 12/18/1910, p. 1)

treated as the beginning of the actual contest. The next day---three days prior to the caucus meeting---the New York *Times* reported that it had once again taken a poll of state legislators on the senatorial election, with quite a different result from the poll taken two years previous. In this case, no one was willing to make a commitment (NYT 1/13/1911).

Murphy's difficulties became apparent when he held a highly publicized audience with Governor Dix, who pointedly refused to take a position in the upcoming senatorial election. Asked by a reporter if he would tell Murphy whom he preferred for senator, Dix replied, "I doubt it." Asked if doing so would be considered inferring with the legislature, Dix is recorded as saying, "with a smile," that "'It might be, by indirection,' (NYT 1/14/1911, p. 1).

The Democratic caucus, which met three days later, revealed the extent of Murphy's problems. As predicted, 25 legislators, including Sen. Franklin Roosevelt, stayed away from the caucus, thus signaling that they would not be bound by any decision the caucus made. In addition, of the 91 Democrats who did attend the caucus, only 62 voted for the machine candidate. Twenty-two supported Shepard and 7 favored D. Cady Herrick (NYT 1/17/1911, p. 1). This was a slap in the face for the Tammany and allied organizations, which had just demonstrated that they could only hold together a bare majority of their own party caucus.[12]

The Republican caucus was much more sedate, but even it experienced some discord when Sen. J. Mayhew Wainwright nominated Theodore Roosevelt. Roosevelt garnered only one other vote, and Depew was nominated 58-2, with 17 absent (NYT 1/17/1911, p. 1). (The absence of such a large number of Republicans at the caucus meeting has gone un-analyzed in the historical literature. Given the practice at the time, the most likely explanation is that this

[12] The New York *Times* report notes an attempt to exclude newspaper reporters from the caucus meeting which, in the estimation of the reporter, would have been a first in New York history. The report also noted that the resolution to exclude the reporters did not exclude the large number of party officials who were also in the chamber. Following a vociferous protest, the reporters were allowed to stay. (NYT 1/17/1911)

collection of Republicans desired to retain maximal flexibility in subsequent balloting, perhaps joining with insurgent Democrats to elect a bipartisan reform candidate. Although such possibilities were raised in the coming weeks, they never came to fruition.)

The first ballot in the separate legislative sessions that began the formal election illustrated the pull of the party caucus. On the first ballot in both chambers, all Democrats who had attended the party caucus voted for Sheehan, even those who had supported the nomination of Herrick and Shepard. (Table 6). The absentees, on the other hand, split their support, voting mostly for Shepard.[13] Only one caucus bolter voted for Sheehan.

[Table 6 about here]

As balloting proceeded over the next two months, Sheehan continued to draw a plurality of support, but never enough to garner a majority. A handful of his early supporters deserted after the earliest ballots, but instead of going over to Shepard, they scattered their votes for a variety of "safe" candidates. The purpose of this strategy was to signal a belief that Sheehan was unelectable, while at the same time demonstrating that the legislator was unwilling to go over to the insurgent faction (NYT 1/21/1911, p. 1; 1/22/1911, p. 1; 1/24/1911, p. 1).

There was no material change in the balloting over a five-week period. Eventually Boss Murphy and Sheehan left Albany, as did most of the legislature, leaving a skeleton crew of legislators to cast *pro forma* ballots day in and day out. After five weeks of balloting, however, Shepard made the next move, by withdrawing from the race, confident that Sheehan would not be chosen, hoping that a compromise candidate would emerge who would be more in keeping with insurgent desires. Martin Littleton immediately jumped into the race, picking up support of

[13] The other prominent candidate among the caucus bolters was Alton B. Parker, who had been the Democratic nominee for president in 1904. Because Parker was a conservative Democrat who had nonetheless supported Bryan's candidacy, he was considered a possible compromise candidate.

the insurgents who had previously supported Shepard, plus some erstwhile caucus loyalists who had fallen away from Shepard (NYT 2/27/1911, pp. 1-2).

Littleton quickly hit a glass ceiling of support, however, which led to a month of fruitless efforts to hold a second caucus to arrive at a compromise (NYT 3/6/1911, p. 1). By the third week of March, Murphy had apparently decided to ease Sheehan out. The effort was on to find a suitable replacement who could attract enough insurgents to win (NYT 3/20/1911, p. 1; 3/23/1911, p. 1). Eventually the insurgents expressed a willingness to enter into a second caucus, even though when the caucus was actually held, most were no-shows (3/25/1911, p. 1; 3/26/1911, p. 1; 3/26/1911, p. 10).

The maneuvering toward the end game came in this second caucus. When Sheehan refused to step aside, the new caucus refused to endorse him again, giving him 28 votes out of 90 cast. Only four of the original insurgents entered the second caucus. However, the regular Tammany forces remained divided, so Democrats were still unable to choose a senator (NYT 3/28/1911, p. 1). Using Senate President Robert Wagner as an intermediary, a group of insurgents submitted a list of acceptable candidates, suggesting that if one from the list was not chosen, they would enter into an agreement with the Republicans to elect a senator instead (NYT 3/30/1911, p. 1).

Murphy had other ideas, however. His supporters countered with James O'Gorman, a "safe" justice of the state Supreme Court (NYT 4/1/1911). Surprisingly, the insurgents swung into line, allowing O'Gorman to by elected on a strict party line vote. In the end, although the insurgent leaders tried to salvage the situation, the general verdict seemed to be that Murphy had out-maneuvered Roosevelt and the insurgents (NYT 4/1/1911).

The final resolution to the contest occurred through the confluence of three exogenous events, one an Act of God. The first was the approach of the April 4 date for the convening of the United States Congress. Few in New York desired for the state to be lacking a U.S. senator when the U.S. Senate convened (NYT 3/24/1911, p. 10). The second was Gov. Dix's increasing impatience with the protracted senatorial voting, which ground legislation to a halt, hindering his chances of pursuing the reform agenda that had gotten him elected. Dix was simply unwilling to continue drawing the wrath of Tammany leaders on an issue that did not directly affect his programmatic plans. The third was a fire in the state capitol on the eve of the final caucus, which destroyed the state library, caused $5 million in damage, and rendered the House legislative chamber unusable. Immediately upon the election of O'Gorman, both chambers adjourned for two weeks, allowing repairs to be made to the capitol.

As with the 1881 Platt-Conklin fiasco, the protracted 1911 senatorial election focused on the party caucus as the formal instrument to settle inter-party conflict. The pull of Tammany was evident in the decision to go to caucus in the first place — although the New York City contingent of the Democratic Party was considerably larger than the upstate contingent, upstate Democrats were roughly 2/3 of the Democrats who stayed away from the caucus in the first place. Dissident New York City Democrats were not so afraid of Tammany that they slavishly followed the organization whip in caucus — Democrats from the city were just as likely to support the Shepard insurgency as were upstate Democrats. However, once the fight moved from caucus to the legislature, everyone who had entered the caucus, regardless of prior inclination, lined up behind the organization candidate Sheehan. As such, this election represents a facet of the indirect election process in that the party experienced extensive internal conflict before ultimately settling on a single nominee. It seems that where there was little

possibility that the opposite party could capture a Senate seat, majority parties allowed themselves to be plagued by conflict that extended the balloting process.

Conclusion

The indirect election of U.S. Senators, which was general practice until the adoption of the 17th Amendment in 1913, presents a number of important questions about political parties, electoral accountability, and state legislative voting behavior. In our project, which involves collecting all roll call ballots for U.S. Senator in state legislatures from 1871-1913, as well as membership and party affiliation of state legislators, we have observed a contradiction within this process. The contradiction that presents itself is one where seemingly strong state political parties experience repeated intra-party conflict during these elections in and out of the state legislature. This paper is a first step in addressing this particular contradiction in the larger context of reexamining our assumptions about the strength and coherence of state political parties during this period of American history.

Using a subset of a larger dataset that includes over 230,000 individual roll call votes, we examine the patterns of partisan loyalty among legislators during this period of time. We find that when parties ultimately decide who their "party candidate" will be, legislators are extremely loyal. In general, 93% of all ballots cast for senator were loyal party votes. However, we do find variability in that measure; Kentucky has the low score of 83% while South Carolina has a 100% party loyalty score. Granted Kentucky's 83% is not exactly a low number but conventional wisdom has suggested that parties were monolithic and strong organizations in the late 19th century, so one would expect close to 100% party loyalty on Senate ballots across the board. Another way of examining the data is to look at chamber partisanship and the percent of the party membership that voted for the candidate who received the highest vote total (the de

facto party candidate). We find variation across states, and even between legislative chambers, in this number, with some states experiencing much more intra-party factionalism than others, and not just confined to the South.

We have observed in this paper that once it became clear to members of state legislatures that there was a single candidate who would receive majority support for election to the U.S. Senate, the election was decided because the vast majority of state legislators were party loyalists on this vote. However, the two New York state case studies of the 1881 and 1911 elections illustrate that when the process of balloting began for U.S. Senator in state legislatures, there were frequently multiple nominees from the same party, which meant that party unifying devices, like the caucus nomination, were not always effective. How is it that strong party organizations would allow intra-party fracturing at the beginning of this process when all the participants knew full well that the ultimate winner of the Senate election would be from the majority party? The failure to control the nomination and election process efficiently resulted in elections with multiple ballots and extensive negotiation, and this paper has been a first step in our efforts to arrive at a systematic explanation of this breakdown in party organizational strength.

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Note: Citations to the New York *Times* are abbreviated "NYT."

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Figure 1. Votes received by partisan candidates for U..S. Senate, compared to partisan composition of state legislatures, 1871—1913.



Table 1. Availability of individual-level partisanship for members of state legislatures, 1871—1913.

		Presiding officer votes					Presiding officer votes	
State	Coverage of partisanship	House	Senate		State	Coverage of partisanship	House	Senate
Alabama	1872–1913	Yes	Yes		Nebraska	No	Yes	Yes
Arizona	1912–1913	No	No		Nevada	Yes	Yes	Yes
Arkansas	1871–1883 (spotty)	1891+	No		New Hampshire	1871–1913	No	No
California	1871-1913	Yes	Yes		New Jersey	No	Yes	Yes
Colorado	1876-1909 (spotty)	No	No		New Mexico	1913	?	Yes
Connecticut	1873-1913	No	No		New York	1871–1913	Yes	No
Delaware	No	No	No		North Carolina	No	Yes	Yes
Florida	1873-1913 (65 %)	No	No		North Dakota	1889-1913	Yes	Yes
Georgia	No	1900+	1900+		Ohio	1904-1913	Yes	Yes
Idaho	No	No	No		Oklahoma	No	Yes	No
Illinois	1881–1913	Yes	?		Oregon	1871-1913	Yes	Yes
Indiana	1871–1913	?	?		Pennsylvania	1871-1913	Yes	Yes
Iowa	1878–1913	?	?		Rhode Island	1871-1874;1907	?	?
Kansas	1877-1913 (40 %)	Yes	Yes		South Carolina	1901-1913	Yes	Yes
Kentucky	1871–1913	Yes	Yes		South Dakota	No	Yes	Yes
Louisiana	1880-1913	Yes	Yes		Tennessee	No	Yes	Yes
Maine	1873–1913	?	?		Texas	1887–1913 (spotty)	?	?
Maryland	1902-1913	No	Yes		Utah	Spotty	?	?
Massachusetts	Spotty	No	No		Vermont	1876–1912	No	No
Michigan	None	?	?		Virginia	None	Yes	No
Minnesota	1892-1913	Yes	Yes		Washington	1889-1913	Yes	Yes
Mississippi	None	1892+	Spotty		West Virginia	Spotty	?	?
Missouri	1871-1913 (60%)	Yes	Yes		Wisconsin	1871–1913	?	?
Montana	1893-1913	1900+	1900+		Wyoming	1890–1913	Yes	Yes

Note: "Coverage of partisanship" records the legislative sessions for which we have been able to gather data about the partisanship of individual state legislators. The notation "spotty" indicates that there are large holes in the coverage. "Presiding officer votes" records whether we have

been able to gather individual-level roll call votes about the election of the chamber's presiding officer. "Yes" indicates that the data have been gathered. "No" indicates that the chamber did not record these roll call votes. "?" indicates that we have yet to ascertain whether the chamber recorded these roll calls in the Journal.

Table 2. Total number of roll call votes casts for U.S. senator, by Democrats and Republicans, 1871–1913.

	House Democrats			Senate Democrats			House Republicans			Senate Republicans			All votes		
State	Total votes	Loyal votes	Pct. loyal	Total votes	Loyal votes	Pct. loyal	Total votes	Loyal votes	Pct. loyal	Total votes	Loyal votes	Pct. loyal	Total votes	Loyal votes	Pct. loyal
Alabama	1,164	1,094	94%	398	372	93%	48	48	100%	0	0	–	1,610	1,514	94%
Connecticut	735	626	85%	70	64	91%	1,687	1,656	98%	188	180	96%	2,680	2,526	94%
Illinois	541	524	97%	207	193	93%	518	490	95%	347	327	94%	1,613	1,534	95%
Indiana	506	502	99%	258	256	99%	565	559	99%	273	273	100%	1,602	1,590	99%
Iowa	353	335	95%	168	164	98%	936	931	99%	489	487	100%	1,946	1,917	99%
Kentucky	1,033	810	78%	439	352	80%	308	298	97%	98	91	93%	1,878	1,551	83%
Maine	537	526	98%	58	55	95%	1,423	1,401	98%	385	384	100%	2,403	2,366	98%
Massachusetts	534	508	95%	118	110	93%	1,448	1,044	72%	451	409	91%	2,551	2,071	81%
New Hampshire	967	939	97%	29	27	93%	1,992	1,967	99%	121	118	98%	3,109	3,051	98%
New York	791	765	97%	214	203	95%	1,251	1,099	88%	383	332	87%	2,639	2,399	91%
South Carolina	557	556	100%	177	177	100%	-	-	-	-	-	-	734	733	100%
Vermont	518	450	87%	14	13	93%	2,773	2,549	92%	403	388	96%	3,708	3,400	92%
Wisconsin	343	289	84%	95	69	73%	834	716	86%	272	241	89%	1,544	1,315	85%
Wyoming	40	40	100%	21	18	86%	225	216	96%	84	84	100%	370	358	97%
Total	8,619	7,964	92%	2,266	2,073	91%	14,008	12,974	93%	3,494	3,314	95%	28,387	26,325	93%

Definitions:
“Total votes” = total votes cast by party members, across all elections in which we have individual party affiliation data
“Loyal votes” = total number of votes cast by party members for the candidate who received the most votes by legislators of that party, in a particular election.
“Pct. loyal” = “Loyal votes” divided by “total votes”.

Table 3. Relationship between party control of state legislatures and party of state legislature.

	Party of senator			
Control of state legislature	Democratic	Other	Republican	Total
Democratic	258	1	3	262
Mixed	40	11	41	92
Republican	7	1	350	358
Total	305	13	394	553

Note: Data analyzed here includes virtually all U.S. Senate elections from 1871 to 1913.

$\chi^2 = 654.8$, $p < .0005$

Table 4. Relationship between state legislative partisanship and votes for senatorial candidates.

	Democrats			Republicans	
State	Corr.	Diff.		Corr.	Diff.
Alabama	.39	.08		.88	.16
Arizona	--	.16		--	--
Arkansas	.33	.19		.38	.09
Colorado	.78	.11		.58	.20
Connecticut	.89	.04		.95	.05
Illinois	.37	.08		.43	.08
Indiana	1.00	.02		.93	.07
Iowa	.95	.02		.96	.02
Kentucky	.00	.19		.67	.09
Maine	.76	.05		.98	.02
Massachusetts	.83	.03		.64	.10
Michigan	.64	.06		.96	.03
Mississippi	.91	.07		.93	.11
New Hampshire	.97	.03		.97	.02
New York	.96	.02		.75	.07
South Carolina	.82	.06		.94	.08
Texas	.09	.12		.96	.06
Utah	.98	.02		.98	.02
Vermont	.65	.03		.82	.05
Virginia	.95	.03		.71	.07
West Virginia	.99	.03		.98	.06
Wisconsin	.43	.08		.66	.11
Wyoming	.93	.04		.58	.09

Table 5. Number of candidates receiving votes for U.S. Senate, by party and chamber, 1871—1913.

			Democrats						Republicans					
			House			Senate			House			Senate		
State	Election year	Seat starting year	Total votes	# cands. getting votes	Effective number of candidates	Total votes	# cands. getting votes	Effective number of candidates	Total votes	# cands. getting votes	Effective number of candidates	Total votes	# cands. getting votes	Effective number of candidates
Alabama	1876	1877	83	3	1.21	32	2	1.28	–	–	–	–	–	–
	1878	1879	85	3	1.05	28	1	1.00	–	–	–	–	–	–
	1882	1883	79	2	1.05	28	2	1.15	–	–	–	–	–	–
	1884	1885	m	m	m	26	2	1.08	–	–	–	–	–	–
	1888	1889	81	1	1.00	25	1	1.00	–	–	–	–	–	–
	1890	1891	91	4	3.36	32	4	3.41	–	–	–	–	–	–
	1894	1895	59	2	1.03	20	1	1.00	–	–	–	–	–	–
	1900	1901	81	1	1.00	27	1	1.00	–	–	–	–	–	–
	1903	1903	86	1	1.00	32	1	1.00	–	–	–	–	–	–
	1907	1907	92	1	1.00	30	1	1.00	–	–	–	–	–	–
	1907	1909	91	1	1.00	30	1	1.00	–	–	–	–	–	–
	1907	1909S	75	1	1.00	m	m	m	–	–	–	–	–	–
	1911	1913	88	1	1.00	30	1	1.00	–	–	–	–	–	–
Connecticut	1881	1881	69	2	1.06	4	1	1.00	156	2	1.01	16	1.00	1.00
	1885	1885	75	2	1.20	7	1	1.00	148	2	1.11	15	1.00	1.00
	1887	1887	98	2	1.02	10	1	1.00	128	1	1.00	12	1.00	1.00
	1891	1891	112	13	6.39	17	1	1.00	131	1	1.00	7	1.00	1.00
	1893	1893	101	2	1.04	11	1	1.00	124	3	1.05	11	1.00	1.00
	1897	1897	11	1	1.00	0	-	-	141	1	1.00	24	1.00	1.00
	1899	1899	51	1	1.00	1	1	1.00	156	2	1.01	19	1.00	1.00
	1903	1903	52	4	1.32	6	1	1.00	168	3	1.02	18	1.00	1.00
	1905	1905	30	1	1.00	5	1	1.00	199	2	1.01	27	1.00	1.00
	1909	1909	41	2	1.05	2	1	1.00	190	2	1.16	31	1.00	1.00
	1911	1911	95	2	1.16	m	m	m	146	2	1.01	m	m	M
Illinois	1883	1883	73	2	1.03	20	1.00	1.00	77	2	1.05	30	1	1.00

			Democrats						Republicans					
			House			Senate			House			Senate		
State	Election year	Seat starting year	Total votes	# cands. getting votes	Effective number of candidates	Total votes	# cands. getting votes	Effective number of candidates	Total votes	# cands. getting votes	Effective number of candidates	Total votes	# cands. getting votes	Effective number of candidates
	1885	1885	44	2	1.05	m	m	m	1 (B)	-	-	m	m	M
	1887	1885S	60	2	1.14	17	2	1.12	78	2	1.14	32	1	1.00
	1889	1889	69	2	1.09	13	1	1.00	78	2	1.08	35	1	1.00
	1891	1891	m	m	m	23	1.00	1.00	m	m	m	27	1	1.00
	1895	1895	m	m	m	12	1	1.00	m	m	m	32	1	1.00
	1897	1897	54	1	1.00	11	1	1.00	12	8	4.50	8	8	8.00
	1901	1901	m	m	m	18	1	1.00	m	m	m	31	1	1.00
	1903	1903	61	1	1.00	12	1	1.00	88	2	1.02	36	1	1.06
	1907	1907	57	2	1.04	8	2	1.28	86	3	1.07	42	1	1.00
	1913	1909S	56	8	1.30	24	7	3.31	49	5	1.35	24	2	1.99
	1913	1913	67	1	1.00	24	1	1.00	49	1	1.00	24	2	1.09
Indiana	1875	1875	52	2	1.12	23	2.00	1.09	29	3	1.33	24	3.00	2.07
	1879	1873S	50	1	1.00	23	1.00	1.00	37	2	1.06	22	1.00	1.00
	1879	1879	50	1	1.00	23	1.00	1.00	37	1	1.00	22	1.00	1.00
	1881	1881	39	1	1.00	24	2.00	1.09	57	1	1.00	22	1.00	1.00
	1885	1885	63	1	1.00	30	1.00	1.00	35	1	1.00	16	1.00	1.00
	1887	1887	44	2	1.05	31	1.00	1.00	56	2	1.11	18	1.00	1.00
	1891	1891	72	1	1.00	35	1.00	1.00	25	1	1.00	15	1.00	1.00
	1893	1893	60	1	1.00	35	1.00	1.00	35	1	1.00	13	1.00	1.00
	1897	1897	43	3	1.10	17	2.00	1.12	50	1	1.00	30	1.00	1.00
	1899	1899	37	1	1.00	20	2.00	1.10	58	1	1.00	27	1.00	1.00
	1903	1903	30	1	1.00	13	1.00	1.00	67	2	1.03	35	1.00	1.00
	1905	1903S	18	1	1.00	12	1.00	1.00	80	2	1.03	36	1.00	1.00
	1905	1905	18	1	1.00	12	1.00	1.00	80	2	1.03	36	1.00	1.00
	1909	1909	61	2	1.03	23	1.00	1.00	39	1	1.00	27	1.00	1.00
	1911	1911	60	1	1.00	30	1.00	1.00	40	1	1.00	20	1.00	1.00
Iowa	1876	1877	2	2	2.00	7	1	1.00	14	1	1.00			

			Democrats						Republicans					
			House			Senate			House			Senate		
State	Election year	Seat starting year	Total votes	# cands. getting votes	Effective number of candidates	Total votes	# cands. getting votes	Effective number of candidates	Total votes	# cands. getting votes	Effective number of candidates	Total votes	# cands. getting votes	Effective number of candidates
	1878	1879	22	1	1.00	12	1	1.00	65	1	1.00	34	1	1.00
	1882	1877S	19	2	1.11	2	1	1.00	65	1	1.00	41	1	1.00
	1882	1883	20	2	1.10	2	1	1.00	65	1	1.00	41	1	1.00
	1884	1885	41	2	1.21	11	2	1.20	49	1	1.00	38	1	1.00
	1888	1889	27	2	1.16	11	1	1.00	56	3	1.07	29	1	1.00
	1890	1891	45	2	1.14	20	1	1.00	50	2	1.04	27	1	1.00
	1894	1895	18	2	1.12	m	m	m	75	1	1.00	m	m	m
	1900	1901	17	1	1.00	12	1	1.00	77	1	1.00	35	2	1.12
	1902	1901S	16	2	1.13	10	1	1.00	82	2	1.02	35	1	1.00
	1902	1903	16	2	1.13	10	1	1.00	81	2	1.02	35	1	1.00
	1907	1907	33	2	1.13	15	2	1.14	72	1	1.00	34	1	1.00
	1909	1909	24	1	1.00	15	2	1.14	77	1	1.00	33	1	1.00
	1913	1913	39	1	1.00	18	1	1.00	63	1	1.00	29	1	1.00
Kentucky	1872	1873	34	1	1.00	m	m	m	3	1	1.00	m	m	m
	1876	1877	87	5	3.90	34	5	3.46	10	1	1.00	3	1	1.00
	1878	1879	84	3	2.75	37	3	2.82	14	2	1.15	1	1	1.00
	1881	1883	68	1	1.00	28	1	1.00	19	1	1.00	9	2	1.25
	1884	1885	85	4	3.10	33	3	2.98	8	3	1.68	0	-	-
	1888	1889	64	1	1.00	29	2	1.07	21	3	1.34	5	1	1.00
	1890	1889S	68	26	13.29	24	16	11.08	5	1	1.00	4	3	2.67
	1890	1891	61	1	1.00	18	1	1.00	7	1	1.00	3	1	1.00
	1894	1895	1	1	1.00	4	1	1.00	1	1	1.00	0	-	-
	1896	1897	7	1	1.00	m	m	m	2	1	1.00	m	m	m
	1900	1901	55	1	1.00	22	1	1.00	40	1	1.00	12	1	1.00
	1902	1903	72	2	1.03	23	1	1.00	22	1	1.00	11	1	1.00
	1906	1907	68	1	1.00	29	1	1.00	25	2	1.08	6	2	1.38
	1908	1909	47	2	1.04	20	4	1.37	48	1	1.00	14	1	1.00
	1912	1913	74	2	1.03	26	1	1.00	24	2	1.09	3	1	1.00

			Democrats						Republicans					
			House			Senate			House			Senate		
State	Election year	Seat starting year	Total votes	# cands. getting votes	Effective number of candidates	Total votes	# cands. getting votes	Effective number of candidates	Total votes	# cands. getting votes	Effective number of candidates	Total votes	# cands. getting votes	Effective number of candidates
Massachusetts	1871	1871	32	4	1.48	4	1	1.00	182	3	1.07	33	1	1.00
	1875	1875	74	3	1.21	14	1	1.00	142	7	2.23	25	4	1.78
	1877	1877	55	2	1.04	7	1	1.00	177	9	2.66	33	3	2.43
	1881	1881	m	m	m	3	1	1.00	m	m	m	34	1	1.00
	1887	1887	74	4	1.09	m	m	m	150	4	2.92	m	m	M
	1889	1889	52	1	1.00	5	1	1.00	163	1	1.00	28	1	1.00
	1893	1893	m	m	m	9	1	1.00	m	m	m	29	1	1.00
	1895	1895	m	m	m	4	1	1.00	m	m	m	34	1	1.00
	1899	1899	62	1	1.00	7	1	1.00	154	2	1.01	31	1	1.00
	1901	1901	m	m	m	9	2	1.25	m	m	m	28	1	1.00
	1905	1901S	m	m	m	6	1	1.00	m	m	m	33	2	1.06
	1905	1905	65	1	1.00	6	1	1.00	162	2	1.01	33	1	1.00
	1907	1907	m	m	m	10	5	3.13	m	m	m	27	1	1.00
	1911	1911	m	m	m	14	1	1.00	m	m	m	26	2	1.17
	1913	1913	m	m	m	13	3	1.37	m	m	m	24	1	1.00
New Hampshire	1885	1885	118	2	1.09	m	m	m	175	3	1.04	m	m	M
	1887	1883S	134	2	1.06	m	m	m	164	2	1.06	m	m	M
	1891	1891	157	3	1.05	m	m	m	184	2	1.11	m	m	m
	1895	1895	77	2	1.03	1	1	1.00	244	3	1.02	18	1	1.00
	1897	1897	58	2	1.19	2	1	1.00	259	1	1.00	21	1	1.00
	1901	1901	84	2	1.02	1	1	1.00	276	1	1.00	21	1	1.00
	1903	1903	120	2	1.09	2	1	1.00	217	2	1.01	16	1	1.00
	1907	1907	115	3	1.04	6	1	1.00	235	2	1.03	18	1	1.00
	1909	1909	104	2	1.02	4	1	1.00	238	2	1.01	18	1	1.00
	1913	1913	m	m	m	13	3	1.37	m	m	m	9	2	1.80
New York	1873	1873	27	2	1.08	5	1	1.00	91	1	1.00	22	3	1.20

			Democrats						Republicans					
			House			Senate			House			Senate		
State	Election year	Seat starting year	Total votes	# cands. getting votes	Effective number of candidates	Total votes	# cands. getting votes	Effective number of candidates	Total votes	# cands. getting votes	Effective number of candidates	Total votes	# cands. getting votes	Effective number of candidates
	1875	1875	68	1	1.00	13	2	1.17	53	2	1.04	17	1	1.00
	1879	1879	20	1	1.00	12	1	1.00	96	2	1.04	19	1	1.00
	1881	1881	44	1	1.00	6	1	1.00	78	1	1.00	25	1	1.00
	1881	1879S	47	1	1.00	7	2	1.32	78	19	6.22	25	6	4.50
	1881	1881S	47	1	1.00	7	1	1.00	78	15	7.21	25	9	4.84
	1885	1885	51	1	1.00	12	1	1.00	74	2	1.03	19	1	1.00
	1887	1887	41	1	1.00	11	1	1.00	68	3	2.57	20	3	2.20
	1891	1891	65	1	1.00	13	1	1.00	57	1	1.00	19	1	1.00
	1893	1893	71	1	1.00	15	1	1.00	52	1	1.00	13	2	1.17
	1897	1897	34	3	1.20	13	2	1.35	110	1	1.00	35	1	1.00
	1899	1899	58	1	1.00	23	1	1.00	84	2	1.02	26	1	1.00
	1903	1903	56	1	1.00	21	2	1.21	85	1	1.00	28	3	1.45
	1905	1905	44	1	1.00	12	1	1.00	99	1	1.00	35	1	1.00
	1909	1909	31	2	1.07	14	1	1.00	89	1	1.00	35	1	1.00
	1911	1911	87	6	1.67	30	5	1.42	59	1	1.00	20	1	1.00
South Carolina	1901	1901	109	2	1.02	30	1	1.00	0	-	-	0	-	-
	1903	1903	108	1	1.00	35	1	1.00	0	-	-	0	-	-
	1907	1907	113	1	1.00	37	1	1.00	0	-	-	0	-	-
	1909	1909	113	1	1.00	38	1	1.00	0	-	-	0	-	-
	1913	1913	114	1	1.00	37	1	1.00	0	-	-	0	-	-
Vermont	1878	1879	42	3	1.21	1	1	1.00	164	3	1.12	28	3	1.16
	1880	1881	16	1	1.00	0	-	-	199	1	1.00	28	1	1.00
	1884	1885	25	2	1.47	2	1	1.00	174	5	1.10	28	2	1.07
	1886	1887	29	2	1.15	1	1	1.00	202	2	1.08	29	1	1.00
	1890	1891	57	2	1.07	1	1	1.00	158	1	1.00	25	1	1.00
	1892	1887S	35	2	1.06	0	-	-	189	2	1.01	28	1	1.00
	1892	1893	35	2	1.06	0	-	-	190	2	1.01	28	1	1.00

			Democrats						Republicans					
			House			Senate			House			Senate		
State	Election year	Seat starting year	Total votes	# cands. getting votes	Effective number of candidates	Total votes	# cands. getting votes	Effective number of candidates	Total votes	# cands. getting votes	Effective number of candidates	Total votes	# cands. getting votes	Effective number of candidates
	1896	1897	15	1	1.00	0	-	-	212	2	1.01	30	1	1.00
	1898	1899	37	2	1.06	0	-	-	178	2	1.02	30	1	1.00
	1902	1903	46	2	1.29	4	1	1.00	164	1	1.00	24	1	1.00
	1904	1905	29	2	1.23	0	-	-	196	1	1.00	30	1	1.00
	1908	1905S	33	2	1.13	2	1	1.00	190	2	1.04	27	1	1.00
	1908	1909	36	2	1.12	2	1	1.00	194	2	1.01	27	1	1.00
	1910	1911	44	1	1.00	0	-	-	176	3	1.02	29	1	1.00
Wisconsin	1873	1873	26	2	1.08	8	1	1.00	61	2	1.07	19	1	1.00
	1879	1879	24	3	1.29	8	1	1.00	62	7	3.74	23	5	3.02
	1881	1881	20	1	1.00	9	2	1.25	75	3	1.06	23	1	1.00
	1885	1885	33	1	1.00	11	1	1.00	54	1	1.00	17	1	1.00
	1887	1887	27	1	1.00	5	1	1.00	55	1	1.00	25	1	1.00
	1891	1891	63	1	1.00	15	1	1.00	31	1	1.00	14	1	1.00
	1893	1893	50	47	44.64	25	25	25.00	42	1	1.00	7	1	1.00
	1897	1897	5	1	1.00	2	2	2.00	88	1	1.00	28	1	1.00
	1899	1899	17	1	1.00	2	1	1.00	79	5	4.18	31	5	3.77
	1903	1903	23	1	1.00	6	1	1.00	73	1	1.00	60	1	1.00
	1905	1905	12	2	1.18	m	m	m	78	1	1.00	m	m	M
	1909	1909	15	1	1.00	m	m	m	64	5	1.17	m	m	m
Wyoming	1895	1893S	2	1	1.00	4	2	1.60	33	1	1.00	14	1	1.00
	1895	1895	2	1	1.00	3	1	1.00	33	1	1.00	14	1	1.00
	1901	1901	2	1	1.00	1	1	1.00	36	2	1.12	18	1	1.00
	1905	1905	2	1	1.00	4	1	1.00	45	2	1.05	19	1	1.00
	1907	1907	5	1	1.00	m	m	m	44	1	1.00	m	m	m
	1911	1911	27	1	1.00	7	1	1.00	28	1	1.00	17	1	1.00

m = data missing at present
B = Boycott of vote

Table 6. Democratic caucus vote for Senator *vs*. first ballot vote for Senator, 1911.

a. House

Caucus:	A.B. Parker	D. Cady Herrick	E.M. Shepard	Martin Littleton	William F. Sheehan	Total
Absent	6	1	12	1	1	21
Herrick	0	0	0	0	5	5
Sheehan	0	0	0	0	46	46
Shepard	0	0	0	0	14	14
Total	6	1	12	1	66	86

b. Senate

Caucus:	D. Cady Herrick	Edward M. Shepard	James W. Gerard	Martin L. Littleton	William F. Sheehan	Total
Absent	1	2	1	1	0	5
Herrick	0	0	0	0	2	2
Sheehan	0	0	0	0	16	16
Shepard	0	0	0	0	7	7
Total	1	2	1	1	25	30

Source: New York House and Senate Journals; New York Times 1/17/1911, p. 1