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responding to disaster: trauma, recovery and remembrance

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EDITORIAL:
ON TRAUMA, RECOVERY AND REMEMBRANCE

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In a world of real and imagined danger in which we find ourselves, the process of trauma, recovery and remembrance has taken on new significance. While we do not address the events of September 11th 2001 directly, this volume of *Projections* certainly has its genesis in the struggle we have faced to rebuild, personally and professionally, in the months and years following that tragic morning. For me, the struggle to cope with disaster recovery began earlier, following my visit to Sarajevo in 2000 where I was part of a group re-designing the government center after its 1992-95 siege. Five years after the war ended, the scars of conflict were immediately present (Fig. 1): buildings toppled, areas land-mined, growing squatter settlements and thousands of simple white sticks dotting the landscape, marking the resting place of the city's defenders.

Figure 1. THE OSLOBODENJE NEWSPAPER BUILDING.
Source: SFOR Archives.

The buildings and streets spoke of their hardship, pock-marked by the effects of three-and-a-half years of artillery fire. For those living within this battleground, as in all places recovering from disaster, the recovery of Sarajevo was as much a process of healing as it was of re-building.

Each of us has experienced the loss of a loved one at one point or another. Every culture and religion has traditions – rituals, celebrations and monuments – that help us publicly and privately confront feelings of grief and honor the life that was lived. While these traditions are understood when a single person dies, the process to honor, remember and rebuild our lives (emotionally and physically) when a collective disaster strikes are not as apparent. Early efforts to understand disaster recovery have focused on outlining the timelines and typical activities of various stages of recovery: emergency response, restoration, reconstruction, and commemoration (Haas, 1977). Yet, as Vale and Campanella rightly demonstrate, understanding recovery from disaster is not simply about collapsing the intricate details into a reconstruction model, but also about what gets rebuilt and why, who is involved and by what means (Vale and Campanella, 2005). Fortunately, a healthy body of work has begun to emerge that explores these questions more fully, as witnessed by studies about the Oklahoma City bombing (Linenthal, 2001), post Second World War Japan (Hein et al, 2003) and post-partition Berlin (Ladd, 1997) to name a few.

This long-awaited volume of *Projections* attempts to understand trauma, recovery and remembrance when collective disaster occurs. As we have witnessed most recently in the earthquake and subsequent Indian Ocean tsunami on December 26, 2004 – a natural disaster that claimed a quarter million lives – disaster can strike at any time, in any place and with an impact that can destroy entire villages within seconds. We are especially interested in the role that planning and design can have in disaster recovery. As professionals helping people cope with difficult circumstances, we are key players in the recovery process.

As in personal loss, who gets blamed, what participants are involved, and the symbolism of the recovery depend on the place, the time and the nature of the disaster. Clearly, large-scale disasters arise from a variety of causes – natural, accidental, or by human malice. Their effects are varied – sometimes concentrated in one area (as the Mexico City earthquake in 1985) while other times spread across a wide area (as in the Tangshan earthquake of 1976). Often the devastation is measured in lives lost; sometimes damage is measured by its havoc on property or infrastructure. The specific time in history when disasters occur and under what political regime also impacts the nature of the recovery. The symbolic value of the disaster also colors recovery and remembrance, as embodied in current efforts to rebuild Lower Manhattan with expressions of freedom and patriotism.

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As was the case in Sarajevo, recovery is often tied to a larger political discourse about identity. In Sarajevo, all facets of recovery have been influenced by a desire to assert an independent Bosnian–Muslim identity, built upon their own way of life and distinct from the western remnants of their past. On April 5, 1992 the Yugoslav National Army, aided by local Serb terrorists, began encircling the city in an attempt to "cleanse" Bosnian-Muslims. It is commonly said that the violence in Sarajevo was imported from elsewhere. In this city of a half million people, friends and families were intermixed: brothers, aunts, step-sisters reflected the Croat (Roman Catholic), Serb (Eastern Orthodox), and Bosnian Muslim populations that by-and-large co-existed. Efforts to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina into distinct ethnic communities originated largely in the rural areas of the country; Sarajevo, the country's largest city and the confluence of the different groups, was an unwilling target in a war not of their choosing. For 1,395 days, the city was shelled by some 4,000 pieces of artillery each day. Its geography – a narrow, linear city wedged in a valley and stretched along the Miljacka River – made it an easy target. The notorious "Sniper's Alley" adjacent to the government center (Fig. 2) saw the city's central

Figure 2.THE GOVERNMENT COMPLEX ADJACENT TO SNIPER'S ALLEY, 2000.
Source: Author.

Figure 3. SARAJEVO BUILDING TYPES, FROM MODERNIST (TOP) TO OTTOMAN (BOTTOM).
Source: Paul Schlapobersky.

tree-lined boulevard turned into a dangerous no-man's land as the only shelter, the trees, were cut for firewood. By February 26, 1996 when the city was "liberated", the world had watched the deaths of over 10,000 Sarajevans, nearly 2,000 children, slaughtered as they went about their daily lives.

Sarajevo emerged a different place – a place more cognizant of its internal fractured identities. The city itself reads as a timeline from east to west – the Ottoman Bascarsija (Old Town) gives way to the Austro-Hungarian central city which, in turn, becomes the Modernist city of socialist Yugoslavia on the western frontier. The housing types reflected this range (Fig. 3). To the government and University of Sarajevo officials with whom we interacted, our task to design a section adjacent to Sniper's Alley was viewed as an opportunity to re-assert the traditions of Bosnian-Muslim urbanism (Fig. 4). In doing so, we would reject the Austro-Hungarian (Fig. 5) and Modern Socialist (Fig. 6) patterns of urban form that were associated with oppressive regimes of the past. We were escorted through the old *mohallas* (districts) and traditional Ottoman houses, set behind their blank walls and complete with their *selamluk* (male front section of house with its 'public' court) and *haremluk* (female rear section with its 'private' court) – each strictly separated from one another according to religious practice. Even the kamerija (screened room where women could work with a secret view of the street) reflected the way of life that, to us "westerners", placed women in a subservient role relative to the male.

Thus our mandate was to re-build using this low-rise Bosnian-Muslim urban form (that comprised only 5% of the city's area) at the expense of the mid-rise (Austro-Hungarian) apartment blocks (30% of the city) that we see in every European city and the high-rise (Socialist) modern apartment towers (65% of the city). This posed

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Figure 4. OTTOMAN URBAN FABRIC.
Source: Author.

Figure 5. AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN.
Source: Author.

Figure 6. SOCIALIST FABRIC.
Source: Author.

a dilemma for us, both as outsiders and as professionals. First, the traditional two-story courtyard houses were not typical of what the average family could afford; the slopes around Sarajevo were covered with "squatter" settlements that reflected the more modest aspirations and realities of life in the city. Also, these houses were constructed at a density far too low to sustain other public services necessary for the functioning of the city (transit, grocery stores, etc). This is particular true for a land-locked city with a limited area on which to build. Constructing a city of private realms behind blank walls was counter to our western conceptions of "public" space which placed permeability (ground-floor shops?) as a desirable characteristic. Moreover, to design new housing types that entrenched a woman's subservient role seemed to us troublesome. Then there was the question of selectively honoring part of a city's past (and culture) while ignoring all others in a city that only a few years earlier was a healthy multicultural city. Thus our role was paradoxical: we had the urban design expertise that the Sarajevans desired, but not the cultural sensitivities necessary to make it a truly "made-in-Sarajevo" plan. The politics of reconstruction would very much determine how, what and by what means the city would be re-born.

My experience in Sarajevo highlights some of the difficult questions faced when re-building after disaster. We even call into question the traditional definition of disaster when we label Sarajevo as such (disaster: that which causes sudden, unexpected and violent change with attending distress). Sarajevo was certainly violent and caused distress, but the near four-year siege of the city, documented

each night on the evening news could hardly be qualified as sudden or unexpected. In this volume of *Projections*, we frame disaster very broadly, examining very different kinds of disaster and how trauma, recovery and remembrance are framed in each.

In "From Pathologist to Social Reformer," Esther Charlesworth begins by framing the traditional roles which planners and designers have often taken in post-disaster recovery. Citing the cases of Beirut, Mostar and Nicosia, she proposes that the role of design professionals should be re-cast as "city mediator", negotiating the urban politics that lie between expectations, process and product. We then examine three cases that test the ability of planners and design professionals to act as mediator: the 1999 shootings at Columbine High School, the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, and the 1931 earthquake in Napier, New Zealand.

In "Innocents and Monsters", Jessica Katz examines the 1999 tragic killing of thirteen teachers and students by two troubled teens at Columbine High School in Littleton Colorado. Katz examines how the various narratives of the event, as portrayed in the media, impacted recovery and remembrance. A confluence of events and its proximity to a major media center positioned Littleton as a cultural icon, symptomatic of the larger ills of modern society. From gun control laws, child-rearing, the entertainment industry and suburban lifestyle more generally, Littleton forced ordinary Americans to re-think the ideals of the post-war period. Recovery from the event oscillated between the national and the local, struggling to determine whether the perpetrators (and teens more generally) were innocents in a world gone wrong or monsters to be feared and controlled.

Thrust back into public consciousness by the 2004 film "Hotel Rwanda", Hope Fang's "Recovery, Remembrance and Growth" examines the impact of the 1994 genocide on the country's urban areas, particularly the capital Kigali. Fang demonstrates how the crisis and its aftermath have re-shaped urban/village policy as it struggles to cope with the human toll caused by mass migration. Through first-hand accounts, Fang illustrates the role of international agencies on the recovery efforts in the war-torn countries in sub-Saharan Africa.

Elizabeth Aitken-Rose tells the story of a more prototypical disaster, by examining the fascinating rise and fall of Napier, New Zealand following the earthquake and subsequent fires of 1931. Napier demonstrates how the disaster gave the opportunity for innovations in both the physical reconstruction of the city (planning, Art Deco architecture, infrastructure), but also fostered social changes (government reforms, community engagement and leadership). Napier highlights the inherent tension between restoring a damaged city to its former self and using the tragedy as a progressive social agenda.

Collectively, the articles serve to highlight the various ways that recovery and remembrance are played out following different kinds of urban trauma. As we are currently witnessing with Lower Manhattan, the process to find ways to collectively discover new traditions to deal with our losses depends very much on the narrative of the event, who is involved in the recovery and the relative weight that each participant is given. As planners and design professionals, these are questions that we face every day in helping communities grow given other, less apparent, forms of "disaster" (segregation, gentrification, crime, poverty, etc). While disasters have largely been looked upon as anomalies from some 'normal' condition, it is incumbent upon us to realize that while the cataclysmic events capture the global spotlight, every city and town has its story of trauma and its own way of recovering from and remembering that event.

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FROM PATHOLOGIST TO SOCIAL REFORMER: THE ROLE OF DESIGN PROFESSIONALS IN WAR-DIVIDED CITIES

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ABSTRACT

This article examines the multiple roles of design professionals (which here includes architects, planners, urban designers and landscape architects) in the reconstruction of a range of war-divided cities, and the potential for designers to assist peace-making efforts in the period immediately after conflict. The aim of this examination is to propose a planning and design framework to effectively respond in future cities destroyed and partitioned by war and civil conflict. My investigations highlight the limitations of traditional design practice in post war reconstruction and argues that such practices: (1) are detrimental to the quality of the urban environment and to those living in still polarised cities; (2) limit architectural contributions to the larger and longer-term peace-building process, and (3) deny cities and their people access to the design expertise that may help redress post-conflict, social, economic and spatial divisions. I argue that by re-focusing the design profession upon ethical rather than purely aesthetic concerns, we can establish an effective platform from which architectural and planning professionals can contribute to the reconstruction of the increasing number of cities polarised by ethnic and economic conflict.

Dedicated to a great reconstructionist, Rafiq Hariri, ex-Prime Minister of Lebanon, killed 14.02.05

In tragedy is opportunity; we can come to positively restructure our personal selves not only as individuals but also as groups comprising individuals. Opportunity is not the excuse for tragedy, disaster and war, any more than is war's advancement of science and technology, but war in its various guises has perhaps for some to be accepted as continuing or recurrent reality, in the same way as are accidents and disasters in all societies (Stewart, 1991).

INTRODUCTION

This paper focuses on how design professionals may play more effective roles in cities divided by war.[1] Divided cities, within my research,[2] can be defined as extremely polarized post-war centers (for example Beirut, Nicosia, Jerusalem and Mostar), which have been separated by an actual physical barrier such as a road, boulevard or "Green Line", during a period of sustained ethnic conflict. These barriers often remain as strong psychological barriers after hostilities have ceased and serve as a way of separating the previously warring parties. This paper specifically examines the potential for design professionals to assist peace-making efforts in the period immediately after conflict, when partition lines demarcate the boundaries of each warring territory and each party tries to consolidate its shift into its (former) enemy's space. Once an initial political consensus is reached (and there is rarely any point in talking about connection before at least a minimal consensus is reached) then the buffer zone along the partition lines becomes the area or zone with the most potential for connections.[3]

My investigation is a response to the dilemma presented when we examine the roles played by professionals and non-professionals in alleviating the chronic human and physical suffering caused by the alarming acceleration of urban conflict; the doctors, lawyers, and engineers are there, but where are the architects and urban planners? In the aftermath of war, where is the intersection between reconstructing the physical landscape and reconstituting civil society? My journey across many cities partitioned by ethnic, political and social conflict leads to a clarification of five roles that design professionals have and could play in the aftermath of war.

Before introducing the three case studies of Beirut, Nicosia and Mostar, it may be useful to reflect on the professional delineations between architects, urban designers and planners. While I argue for collaboration between not only 'design professionals' and the people affected by their reconstruction, there can often be clash also between the design professionals themselves.

THE ARCHITECT

An "architect" is defined in the Macquarie Dictionary (1981) firstly as "one whose profession is to design buildings and superintend their construction"; and, secondly as "the deviser, maker, or creator of anything", and "the art or science of building, including plan, design, construction and decorative treatment". Thus, the term "architecture" connotes the practical act of producing an actual building. However, it also suggests the broader acts of thinking, creating and implementing within a structured intellectual framework. However, unlike the engineering and medical disciplines, which draw authority from the state and the legal protection associated with it, the architectural profession and its ethical authority rests on the often contradictory base of the architect as artist against the architect as technician.

THE PLANNER

How is urban planning defined and what are planners' core skills and knowledge? Or as Healey (1995) asks: "How do I do planning, or what do I know"? (p. 7). Oren Yiftachel, an Israeli planner, provides one of the most succinct and optimistic definitions of planning as related to the broader objectives of this paper. He points out that planning can be used to "reduce inequalities, open gates, level walls, permit free and non-hierarchical relations among the residents of a city" (Yiftachel, 1995:217). In this way, Yiftachel sees planning policies such as the physical rearrangements and restructuring of cities, as helping achieve a civil society, "attacking walls of domination, walls of confinement" (p. 217).

THE URBAN DESIGNER

Urban designers are often called "planners" by architects and "architects" by planners. This semantic but revealing cultural bias in these professions suggests that there is a considerable identity crisis in the field of urban design as Rowley suggests: "the difficulties over definition are compounded by the fact that the constituent words urban and design are themselves so slippery and problematic" (Rowley, 1994). In this paper, the major defining feature of an "urban design" rather than "architectural" approach is that it concentrates more on issues of linkage, context, and interstitial spaces than the building of one-off "objects". Thus, the practice of urban design deals with long-term incremental growth and decision-making that, like the post-war environment, is often politically complex and highly contested by competing ethnic groups.

It is at the intersection of the three professions of architecture, planning

and urban design, that the most effective approaches to post-war reconstruction can thus begin. The architect deals with the specific manifestations of agreed urban strategies in consultation with local architectural expertise; the planner helps to navigate the roadmap through the political process and finally, the urban designer claims a common ground, between physical reconstruction and actual community needs.

THREE SNAPSHOTS: BEIRUT, NICOSIA AND MOSTAR

The three divided city case studies to which I refer illustrate different ways in which war can divide a city, historically as well as physically, as well as the range of design approaches that may be used to deal with post-partition fractures. They include:

> 1. Beirut, capital of Lebanon. The sectarian division of the city over hundreds of years into Christian (east) and Muslim (west) enclaves resulted in a Green Line or Ligne de Démarcation (Line of Demarcation) which intensified as a barrier during 15 years of civil war from 1975 to 1990. Since the war ended, reconstruction has focused primarily on the downtown or "Centre Ville" area of Beirut and has been managed by a private development corporation, Solidere.

> 2. Nicosia, capital of Cyprus. A Green Line or the Attila Line was drawn across a map of Cyprus in 1963 to separate its feuding Greek and Turkish populations. The Nicosia Master Plan (funded by the UNDP) has guided limited reconstruction in the Turkish and Cypriot sectors of the Nicosia since 1985.

> 3. Mostar, Bosnia. This largely integrated city was split into east-west (Muslim-Croatian) ethic enclaves, separated by the Boulevard or Bulevar Narodne Revolucije during the years of war between 1992 and 1995. Despite substantial international assistance from agencies such as the World Bank, the World Monuments Fund and the Aga Khan Trust for Culture, Mostar remains divided, although many heritage buildings in Mostar's old city core and the sixteenth century Stari-Most Bridge are being restored.

My research is based upon a series of semi-structured interviews that were conducted with thirty-five senior architects, urban designers, politicians and social commentators in Beirut, Nicosia and Mostar between 2000 and 2004.[4] Questions that were asked included: What were the goals of reconstruction? Who contributed to the urban planning process? Under whose direction or control? What change took place?

When? Where? Why? What was the institutional response? What was the success or impact of that response? The analysis of this interview data revealed that design professionals might play any one of five roles in post-conflict reconstruction. These roles include the designer as: Pathologist, Hero, Historicist, Colonialist and Social Reformer, and as mentioned above, I will examine how they were played out in Beirut, Nicosia, Mostar, (with fleeting references to Jerusalem and Berlin). The five roles are analyzed in the first major section of this paper. In the second, the positive aspects of these roles are synthesized into a framework of three principles that might guide future work of design professionals in the post-war reconstruction of cities.

FIVE RECONSTRUCTION ROLES

Role I: Design Professionals as Pathologists

The planner should be able to distinguish between sick spaces and spaces linked to mental and social health which are generators of the health. As a physician of space, he should have the capacity to conceive of a harmonious social space (Léfebvre, 1996:152).

As pathologists, design professionals seek to diagnose the divided city and prescribe the right "medicine" in the aftermath of sustained civil conflict. This role can suit post-war reconstruction goals of domestic peace, economic restructuring, and recapture of lost investment

Table 1. FIVE ROLES FOR DESIGNERS IN WAR-DIVIDED CITIES

Roles	Metaphors	Outcomes	Case Study
Pathologists	Design professionals as physicians of space. City as body- Reconstruction as surgery.	Incremental master planning and radical urban "surgery".	Beirut
Heroes	Design professionals as messiahs, gods.	Architectural monuments, Utopian cities and buildings as objet's d'art.	Beirut, Berlin
Historicists	Design professionals as conservationists and nostalgists.	Reproduction-Facsimile architecture	Mostar, Berlin
Colonialists	Design professionals as imperialists.	Foreign visions "implanted" onto urban form, we know what is best for you	Beirut, Jerusalem
Social Reformers	Design professionals as peace builders and political actors within larger policy framework.	Design and planning are a public act based upon wide public consultation to address social integration as well as physical rehabilitation problems.	Nicosia, Jerusalem Berlin

Figure 1. BEIRUT.
Source: Author.

and tourist dollars. Lebanese writer Makdisi (1990), for example, has analyzed the way Beirut's privatized planning agency, Solidere, presents itself as a "healing agency", operating to help the city recover from its multiple afflictions. In practicing architectural surgery, design professionals see themselves as facilitators of control and order and as curers of pathological diseases who cut out the diseased cells. For example, one of the design professionals in Beirut who was interviewed for this study described the eviction of lower income residents to make way for new residential projects in the city as, "cutting out the cancers" and "correcting the wrong cells".[5] Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri discussed the 'heart-body' metaphor of Beirut's reconstruction in suggesting that mending of the heart of Beirut, Centre Ville, was critical to the functioning of the whole country, that is, its 'body'.[6]

As pathologists, the architect, planner and other design professionals can play a critical role, but may often miss valuable opportunities. As Sarkis (1994) wrote of design professionals in Beirut:

> The urban designer is given charge, then remembering and accordingly rebuilding Beirut. Regrettably he is unaware of the meaningful slippages that might occur between what he remembers and what he forgets (p. 89).

In a similar vein, Khalaf (1993) argues that the Solidere process has sought "to establish a stable heartbeat within the city without too much knowledge of the past trauma itself". However, he notes that this situation has contributed to a collective post-war amnesia, if not

selective memory, and a pervasive mood of lethargy, indifference, and weariness among many citizens. Thus, a problem with the pathologist's role is that 'medical' conditions may persist after the so-called 'surgery' of reconstruction if people with a memory of prior events are not involved in the planning and decision making process.

While medical analogies for design professionals provide for convenient metaphors, Till (1997) suggests that, in fact, during the process of urban surgery, design professionals should also consider playing the part of the caring supportive nurse, rather than the prescriptive, know-it-all doctor. He remarks, "Society is telling us quite clearly through its economic rewards and cultural identification – nurses. I do not see that at all as a position of weakness, extending the analogy further than it deserves, the actions of nurses are humanly conditioned, socially embedded but also remarkably tough" (p. 111).

The humane diagnosis of the reconstruction problem is thus a critical but commonly overlooked one. In light of accelerating global conflict, Orner (1988:83) goes as far to suggest, "There seems to be a strong case to make that post-war settlement reconstruction now may lay the seed of future terrorism, but equally be the most single important contribution towards its prevention. That is how important it is and how important it is to get it right".

Role II: Design Professionals as Heroes

> Within this well-worn perspective, the architect perceives and imagines himself as an architect of the world, human image of the god creator (Watson and Bridge, 1995).

The contemporary concept of the designer as "hero" largely results from the celebrity ranking system that operates within the international design community. In this elite hierarchy, we see much continual glorification by the profession and the press of individual design professionals such as Frank Gehry, Rem Koolhaus, Daniel Liebskind and Peter Eisenman.[7]

Linked to this hero model is the supporting role of the architect as an independent artist and creative genius, who sullies his profession in any act of artistic compromise. Heroism and artistry are, however, much harder to achieve in the complex and fragmented political settings of post-conflict reconstruction than they are in the glamorous urban metropolii of New York, Paris and Berlin. However, the privatized basis of the Solidere scheme for Beirut still provides many opportunities for architectural heroism and glamour. Examples include Spanish architect Rafael Moneo's scheme for the new Souks (marketplaces) of downtown Beirut, and Lebanese architect Bernard Hour's legendary nightclub, "BO18", located on a former massacre site in inner suburban Beirut.

In contrast to the role of 'hero', however, in war-divided cities design professionals must often work within international development frameworks that demand broader socio-economic analysis rather than purely design-led solutions. In fact, the designer's role may often be extremely marginalized, as the priorities are water, sanitation infrastructure and basic healthcare. During the 1992-1996 civil war in Mostar and Sarajevo, for example, the immediate repair of hospitals and water supplies was seen as far more important than the repair of the iconic Stari Most Bridge or reconstruction of public buildings.

Closely linked to this 'hero' concept of design is the exclusion of anybody who does not fit into the standard western profile for the profession: the "stereotype of the heroic architect-white, male, middle-aged and moneyed" (Dyckhoff, 2003: 18). Despite the large numbers of women graduating with design degrees, architecture is still in fact a predominantly male domain and a "closed clubby world" (Dyckhoff, 2003) guided by "endemic racism and sexism". Thus, in the case of Beirut, Jacques Liger-Belair, a French architect who has worked in Beirut since 1965, commented that design professionals lack the ability to work outside this traditional mode of professional heroism:

> I think architects are not inclined to do the social work. They want to construct. The architect's education doesn't emphasize the public welfare. So few architects have this desire. And if they have it, no one asks them to express it and if they end up doing it, no one listens![8]

Role III: Design Professionals as Historicists

> Everything's selective. I am not against being selective. I am against how to select. And I don't think normally you have to adore memory. Memory is selective of course, but who's selecting and how to select. This is the problem.[9]

The reconstruction of historic city areas and cultural monuments has been accorded high priority in many design approaches for war-divided cities. For example, the rebuilding of Beirut's downtown district has focused solely on the rebuilding of the former city center and its associated archaeological relics rather than plans for the much larger and socially disadvantaged Beirut metropolis. Samir Khalaf (1993:1), speaking about his own city, raises concerns about the authenticity of the reconstruction process: "How much of the ugly vestiges of war can or should be incorporated into the rebuilt fabric of Beirut? How much in other words, should the new city look like the one which was destroyed?"

In this quest for historic authenticity, the peripheral scarred areas and dividing lines of the post-war city, such as the Boulevard in Mostar and the Green Line in Beirut, are commonly neglected areas. Amir Pasic comments on the irony of rushing to rebuild the Stari Most Bridge in Mostar, when there is still little industry or associated employment for Mostarians who remain in the city:

> With this city of Mostar, because there is no reconstruction of factories, reconstruction of industry, we are reconstructing something but more emotional, you know, like the bridge. What is (a) bridge? This is an emotional, political case, but like building is (a) piece of cake! They built it in the 16th century in five minutes. We are building some architectural elements, you know, but this is, like, not important![10]

However, since its infamous Wall fell in 1989, Berlin has represented the ultimate "laboratory" for discussion of architectural historicism. For Berlin chief city planner Hans Stimmann, rebuilding the city has been guided by a battle of nostalgia versus modernity, which he labels as the "critical reconstruction" approach.[11] This reification of the past in the (re)construction that has followed the reunification of Berlin has produced mixed results, in a diversity of architectural styles by a wide range of international design professionals selected to re-envision the new German capital city. An example of this battle is the sterile Potsdamer Platz development, bridging the West and former Eastern sections of the city, versus the radical imposition of Daniel Libeskind's Jewish Museum in an inner suburb of Berlin. Nevertheless, there are those who have doubts about "critical reconstruction", such as Berlin architect Dirk Alten:

> In many aspects it is too restrictive and, in many ways, it leads to historicist architecture, which is ridiculous. I mean in the beginning of the 21st century, to design office buildings, which don't have a lot of glass with small windows, is crazy. There's no excuse for that. And to use the streets as a sort of theatre in trying to re-enact the 19th century is totally false.[12]

Role IV: Design Professionals as Colonialists

> The history of cities has been an attempt to impose order on the apparent chaos that is the individual experience of the impact of capitalism on urban form, defining characteristic of modernism (Berman, 1982:35).

Design professionals in cities such as Beirut, Nicosia, Mostar and Jerusalem are often working within the colonial mentality of "we know what is good for you". The legacy of French architects and planners

imported into Beirut, to "reconstruct" the city over the last 50 years is clear evidence of this.

The colonialist stance in architecture is clearly not limited to post-war cities. Architectural theorist, Anthony King (1996:146), describes how in developing countries, "It was thought that modernism would save cities from Europe's industrialist-capitalist urban chaos". Similarly, Sophie Watson (1995:8) describes the situation in South Africa where "The challenge is to overcome the fragmentation wrought by colonialism and modern planning," and in India, "[where] the fragmentation exacerbated by British Colonialism" must be overcome.

The tradition of architectural colonialism has clearly been more successful at the scale of the object rather than at the urban scale. For example, the modernist projects of "Chandigarh" and "Brasilia" by French architect Le Corbusier and (his disciple) Oscar Niemeyer, respectively, are great architectural achievements, if you look at architecture as sculpture, but not in terms of the people for whom the architectural vision was made.

The reliance on international aid agencies in countries such as Bosnia also illustrates such colonialist-colonized relationships. In Mostar, for example, design professionals have played only a small role in determining the future of their city, as they are completely dependant on foreign aid for reconstruction projects.[13] The often dubious agendas and priorities of international development agencies such as the World Bank and UNESCO, thereby get foisted upon local communities who have had little input into specific cultural heritage projects such as the reconstruction of mosques or other religious complexes.

Beirut architect Assem Salaam[14] discusses the perceived problems of "outsider" architectural experts arriving in Beirut to reconfigure his city:

> Who is going to recreate this fabric? People from Saudi Arabia? Bankers from AMRO bank? What's the destination and what class of society also? It's going to be a paradise for the rich where you could enter it with a classic car and a gate.[15]

However, Eric Huybrecht of the French planning agency in Beirut, Cermoac, sharply rejects the notion of foreign design professionals as "colonialists":

> Colonialist, it is so caricatured! Now when the Lebanese government has French people for their expertise it is also because there is no kind of quality, there are no specialists. But all the people who say, "I am the specialist" are not good.[16]

Role V: Design Professionals as Social Reformers

> Why are we here? This is a fundamental question and we need to do some soul searching. Are we here out of conviction, out of duty, or out of philanthropy for the less privileged of our fellow human beings? (Khalaf, 1993).

If the division lines of war are political, do design professionals have a political role within the broader mission of achieving social reform? Contemporary positions in the debate on architecture's socio-political role fall along a pendulum between a view of architecture as an instrument of capitalist production and a view of architecture as a tool capable of transforming a civil society.

In regard to the ability of architecture and planning as socially transformative tools, Jerusalem planner and politician, Meron Benvenisti (1982) remains pessimistic about the profession's peace-brokering capacities. He suggests that the efforts of most planners in the arena of inter-ethnic conflict are "ineffective because of the complex relationship between 'real' and 'perceived' environments".

As individuals, many design professionals may be concerned about issues of social and economic justice. Yet, over the past 20 years, the architectural profession has steadily moved away from engagement with the complex and increasing civil conflicts associated with urban violence or even such basic problems as homelessness, the degradation of urban environmental quality, and the challenges posed by the rapidly changing demographic patterns of inner city migration. However, the capacity of design professionals to influence the political process as social reformers does depend on the socio-cultural and legislative contexts in which they are operating. For example, design professionals can have substantially more impact in cities such as Paris and Barcelona where there is a democratic planning framework than they can in Beirut and Mostar, where this is clearly lacking.

In his seminal essay, "Space, Knowledge and Power", Michel Foucault (1997) engages in this broader debate on the social role of design professionals. Foucault argues that the city is a place of resistance and contestation, increasingly producing spaces of profound economic and ethnic exclusion:

> Architecture in itself cannot resolve social problems: I think that it can and does provide positive effects when the liberating intentions of the architect coincide with the real practice of people in the exercise of their freedom. (p. 36)

Indeed, architectural and landscape projects can be used to bring conflicting parties to the table in the political mediation process. There is

something tangible about an architectural plan as a basis for negotiation rather than just a series of discussions, policy or peace treaties. The ability to use the tools of planning, such as design workshops and long-term master plans, to reconnect divided communities depends entirely on who is taking command of urban planning operations after the cessation of conflict. No other reconstruction episode illustrates the close and inseparable link between architecture and politics more clearly than Berlin's post-Wall rebuilding decade (1989-1999). The most effective component of Berlin's rebuilding program was the public participation process initiated under the "StadtForum"[17] (City Forum) debates. Gerald Bloomeyer, a Berlin architect involved in the international workshops, comments about the cathartic role of the StadtForum series:

> I believe in dialogue. The major division is in our heads. At the end of the GDR, the Mayors of East and West Berlin asked us to put on a workshop with the best local and international planners. The results were discussed at an international conference for 500 people. This allowed many groups to meet for the first time. It was important to hear the different priorities politicians, investors, planners had.[18]

TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK: THREE PRINCIPLES

Design professionals working on the rebuilding of war-divided cities have an ambiguous role: Is their mandate to act as social reformers or obedient bureaucrats or should they confine their expertise to the more aesthetic issues of post-war architectonics? The challenge within the reconstruction field lies in defining new roles for design professionals, as mediators, urban peace builders and social reformers, and not just relegating them to the more traditional modes of pathologists, heroes or colonialists.

Are there any applicable principles embedded in this brief survey of reconstruction approaches in divided cities? How can the negative lessons, such as the over reliance on foreign architects and international development agencies seen in case study cities like Mostar, be reversed? How can they be used as guiding principles for an operational framework for reconstructing the physical fabric and reconciling the social life of divided cities? Three key principles may be useful in establishing such a framework:

1. Political and Ethnic Collaboration
2. Public Consultation
3. Pilot Projects

Principle I: Political and Ethnic Collaboration

Achieving political and ethnic collaboration is critical to the success of urban professionals working in cities divided by war. However, this demands a radical adjustment of contemporary practice, as it requires architects to consult with "non-spatial" professionals such as politicians, environmentalists, sociologists, psychiatrists, economists and community representatives when preparing plans for post-conflict reconstruction.

For example, the Nicosia Master Plan process (1985-2004) has involved both political and ethnic collaboration that was established through a bi-communal planning process. This was the key to the Master Plan's success, while the breakdown of collaboration was the cause of its eventual limited implementation. However, the original successes of the multi-disciplinary and multi-ethnic (i.e. Greek and Turkish Cypriot) team of architects, sociologists, politicians and economists involved in the master plan process suggest that it is not always necessary to see the reconstruction of divided cities purely in terms of architectural solutions. Rather, there is a need to identify and build commitment to universal values and collective cultural identities as part of the peace-brokering process. Indeed, the fact that the Nicosia Master Plan became the negotiating tool for the re-establishment of bi-communal relations suggests that design and planning initiatives can themselves

Figure 2. NICOSIA.
Source: Author.

be powerful peace-brokering tools for politicians and communities interested in resolving their cultural, ethnic, and economic divisions. As local architect, Pefkios Georgiades commented:

> The basic advantage and the basic value of the Master Plan was to show that there is a very strong will from both sides to live in a united city. Because Nicosia is an unnatural city, a city that has a wound is bleeding now. Both sides say, "How can we stop this bleeding?" At least we agreed on that principle at that time.[19]

Conversely, there have been few attempts at collaborative planning between the Croatian (West) and Muslim (East) planning agencies in Mostar, since the Balkan war ended in the mid-1990's. This lack of cooperation largely explains (with the simultaneous stalemate in political reconciliation) why the city, while no longer technically divided, still operates as two separate halves. Similarly, in Beirut, the systemic sectarian bifurcation of all political and development issues (and associated issues of corruption), continues to dominate important reconstruction decisions apart from the privatized (rather than governmental) Centre Ville project.

Principle II: Public Consultation

> The concept that the people in a city or society that is under reconstruction must "own" their reconstruction programs is often repeated — so often and so glibly, that it has become meaningless (Hill, 1997:76).

Public consultation processes are critical to the legitimacy of any democratic planning process, in or outside of war. However, the consultation process in Beirut's reconstruction was limited to public lectures by visiting foreign architects and Solidere exhibitions of design schemes already decided upon and in their implementation stages.[20] In Mostar, consultation was limited to international development agencies and the "experts" undertaking projects in the city rather than with resident Mostarians.

Only Nicosia offers a more consensual reconstruction model where the Master Plan became the negotiating tool for the re-establishment of bi-communal relations in the city. However, there was limited consultation with the public on the plan and because it lacked broader consensus, the "top-down" nature of the Nicosia Master Plan made it inflexible. "Bottom-up" processes, which recognize the needs of community groups and local authorities, are central to the creation of a sustainable action plan. They also ensure that people will come to have a vested interest in their realization and success.

The Nicosia experience suggests that if sufficient resources are attributed to a long-term reconstruction process, design and planning initiatives can become powerful peace-brokering tools where politicians and communities can work collectively in resolving their cultural, ethnic, and economic divisions. None of the three case studies investigated in this paper, however, come close to Berlin's consultation model of the "StadtForums", or "City Debate" Series.[21] The Stadt Forums were conducted after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 through a "question and answer" process on contentious urban projects such as the Pottsdamer Platz project. In these public forums, architects, politicians and resident groups commented on major development projects such as the afore-mentioned Pottsdamerplatz site. These city debates acted as a kind of public "catharsis" in promoting comment by Berliners on the future reconstruction of their formerly divided city. As Phillip Meuser, the Director of the StadtForum, describes:

> The Stadtforum was initially a planning instrument that brings together planners from the east and the west. I think it's a very important thing because we have the opportunity to bring people from all the parties and groups in the society to come together in a "round table" and discuss ideas and projects without the need for making a decision.[22]

Gerald Bloomeyer, Berlin architect, and one of the initiators of the StadtForums, expands on their purpose by stating that they acted as "pressure cookers" for letting off steam. He argues that they also had a "cleansing" role: "If you allow criticism, you diffuse a bomb".[23]

Public participation in cities divided by civil conflict should be structured, however, such that there is representation from all sectors of the population, not just the political elites and international "experts" who control the rebuilding process. This could operate on the basis of either geographical location or special interest, although a framework of robust socio-economic and demographic data is needed for this. Unfortunately, in Beirut, the last official census was taken by the French colonial administration in 1932! In conjunction with public participation, it is thus important to have a comprehensive understanding of the population living and working in specific sectors of the city and what their roles in their communities are and can be. The ability to project who will be the future inhabitants of regenerated areas and how this will affect the demographic profile of a post-war community is also essential. This information is critical to the healthy economic development of the city as design professionals strive to attain a mixed population in terms of residential tenure and income, with the aim of bridging the gap between "those who have" and "those who have not".

Figure 3. MOSTAR.
Source: Author.

Principle III : Pilot Projects

Projects are often the key building blocks in the design and implementation of strategies in post-conflict or natural disaster reconstruction efforts (Hasic, 2002).

The successful merging of theory with practice in the post-recovery field is a rare phenomenon. This gap is clearly evident in Beirut, Nicosia and Mostar where an enormous void still exists between academic critiques of these cities (e.g. Nasr, 1996; Khalaf, 1993; Hocknell, 2002) and any visible improvement of their physical environment. The existence of this gap is not surprising, as it is understandable that the development of major commercial or iconic projects without the collaboration of local professionals would invite, and indeed demand, criticism. Unfortunately, such large scale processes detract from the involvement of local design professionals in the reconstruction of their own cities.

An alternative approach would engage local design professionals and students in small pilot projects. The pilot project is defined as a small architectural landscape or engineering project that can be implemented as part of a sequence of long term rebuilding projects. The pilot project approach is summed up by Oriel Bohigas, one of the key figures in the 1990s renaissance of Barcelona, who comments:

I believe that this understanding of the city as the sum of

its neighborhoods or identifiable fragments has also been one of the basic criteria in the reconstruction of Barcelona. Controlling the city on the basis of a series of projects rather than uniform general plans makes it possible to give continuity to the urban character, the continuity of relative centralities (Bohigas, 1999:32-33).

The modest scale of the pilot project approach can more eas ly incorporate the collaboration of local architects, residents, planners, students and policy makers than major development undertakings. In this regard, why not spend a summer workshop in Mostar, for example, collectively building a simple studio space for local artisans or rebuilding a timber deck for bathers and pedestrians on the edge of the city's Neretva River? Surely such "built" outcomes could be more useful than the typical architecture studio process of encouraging foreign architects and planners to fantasize over their drawing boards about structures that will never be of benefit to the community under investigation? The aim of the pilot project approach is thus to leave something behind, and through practice help to rebuild local capacity.

An example of this approach is the "River of Light" project I am now undertaking, five years after originally taking Melbourne University architecture students to Mostar for a design studio on reconstruction strategies in 1998. I am currently working with two of these original students in the design development phase of their original project to reconnect the formerly severed East-West sides of the city through a landscape/urban design strategy. The process of realizing the proposed "River of Light" project has been incredibly complex and sometimes seemingly impossible. Yet, the negotiations between politicians, architects and resident groups in Mostar involved so far have also been a significant learning experience in attempting to understand the limits and opportunities of my profession in the divided city scenario. For example, while attempting to seek permission for the project, it became almost impossible to find out who actually grants planning approval in the city. Is it the Mayor (which one?), or the local or regional planning offices, (the Croation West "Urbing", or the Muslim East planning office?).

In Nicosia, the pilot project approach was successfully tested through its Master Plan and via a series of small scale residential and conservation projects on both sides of the Green Line. The malaise, however, brought on by nearly 30 years (1974-2004) of political (non) negotiation has undermined the benefits of these developments. In Beirut, the "city as heart" metaphor that dominated reconstruction planning has meant that neither the government nor Solidere have implemented any small-scale urban space or low-income housing projects in the wider metropolitan region of the city. Solidere's assumption, that there would be an osmosis effect from the redevelopment of the Centre Ville area into the poorer

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areas immediately outside of its project boundaries, has been proven false as the neighbourhoods such as Basta on the edge of the Solidere developments still await basic housing and infrastructure services.

The need to continually test urban theory through practice therefore emphasizes the need for "pilot projects". Similarly, South African architect Denise Scott Brown (1990) comments, "I think great schools of urban design should stress philosophy, but it should be the philosophy of action, they should stress it a little too much".

CONCLUSION: SANS FRONTIERES?

This paper begins to propose a potentially more liberating future for design professionals, as roaming, collaborative mobile agents able to work outside of traditional sites and constructed environments. My analysis of divided cities sees the task of the design professional in the much more expansive role of city mediator, moving between the design of actual buildings to the negotiation and problem solving inherent in the post-war reconstruction process. The role of the urban designer is thus not limited to being satisfied with opportunities and constraints, so much as imaginatively finding ways to engage with diverse community expectations and associated planning processes.

Therefore, re-focusing the design profession upon social and ethical concerns can establish an effective platform from which architectural and planning professionals can contribute to the reconstruction of the increasing number of cities polarised by ethnic and economic conflict. As already discussed, the failure of many design professionals working in the post-war field to provide effective and sustainable reconstruction strategies, suggests that aesthetics and architectural heroism alone cannot solve the physical scars of sustained urban violence.

My investigation suggests that it is only by looking over the self-defined walls of the architectural profession into more pressing issues affecting the social and physical health of cities that the practice of architecture can be re-invigorated. Focusing exclusively on aesthetics, on the understanding of architectural form and its representations, while paying lip service to "others" in the process, has confined architectural discourse within the extremely narrow community of its own professional elite. As Ghandour (2002) suggests: "By reducing the understanding of society to that of built form, the discipline of architecture has thus dissociated itself from social practice". Without such a radical change in their professional direction, design professionals will be increasingly marginalized, and will eventually become irrelevant in terms of their potential contribution to society at large.

Finally, both architecture and planning are systems of spatial thinking that can be linked to both site-specific design problems and to a wider contemplation about urban and regional territories and their associated patterns of social contexts. This broader definition of design extends the role of the design profession beyond acting as the conceivers and executors of blueprint plans to potential negotiators and mediators of urban politics and planning. While an urban pathologist may be needed to dissect the diseased city at hand, it is the social reformer and educator that ensures the prescribed medicine, can in time, actually be of use to the myriad of victims scarred by the divided city phenomenon.

ENDNOTES

1 In this paper, the term "design professional" encompasses a wide range of disciplines associated with the built environment, including architecture, urban planning, landscape architecture, civil and environmental engineering, landscape architecture and urban design. Divided cities are not just a series of broken buildings but are rather a sequence of destroyed landscapes, bridges, roads and civil infrastructure.

2 Much of the fieldwork undertaken upon Divided Cities was done between 1999-2004 across Beirut, Nicosia, Mostar, Jerusalem and Belfast, with colleague Jon Calame, as a result of a Macarthur Foundation Grant award in 1999.

3 A tangible example of such a "Zone of Connection" is Rue Monot in East Beirut, which was aligned to the Green Line, Rue Damas, during the Lebanese civil war but which, today, is the most popular zone for night entertainment in the country, for Muslims and Christians alike.

4 Much of the fieldwork for this paper was conducted with Jon Calame, and was funded by a Macarthur Foundation Grant.

5 Interview with Maha Yayha, June 20, 2000, Beirut.

6 Interview with Rafiq Hariri, June 10, 2000, Beirut.

7 Till also comments on the problematic celebrity role that many architectural educators promote: "The idea of architect as artist plays an important part in establishing architectural culture to the outside world. It also affects the internal economy of the profession, with the 'star design professionals' underpaying their staff, but offering an osmotic relationship with artistry in return" (Till, 1997:109).

8 Interview with Jacques Liger-Belair, Beirut, August 2, 2001.

9 Interview, Elias Khoury, Journalist, Beirut, June 20, 2000.

10 Interview, Amir Pasic, Architect, Mostar, 2000.

11 See Wise, 1998

12 Interview, Dirk Alten, Berlin, January 23, 2000.

13 See Yarwood, 1998.

14 Assem Salaam is former President of the Order of Engineers and Architects in Beirut.

15 Interview, Assem Salaam, Beirut, June 18, 2000.

16 Interview Eric Huybrecht, October 2, 2001, Beirut.

17 "StadtForum Berlin" (City Debates), was set up in 1990 as an informal planning tool of the Berlin Senate administration. Stadtforum's bi-monthly events are complemented by public discussions in the context of the series "StadtProjekte", concrete planning workshops on specific locations.

18 Email from Gerald Bloomeyer, Berlin Architect, September 10, 1999.

19 Interview with Pefkios Georgiades, April 2002, Nicosia, Cyprus.

20 For example the exhibition of "Souks Competition" and "Gardens of Forgiveness" project refer <http://www.solidere.com.lb>.

21 "StadtForum" is defined as a public "city debate". A sequence of StadtForums were held in Berlin 1990–1997 in establishing parameters for physical unification strategies after the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989.

22 Phillip Meuser, Interview, Berlin, October 10, 2001.

23 Gerald Bloomeyer, Interview, Berlin, February 23, 2001.

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INNOCENTS AND MONSTERS:THE STRUGGLES OF AFTERMATH IN LITTLETON, COLORADO

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ABSTRACT

This article examines the social construction and the memorialization process in the aftermath of the Columbine shootings. The tragedy played out on the national stage, and its effects rippled far beyond the small affluent suburb where the tragedy took place. At the same time, mourning, healing, and memorializing had to take place within the Littleton community.

While the nation bounded ahead in appropriating the tragedy for political purposes, the Littleton community realized the need to reflect on the meaning of the event. In the media and in the political arena the event has been labeled and wrung dry of symbolism and meaning, while at Columbine High School itself, the community has had the sense to step back and take time to mourn and reflect before making final decision about how to remember the event and tell the story of the Columbine tragedy.

INTRODUCTION

Just after 11am on April 20, 1999, two teenagers entered their own high school with guns and homemade explosives. The adolescent gunmen fired 188 shots, and before it was over there were 23 wounded and the pair had killed 12 students, one teacher, and then themselves (Janofsky 2000). The nation watched the tragedy unfold on live television. In the aftermath, the reasons for the shootings included bullying, drugs, racism, homophobia, violent music and video games, or simply an inevitable product of teenage alienation combined with easy access to firearms. Blame was accorded to the perpetrators, their parents, the bullies, the entertainment industry, the gun lobby, our permissive and violent society, and 'kids today.' Proposed policy solutions ranged from police in schools to conflict resolution classes to dress codes and limitations on violence in television, music, film and video games.

The social and political construction of Columbine arose from the narrative of the event as built by the media; and there is considerable variation in how that narrative was developed. At Columbine, the two shooters were described as either so unhinged and obsessed with violence that they went on a shooting spree for sport, or so persecuted by the popular athletes at their school that they retaliated out of desperation. The event was alternately an isolated incident or a widespread epidemic; urban violence spread to the suburbs or a new brand of juvenile violence altogether; random or completely foreseeable. As a result, in the aftermath of Columbine, modern teenagers are innocents or monsters; children to be protected or criminals to fear and control. The media narrative of the event also helped determine who was to blame for this kind of crisis; the perpetrators or the bullies, the parents or the schools, the politicians or the rock stars, and the 'blame game' informs policy responses to the event. If violence in entertainment is the culprit, limiting exposure to media violence is the solution. If access to guns is the problem, gun control is the appropriate answer. If bad parenting is to blame, then holding parents legally responsible for their children's criminality becomes the remedy. Responses at Columbine included enhanced school security, increased mental health services, lawsuits against everyone from the school administration to the parents of the shooters to musicians and record companies, and establishment of hotlines and other means to encourage students to report threats of other such incidents.

Throughout and after the Columbine crisis, media would fill the public's thirst for information and would later be chastised for its graphic and constant portrayals of the event and for how they behaved with survivors. The public and the polity would pay respects to Columbine by arguing over new laws to ensure that there would never be another Columbine, fighting for gun control or school security or after school programs or

anything else we could think of that might prevent such events in the future. At Columbine, the incessant media coverage focused on the need to 'do something' about what came to be seen as an epidemic of youth violence and of school shootings in particular. This overshadowed the creation of the memorial and rebuilding of the school itself, which, as opposed to the World Trade Center Memorial, was done in relative privacy by the Littleton community with little media or public scrutiny. This paper will examine both the social construction of the crisis in the media, and the memorialization and policy design process it led to, in the Aftermath of Columbine.

WHAT HAPPENED: THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONSTRUCTION OF A TRAGEDY IN THE MEDIA

To describe 'what happened' at Columbine is to interpret the facts of the case and the causes of the crisis. The interpretations built up of Columbine became its story, as well as the grounds for policy design in its Aftermath. The Columbine story focused on guns, suburbs, and kids, in the context of an ongoing battle over the constitutional right

	City, State	Perpetrator Name, Age	Date	# Killed	# Injured
1	Great Barrington, MA	Wayne Lo, 18	12/14/92	2	4
2	Grayson, KY	Scott Pennington, 17	1/1/8/93	2	0
3	Blackville, SC	Toby Sinico , 16	10/12/95	3*	0
4	Lynnville, TN	Jaime Rouse, 17	11/15/95	2	1
5	Moses Lake, WA	Barry Loutikas, 16	2/2/96	3	1
6	Bethel, AK	Evan Ramsey, 16	2/19/97	2	2
7	Pearl City, MI	Luke Woodham, 16	10/1/97	2**	7
8	Paducah City, KY	Michael Carneal, 14	12/1/97	3	5
9	Jonesboro City, AK	Andrew Golden, 11 & Mitchell Johnson, 13	3/24/98	5	10
10	Springfield City, OR	Kipland Kinkel, 15	5/21/98	2***	21
11	Littleton City, CO	Dylan Klebold, 15 & Eric Harris, 18	4/20/99	15****	23
			Totals	**19**	**74**

*	including perpetrator suicide
**	not including victim's mother shot at home first
***	not including victim's parents shot at home first
****	including 2 perpetrator suicides

Source: National School Safety Center "School-Associated Violent Deaths" and *New York Times* "List of Rampage Killers Across the Country" April 9, 2000.

to bear arms, the suburban development of thousands of communities across the country just like Littleton, and a fear of teenage violence in the inner city. In this milieu, the title of the Columbine story became 'it can happen anywhere' and 'no one is safe.' In a different context, the story might have been dismissed as a freak accident, a result of mental illness, of little concern to the rest of the country. How did we frame Columbine and why did it get so much attention? In some tragedies, one tries to separate oneself from the event, and create a sense of security by demonizing the perpetrators, blaming the victims, and creating the sense that "it couldn't happen here." Why in the case of Columbine did the social tide move the other way? Why did Columbine get media coverage as a national crisis rather than a local aberration? Joel Best's analysis of the social construction of crimes helps to shed light on how the Columbine shootings were processed by the media, the public, and the policy-makers (Filler 2000). As Best argues, three processes occur in the creation of a new type of crime; typification, domain expansion, and the transformation of 'incidents' to 'instances.' These processes will help to explain why Columbine was framed as it was and how there came to be so much national attention, making 'Columbine' part of the national lexicon.

Best describes typification as the "selection of particularly gruesome cases to typify a broader...problem, despite the fact that these horrific crimes were not at all representative" (Filler 2000). Typification was rampant in the discourse surrounding the Columbine tragedy. The term 'Columbine' was eventually used to refer to gun violence in general: "Gunfire kills approximately 5,000 children annually, which is roughly equivalent to one Columbine tragedy every day" (Degatte 2000, 2). The term 'Columbine' was also used to connote teenage unhappiness in general: "No single word," wrote Dan Rather after the shootings, "better captures the unique stresses and problems facing kids today than "Columbine"" (Rather 2000, 6). When the crime or string of crimes comes to represent something more general, it becomes a national crisis rather than an isolated tragedy. Gun violence is a problem, surely, and so is teenage malaise, but neither problem typically results in the death toll seen in Littleton. There is not 'one Columbine tragedy every day,' and the many ways in which children are tragically killed by gunfire are not 'roughly equivalent' to one another. From a policy perspective it makes little sense to collapse all childhood gun deaths; be they accidents, gang-related, suicides, or spree shootings, but still, the media continued to irresponsibly hold up Columbine as an example of just about any problem facing the nation's youth.

The second process by which the media spun a social problem as a result of the narrative it devised is domain expansion, which Best describes as the presentation of the new problem as 'the functional or moral equivalent of an existing problem" (Filler 2000, 4). Through

domain expansion, Columbine is not only the latest in a string of less than a dozen school spree shootings, but also becomes an example of all school crime, which includes theft, and vandalism. It becomes an example of youth violence in general, collapsing gang violence with spree shootings. Through domain expansion, Columbine has come to represent school violence in general or youth violence in general or gun violence in general, broadening its symbolic base of power until one Colorado Congressman criticized his colleagues for abusing the image of the massacre to further their own legislative agendas. "The word Columbine has been evoked over and over again," said Representative Tom Tancredo (whose district includes the Columbine High School) "When you use words like that inappropriately you degrade the event" (Sanko 2000). Through domain expansion, the event is able to stand for a broader social problem and becomes a new symbol for the need to respond to an existing social problem with an existing constituency, such as gun control.

The third process by which the media translated the tragedy into a symbol is called "the transformation of "incidents" to "instances"" (Filler 2000, 4). Using rhetorical devices which make the event seem like one in a long string of events and therefore quite likely to recur, "a single criminal incident, or small number of incidents, are used as evidence of a broader social crisis" (Filler 2000). One way in which Columbine was expanded to represent a concern for the nation as a whole was its description as "random." If a crime is "random," it can no longer be viewed as a result of specific circumstances: "If a crime could happen to anyone, then everyone is at risk" (Filler 2000). This 'democratization' of the tragedy increases fear and perceived risk by making it difficult to dissociate oneself (or one's child) from the possibility of becoming the 'next victim.' So while the media portrayed Columbine as an incident of the youth violence epidemic in the nation, a spree shooting such as what happened at Columbine is not a likely event, much less an epidemic. Nor are school spree shootings an example of inner-city violence spread to the suburbs. The following sections address the fact and fiction of school spree shootings, and what generalized responses were and were

Table 2.   MEDIAN INCOME AND POVERTY LEVEL OF SITES OF RECENT SCHOOL SHOOTINGS

	Median Family Income	*Median Household Income*	*% Below Poverty Line*
Paducah City, KY	$23,665	$17,196	23.81%
Springfield City, OR	25,431	21,932	16.47%
Jonesboro City, AK	29,391	23,318	16.45%
Pearl City, MI	34,009	29,488	8.63%
Littleton City, CO	43,656	34,006	7.34%

Source: 1990 US Census.

not produced by the Columbine tragedy. It will also examine the reasons why the incident received so much media attention despite the fact that it is neither the only example of such a tragedy nor, on the other hand, are school spree shootings an uncommon problem.

LIGHTNING STRIKE OR EPIDEMIC: HYSTERIA AND STATISTICS OF SCHOOL SPREE SHOOTINGS

While media coverage may have convinced the public otherwise, the likelihood of a child being shot and killed at school is extremely small. "To give the reader a sense of the idiosyncratic nature of these events, the number of children killed by gun violence in schools is about half the number of Americans killed annually by lightning strikes" (Donahue, Schiraldi, and Ziendenberg, 1998). Despite this fact, a poll taken by the *Wall Street Journal* found that 71% of Americans believed a shooting in their children's school was "likely" (Dorfman and Shiraldi 2001, 3). This is not surprising considering the rhetoric used after the shootings. The deaths of children seem to have promoted the use of alarmist language that distorted the facts among journalists and academics alike. At a Law & Policy Symposium, conference materials began with the following statistics:

- "By the time you finish reading this sentence, another crime will have been committed on or near a school campus.
- By the time a child completed elementary school, he/she will have seen over 8,000 made-for-TV murders" ("Reactions to Youth Violence: The Legacy of Columbine" 2000, 1).

The 'fact sheet' concludes with a question: "Is there a crisis of juvenile violence in our schools?" Where this question is preceded by the above facts, the authors make it impossible to conclude otherwise, despite the fact that they present no support for the relationship between 'juvenile violence' and 'crime on or near a school campus' as implied by this document. School shootings such as at Columbine are not typical of juvenile violence in general, and crime on campus is much more likely to be theft than a shooting (Schwartz, Wiener, White, and Joe 2000 5). This type of 'domain expansion' is also typical of post-Columbine media discourse.

The New York Times reported that "the enduring mysteries of the school shootings in places like Littleton Colo. and West Paducah, Ky. [is that] in case after case" the perpetrators had made specific threats to their peers (Glaberson 2000, C7). Use of the terms 'places like' and 'case after case' implies that there is a long catalogue of such events; in fact, West Paducah and Littleton are 2 of only perhaps 11 such incidents in the past decade (See Table 1). The extensive coverage of Columbine and the reference to other instances of this type of shooting immediately created the idea of an epidemic.

Similarly, news outlets described the tragedy as "an all-too-familiar story" or "another in a recent trend" (Donahue, Schiraldi, and Ziendenberg, 1998). Perhaps it was somehow inappropriate to draw attention to the rarity of such an event because children had died, as though doing so would somehow belittle the event. However, in the end it makes for dangerous policy to overestimate the likelihood of another Columbine through a "tragic misdirection of attention and resources" (Donahue, Schiraldi, and Ziendenberg, 1998). If we are concerned about children's safety, it makes more sense to describe tragedies like Columbine as the anomalies they really are and focus instead on the 75% of homicide victims aged 12-17 who are killed by adults and the 90% of child homicides that occur in or around the home (Donahue, Schiraldi, and Ziendenberg, 1998).

THEY 'JUST SNAPPED': RANDOM VIOLENCE?

A *New York Times* study of spree shooters described the aftermath of such incidents: "Before the ambulances leave, the news crews arrive. The killer's neighbors, friends or families submit to interviews, and inevitably say something like "he just snapped." But the killers do not just snap ("Rampage Killers: They Threaten, Seethe, Unhinge, Then Kill in Quantity" 2000, 1[1]). Despite public fears that another Columbine is likely and will be unpredictable, neither is true. The *New York Times* studied 100 spree shootings and found that in 63 cases the perpetrators previously made threats about the impending incident ("How the Study was Conducted", 2000).[1] The Secret Service Safe Schools Initiative focused on school shootings in particular, and found that in three-quarters of school shootings the perpetrator had told someone what they were planning (Butterfield

Table 3.   TIMELINE OF EVENTS: COLUMBINE HIGH SCHOOL APRIL 20, 1999

11:17	AM	Shooters Enter the Building (2 Dead, 9 Injured)
11:19	AM	First 911 Call
11:23	AM	Sheriff Arrives at the School
11:35	AM	Killings End (11 More Dead in Library)
12:06	PM	Shooters Commit Suicide
12:06	PM	Just After Suicides, First SWAT Team Arrives
12:30	PM	2nd SWAT Team Enters
2:38	PM	Student Pat Ireland Jumps Out 2nd Story Window to Escape
2:42	PM	SWAT Team Finds Teacher Dave Sanders
3:22	PM	SWAT Team Reaches Library

Source: *New York Times* 5/16/00 p. A14 "Victims were Killed Minutes into Siege at Colorado School, Report Reveals".

2001, A[1]). Since Columbine, the most targeted intervention to prevent school shootings has been to encourage students not to keep such threats secrets. At least a half a dozen copycat shootings have been averted since Columbine, including one in New Bedford, Massachusetts ("Teenagers Held in Plot at Massachusetts School 2001, A[13]; "Masssachusetts School Opens After Bomb-Plot Arrests" 2001, A[15]; Butterfield 2001, A[1]; B;aberson 2001, C[7]).

Explaining the Media Coverage:

Why was Littleton subjected to such a media blitz and why did Columbine become not only a tragedy but also a symbol? To be sure, it was the deadliest of all the school shootings, by a wide margin (See Table 2). The other reasons have nothing to do with the nature of the shootings themselves. While other school shootings have been in rural or outer suburban areas, Littleton is in close proximity to Denver, home to "all major television networks, two major daily newspapers, and several national news bureaus." At Columbine the media was close enough to Littleton to descend upon the scene while the tragedy was still taking place. Furthermore, the NRA was coincidentally scheduled to hold its annual convention only several days later, so the national media (along with, presumably, a barrage of pro- and anti-gun control pundits) was already prepared to focus on Denver in the coming days (Filler 2000, 9).

Many have argued that the publicity accorded Columbine was because it was in a predominantly white neighborhood where it is assumed that teenagers are spared the threat violence many assume is common in inner-city high schools. This argument certainly has truth to it; certainly all press accounts referred to urban violence spread to the suburbs and many columnists pointed out that suddenly the nation is concerned only now what white children were being shot in their schools (Nelson 1999). However, all the most recent school shootings have occurred in predominantly white areas, and none garnered the national attention showered upon Littleton in the days and weeks that followed. Littleton was unique in that it is considerably more affluent than the other communities where such tragedies occurred (See Table 2). Also, it was the model of a community of politically contested voters described by the term 'soccer moms'; "the affluent suburban community that traditionally supports republicans but that maintains more moderate views on social issues" (Filler 2000, 9). After Columbine, legislators scrambled to make policies that would assure this population that such a thing would never happen on their watch, and the media continued to report as everyone weighed in with the latest proposals ranging from gun control to school uniforms to a ratings system for popular music. A confluence of economic and political reasons unrelated to the shootings themselves ensured that Columbine was the center of media attention.

Media Coverage of Law Enforcement

Not only was the media coverage of the Columbine massacre extensive, it was also live. On television, the high school "appeared to be under siege for hours" (Filler 2000). This was in fact only an appearance, due to emergency response management of the incident rather than actual fact. The shootings were over in less than 20 minutes after they began, and the perpetrators committed suicide shortly thereafter (See Table 3). But because law enforcement did not know what awaited them inside the school, it was almost an hour before law enforcement entered the school building, and almost 4 hours before they entered the library where most of the violence took place, and television networks broadcast the 'standoff' continuously throughout the day. Meanwhile, nearly 1,000 law enforcement officials had amassed throughout the day without ever entering the building (Janofsky 2000). Despite this fact, proposals in the wake of Columbine called for expansion of the School Resource Officer Program which stations police in schools. In fact, Columbine had such an officer who left the building to tend to an injured student ("What if We Had Taken Columbine Seriously?" 2000, 20).

Police response and preparedness got relatively little national attention in the aftermath of Columbine; which has been explained as follows: "partly, there was a commendable reluctance by the media to shift any blame away from the two murderers themselves. And partly, too, there was a widespread feeling that it would be ignoble to question the work of the police in hindsight, given the chaos of that day" ("What if We Had Taken Columbine Seriously?" 2000). These reasons do not seem sufficient. There was, after all, little reluctance on the part of the media to shift the blame to musicians, parents, gun laws, or bullies. The police are the public agency charged with reacting appropriately in a chaotic situation, and the public rarely forgives them when they do not, such as the Rodney King or OJ Simpson incidents. This was pre-9/11, before emergency first responders were accorded the status they now have. With the lives of teenagers at stake, it seems unlikely that the American public would suddenly sympathize with 1000 law enforcement officials scared and unprepared to face off with two high school age gunmen.

AFTERMATH AND THE DEATH/SUICIDE OF PERPETRATORS

Instead, perhaps the police escaped scrutiny for another reason; because the perpetrators were dead, and so 'law enforcement' was no longer an issue at Columbine. The Columbine tragedy had instantly become a symbol, so that the details of the Columbine shootings in particular became irrelevant and were no longer part of the debate. Normally, a crime of this magnitude would be closely scrutinized and the police response and the criminal trial would be given considerable coverage.[2] But at Columbine, the deaths of the perpetrators "robbed the

public of the important cathartic benefit of public prosecution. Lacking an opportunity to punish the criminals who tore the social fabric, the public, the media, and legislators sought catharsis elsewhere" ("What if We Had Taken Columbine Seriously?" 2000). "Elsewhere," in this case, turned out to be beyond Littleton borders in national debates about gun control, entertainment violence, and 'kids today.' But because there were no evildoers to catch and bring to justice, the Columbine narrative did not include a subplot about law enforcement, and the law enforcement response went largely unexamined. In Colorado, police publish report after report about the events of that day and the subsequent investigation, but the substance and controversy held in these reports go largely unnoticed by the nation at large.

The media focus on the shooters in Columbine created several dilemmas. There was concern that the perpetrators would become cult heroes and that publicity of the event would encourage 'copycat' shootings, and that making the public aware of the event would mean glorifying their deeds (Zuckerman 2001, 1).

Discussion of Columbine has been in broad strokes; we have talked about teenagers in general, electoral politics, the role of parents, and civil liberties in schools. It seems that the actual teenagers shot on April 20, 1999 have been all but forgotten. These images have none of the anesthetic of symbolism or metaphor, and they remind us.
One journalist wrote:

> One of our nastier local columnists had written this spring that the families should stop whining and sucking up money for their problems. I thought he was a jerk to complain, but I did think the families were misguided. It was hard to see how ripping out a floor and ceiling was going to provide the kind of relief they were looking for. How could obliterating the library wipe out their bad memories? They'd thrown their hearts into this campaign for a year now, they were heavily invested emotionally and they seemed headed for sure disappointment.

> But I was wrong.

> The cafeteria was wide open and airy with the extra vertical space from the atrium and an eye-catching mural on the ceiling. The plate-glass windows that had been blocked by lockers were clear again, looking down into the cafeteria, across to green outer tinted windows, and all the way to the Rocky Mountains if you scrunched down and peered. But the change wasn't about the view, the painting or anything outwardly architectural; it was what was missing. The library had vanished. It didn't feel hidden, it didn't feel missing, it looked and felt like it had never existed (Cullen 2000).

THE MEMORIAL–CONCLUSION

The Columbine massacre occurred at a time of relative stability and prosperity in the United States. Because it played out on national television, because so many lives were claimed, and because of Littleton's socio-demographic characteristics, Columbine left the country asking; "Will we be next?" Columbine was placed on the national stage as an example of lax gun control policy, and tragedy's ability to strike anywhere. However, while battles were fought in public over gun control, the nature of youth, and made-for-TV violence, the rebuilding and remembrance process was taking place in Littleton.

For now, the Littleton community has decided to let wounds heal before deciding how the story of Columbine will be told to their successors.

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ENDNOTES

1 "Spree shooting" is defined as crimes (by perpetrators of any age) with multiple victims at least one of whom died, occurred in a gathering place such as workplace, school or shopping center, and excluding domestic violence, serial killings, and politically motivated murders.

2 Think of the OJ Simpson and Timothy McVeigh trials. Perhaps this is also why the security issues that have taken the forefront after 9/11 were lost after the Oklahoma City Bombing. Because in OK City there was a live perpetrator to be brought to justice, the national attention focused on his trial and the major issue at hand became the death penalty instead.

RECOVERY, REMEMBRANCE AND GROWTH:
RWANDAN CITIES AFTER THE 1994 GENOCIDE

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ABSTRACT

This article examines the impact of the 1994 Rwandan genocide and war on Rwanda's urban areas, with a focus on the capital Kigali. While Rwanda has historically been a predominantly rural country, its cities have been transformed in the aftermath of the genocide, as large population migrations have caused unprecedented growth in urban areas. The influx of urban residents is in response to new social and economic opportunities in cities since the genocide, but the rapid increase has also put considerable strain on the already limited resources of municipal authorities. However, negotiating shortages of funding and human resources, Rwandan authorities have nonetheless made urban growth an integral part of the country's reconstruction and development goals.

INTRODUCTION

How do a country and its people recover from a genocide that claimed the lives of 800,000 people in 100 days? The horror of the mass killings has inspired a great deal of research by international aid agencies, academics and journalists as to the causes of the 1994 genocide. Much has also been written about the challenges of Rwanda's recovery and reconciliation, and the continuing struggle to bring to justice those responsible for the massacres.

This article considers the widespread social, demographic and cultural changes in the country since the genocide, and looks at how they have spurred unprecedented urban growth in this predominantly rural country. The historical background and colonial legacy of Rwandan urban policy explain why urban development has until recently been much more limited than in other African countries. The cause of the recent increase in urban development appears twofold: on one hand, social changes brought about by the genocide have made life in urban areas more attractive to Rwandans, and on the other hand, the government has made urbanization an integral part of their social and economic recovery and development strategy.

Figure 1. MAP OF RWANDA
Source: United Nations.

GENOCIDE IN THE LAND OF A THOUSAND HILLS

Rwanda is a hilly landlocked Eastern African country about the size of the American state of Vermont. With 8.3 million people, it has a population density of about 315 inhabitants per square km, one of the highest in Africa (Economist Intelligence Unit 2002; Préfecture de la Ville de Kigali 2001). Originally colonized by Germany, then by Belgium after the German defeat in World War I, Rwanda has remained a predominantly rural country, with close to 89% of the population living in the countryside and making a living from agriculture (Préfecture de la Ville de Kigali 2001). Rwanda's main sources of revenue are from the production and export of coffee and tea, and, before the genocide, a tourist industry based on the country's national parks and rich wildlife.

The 1994 genocide began after Rwandan President Habyarimana's airplane was shot down over Kigali on April 6th, 1994. The newly installed Hutu leaders almost immediately started the organized extermination of Tutsis and moderate Hutus who opposed them. The ensuing killings claimed the lives of between 800,000 and a million people over the course of 3 months, between April and June 1994. About 700,000 of the victims were of the Tutsi ethnic group, targeted for extermination by the extremist Hutu government, but an estimated 100,000 Hutus, political moderates and those who opposed to the killing of Tutsis also perished. The victory of the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Army over government troops on July 4th, 1994, marked the end of the genocide, but important demographic shifts continued in the country: Hutus were killed in revenge for the genocide, and millions, fearing reprisals, fled to neighboring countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Burundi. Since 1994, there has been a gradual repatriation of people from refugee camps and neighboring countries. These are Tutsi refugees from the 1994 genocide, Hutus who had left the country after the genocide, but also "old refugees" – exiled Tutsi Rwandans who had fled persecution and killings in 1959 and were now returning with their foreign-born children to a homeland they had not set foot in for over 30 years.

RECONSTRUCTION, GROWTH AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN URBAN AREAS

Environmental and human scars
In the period after the genocide Rwanda has seen a relatively rapid reconstruction of the physical damage of the war, but the social and psychological consequences run deep. In his award-winning book about the Rwandan genocide, *We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will be Killed with our Families*, Philip Gourevitch writes:

"I asked Joseph, the man who was giving me a ride, whether Rwandans realize what a beautiful country they have. "Beautiful?" he said. "You think so? After the things that happened here?" [...]

"[...] I, as a newcomer, could not see the emptiness that blinded Joseph to Rwanda's beauty. Yes, there were grenade-flattened buildings, burnt homesteads, shot-up facades, and mortar-pitted roads. But these were the ravages of war, not of genocide, and by the summer of 1995, most of the dead had been buried [...]. Now the work of the killers looked just as they had intended: invisible."

During my June 2002 visit to Rwanda, it was difficult to tell that there had been a war and genocide less than 10 years ago. To the eye of a visitor, the physical damage to the capital city of Kigali has been repaired. I found just one house in the central Kacyiru part of the Nyabugenge area that had not been rehabilitated. According to Emmanuel Nyirinkwaya, Director of Urban Planning and Housing for the City of Kigali, a few houses in the Nyamirambo area still bear bullet marks (Nyirinkwaya 2002). But otherwise, as Gourevitch remarks, there is hardly any indication in the physical environment of the tremendous human toll of the genocide. The bridge to Gitarama on the outskirts of Kigali, where thousands of bodies were dumped and floated up the river to Lake Victoria, is spotless. Roads have been repaired, or in some cases like the road to Kibuye, new ones were built. The memorials to the victims of the genocide are omnipresent, but even they are understated given the extent of human loss and suffering that took place. In the town of Kibuye, an enclosed 30 by 50 meter grassy plot of land on the main road next to the stadium bears inscriptions in French, English and Kinyirwanda, indicating where 10,000 victims of the genocide are buried; the gates are open and goats graze inside. At the Nyakibanda Seminary in Butare, the classrooms and courtyard that were destroyed by grenades and gunfire, and where 3,000 were murdered, have been renovated, and a modest memorial next to it marks the reburial site of the victims. In Kigali, a column with a wreath of flowers in the front garden of United Nations Development Programme offices bears the names of United Nations staff lost in the events of 1994.

If the physical environment of the towns does not convey the horror of the genocide, the memory of what happened lives on in the survivors. It is what Ed Linenthal calls the "toxic narrative" in the context of the Oklahoma City bombing – the physical and psychological trauma that acts as a daily reminder to the victims and witnesses of the attacks – that is most poignant in Rwanda. Rwanda is still recovering from the

Figure 2. CEMETERY AND MEMORIAL TO 10,000 VICTIMS IN KIBUYE
Source: Author.

genocide, and even to a visitor, everyday life is a reminder of what happened: street children with missing limbs, daily news coverage about trials and the hunt for the génocidaires (perpetrators of the genocide), the common sight of prisoners in pink uniforms working on public works projects, and the constant discovery of mass graves throughout the city. Even those who did not live through the genocide witnessed its horror firsthand: Rwandans who grew up in surrounding countries and returned to Kigali months after the genocide, say that corpses were still laying in the streets and in houses where people had been murdered, scenes that they are not likely to forget.

The Return of Refugees and Unprecedented Urban Growth
The end of the genocide brought about tremendous movements of populations across and within Rwanda's borders. Despite the massive loss of population, the resident population of Rwanda did not decrease significantly after the genocide due to the return of 1.1 million "old refugees" - Rwandans who had fled ethnic killings in the country between 1959 and 1973 (Bucagu 2000).

In 2000, "old" and "new" returned refugees made up 35% of Rwanda's population. According to government figures, the population of Rwanda in March 1994, before the genocide, was 7,750,000. In 1996 it was 7,650,000, and in the year 2000, it had increased to 8,340,000 (Bucagu 2000).

The return of refugees after the genocide has spurred tremendous urban growth in this predominantly rural country. Kigali, the capital, more than doubled from about 236,000 in 1991 to 608,000 in 2002 (National Census Service, 2002).

According to Monique Sevumba, the Director of Urbanism and Public Infrastructure at the Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communication (MINITRACO), secondary cities are also experiencing surges in population: in roughly the same period Butare grew from 30,000 to 70,000 inhabitants, Ruhengeri from 10,000 to 80,000, and

Table 1. RWANDAN REFUGEES ACCORDING TO DATE OF RETURN TO RWANDA

Source: UNHCR Rwanda Report, April 2000, in Bucagu, 2000; * Rwandan Government.

Year	"Old" Refugees (pre-1994)	"New" Refugees (post-1994)	After 1996	Undetermined	Total
1994	900,000	200,000	-		1,100,000*
1995	146,476	79,302	-		225,778
1996	28,646	1,271,936	-		1,300,582
1997	615	199,183	-		218,798
1998	7,723	3,167	-		10,890
1999	890	15,230	4,107	18,001	38,228
April 2000	10	5,101	376		5,487
Total	1,103,360	1,773,919	4,483	18,001	2,899,763

Gisenye from 20,000 to 60,000 (Sevumba 2000).

Part of this growth is due to the administrative expansion of urban boundaries, but the influx of new inhabitants has been the major cause of the increase (National Census Service, 2002). Sevumba explains that since the returning Rwandan refugees had been living abroad in refugee camps that functioned like small towns, they preferred the urban environment of Rwanda's cities. Furthermore, many of the "old" refugees and their families had lived and grown up in large East African cities like Kinshasa in the DRC, Dar Es Salaam in Tanzania, and Kampala in Uganda. Accustomed to living and working in cities, they had no desire to settle in the countryside and farm, so they relocated to Rwanda's urban areas (Sevumba 2002). The pattern of urban growth is largely a reflection of the travel routes of returning refugees. The population growth in the

Table 2. RWANDAN POPULATION BETWEEN 1952 AND 2000
General Population and Housing Census, 1991; Social and Demographic Study, 1996 in Bucagu, 2000

Year	Resident Population
1952	2,000,000
1970	3,572,550
1978 (August)	4,831,527
1991 (August)	7,157,551
1994 (March)	7,745,778
1996 (November)	7,651,792
2000 (June)	8,342,000

Table 3. RESIDENT URBAN POPULATION IN RWANDA BETWEEN 1978 AND 2002
Source: General Census of Population and Housing, Rwanda: 16-30 August 2002.
Report on the Preliminary Results.

Province/City	Total Population		
	1978	**1991**	**2002**
Kigali City	698,442	235,664	608,141
Kigali Ngali		914,034	792,542
Gitarama	606,212	851,451	864,594
Butare	602,550	764,448	722,616
Gikongoro	370,596	467,332	492,607
Cyangugu	333,187	514,656	609,504
Kibuye	336,588	470,643	467,745
Gisenyi	468,882	734,658	867,225
Ruhengeri	531,927	769,297	894,175
Byumba	521,894	982,427	712,372
Umutara			423,642
Kbongo	361,249	652,941	707,548
Rwanda Total	**4,831,527**	**7,157,551**	**8,162,715**

northwestern towns of Ruhengeri and Gisenye is explained by their proximity to the DRC border and mild climate that made them attractive to Rwandans returning from the DRC. People returning from Burundi in the South have tended to settle in the university town of Butare and in Nyanza (Sevumba 2002).

SOCIAL CHANGE AND NEW OPPORTUNITIES: IN RWANDAN CITIES

The returned refugees have brought significant cultural change with them to Rwandan towns and cities, and urban areas in turn offer new opportunities sought by genocide survivors and their families. Because of the influx of "old refugees" and their families from Anglophone countries like Uganda and Tanzania, Rwanda has added English as an official language. Official government business is now conducted in French, English, and Kinyirwanda, and public workers are expected to be proficient in all three. According to Lillian Muiine from the Office of Good Governance at the City of Kigali, it has not been too difficult for Rwandans from abroad like herself to adapt to Rwandan society. Despite having grown up in different countries, all Rwandans have in common the Kinyirwanda language, and according to her, it is difficult to tell apart

Urban Population			Urban Population (%)		
1978	**1991**	**2002**	**1978**	**1991**	**2002**
115,990	235,664	608,141	16.6	100.0	100.0
		51,128			6.5
8,531	17,490	128,449	1.4	2.1	14.9
33,752	38,442	133,148	5.6	5.0	18.4
5,637	8,506	32,476	1.5	1.8	6.6
7,201	9,693	59,429	2.2	1.9	9.8
3,045	4,393	46,500	0.9	0.9	9.9
12,655	22,156	67,192	2.7	3.0	7.7
18,492	29,286	70,525	3.6	3.8	7.9
7,702	11,947	66,536	1.5	1.5	9.3
		8,003			19.0
9,272	13,617	90,785	2.6	2.1	12.8
222,727	**391,194**	**1,362,312**	**4.61**	**5.47**	**16.69**

the newcomers from those who grew up in the country. Furthermore, the newcomers have also brought with them a will to invest their energy in rebuilding the country, said Muiine. "Imagine," she told me, "that you have been exiled for 30 years and all of the sudden you have the chance to go back to your country."

Peace in Rwanda has also attracted non-Rwandans to the country. In addition to the staff of international organizations, for example, a sizeable population of Senegalese fled armed conflicts in Burundi and the DRC to settle in Kigali after the genocide. With them they have brought their trading and tailoring businesses.

It is unclear how many people were killed in cities as opposed to the countryside during the genocide. Certainly, most of the population lived in rural areas, but when the killings began, many left their homes and sought refuge in schools and religious establishments in or around nearby towns. Unbeknownst to those seeking protection, this regrouping of people was often orchestrated by genocide organizers in order to facilitate the killings, and some of the worst massacres consequently happened in urban areas. On the other hand, according to Sevumba, many survivors are those who hid in Kigali, perhaps because of greater

means of communication with the outside world and a foreign presence, albeit dwindling. For example, over a thousand people who took refuge in Kigali's prestigious Hotel des Milles Collines survived, in part because of their greater visibility to the international community (Gourevitch 1998).

In the period after the genocide many people came to towns for security reasons, because there continued to be raids and killings throughout the countryside. Also, for perpetrators of the genocide, urban life provided more anonymity and distance from their crimes and the accusations they faced in their villages (Sevumba 2002; Nyirinkwaya 2002). Many new urban dwellers are also attracted by the greater economic opportunities and resources available in cities, such as schools, government services, and employment. One such area of opportunity has been the construction industry which boomed after 1997, particularly in Kigali due to the funding available for reconstruction and the building of new facilities for international organizations (Economist Intelligence Unit 2001).

Unprecedented opportunities for women in the active workforce since the genocide have also been instrumental in attracting families to urban and town centers. In Rwanda, one third of all households are now headed by women, and 20% by widows (Economist Intelligence Unit 2001).In Kigali, 25% of households are headed by females (Prefecture de la Ville de Kigali 2000). Women represent 57% of the population aged 20-44, which can be considered as the most productive working age. If one takes into account the large number of men killed during the genocide, imprisoned and awaiting trial, or still living in neighboring countries, then the role of women in the economic and social reconstruction of the country is even greater (Hamilton 2000). According to Sevumba, "women are rising" in Rwandan society, taking on new responsibilities and jobs in cities like construction work, which was unheard of before the genocide.

As a result of these new social and cultural conditions in Rwanda, the country's urban population increased from 5.5% in 1991 to 16.7% in 2002 (National Census Service 2002). The urbanization trend is unlikely to subside anytime in the near future: the gacaca trials, community-based trials modeled on the traditional Rwandan system of justice, began in June 2002 with the hope of speeding up the judgments of more than 100,000 less serious criminals held in crowded prisons since 1994. The release of these prisoners, demobilization of ex-combatants from the DRC and anticipated return of over 100,000 Rwandans still living abroad will increase the number of Rwandans seeking jobs, shelter and services in urban areas (Brookings Institute 2001).

A NEW URBANIZATION POLICY: URBAN GROWTH BY GOVERNMENT DESIGN

Rwanda had until recently put little emphasis on urban development, and authorities have had to rapidly formulate a response to the dramatic growth of urban populations (Sevumba 2002). According to Sevumba, Rwandan urban policy before the genocide was "a continuation of the colonial government [policy]" that discouraged people from moving to cities: urban residents were required to obtain an identity card and have proof of gainful employment in order to live in a city. The social and demographic changes after the genocide, however, have shown this policy to be obsolete, as Rwandans have flocked to urban areas in large numbers.

While the government's increased attention to urban development is a response to new demographic conditions in the country, they have also proactively made urbanization an important part of their economic recovery and development policy. Rwanda is a small country with a dense population and finite natural resources, and with the increased population growth after the genocide, its traditional agricultural capacity is reaching its limits. The government must therefore develop alternative means of income for its population (Ngaboyisonga 2002). Since urban areas are seen as an attraction for potential investors in East Africa, the government has set the goal of 30% of the population living in cities by 2020 (Sevumba 2002). This urbanization has been undertaken in three main areas: a villagization policy in the countryside, the organization of urban policy at a national level, and the devolution of planning responsibilities to local governments.

In the countryside, the government has undertaken development in the form of a nationwide campaign of villagization, known in the Kinyirwanda language as *imidugudu*. The official objective is to resettle dispersed rural populations in small communities with government provided housing, in order to allow for a consolidation of agricultural land which will lead to more efficient production, and for better provision of infrastructure and services to "village" inhabitants. The villagization program started before 1994, and has been continued after the genocide, in great part as a means to resettle and provide adequate housing for survivors and the large numbers of returned refugees. Some of the new villages have been established on the outskirts of cities to provide infrastructure and housing near urban centers. While some Rwandans voluntarily resettle, others have resisted, and the villagization policy has been criticized by international aid agencies as a forced relocation of some rural populations by the government. Critics see *imidugudu* in large part as a political move by the government to establish better visibility and control over Rwandans, and point to examples of failed villagization attempts in other African countries like Tanzania and Mozambique (Jackson 1999).

According to Sevumba (2002), Rwanda's new urbanization goals need to be supported by appropriate policies and institutions, which do not yet exist. For example, she says, the current lack of planning is allowing unorganized settlements of people in urban areas, and any future attempt by the government to build new infrastructure like roads will require expensive negotiations and compensation for the displaced residents, which will further hinder the undertaking of such public projects.

On the national level, urban development now falls under the shared jurisdiction of two ministries: the Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communication (MINITRACO), which oversees urban infrastructure, transportation, and urban planning, and the Ministry of Lands, Human Resettlement and Environmental Protection (MINITERE), which is in charge of housing, urbanization policy, and relationships with local authorities. The government is however seeking to delegate more responsibility to municipalities: in 2000, the funding and management of major secondary cities was decentralized and transferred from the central government to local authorities in a move to promote reconciliation and increase local participation in political life. March 2001 marked the first elections of local councils and district mayors, who were formerly known as bourgmestres and appointed by the central government (Economist Intelligence Unit 2002). With the new local responsibilities, however, has come a greater need for local funding and management skills. The opportunities and challenges facing new local governments are illustrated by the case of the city of Kigali in the section that follows.

KIGALI: COPING WITH GROWTH AND PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE

Rwanda's main urban center, Kigali alone currently represents 45% of the country's urban population (National Census Service 2002). Established in 1907 by the Germans as the capital of the Rwandan colony, Kigali grew little under the Belgian administration after World War I, partly because the cities of Butare in the South and Bujumbura in Burundi were favored as administrative centers (Préfecture de la Ville de Kigali 2001). When Kigali was designated the capital of independent Rwanda in 1962, it had a population of only 6,000 people. By 1973, Kigali's population had reached 60,000 (Préfecture de la Ville de Kigali, 2001). In 1993, right before the genocide, it was 250,000 and in 2002, it was estimated at 600,000 to 800,000 people (Préfecture de la Ville de Kigali 2001).

Emmanuel Nyirinkwaya points out that since the war, the city has been dealt the double challenge of coping with rapid population growth and

the simultaneous struggle of the new Rwandan government to rebuild the institutional capacity lost during the genocide.

CHALLENGES FOR A LIMITED MUNICIPAL CAPACITY

Although there are no official figures available as to the extent of the physical destruction in Kigali during the genocide and fighting between the Rwandan Patriotic Army and government troops, the city suffered from damage to houses, road infrastructure and bridges as well as water and electricity supply. Public buildings in particular required a significant amount of rehabilitation (Nyrinkwaya 2002; World Bank 1995). However, according to Nyirinkwaya, most of the damage to the city's infrastructure was rehabilitated by 1997 with a massive influx of international aid. More difficult to recover was the loss of human resources and knowledge. In 1995, a World Bank assessment of emergency needs reported: "The country's institutional memory and project implementation capacity have been all but wiped out by the killings and disappearance of personnel, destruction of files, and theft of computers and equipment." (World Bank 1995). Even when files and official records are available, finding qualified personnel during the transition period after the genocide has been

Figure 3. ADMINISTRATIVE MAP OF KIGALI
Source: Government of Kigali.

difficult, and the turnover has been significant. In 2002 Nyirinkwaya, who was educated abroad as an architect, was the fourth director of urban planning the city had had in the past five years.

While rebuilding its human capacity, Kigali has had to adapt to the many significant changes in its administration since 1994. In 1997, management of the city was transferred from the national government to the Prefecture of Kigali. In March 2001, administration of the city was devolved to the newly created Municipality of Kigali, and in March 2002 the city became administratively and financially independent from the central government, and in charge of local taxation and revenue. At the same time, the city's area of jurisdiction increased threefold, from three districts on 112 km2 to 347 km2 (Préfecture de la Ville de Kigali 2001).

Even as the city struggled to rebuild its institutional and managerial capacity, the increasing number of returning refugees who came to Kigali exacerbated the limited capacity of local officials to provide adequate planning and infrastructure services. For example, of about 3,800 requests for land plots between 1997 and 2001, only 1,291 were filled and 600 building permits issued (Nyrinkwaya 2002). Newcomers have settled wherever they could find available land, usually bypassing municipal authorities even in planned areas of the city, and instead obtaining permission to build their dwellings from traditional leaders (Nyrinkwaya 2002). As a result, City officials estimate that 53% of all residential areas in Kigali are occupied by informal settlements. Shelter for the growing population is sorely lacking: while nearly 10,000 units of housing have been built by the government with the help of foreign donors since the end of the war (Sevumba 2002) and despite some refugee resettlement developments like the Komironko and Gisozi neighborhoods (2,400 households), much of the new housing is out of the reach of most Kigali residents, and it is not nearly enough to satisfy demand. As a result, the number of informal settlements continues to grow (Ngaboyisonga 2002). There are also an estimated 400,000 people who

Figure 4. CONSTRUCTION OF NEW GOVERNMENT HOUSING
Source: Author.

commute to Kigali everyday from surrounding settlements and towns (Sevumba 2000; Ngaboyisonga 2002).

NEW OBJECTIVES OF PLANNING AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

In 1999, with most of the damage to infrastructure repaired and a reorganized administration, the City of Kigali turned to its long-term development plans. It assessed needs and priorities, and in 2001 created a master plan for the year 2020 with funding from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Kigali's Schéma Directeur d'Amènagement et d'Urbanisme (SDAU) is a plan for the spatial development of the city according to the economic development plans elaborated by the national government. Its general goals are: to provide a better living environment for the new inhabitants of the city, to build an attractive business environment for investors, and to improve means of transportation and working conditions in the city (Préfecture de la Ville de Kigali 2001). Since Kigali is the largest urban center in Rwanda and the economic center of the country, its master plan also aims to control the growth of the city so as to encourage the development of secondary cities in Rwanda (Préfecture de la Ville de Kigali, 2001).

In order to attract investment and income for the municipal government and in order to support its larger post-genocide population, Kigali must now fashion itself as a modern and competitive city in the East Africa region (Nyrinkwaya, 2002). Nyrinkwaya points out some of the advantages that Kigali has over nearby cities like Nairobi, notably its small size and the shorter travel distances within Rwanda, as well as its current relative political stability and safety. The Nyarugenge quarter is the largest commercial area of Kigali, housing most embassies, international organizations and banks and stores. It is low density, with broad tree-lined streets and large walled compounds, and 2-3 story buildings in the core commercial area. However, the city planning office would like new

Figure 5. VIEW OF NYARUGENGE FROM KACYIRU ADMINISTRATIVE QUARTER
Source: Author.

Figure 6. NYARUGENGE BUSINESS DISTRICT
Source: Author.

developments to have a minimum of four stories (Nyrinkwaya, 2002), and the city has planned the relocation of some current merchants to make way for high-rises (Hassan, 2002). Construction work for the ten-storied headquarters of the Bank of Commerce and Development and Industry is underway in the center of town.

CONCLUSION

Francis Gatare, an economist at the United Nations Development Fund, is optimistic about the future of Rwanda. "What other option is there?" he asks. The United Nations maintains a strong presence in Rwanda, with the International Tribunal, World Food Programme, and the Development Fund. After the genocide, three billion dollars were pledged by donors to rebuild the country. However, after an initial glut of funding between 1994 and 1997, it is unlikely that much foreign aid will continue to be allocated to Rwanda, given the emergence of other reconstruction priorities like Afghanistan and Iraq (Gatare, 2002). Outside funding allowed a rapid reconstruction of the physical infrastructure, but the country is far from having recovered, and Rwanda remains one of the poorest countries in the world.

Rwanda is in the unique position of experiencing its urban boom later than most other African countries, and in the context of recovery from a major trauma to the country's population and social fabric. The end of the genocide created opportunities for demographic change, both with the return of "old" refugees who had become accustomed to urban life abroad, and of "new" refugees attracted to the security, amenities, and new cultural and economic opportunities of Rwanda's towns and cities. The Rwandan government has responded to this rapid urbanization by restructuring the governance of urban areas and making urbanization and villagization a national priority, but given the scarcity of resources and the magnitude of the population's needs in housing, infrastructure, and social services, the task is daunting. The Rwandan government has so far benefited from initial international support for their planning efforts and the enthusiasm and talent of returned refugees in rebuilding the country, but their challenge will ultimately lie in striking a balance

between promoting further urbanization for economic reasons and managing the tremendous urban growth that is already underway.

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CONFRONTING THE PHOENIX: TRANSFORMATION OR TRADITION? POST CRISIS RECONSTRUCTION TENSIONS IN NAPIER, NEW ZEALAND AFTER THE EARTHQUAKE OF 1931.

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ABSTRACT

A massive earthquake, followed by fires, effaced the colonial port town of Napier on the east coast of New Zealand's North Island on 3 February 1931. The area rose two meters, with approximately three thousand hectares reclaimed from the seabed. It occurred during the Great Depression before the institutionalisation of New Zealand's Welfare State and remains the worst disaster in the nation's history. Reconstruction of the town commenced almost immediately and was nearly complete by 1933. Notwithstanding the loss of life and property, the quake opened up opportunities for improvements in town planning, modernisation of infrastructure, and innovation in architectural design, facilitated by new forms of governance, astute leadership, and community engagement. The 'New Napier' was remarkable for its 'Art Deco' central business area, waterfront beautification, and suburban extensions. The Napier experience led to immediate reforms in national building standards and contributed overtime to revisions in the planning statute. Ideals were, however, compromised by the scale of the task, the costs and urgency of reconstruction, shortcomings in emergency management and loss adjustment, and the impact of the global economic crisis combined with a largely unsympathetic central government. Settlement inertia, entrenched values, and resident complacency strengthened resistance to change. There was a tension between the need to find meaning in tragedy through progressive and prudent urban renewal and the desire to restore the town to what it had been. As a consequence, the changes achieved were largely pragmatic and incremental, rather than radical and far-reaching.

INTRODUCTION

Cities and their buildings have always been vulnerable to natural phenomena such as earthquakes, floods and volcanic eruptions or to human influences such as war, terrorism and economic failure. An element of risk is inherent in city living: its management is part of the business of modern government and future-oriented planning mechanisms. While urban crises cause terrible destruction and tragedy alien to everyday experience, they can at the same time provide the impetus for civic renewal: the opportunity to break with past and respond to new cultural and economic possibilities. They may also prompt a review of institutional structures and processes, emergency management procedures and hazard reduction policies.

This article focuses on the reconstruction of the New Zealand town of Napier following a catastrophic earthquake in 1931. The case of Napier is nationally significant, given the magnitude of the calamity (New Zealand's most severe earthquake if measured in loss of life and property) and the impact of the event on a depression economy. It also offers historical insights into the planning and rebuilding processes that take place after urban disasters, which offer significant opportunities to chart new territories and visions, although the forces of urban agglomeration, political inertia and human behaviour can provide powerful resistance to change.

Following an outline that first describes life in Napier immediately prior to the earthquake and then the event itself, the reconstruction of the 'New Napier' is reviewed, focusing on local and national policy and design responses affecting the built environment. These include the impact of the crisis on governance, infrastructure, business, the town plan, building codes, and architectural styles. Consideration is then given to the forces that militate against change and lead to the restoration of the status quo. The conclusion reflects on the factors and tensions that encouraged and restrained planning innovation in Napier and its significance for other cities planning in the wake of natural disaster.

'EARTHSHOCK 7.8'

Napier is a city on the east coast of the North Island of New Zealand and the civic focus and port for the Hawke's Bay region. Napier was constituted as a borough in 1874, becoming a city in 1950 once its population reached 20,000. By 2001 it had a population of 53,661, 1.4% of the population of New Zealand (Statistics New Zealand, 2004).

The harbour and sunny, fertile plains of the region attracted Maori[1] settlement long before it was discovered by Captain James Cook in 1769

Figure 1. MAP SHOWING LOCATION OF NAPIER
Source: Author.

and named after Sir Edward Hawke, First Lord of the Admiralty. The future site of the town, a sand-spit enclosed by hills, was known to Maori as Ahuriri 'the rushing in of waters'. Whalers, traders and missionaries arrived from the 1830s, with permanent colonial settlement commencing in earnest after the Government bought the land from Maori in 1851. Alfred Domett, Commissioner of Crown Lands and Resident Magistrate 1854, prepared the plan gazetted in 1855. The design was shaped by topography, with quarter acre town sections laid out on the flat land and suburban sections of 2.5 to 8 acres on the accessible parts of the hills (known as Scinde Island). The street pattern followed the gullies. Land was set aside for public institutions, services and reserves and considered more generous than those provided in other towns established at the time (New Zealand Government, 1855). Domett named the town after the British war hero Sir Charles Napier and continued the imperial theme in street designations with the commemoration of military campaigns and the imputed urbanity of prominent scientists

and poets (Domett in Shaw and Hallet 1998, 9).

Napier evolved as a provincial centre of government and export port for its pastoral and horticultural hinterland. The town prospered after the development of refrigerated shipping in the 1880s and through the growth of rural service and processing businesses. Railway construction began in 1872, with the connection to the capital Wellington completed in 1891 and links to other provincial centres built over the next thirty years. Growing wealth was reflected in its British Victorian colonial architecture, often hastily built. After a fire in 1886 building regulations required all new inner city buildings to be constructed of brick or concrete (Campbell 1975,129) and the timber structures of the settlers were replaced by large and ornately decorated two to three storey brick and concrete buildings or updated with the addition of elaborate façades and porticos.

By the late 19th century Napier was promoted nationally and internationally as a holiday resort, modelled on the English seaside and touted as 'The Brighton of the Pacific'. Early in the twentieth century, it was recorded that the town had an "an exceedingly neat and clean appearance", asphalted streets, water from wells and artesian bores, gas lighting, botanical gardens, town squares and a Marine Parade and bay "which resembles somewhat that of Naples" (Cyclopedia of New Zealand 1908, 305). "Handsome" buildings accommodated leading business and government institutions; there were churches, schools, and newspapers along with a cathedral, a Municipal Theatre, and a gentlemen's club

Figure 2. NAPIER BEFORE THE QUAKE
Source: Collection of Hawke's Bay Cultural Trust - Hawke's Bay Museum, Napier.

(Cyclopedia of New Zealand 1908, 304-305). There was a strong sense of civic pride and philanthropy. A group of businessmen formed the Napier Thirty-Thousand Club in 1913 to boost the town's population through improvements in amenity and promotion: "Napier – Bright, Breezy and Beautiful – an ideal spot to live in, excellent in its natural beauty of situation, which gained for it the reputation of being the 'Nice of the South' " (Campbell 1975, 125). The population grew from 343 in 1858, to 8,341 in 1891. By 1930, there were 16,160 people (1.14% of New Zealand's population), just over half the Thirty-Thousand Club's target (Childs 1972, 3).

Despite the promotional hype, the Hawke's Bay region was vulnerable to forces of nature. Severe storms and flooding were documented in 1867, 1893, 1897, 1917 and 1924; earthquakes measuring greater than Magnitude 6 were recorded in 1863, 1892, 1898, 1903, 1921, 1929 and 1930 (Hawke's Bay Regional Council 2001-2003). Significant droughts in 1903, 1915, 1920, 1921, 1926 and 1931 undermined the region's pastoral prosperity (Johnston and Pierce 1999, 32).

The tenuous nature of the international economic environment was causing even more concern at the end of the 1920's as the Great Depression (1929-35) "settled on New Zealand 'like a new and unwanted stranger, a ghostly visitor to the house'" (Belich 2001, 243). As demand contracted in Europe and America, export prices fell, production diminished and unemployment rose. The national debt increased to "truly awesome proportions" and by 1931-2, twenty-six percent of the country's exports went towards paying interest that, by 1933, added up to forty percent of government expenditure (Sinclair 1969, 256). As government revenue fell, spending on public works, the civil service and welfare was cut. Twenty-three thousand were registered as unemployed in February 1931, and at the height of the Depression (1933) it is estimated that over one hundred thousand were unemployed, approximately forty percent of the male workforce (King 2003, 346). The average male wage in the Hawke's Bay region almost halved from £200 to £120 between

Figure 3. EARLY NAPIER
Source: Collection of Hawke's Bay Cultural Trust - Hawke's Bay Museum, Napier.

1926 and 1935, and women's wages dropped from £105 to £55 in the same period (Wright 2001, 467). Soup kitchens and other forms of charitable support were established. The Napier Borough Council set up a scheme to employ those out of work on council projects, but relief was limited through lack of finance. Even when augmented by government subsidies "such measures were piecemeal. They could not stop the growing tide of misery in the community" (Campbell 1975, 121).

Nature dealt the region a greater misery when the Hawke's Bay Earthquake struck "like a bolt from the blue" (Ashcroft in Wright 2001a, 5) at 10.46am on a still and sultry Tuesday, 3 February 1931. The ground shook for two and a half minutes, with a thirty-second lull in the middle and was followed by five hundred and twenty-five aftershocks over the next fourteen days. The area tilted upwards over two metres, water rushed out of the estuarine Ahuriri harbour and 2,230-3,000 (figures vary) hectares of seabed were 'naturally' reclaimed. The quake was shallow (at approximately 16 kilometres), with an epicentre 15-20 kilometres north of the Town, and measured 7.8 on the Richter scale[2.]

One hundred and sixty two people died in Napier (one percent of the population, equivalent to ten thousand in a city of one million) two hundred and fifty eight people died in the region (two percent of the

Figure 4. NAPIER FIRES
Source: Collection of Hawke's Bay Cultural Trust - Hawke's Bay Museum, Napier.

population). Many were killed by falling masonry or caught in the devastating fires that followed. Ignited by chemist shop gas burners, the central area of the town was in flames an hour after the shake. Water mains ruptured, sumps (irregularly checked), had dried up, and hoses clogged with sand when fireman tried to pump water from the sea. By the next day the town centre had vanished. Bridges disintegrated and communications, sanitation and the water supply were severely disrupted. Many public buildings including schools, hospitals, churches and an old people's home crumbled, some only recently built:

> The quality of the building more or less decided its fate in the earthquake... There were a number of buildings soundly constructed of ferro-cement which showed no ill effects of the earthquake beyond slight cracks. Others, where the construction was faulty, were reduced to ruins. The whole town bore the appearance of having been subjected to a severe artillery attack for some days, and many of the buildings, of which portions remained erect, constituted a continued source of danger owing to their cracked and fissured walls (Callaghan 1933, 9).

Connections were often made with World War One, both in descriptions of the wreckage and in the social bonds forged between people during hard times. Many of Napier's leaders had fought in France and early citizen-led emergency relief efforts drew on old regimental ties and wartime experience (Wright 2001b, 444-5). Popular accounts suggest that

Figure 5. EARTHQUAKE DAMAGE
Source: Collection of Hawke's Bay Cultural Trust - Hawke's Bay Museum, Napier.

class distinctions dissolved and there were many stories of heroism, stoicism and simple human kindness (The Daily Telegraph, 1981; Wright, 1994). Hardly any of Napier's citizens were unaffected by the death or injury of family and friends. In a few unpredicted and unprecedented minutes, normal expectations were destabilised and shock, grief and confusion followed. Human vulnerability and loss were embodied in the ruins of the town's buildings and infrastructure, which had so obviously failed to afford protection and sustenance - or to be an enduring monument to civic prosperity and achievement.

Institutional structures also broke down with the death or affliction of personnel and the destruction of premises and records. There was no emergency plan and local government collapsed. On the day after the earthquake, residents, local administrators and central government officials formed the ad hoc Napier Citizens' Control Committee[3] to coordinate rescue efforts and restore public services (water, sewerage, communications, and electricity). Two days later it became an official sub-committee of the Borough Council and operated for five weeks until the appointment of two government commissioners who took over the 'functions and duties' of the Council in March. John Saxon Barton, an accountant and magistrate, and Lachlan Bain Campbell, a public works engineer, were initially appointed under The Municipal Corporations Act 1920, s49. Their authority was confirmed and powers extended in April with the passage of The Hawke's Bay Earthquake Act 1931 (Callaghan, 1933; Conly, 1980). Early recovery was assisted by the presence of the Navy[4], with relief from charities, neighbouring towns and subsequently from throughout New Zealand.

Contemporary newspaper reports capture the sense of despair: "It's the end of Napier!"..."You will never get any one to live here again" (The Daily Telegraph 1981, 126). But the press also conveyed the yearning "to get back to normal...To be as 'you were' was the general desire...(but) bigger, brighter and better than ever" (The Daily Telegraph 1981, 112) and exemplified the ambiguous vision that shaped Napier's uncertain redevelopment: what part of the city should go back to normal; what should or could be bigger, brighter, or better?

IMAGE OF THE PHOENIX: THE NEW NAPIER

The downtown was substantially rebuilt in two years, along with schools, hospitals and other public institutions. This was celebrated with the Napier Carnival in January 1933; as a gesture of thanks, every New Zealander was invited to come admire the accomplishment. *The Dominion* (1933)[5] produced a special supplement surveying the reconstruction. The image of the Phoenix was invoked, with its mythical qualities of immortality,

resurrection and life after a fiery death. Journalists proclaimed that:
> The Napier of tomorrow - it might be said the Napier of today... will rouse admiration, for it is being transformed into a model town - beautiful in architecture and modern in every detail, from the curved corners of its widened streets to the glinting plate-glass and nickel steel of its fascinating shop windows (19).

Nature's tabula rasa presented Napier's citizens with the unique opportunity to start afresh and holistically design a new town: drawing on and responding to contemporary planning principles (the use of physical design and regulation to promote health, safety, amenity and economic development) and the latest technologies (metal framing, reinforced concrete, plate glass, electricity, the telephone and the automobile). In effect, the earthquake seemed to have provided Napier with the chance to break with the happenstance of its colonial-settler origins and frontier mentality, and to embrace the urban practices of the 'modern' machine age.

Town planning was nascent in New Zealand in the 1930's, building regulation was not widely accepted, and policies for managing civil emergencies were non-existent. The disaster triggered new forms of governance and cooperative commercial and design alliances to assist in recovery and reconstruction; new infrastructure opportunistically incorporating new technologies; a revised plan for the central business district; innovative plans for suburban expansion; and a new architecture responding to safety imperatives, reflecting international styles, and disciplined by economic conditions. It led directly to the introduction of a national building code and eventually, to a more effective national planning framework.

New Governance
Despite the hazard prone nature of the Hawke's Bay (and New Zealand in general) contingency plans had not been prepared and Napier's emergency administration (the Commission) was seen to be "rare, if not unique, in New Zealand" (The Dominion 1933, 5). The Commissioners were effectively "benevolent dictators" (McGregor, 1998) with absolute powers (within the government's mandate), but for practical reasons they worked closely with numerous local committees, including the voluntary Citizens' Reconstruction Committee[6] formed in July 1931 to advise on architecture, town design, building safety, and the reconstruction of public and commercial institutions. Local officials supported the suspension of normal democratic processes, probably hoping that the presence of government appointees would increase the state's largesse (Conly, 1980). A centralised authority with streamlined decision-making powers was identified as an important factor in the town's rapid regeneration, and the press reported that some residents were not pleased when

Figure 6: NAPIER UNDER CONSTRUCTION
Source: Hawke's Bay Cultural Trust - Hawke's Bay Museum, Napier.

"ponderous" local government returned in May 1933 (*The Dominion* 1933, 5). Others were concerned at the loss of public debate and while the Reconstruction Committee was a pragmatic response and thought to represent a good cross-section of opinion, it was also criticised for being a "self-elected body" (*The Dominion* 1933, 3).

Commentators suggest that the Commissioners used their powers wisely and compassionately, carrying out "their task with zeal, thoughtfulness, and a generous perspective...(to) enable a much improved town to rise from the ruins" (Callaghan 1933, 35). They had the vision to recognise that the rebuilding process offered the potential for urban improvement: "We are not merely replacing what was there before, but have been planning with an eye to the future" (Commissioner Barton in *The Dominion* 1933, 3) and are credited with building optimism and a sense of purpose:

> Commission control achieved much more than (the restoration of physical infrastructure). A creation of a new confidence in the future was probably the greatest gain and determination to build bigger and better – and more safely- welded a community spirit that has never left Napier. Out of a shared adversity and harsh loss came the vision of a greater tomorrow, not quickly, but gradually, and often in small ways (Conly in *Daily Telegraph*, 1981).

Napier's resilience is attributed to this confidence and to a New Zealand

culture of self-reliance and resourcefulness, along with the high degree of social cohesion and altruism generated by the Great War and the crisis itself (*The Daily Telegraph*, 1981; Wright, 2001a and b).

Apart from formalising the Commission, The Hawke's Bay Earthquake Act 1931 established new agencies to resolve legal issues and allocate public money for reconstruction. The Adjustment Court[7] was set up to regulate pre-quake liabilities. Once settlements had been reached, the Rehabilitation Committee (engineers and officials from Napier and elsewhere) made grants to those requiring financial assistance from the £1,500,000 Government allocated to the region (£1,250,000 for businesses and £250,000 for local bodies)[8]. An Earthquake Relief Committee, set up immediately after the disaster to assist homeowners with building repairs, worked with the Rehabilitation Committee to allocate funds from a nationwide appeal administered under The Hawke's Bay Earthquake Relief Funds Act 1931.

The Hawke's Bay Earthquake Act also provided for a modification of the Town Planning Act 1926. This was New Zealand's first planning statute[9] and required all cities and boroughs with a population of over a thousand inhabitants to prepare and administer a comprehensive town plan regulating land use through zoning, which had to be approved by a national Town Planning Board. As the Commissioners did not have the time to prepare a comprehensive plan, The Napier Town Planning Regulations 1931 (gazetted in October) provided for the preparation and implementation of special plans for sections of the Borough. Adjustments were made to speed up public notice procedures, deal with issues of compensation and betterment, and clarify legal standing. Some of the changes pioneered through necessity in Napier were subsequently incorporated in The Town and Country Planning Act 1953 that replaced the 1926 Act, which had "proved to be an innocuous, largely unworkable measure" as local authorities lacked the technical capacity and political determination to implement it, and central government the will to enforce it (Memon 1991, 22). The 1953 Act constructed a more effective statutory framework with planning becoming a mandatory responsibility for all local authorities, with greater delegated powers from central government, and significantly improved administrative machinery.

New Infrastructure
In the interests of public health and resettlement, the Commissioners applied themselves most urgently to the provision of essential infrastructure. Drainage, sanitary and water supply systems were rebuilt with a modern plant, and with improvements made to pumping capacities through electrification. An emergency fire fighting system was installed based on strategically bored wells. Lack of pressure had caused the reticulated water supply to fail during the fire; the new system was based

on an old proposal to draw on the tidal waters percolating through the shingles beneath the central area (*The Dominion* 1933, 6). To promote amenity and safety, electricity and telecommunication lines were placed underground (unique at that time in New Zealand) and channelled beneath footpaths so that repairs would not disrupt the street.

The rubbish incinerator was not rebuilt (on cost and inefficiency grounds) with refuse going instead to landfill (Committee of Management 1933, 16). The tramway system was also not reconstructed. Although the trams were a relatively new addition to the civic infrastructure, running since 1921, they had been continuously opposed by some ratepayers[10] who regarded them as a "foolish extravagant attempt to bring Napier, a provincial town...into line with the four main centres" (Campbell 1975, 100). The capital costs of replacing the system and operating losses[11] in pre-quake years were used to justify its closure and replacement by privately operated buses, with the scrapping of trams in United Kingdom and Australasia providing further validation (Committee of Management 1933, 21-22).

In radically altering the physical characteristics of Ahuriri harbour, the earthquake also resolved a long and bitter controversy between experts on the siting of the port. The old Ahuriri port was shallow and tidal and concerns had been raised about its ability to handle to the growing volume of shipping trade. The quake severely damaged infrastructure and the two-metre rise in the seabed further compromised its port functions. This hastened the construction of an artificial harbour (now the Port of Napier) at Bluff Hill on Napier's ocean coast, which had begun in 1887. Rentals from leaseholds and land sales accruing to the Harbour Board[12] through its ownership of the dewatered Ahuriri land helped defray the costs. Some of this land provided a site for the Napier airport, developed in the late 1950s.

New Business
New businesses were established within two weeks in fifty-four temporary corrugated iron shops and offices. 'Tin Town'[13] was built on the town square at the edge of the burnt-out retail district. The first building to open housed the Associated Banks, a short-term alliance forged between the town's finance institutions. Tin Town remained for several years, becoming a popular social centre (Conly 1980) and forerunner of the shopping mall. Apart from permitting business to operate and people to return to work – all the more pressing given the Depression – Tin Town was designed to prevent the hasty and unplanned reconstruction of the central business district. It was recognised that the quake had provided an opportunity to improve the town, provided there was time for appropriate reflection:
It was partly to prevent the town going back to the old order of things

that temporary business premises were built in the Square. Had we encouraged the desire to rebuild at all costs, to rush back to the ruined buildings, clear away the debris and run up any sort of structure, the difficulties in the way of street improvement would have been as great as ever. Instead the business people for the time being moved out of the way...in the meantime it was possible to take stock of the situation and plan for the future (A.B. Hurst, Chair of the Town Planning Committee and Napier Businessman, *The Dominion* 1933, 20).

New Plans

Unlike many of New Zealand's other towns and cities, Napier had prepared a plan under the 1926 Act, which was aimed at rationalising the ad hoc pattern of settler development and improving town layout, with street widening to deal with increasing traffic volumes, particularly with the growing popularity of the car. Its implementation, however, had been prevented by a lack of consensus, property rights issues, and an unclear regulatory framework (Childs, 1972). The disaster provided the necessary impetus and civic co-operation to put elements of the plan in place. A local Town Planning Committee[14] was set up to advise the Commissioners and assist the Government Town Planner J.W. Mawson[15] in the preparation of a scheme focusing on the central area, using the 'sectional' provisions of the Napier Town Planning Regulations. Changes focused on improving traffic circulation, visibility, and general amenity, with the widening of major thoroughfares, splaying back of corners, and the creation of several new streets and service lanes[16]. The lanes were designed to provide access for goods and emergency vehicles, but also conduited water, sewerage and other services underground that normally would have been laid in nearby streets. Open spaces were upgraded to provide for parking and recreation (Childs, 1972).

The cost of improvements was relatively modest[17]. Many property owners donated land and waived their rights to compensation, showing considerable public good will in the face of personal loss and business uncertainty. When compensation was paid, often to corner lot owners who were substantially more disadvantaged, it was financed through an insurance company loan. The special powers of the Town Planning Regulations were used to resolve legal difficulties, particularly complex given the destruction of title deeds and mortgage documentation. The Commissioners were skilful negotiators, arguing that the measures would bring economic benefits to business and increased revenue to local government through betterment charges and increased taxes as land values rose (*The Dominion*, 1933).

Nature also endowed Napier with new land for residential and industrial expansion. Prior to 1931, development had been confined to the narrow spit, adjacent Scinde Island hills, and Ahuriri port area. Some reclamation

Figure 7. KIDSON'S BUILDING (1932).
(Corner splayed to incorporate road widening.) Architect: D. B. Frame. Source: Art Deco Trust.

had commenced in the marshy lagoons adjoining the town to provide for residential extension, but this was costly and sporadic as tensions grew between the Borough Council and the Harbour Board. This stalemate was resolved with the uplifting of the Ahuriri seabed and draining of surrounding wetlands. The Napier Harbour Board and Napier Borough Enabling Act 1933 gave the Borough the authority to lease the new land from the Harbour Board, so that it could be developed for housing after further draining and clearing, ensuring that the "work of restoration went hand in hand with plans for expansion" (Watters 1958, 64). The first development was Marewa (from 1934), a comprehensive public housing scheme influenced by Raymond Unwin's design principles and built in 'moderne' Art Deco style, under the sectional plan provisions (Childs, 1972; Shaw and Hallett, 1998). The development proved to be seminal for later joint agreements between the Harbour Board and Borough Council to create the residential suburbs of Onekawa (from 1949), Maraenui (from 1955) Pirimai (1960s), Tamatea (1970s) and industrial areas of Pandora and Onekawa. Comprehensive public planning of this type is relatively unusual in New Zealand and was seen to promote a greater coherence in style and design:

> Such large-scale planned developments, in which the styles of domestic architecture are almost without exception harmonious and representation of the period, are unique in New Zealand, at least in the provincial centers. In most cities development was more piecemeal, as farmland was subdivided on an ad hoc basis (McGregor 2002, 2).

Marine Parade, along the seafront[18], had been identified as a civic and tourist amenity before the quake but the thin shingle beach restricted development. The elevated seabed created a wide sandy swimming beach and a grand promenade park was laid out alongside on top of debris removed from the ruins (Callaghan, 1933; Natusch, 1933). This was carried out under the supervision of the Town Planning Committee, the Commissioners and the Napier Reconstruction Committee. The Napier Thirty-Thousand Club and other private benefactors contributed public art, an outdoor dance floor, a Hollywood-styled sound shell, and memorials to the dead and to those who came to the rescue (Callaghan 1933). The park, now the City's leading tourist attraction with the post-war addition of an aquarium and marine park, continues to be the focus of public commemoration.

New Architecture

The phoenix was perhaps most potently represented to the people in the architectural transformation of central Napier. Four local firms collaborated to form the 'Associated Architects'[19], a novel professional

Figure 8. HAWKE'S BAY CHAMBERS (1932).
Architect: E. A. Williams. Source: Art Deco Trust.

Figure 9. DAILY TELEGRAPH BUILDING (C1933).
Architect: E. A. Williams. Source: Art Deco Trust.

arrangement that brought those "otherwise in competition" together to "meet a special need" (Natusch 1933, 21); their improved communication sped up decision-making and problem solving in the interests of the town, rather than privileging their individual practices. Assisted by architects from Wellington and recent graduates from the University of Auckland (eager to gain experience not offered elsewhere because of the Depression), they created what has now become known as 'Art Deco Napier': a generic term for an eclectic range of loosely interpreted modern styles[20] reflecting contemporary architectural fashion, but incorporating New Zealand motifs and vernacular materials. Images from Paris (the Exhibitions of 1919 and 1925) and the United States displaced colonial Victorian neo-classicism. American culture had reached New Zealand via the cinema and resonated with a cheerful optimism: the magic and pizzazz of the pre-depression, pre-earthquake jazz era. The bright Mediterranean colours appealed to the Hawke's Bay imagination, "lending the Civic Centre a refreshing original touch, almost foreign to workaday New Zealand towns, conveying more an impression of sunny Continental smartness" (The Dominion 1933, 3). Pride was also taken in the application of the latest materials (plate glass and chrome) and in the introduction of new equipment technologies: "Women may have their hair trimmed and waved in parlours replete with the latest electrical devices from overseas" (The Dominion 1933, 14).

Art Deco also conformed to the new building standards developed to reduce earthquake risk, with structures of reinforced concrete, low in height and spare in ornamentation. Moreover, it was inexpensive and

allowed Napier businessmen to make a progressive statement on a tight budget. While some of the young architects would have preferred the purity of the International Style, Art Deco responded to the community's desire for some decoration, albeit restrained (Natusch 2002).

New Building Codes

The earthquake gave architects and engineers the opportunity to directly observe the effects of earth movement on structures. The Institute of Architects had unsuccessfully called for reforms in building standards after the Murchison earthquake in 1929 (Natusch 1933). The magnitude of Napier's devastation (through the direct impact of the quake and subsequent fires) led to immediate national action and a Building Regulations Committee was set up in February 1931, followed by The Building Regulations Act 1932 introducing a uniform national building code and the Standards Institute[21] to develop and enforce it. Local building by-laws were also updated and improved. Many local authorities did not have building by-laws at this time and it was evident to public works engineers, Brodie and Harris (1933), that lives and property were lost in Napier through errors in the design and construction of buildings, and cost cutting driven by consumer demand. Foundations were poorly laid, bracing often inadequate, and mortar in brick buildings sometimes consisted only of sand and water. According to Natusch (1933, 22) ninety-percent of the work had been done by unqualified builders. Timber buildings proved more resilient and, along with ferro-cement, replaced brick in New Zealand construction. Noonan (1976) also observed a shift in Public Works Department practice: "...previously public buildings had been the almost exclusive concern of architects, after the earthquake the role of engineers in structural design became increasingly important" (133). Even before they became mandatory, the new standards were generally followed in Napier, with engineers checking structural drawings (Natusch 1933). Local builders had learnt the benefits of resistant design and accepted the need for professional supervision and a public code of practice.

In short, the changes that took place in Napier after the quake were largely a pragmatic response to a catastrophic situation, although some imagination was shown in planned improvements. New forms of governance emerged to fill an emergency management vacuum and to provide the flexibility necessary for rapid reconstruction. The quake forced the reform of building codes and professional practices, created the opportunity to rebuild using the latest technologies and styles, and helped construct popular support for improvement that drew succour from a belief that natural forces might be mitigated through judicious urban renewal[22].

PHOENIX OR SISYPHUS? THE RETURN OF THE STATUS QUO

While the media made much of the town's new image and up-to-date technologies, the phoenix-like resurrection of Napier was constrained by the enormity of the disaster, the practical circumstances and ethos of its people, political ideology, and global economic forces.

Geographic and Socio-Cultural Inertia

The new town planning regulations and institutions such as Tin Town were designed to prevent the rebuilding of the central area until planning issues were resolved, but the exigencies of the situation (particularly the need to restore people's livelihoods) were not conducive to the development and implementation of an ideal town plan or informed process. The new central area plan was an expedient adaptation of a pre-quake paradigm. Comprehensive redesign would have required a new survey and revision of land titles, not supported by business because of the time involved (Natusch, 2002). The 'New Napier' was rebuilt on the bones of the old Domett plan, considered: "quite sound and on reasonably good lines" (Natusch, 1933, 21). The town was resurveyed along existing roads with new buildings constructed on existing sites. The first building to go up was the Market Reserve Building, approved before the quake and built using traditional technologies (although riveted rather than welded steel was used – to reduce construction noise, not hazard) (McGregor 1998). It was considered part of a deliberate strategy to bolster public confidence by signifying continuity rather than change (*The Dominion* 1933).

The coherence and distinctive 'Deco' character of Napier's central area was not achieved by blueprint. Its apparent unity today reflects the fact that it was redeveloped in a short space of time rather than evolving over a long period. Although the architects collaborated for just over three years, design co-ordination did not extend much beyond an agreement on the standard height of the verandas and a taste for modern styles: "Spanish Mission, Modern and Chicago School-style buildings sprang up alongside each other in confused profusion" (Wright 1994, 163). Major reconstruction was largely confined to the fire ravaged central area, and to public utilities and institutions. Many buildings were simply restored and strengthened. The less damaged suburbs were patched up rather than remodelled and remained much as they had been. Some consolation was taken from their organic form and heritage; *The Dominion* (1933, 21) nostalgically contrasted the old with the new:

> Visitors, who, after admiring the rebuilt areas, ramble on the slopes of the hill, will find themselves in a place apart, where streets and roads without the benefit of town planning as it is known today, wind in and out in charmingly bewildering fashion...Many handsome modern houses are dotted among the trees and shrubberies...but

old and picturesque houses predominate.

It appears that there was little debate over whether the town should have been rebuilt on such a potentially vulnerable site, although there was a fleeting proposal to move the central area to the new suburb of Pandora (Wright 1994, 162). Seismic mechanisms were not well understood in 1931. Geologists had noticed a pattern of activity running laterally across the upper west of the South Island and through the east coast of the North Island, but the cause of the Napier earthquake was not explained until the 1960s when tectonic theory placed the town on the volatile intersection of the great Pacific and Indo-Australian Plates. If earthquake science had been more advanced, it is still unlikely that a decision to relocate the town would have been made; New Zealand research has shown that even when a destructive earthquake is personally experienced there is a perceptual complacency that 'lightening will not strike twice': "awareness of the earthquake threat – when it is acknowledged at all – is, in itself, an insufficient stimulus for the taking of action" (Britton 1981, 193). Once settlements become established they are difficult to shift, even those partially destroyed by a major calamity, in a region with a history of extreme natural events. Future security is typically sought through measures aimed at modifying risk; in Napier's case, the construction of a more robust built environment through better engineering, technology and regulation.

Hall and Hallet (1998, 8-9) argue that the changes achieved in the post-crisis planning of Napier were largely superficial, despite the possibilities:

Disaster had been visited unexpectedly upon their town but social ideals remained unchanged. In fact alterations to Napier's town plan were merely cosmetic; no one felt the need for drastic change despite the unique opportunity. The citizens of Napier wished to resurrect their town, not to revolutionise its appearance.

Even had time and money been limitless, the desire for continuity, sense of place, habitual values and selective memory favoured the return of the status quo –with a few 'progressive' tweaks.

Political and Economic Inertia
The Daily Telegraph and local architects initially called for a new city inspired by the white Spanish Mission[23] uniformity of Santa Barbara in the United States (Wright, 2001a). But Santa Barbara was reconstructed after an earthquake in 1925, during the affluent bubble of America's 'Roaring Twenties', conditions not matched in New Zealand. Preliminary plans were drawn up but abandoned on account of cost. The restitution of shattered infrastructure took precedence over the grander visions of the architects and the press. Expensive utilities built up over many years

had to be replaced quickly, under dire economic and unsympathetic political circumstances. Funds were tight and government support was relatively modest, in part because of the slump, but also because of the orthodox neoclassical ideals of its leadership – recovery from depression and disaster was considered to be the responsibility of the individual, rather than the role of the state. The costs of the quake were huge and took a toll on the Borough, local businesses and citizens for the next three decades.

Total capital losses have been estimated at £3,405,500[24] (Chapple 1997, 26) and up to £10 million (King 2003, 352). Insurance offices held policies for more than £5 million in the area, but policy holders discovered that the fine print excluded earthquake risk or damage from fires triggered by earthquakes and payments met little more than ten percent of the assessed damage (Wright 2001a, 116; Eiby 1975). Specific earthquake insurance was voluntary at the time and few were covered. Charity from other local authorities, humanitarian organizations and New Zealand citizens was a significant source of immediate relief with £396,000 administered under The Hawke's Bay Earthquake Relief Funds Act. This provided for food, clothing, accommodation and private housing repairs, but is estimated to have only covered sixty-one percent of homeowners' real costs (Wright 2001a, 117).

Government assistance given through The Hawke's Bay Earthquake Act, was largely in the form of loans that had to be repaid: by the Borough, businesses and individuals. Although the Rehabilitation Committee was authorised to gift or loan money, it interpreted its role as commercial rather than charitable. The bulk of the money was loaned with interest charged at 4.5-5.5% after up to five years, with capital repayments required immediately. Claims from national and international companies were excluded (Conly 1980, 184-5). The amount of money made available was parsimonious, meeting only one-fifth of the estimated losses in Napier and the nearby ruined town of Hastings (where, unlike Napier, businessmen rejected street widening proposals). The terms were also harsh and many businesses faced double interest repayments if they held pre-quake mortgages. Businesses were prepared to carry significant debt and this undoubtedly encouraged the initial rebuilding process, but discouraged development in the longer term. Local growth waned after World War Two as companies struggled to pay off liabilities not discharged until the 1960s (Natusch 2002).

The Borough had limited reserves when the quake struck. The annual tax was being levied at the time and on 31 March 1931 only £17,000 of the £68,000 expected had been paid (Committee of Management, 1933, Appendix). State loans were supplemented through borrowing on the open market. This had clearly been the government's intent and special powers were conferred through The Hawke's Bay Earthquake Act to raise

overdrafts without recourse to ratepayers (Committee of Management 1933, 4; Wright, 2001a, 115). The interest rates were prohibitive.

There is a difference of opinion over the real economic impact of the quake. Chapple (1997, 47) argues that while capital losses were considerable, they were greatly exaggerated and quickly made up by the reconstruction boom that followed. Wright (2001b, 468-9) disputes the boom and contends that construction was piecemeal, under-funded and had little overall effect in alleviating Depression conditions. These conditions, in fact, imposed an additional pressure on Napier's leadership. The jobless flowed into town, attracted by free food and clothing offered through emergency relief and the prospect of work, but many did not have the skills required. They came in such great numbers that a permit had to be imposed to restrict entry. Resettlement also occurred so rapidly that it outstripped the restoration of services and a temporary sanitary system had to be installed alongside the reconstruction of the sewers (The Dominion 1933, 5).

Most commentators concur that the national Forbes-Coates United-Reform Coalition Government (1931-35) of the time was unduly stingy. Forbes has failed to inspire any of New Zealand's major historians, and has most recently been described as "the wrong man in the wrong place at the wrong time" (King 2003, 345). Apart from a commitment to balancing the budget through slashing public expenditure, he was concerned to avoid any policy position that might establish a precedent and expose the state to risk. While Napier officials urged the government to take out charity loans, Forbes turned down English and American offers defiantly insisting that "New Zealand would look after its own" (Natusch, 2002 and Wright 1994, 161), calling on New Zealanders to donate through the Prime Minister's Relief Fund, perhaps a perverse effect of a growing sense of New Zealand identity (rather than British) emerging after World War One. In hindsight, the earthquake marked the end of minimalist settler government in New Zealand. The size and influence of central government increased from the mid-1930s (until the 1980s) when the socialist Labour Party (1935-49) came into power and took on responsibility for a comprehensive social welfare system and public works (highways and electricity projects), which were beyond the financial and administrative capability of local government. In 1938, the Labour Government wrote off the state loans given under the Hawke's Bay Earthquake Act and considerably reduced the interest burden carried by the Borough (Wright 2001a, 115).

Meagre state relief and the urgency of the situation severely restricted the capacity of the Commissioners "to plan for the future." (The Dominion 1933, 20). The limited finance available was used to clear the debris and rebuild essential infrastructure and it was hardly surprising that a decision was made to shift the cost of public transport (trams) to the private sector (buses). Crippling interest repayments compounded their

problems and the changes that were achieved are remarkable under the circumstances. Limited state relief and insurance cover also constrained businesses, who were hard pressed to replace buildings, machinery, and stock to pre-quake standards, let alone improve them. Households were similarly strapped, personal losses were not fully compensated and some houses never properly repaired (Wright 2001a, 117).

The Napier disaster was often used as a reference point in subsequent reforms to New Zealand's earthquake insurance and emergency management policies, but its real impact was diffuse; the Second World War was more compelling. Proposals for an insurance tax went before Parliament in the Hawke's Bay Earthquake Bill 1931, but were dropped because of arguments over costs to property owners and restrictions on economic freedoms (New Zealand Parliament 1931, 1287-90). A special war damages insurance fund levied as a percentage of all fire premiums was set up in 1941 and after another earthquake[25] in 1942, The Earthquake and War Damage Act 1944 was passed to establish a government-controlled commission and mutual benefit insurance scheme, which indemnified most property owners. Civil emergency management began with the Public Safety Act 1932, which empowered government to proclaim a state of emergency – to deal with Depression-related rioting – but also responding to the problems of authority and support experienced by Napier's citizens committees in co-ordinating relief efforts. Urban authorities were not required to develop risk management strategies until 1962 with passage of the Civil Defence Act.

Figure 10.NAPIER TODAY
Source: Art Deco Trust.

Urban planning frameworks for hazard mitigation evolved just as slowly as insurance policies, and were even less explicitly related to the Napier experience, although it had given greater legitimacy to public regulation of the built environment in the interests of community welfare. Local government reforms (in 1933, 1954, 1974) over time provided councils with greater powers over subdivision and building standards and planning reforms (in 1953, 1977, 1991) required that 'hazard avoidance' be taken into account in urban development. New Zealand's planning legislation has, nevertheless, continued to be intrinsically biased towards the protection of property rights, providing limited opportunities for the development of a coherent and comprehensive urban policy and design framework. Extreme or aberrant conditions generate community cohesiveness, as in Napier, but this usually diminishes once obvious danger passes.

In summary, public and professional aspirations to use the disaster as an opportunity to improve the town through better planning were only partially realised. Ideals were compromised through want of time and money, and challenged by settlement rigidities and mindsets.

REFLECTING ON NAPIER

The Hawke's Bay Earthquake provides interesting historical insights into the factors that encourage and inhibit planning innovation in the aftermath of disaster. In minutes the calamity made urban renewal an immediate necessity rather than a contested possibility and created a public spirit and solidarity supporting change which "is difficult when times are normal and there is no particular incentive beyond the civic pride of a minority to foster community action" (*The Dominion* 1933, 19). In two years the central business district had largely been rebuilt on the basis of an existing but unimplemented plan, with some expedient changes to statutory process. Improvements were made to street layout, safety, and amenity, and along with the moderne architecture (adapted to local conditions and requirements) produced the distinctive 'Art Deco' townscape – now an international tourist attraction. The earthquake accelerated the planned expansion and landscaping of the Marine Parade waterfront for recreation and entertainment, and as envisaged by the city-beautifying Thirty-Thousand Club (sponsor of many features and facilities) it became a municipal icon and place-marketing tool. Planning, rather than the traditional market driven pattern of development, was also a feature of the suburb of Marewa laid out on the uplifted land and a model for subsequent suburban developments in the area. Although town planning had become a function of New Zealand local government by the 1930s, it was not firmly embedded in practice at the time of the

earthquake. Napier's leaders, however, had the wisdom to recognise that it offered a rational way forward in a period of acute destabilisation and the vision and capacity, despite manifold problems, to seize the opportunity provided by the quasi-clean slate and community goodwill to construct a more efficient and beautiful urban environment. In praising the 'New Napier' for its modern design and flair, the press promoted the importance of good planning to a broader public. The special regulations introduced to correct administrative flaws in the 1926 Act subsequently informed national planning framework revisions.

The results of New Zealand's previous laissez-faire building practices were unambiguously evident in the loss of life and ruin of property. Napier prompted the implementation of a national building code to reduce hazard and marks a transition in professional influence over the national public built environment from the aesthetic of the architect to the utilitarianism of the structural engineer. While this has potentially led to more robust structures – New Zealand has yet to experience another earthquake of this scale in a densely populated centre- it has had a pronounced effect on the urban fabric with heritage buildings, for example, being demolished because seismic strengthening proved too expensive.

The governance structure and community alliances that emerged in response to institutional collapse were also significant factors in the town's regeneration. A constructive balance was struck between the authority of the commissioners and the representation of local interests: "All classes were meeting on committees, and there was a frequent interchange of ideas. That tended towards consideration for, and appreciation of, each other's views" (Natusch 1933, 21). These committees and the professional and commercial alliances fostered open communication, mutual support and innovative synergies that expedited decision-making and problem solving. In the longer term productive new partnerships were also forged between government agencies, in particular the restored Borough and the Harbour Board in the suburban extensions.

The quake partially eradicated Napier's senescent British colonial imprint. Design inspiration came from America and France and marks a shift in the local cultural imagination, at least amongst the young architects who had the opportunity to put the 'latest' ideas and building technologies into practice; this was far in advance of New Zealand's economic disengagement from Britain in the 1960s. The vitality of modernism also captivated the people and provided the symbolic reassurance that good could emerge from the ashes in the form of a defiant new town, as fashionable as the most progressive elsewhere in the world.

Radical intentions and ideals were, however, curbed by immediate practicalities and ambivalent emotions and values. Adjustments to the town plan were mostly superficial and evolutionary and potential hazard was modified rather than actively avoided. Residents' complacency together with the desire for stability and continuity, economic imperatives, and property ownership-related inertias restricted the opportunities for sweeping change and real experiment. Confidence came as much through the restoration of the known ways, as much as it did through futuristic visions and modernist solutions.

The costs of reconstructing the town were far in excess of what could be marshalled from local and state resources. Conservative national politics and the prevailing Depression economy limited Napier's capacity for transformation. The Hawke's Bay Earthquake Act, hastily passed to provide urgently needed relief, was an equivocal blessing. The funding allocated to Napier's public and private agencies did not cover basic restoration costs and business indebtedness dampened regional growth in years to come. Although the quake may have triggered a short-term construction boom, it also attracted an influx of unemployed migrants precipitating makeshift solutions. The quake revealed serious deficiencies in New Zealand's urban emergency management, hazard mitigation and insurance regimes, but aside from building regulation, reforms were a gradual response to cumulative crises and external threats in later years, with entrenched private property rights challenging the broader public interest.

One cannot underestimate the personal and community trauma and loss inflicted by disasters; but they may also open up new development opportunities in the reconstruction phase. The case of Napier demonstrates that extreme events kindle new energies and possibilities - if vision, leadership, citizen engagement, and sufficient resources are present. Embedded values political inertia, and financial limitations remain powerful suppressants of any significant paradigm shift. Business – nearly as usual.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ENDNOTES

1. The indigenous peoples of Aotearoa/New Zealand.

2. The Hawke's Bay Earthquake, also known as the Napier Earthquake, was originally measured at 7.9 on the Richter Scale, but later revised down to 7.8 (10-11 on the Modified Mercalli Scale of felt intensity in the Napier/Hastings district) (McGregor, 2002b). Accounts of the earthquake and its aftermath can be found in The Daily Telegraph (1981), Callaghan (1933), Conly (1980), and Wright (2001a).

3. Subcommittees dealt with sanitation and water supply, demolition and safety of buildings, food distribution, shelter, communications, hospital services, transport, and traffic control.

4. The British warship HMS Veronica was in port and two more vessels were quickly despatched from Auckland.

5. The Dominion was published in Wellington and circulated throughout New Zealand's central North Island.

6. The Napier Citizens Reconstruction Committee had thirteen members drawn from the Thirty-Thousand Club, Chamber of Commerce, Law Society, Borough Council, Town Planning Committee, medical profession, architectural profession, business and property owners, retailers and the Napier press (The Dominion 1933, 5).

7. The Adjustment Court had the power to make declaratory orders as to existing rights and obligations where evidence had been destroyed and for relief from legal obligations where financial loss had resulted from the quake (Conly, 1980).

8. This was in addition to £274,000 provided for relief, repairs to public buildings and transport infrastructure (Wright 2001a, 117). Napier's share of £1,500,000 was £101,200. This was augmented by £30,000 from a public debenture issue, a £30,000 loan from an insurance society, and unexpended pre-quake borough loans (Napier City Council, 2003).

9. Local government in New Zealand has only the powers conferred upon it by parliament and has traditionally focused on property servicing. Powers over subdivision, roading, the regulation of building construction, and provision of utility servicing evolved from the late 19th century, until they were finally consolidated in the Municipal Corporations Act 1954 (since replaced by the Local Government Act 1974 and Local Government Act 2002). An acceptance of planning as a legitimate local government activity also developed from the late 19th century in response to the physical problems of rapid urban growth. It was initially influenced by British and later American models, but over the last fifty years has been shaped increasingly by indigenous conditions. Significant statutes are The Town Planning Act 1926, The Town and Country Planning Act 1953 and 1977, and The Resource Management Act 1991.

10. Rates (property taxes) are the primary source of local government funding in New Zealand.

11. The net loss was estimated £ 6,554 (of which £2, 643 was operating losses) (Committee of Management 1933, 22).

12. Ad Hoc or special purpose boards (e.g. harbour boards, drainage boards, electricity boards) were a feature of New Zealand local government until reforms in 1989, and were directly elected. Ownership of the Ahuriri harbour (except for nine islands reserved for Maori) was vested in the Napier Harbour Board by legislation enacted in 1874; subsequent legislation deeded the uplifted land to the Board after the earthquake (Conly, 1980).

13. Tin Town was built with a government loan of £10,000 and opened on 16 March 1931. It was built by Fletcher Construction Co., which subsequently became one of New Zealand's leading construction companies.

14. There were seven members: Commissioner Barton, the Commissioner of Crown Lands, the Surveyor General, a citizen, an architect, a surveyor, and the Borough Engineer.

15. J.W. Mawson, working as a consultant, later prepared the sectional schemes for suburban expansion.

16. Service lanes were uncommon in New Zealand at the time; these were ratified under The Napier Borough Empowering Act 1943 and subsequently incorporated into the 1953 planning legislation.

17. 'The engineer from one of the four main centres on hearing of the work that Napier had done...(for) a total cost of £30,000, said: "You have made several chains of new street, widened 98 chains of street and splayed 87 corners at a less cost than we have to spend to splay a single corner' (The Dominion 1933, 5).

18. Marine Parade runs along Napier's Pacific Ocean frontage for several kilometres.

19. The 'Associated Architects' were E.A. Williams (favouring Art Deco), Finch and Westerholm (Spanish Mission), J.A. Hay (Frank Lloyd Wright) and Natusch & Sons (International Style) (Art Deco Trust, 2002).

20. Influences included: Stripped Classical, Classical Moderne, Spanish Mission and Art Deco. Distinctions now made between the styles were far from clear at the time (McGregor, 2002).

21. Initially set up in 1932 as a private enterprise body, the Standards Institute was supported by private subscription to formulate model standards. It was taken over by government in 1936 when private funding proved insufficient (National Register of Archives and Manuscripts, 1999).

22. As reflected in the press and enshrined on monuments:

> Another Athens shall arise
> And to remoter time,
> Bequeath like sunset to the skies,
> The splendour of its prime
> (The Daily Telegraph 1981, 163)
> ...Within my soul I made my towers high.
> They lie in ruins, yet I have begun
> To build again, now planning to restore
> What life has shaken to the earth; and I
> in faith shall build my towers toward the sun
> A stronger city than was there before.

> Gertrude Rydd Bennett on the Napier Earthquake Memorial (Conly 1980, 231)

23. Spanish Mission architecture was in vogue in Napier from the late twenties. Doctor Moore's Private Hospital and the Nurses Home, severely damaged in the quake, were built in the style (McGregor 1998).

24. Chapple (1997 6) notes that estimates of damage vary widely and there are few accounts of the methodologies used. He concedes that his more conservative estimate was still a substantial burden to the people of Napier at the time.

25. The 1942 earthquake occurred in the Wairarapa region of New Zealand's North Island and recovery was slow, further highlighting lack of insurance cover and equity.

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