Received: from ATHENA-AS-WELL.MIT.EDU by po7.MIT.EDU (5.61/4.7) id AA02527; Thu, 10 Feb 94 18:47:48 EST Received: from A.CNI.ORG by MIT.EDU with SMTP id AA09935; Thu, 10 Feb 94 18:47:39 EST Received: by a.cni.org id ; Thu, 10 Feb 1994 18:46:36 -0500 Date: Thu, 10 Feb 1994 18:46:36 -0500 From: Coalition for Networked Information Message-Id: <9402102346.AA18174@a.cni.org> To: rdshydur@MIT.EDU Subject: Docs from the Coalition FRNT Database Document 1 CD story114.CA NM Laura Guillory JB Manager Network User Services DP Information Resources and Technology OR California State University, Chancellor's Office AD P.O. Box 3842 CI Seal Beach ST CA ZP 90740-7842 CT USA PH (310) 985-9641 FX (310) 985-9400 EM laura@calstate.edu NO Street address is: Laura Guillory, Manager Network User Services Information Resources and Technology California State University, Chancellor's Office 4665 Lampson Ave. Los Alamitos, CA 90720 CN Larry Press, Professor Computer Information Systems CSU Dominguez Hills 1000 East Victoria St. Carson, CA 90747 (310) 516-3570 lpress@csu.edu UC Other CR More equitable access to technology or electronic information Technology transfer Local commitment to network-based activities Text 1 Larry Press, Professor of Computer Information Systems at California State University, Dominguez Hills, experienced first hand the political might wielded by internetworking during the August 19,1991 Soviet coup attempt. One week prior to the coup, Press co-chaired a conference on human-computer interaction in Moscow. While there, he spent several days visiting the Demos cooperative which operates Reliable Communications (RELCOM), the Russian computer network Although only a year old in August 1991, over 400 universities, research institutes, stock and commodities exchanges, news services, high schools, politicians and government agencies have joined RELCOM. During the conference, Press developed close relationships with the Russians managing RELCOM. 2 At the start of the coup, Press was linked to the USEnet news feed via CSUnet and read a message from his colleague that had been posted in the talk politics.soviet forum of netnews. Vadim Antonov of Demos sent a message that said "Oh, do not say. I've seen the tanks with my own eyes.I hope we'll be able to communicate during the next few days. Communists cannot rape the Mother Russia once again!" Although the coup leaders had taken over television, radio, newspapers, and all other mass media; they had neglected RELCOM, either as an oversight or because they did not grasp its international reach. This oversight set the tone for RELCOM's activity during the rest of the coup. 3 Antonov's message was quickly and continuously followed by news from various banned Soviet news agencies and government officials. For example, Boris Yeltsin's defiant decrees were carried to Demos headquarters and posted to netnews as soon as they were written. The Russian versions were quickly translated into English and re-posted by several people on the Internet. CNN, AP and other news agencies were alerted and began watching the postings. 4 Larry responded to Vadim over CSUnet and received the following reply to his first anxious e-mail message from Polina, a Demos staff member: "Don't worry, we're OK, though frightened and angry. Moscow is full of tanks and military machines - I hate them. They try to close all mass media, they stopped CNN an hour ago, and Soviet TV transmits opera and old movies. Now we transmit information enough to put us in prison for the rest of our life. (Polina)" Throughout the coup, Russians called in information to various RELCOM nodes which was then posted to the USEnet news feed and RELCOM became the only viable mass communications media operating in Russia. In addition to receiving information from Russia, many people from around the world sent messages to friends and family in Russia. The volume of mail increased so much that Vadim requested that people stop flooding the communications channel. 5 In spite of this volume, Demos did not want to cut off incoming information completely since it was a source of encouragement for the Russians. Press began sending periodic summaries of US news coverage, which Polina translated and posted internally. While this information may have had some value, Press believes that its primary effect was in providing moral support. Afterwards Polina wrote: "You can't even imagine how grateful we are for your help and support in this terrible time! The best thing is to know that we aren't alone. 6 As the coup progressed, the Demos staff realized that they could be shut down or imprisoned and began to disperse their computers and communications equipment so that they could transmit from locations other than their headquarters located within a mile from the KGB headquarters. From Polina came the message "Don't worry; the only danger for us is if they catch and arrest us, as we are sitting at home and distributing the information we have." 7 The operation of RELCOM throughout the coup required great courage since the outcome was uncertain, and the efforts of the Demos staff were acknowledged in the following message posted to talk politics.soviet: "When the dark night fell upon Moscow, RELCOM was one source of light for us.' Thanks to these brave people we could get information and hope." The experience of Larry Press provides a shining example of the fact that free communication is incompatible with repressive dictatorship. RELCOM would have been prohibited in the past. Gorbachev's glasnost made RELCOM possible, and it quickly became a significant segment of the Soviet communication infrastructure. RELCOM repaid Gorbachev during the coup by perhaps helping to save his life. Although the coup has ended, the political clout of global computer networks will undoubtedly continue to manifest itself in the future. SD Slides/photographs (picture of Larry Press)