Daniel Greco - Papers

Work in Progress

Much of my current research concerns the topic of epistemic level-bridging principles, e.g., the principle that knowing that P entails knowing that one knows that P (often called the "KK" principle), or the principle that having good reason to believe that P entails having good reason to believe that one has good reason to believe that P. While principles like these were once taken for granted, in recent decades they have come under attack. I argue, however, that the defender of level-bridging principles has more resources available than has yet been appreciated. In particular, epistemic contextualism and epistemic expressivism—two epistemological views that have been discussed a great deal in the recent literature, but never in connection with the topic of epistemic levels—can both be used to defend level-bridging principles against otherwise persuasive objections.

Published and Forthcoming Papers

The Impossibility of Skepticism (Forthcoming in The Philosophical Review)

Abstract
Epistemologists and philosophers of mind both ask questions about belief. Epistemologists ask normative questions about belief—which beliefs ought we have? Philosophers of mind ask metaphysical questions about belief—what are beliefs, and what does it take to have them? While these issues might seem independent of one another, there is potential for an interesting sort of conflict: the epistemologist might think we ought to have beliefs that, according to the philosopher of mind, it is impossible to have. In this paper, I argue that this conflict does arise, and that it creates problems for traditional skeptical views in epistemology. In particular, I will argue that on certain popular views about the nature of belief, it is impossible to adopt the near-global agnosticism recommended by the skeptical epistemologist. On other plausible views, it is only possible in special circumstances, and this limitation undermines skeptical epistemological claims. The only views about the nature of belief on which there are no metaphysical hurdles to adopting the agnosticism recommended by the skeptic are views that face powerful objections—objections that are completely independent of anti-skeptical epistemological considerations.

Probability and Prodigality (Forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 4)

Abstract
I present a straightforward objection to the view that what we know has epistemic probability 1: when combined with orthodox decision theory, the view seems to entail implausible conclusions concerning rational choice. I consider and reject three responses. The first holds that the fault is with decision theory, rather than the view that knowledge has probability 1. The second two try to reconcile the claim that knowledge has probability 1 with decision theory by appealing to contextualism and sensitive invariantism, respectively. I argue that each response fails, and that we can hold on to much of what was attractive in the responses while denying that what we know has probability 1.

Significance Testing in Theory and Practice, in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2011, 62(3): 607-637

Abstract
Frequentism and Bayesianism represent very different approaches to hypothesis testing, and this presents a skeptical challenge for Bayesians. Given that most empirical research uses frequentist methods, why (if at all) should we rely on it? While it is well known that there are conditions under which Bayesian and frequentist methods agree, without some reason to think these conditions are typically met, the Bayesian hasn't shown why we are usually safe in relying on results reported by significance testers. In this article, I provide arguments that such conditions will usually be met; the Bayesian can maintain her theoretical disagreement with the frequentist while holding that her error is mostly harmless in practice.

In Preparation

Fine Tuning (with Roger White, in preparation for the Stanford Enyclopedia of Philosophy)

Contact

Daniel Greco
MIT, Dept of Linguistics and Philosophy
77 Mass Ave, 32-d808
Cambridge, MA 02139

dlgreco@mit.edu