

Transparent Wishes

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“Transparent” comes from von Stechow and Iatridou 2008
“How to say *ought* in Foreign”.

We had studied the weak necessity modal *ought*:

1. You ought to do the dishes but you don't have to
- 2a. #You have to do the dishes but you don't have to.
- b. #You must do the dishes but you don't have to.

We found that in many languages *ought* is expressed by the addition of certain morphology on a universal/necessity modal. Specifically, the morphology that appears in the consequent of a “counterfactual” conditional.

We called these “transparent *ought*”.

Greek transparent *ought*:

3. **Tha eprepe** na plinis ta piata ala dhen ise ipexreomenos na to kanis
FUT must+Past NA wash the dishes but NEG are obliged NA it do
'You ought to do the dishes but you are not obliged to do it'

French transparent *ought* :

4. Tu **devrais** faire la vaisselle, mais tu n'es pas obligé
you **must/COND** do the dishes but you not+are not obliged
'you ought to do the dishes but you are not obliged to do them'

And several others, including non-IE languages.

English is an outlier in having a lexical item for the weak necessity modal.
(though historically one can detect CF morphology on *ought*)

So “transparent *ought*”: strong necessity modal + CF consequent morphology

Enter two more terms: X-marking vs O-marking

We introduced the term “X-marked conditionals” in 2016, in work and in class, with the intention of replacing the terms “subjunctive conditionals” and “counterfactual conditionals”.

“subjunctive conditionals” is not a good term because many of the relevant conditionals don’t use the subjunctive, even if the language has a subjunctive (e.g. French).

“counterfactual conditionals” is not a good term because many of the relevant conditionals are not contra-to-fact. For example FLVs:

5. If you left tomorrow, you would get there next week

And moreover, even outside of FLVs, the counterfactuality has been shown to be cancellable (Anderson 1951).

So “X-marking” is whatever morphology on conditionals brings about a counterfactual or unlikely (cancellable) inference.

The absence of X-marking is O-marking.

X: extra

O: ordinary, open...

X-marked conditional:

6. If he knew the answer, he would tell her

O-marked conditional:

7. If he knows the answer, he will tell her

Transparent *ought*: strong necessity modal +consequent X-marking, interpreted as a weak necessity modal in the actual world.

Our proposal aimed to explain why X-marking on a strong necessity modal could yield a weak necessity modal in the actual world:

“Perhaps, then, the counterfactual marking is co-opted here in a somewhat meta-linguistic kind of way: “if we were in a context in which the secondary ordering source was promoted, then it would be a strong necessity that . . .”. This would explain why even though there is CF-morphology, the modal claim is made firmly about the actual world; all that the morphology marks is a change in evaluation parameters.

It probably not an accident that counterfactual marking brings with it an element of tentativeness: the speaker is not saying that the secondary ordering source is something that has to be obeyed. The choice of whether to really promote the secondary ordering source is left open.”

Note that the presence of **consequent** X-marking is vaguely justified by the modal being in the **consequent** of an X-marked conditional.

We had also noted that transparent *ought* is actually ambiguous, unlike English *ought*.

English:

-a weak necessity modal in the actual world:

8. Fred **ought** to use the boat

-a strong necessity modal in a “CF” world:

9. If Fred wanted to go to the island, he **would have to** use the boat

But in a language with transparent *ought*, the forms are the same:

-a weak necessity modal in the actual world:

10. **tha eprepe** na pari aftin tin varka
must+X take this the boat
'he ought to take the boat'

-a strong necessity modal in a "CF" world:

11. An o Fred ithele na pai sto nisi, **tha eprepe** na pari aftin tin varka
If the Fred wanted to go to-the island, **must+X** take this the boat
'If Fred wanted to go to the island, he would have to use the boat'

Why can X-marking on an English necessity modal not mean *ought*?

12. He ought to do the wishes

=/=

13. He would have to do the dishes

We didn't know.

A blocking effect?

So what are “Transparent wishes”?

There is something people call “Counterfactual wishes”:

14. He wishes she had a Honda Odyssey

15. She wishes she was taller than she is

CF wishes are a misnomer: the desire is in the actual world.

In many languages, there is a morphological commonality between X-marked conditionals and CF wishes (Iatridou 2000).

In the full version of the generalization, the morphology on the X-conditional consequent appears on the embedding verb *want* and the morphology on the X-conditional antecedent appears on its complement:

16. X-marked conditional: if p_{m1} , q_{m2}

17. CF wish: I $want_{m2}$ that p_{m1}

We will call this the Conditional/Desire (C/D) generalization.

Spanish X-marked conditional:

18. Si **fuera** más alto **sería** un jugador de baloncesto.

If be.3.sg.**PAST.SUBJ** more tall be.3.sg.**COND** a player of basketball

'If s/he was taller, s/he would be a basketball player'

Spanish CF wish:

19. **Querría** que **fuera** más alto de lo que es.

Want.3.sg.**COND** that s/he **be.3.sg.PAST.SUBJ** more tall than it s/he is

'I wish s/he was taller than s/he is

We will follow the previously established terminology and use the term “X-marked desires” for CF-wishes.

X-marked desires are in opposition to O-marked desires.

Spanish O-marked desires have indicative on *want* and present subjunctive on the complement (when the complement is not infinitival).

X-marked desire:

20. **Querría** que **fuera** más alto de lo que es.
Want.3.sg.**COND** that **be.3.sg.PAST.SUBJ** more tall than it s/he is
'I wish s/he was taller than s/he is

O-marked desire:

21 Quiero que sea alto.
Want.1.sg.**IND** that be.3.sg.**PR.SUBJ** tall
'I want him to be tall'

“Transparent wishes”:

one part of the C/D generalization: want +X-marking

Spanish, Greek, French and others are transparent *wish* languages.

English is not. It has a lexicalized item *wish*, just as it has a lexicalized item *ought*.

Moreover, just as in the case of transparent *ought*, i.e. strong necessity modal+X, X-marked *want* is ambiguous between a modal claim about the actual world and a modal claim in a CF world.

A desire in a CF world: I don't have a desire in the actual world

22. An itan psiloterōs **tha ithele** makritero krevati
if was taller **FUT want+Past** longer bed
'If he was taller he would want a longer bed'

A desire in the actual world:

23. **Tha ithele** na imun psiloteri
FUT want+Past NA was taller
'She wishes I was taller'

And as in the case of weak necessity, this ambiguity is not found in English:

24. (If he were taller) he would want to have a longer bed


=/=

25. He wishes he had a longer bed

The next image is from von Stechow and Iatridou 2006:

transparent languages:

strong necessity + CF




"ought"

"would have to"

English:

"wish"

"would want"



transparent languages:

want + CF

So transparent wish languages are the languages that use X-marking on *want* to express “CF wishes”.

And this is one part of the C/D generalization.

While there are plenty of languages that abide by both parts of the C/D generalization, there are some that abide by only one of the two parts of the C/D generalization.

Some languages only obey the part that has to do with *want* (i.e. they are transparent *wish languages*) but do not obey the *complement-generalization*.

One such language is French, which has COND on *X-want*, the way it does on an *X-consequent*.

However, the complement is in the (unmarked for tense/aspect) subjunctive, unlike an *X-antecedent*, which is in the indicative past imperfective.

French X-conditional:

26. Si Marie **avait** / * **ait** un parapluie rouge,

if Marie have.PST.IMPF. IND /SUBJ a umbrella red,

il l'aurait vu

he it have.COND seen

'If Marie had a red umbrella, he would have seen it'

French X-desire:

27. Je voudrais que Marie **ait**/ ***avait** un parapluie rouge

I want.1.sg.COND that Mary have.3.sg.SUBJ / *have.PST.IMPF. IND an umbr. red

'I wish Marie had a red umbrella'

Why is there no subjunctive in French X-conditionals, unlike in Spanish and Catalan?

Iatridou 2000: because the Modern French subjunctive has no tense distinctions, unlike the Spanish and Catalan one. When French used to have these distinctions, it used past subjunctive as well.

“...in French, as well as in a number of other languages, what is necessary in the morphological make-up of counterfactuals is Past tense **and the subjunctive appears only if the language has a paradigm for the past subjunctive.** Modern French does not have a past subjunctive. Its subjunctive is unmarked for tense. Hence, it cannot appear in counterfactual conditionals. Previous stages of French, however, did have a subjunctive which varied for tense, that is, there was a past subjunctive, and in that stage of the language, the past subjunctive was required in a counterfactual conditional. Modern French, on the other hand, uses the indicative, as it has no past subjunctive...”

(summary from Iatridou 2016, p. 4)

However, even if this is the right explanation for the absence of the subjunctive in French X-conditionals, it does not explain why French does not abide by the complement part of the C/D generalization.

For that part, it seems that the subcategorization frame of *want* is the culprit.

French *vouloir* takes its complement in the infinitive or in the subjunctive, depending on whether the embedded subject is co-indexed or not with the matrix:

28. Je veux aller à Paris.

I want.1.sg go.inf to Paris

'I want to go to Paris'

29. Je veux que tu ailles à Paris.

I want.1.sg that you go.2.dg.SUBJ to Paris

'I want you to go to Paris'

These subcategorization restrictions are retained in X-desires:

30. Je voudrais aller à Paris.

I want.1.sg.COND go.inf to Paris

'I wish to go to Paris' (cf. "I would have wanted to go to Paris')

31. Je voudrais que tu ailles à Paris.

I want.1.sg.COND that you go.2.dg.SUBJ to Paris

'I wish you would go to Paris'

The picture that emerges:

In French X-desires, there is a conflict in what mood the complement appears in when the two subjects are contra-indexed:

Want requires subjunctive on its complement.

The C/D generalization (rather, whatever is behind it) requires Indicative (past imperfective) on the complement of *want*.

The selection requirements of *want* win.

In Spanish, there is no such conflict:

Again, *want* requires subjunctive on its complement.

The C/D generalization requires Past subjunctive.

The complement of *want* in a Spanish X-desire can satisfy both, because Spanish has a past subjunctive.

Greek can be described in the same terms as Spanish.

X-conditional:

32. An **icha** aftokinito tora, **tha imun** eftichismeni
If **have.PST.1sg** car now, **FUT was.PST.1sg** happy
'If I had a car now, I would be happy'

X-desire:

33. **Tha ithela** na **icha** aftokinito tora
FUT want.PST.sg NA **have.PST.1sg** car now
'I wish I had a car now'

The X-desire contains the particle NA, that is absent in the X-conditional.

This particle is part of the selection requirements of *want* (and other verbs):

34. Thelo na echo aftokinito

Want.1.sg. NA have a car

‘I want to have a car’

So it seems that like Spanish, but unlike French, Greek can satisfy both the local selection requirements of the embedding verb, as well as the C/D generalization.

There are also languages that satisfy the complement part of the C/D generalization but not the *want* part (i.e. they do not have transparent *wish*)

Hindi has an undeclinable particle *kaash* that by itself, i.e. without any verb, expresses wishes that cannot be realized (more on this later). It's syntactic category is unknown (Bhatt p.c.). It's reminiscent of Greek *makari*, Italian *magare*, Spanish *ojala*.

However, the morphology on the complement is exactly that of an X-antecedent.

35. *kaash* *vo lambaa ho-taa*
 wish *he tall be-Hab*
 'I wish he was tall'

Hindi *ta* is described as a habituality marker. However, it cannot appear on a predicate that is by its nature individual-level:

36. **vo lambaa ho-taa* (hai)

he tall be-Hab (is)

But *ta* does appear on IL predicates in X-conditionals (and was described as part of “fake” morphology associated with X-marked conditionals)

37. *agar vo lambaa ho-taa,* to army use bhartii kar le-tii
if he tall be-Hab then army he.Dat admit do TAKE-Hab.f

‘If he was tall, the army would have admitted him.’

So *ta* in the complement of *kaash* is compliant with the complement part of the C/D generalization.

38. *kaash* *vo lambaa ho-taa*
 wish *he tall be-Hab*
 ‘*I wish* *he was tall*’

Coming to English, we already saw that it is not a transparent wish language:

Given (40), English would have had to have (41) to mean (42) to qualify as a transparent wish language:

40. If I had a car, I **would** be happy

41. *I **would want** that I had a car now

=/=

42. I wish that I had a car now

So English is not compliant with the *want*-part of the generalization (i.e. it is not a transparent wish language)

But like Hindi, it is compliant in the complement part:

40. If I **had** a car, I would be happy

42. I wish that I **had** a car now

In short, we will take the C/D generalization to have substance to it, even though there are environments where one of its two parts seem violated for language-specific reasons.

From now on then, we will take the C/D generalization as something that needs to be explained, and attempt to do so for both parts of it.

We will start with the *want* part of the generalization, i.e. transparent *wish*.

Why would *want* carry X-marking, and moreover, why would it carry X-consequent marking?

In von Stechow and Trudgill 2008, we briefly considered the possibility (brought up by Tim Stowell p.c.) that the X-marking on certain modals should be interpreted under them. In other words, in this proposal there is some scopal re-ordering.

We rejected this possibility for the cases we were dealing with then (transparent *ought*) but it is possible, of course, that this is the right analysis for the cases we are dealing with now (transparent wishes).

One advantage of such an account would be that *want* would be evaluated in the actual world, since it is not in the scope of the X-marking . This is an advantage because a sentence like

43. **Tha ithela** na **icha** aftokinito tora
 FUT want.PST.sg NA **have.PST.1sg** car now
 ‘I wish I had a car now’

seems to convey that I have a desire in the actual world.

But there are also difficulties with such an account, namely:

-why would the X-marking morphology not appear in the place where it is interpreted?

-what sort of scope reversal is this?

-why would the X-marking on *want* be that of a X-consequent, and not that of an X-antecedent?

-under the modal, there would now be two instances of X-marking: X-marking on *want*, and X-marking on the embedded verb, as we saw in our discussion of the C/D generalization. What do we do with this stacked X-marking?

Instead, we will attempt an account along the lines of our 2008 treatment of transparent *ought*. We repeat the relevant parts with the *ought*-specifics redacted:

“Perhaps, then, the counterfactual marking is co-opted here in a somewhat meta-linguistic kind of way: “if we were in a context in which ~~the secondary ordering source was promoted~~, then it would be a strong necessity that . . . ”. This would explain why even though there is CF-morphology, the modal claim is made firmly about the actual world; all that the morphology marks is a change in evaluation parameters.”

We clearly want to retain this part:

“Perhaps, then, the counterfactual marking is co-opted here in a somewhat meta-linguistic kind of way ...

...This would explain why even though there is CF-morphology, the modal claim is made firmly about the actual world; all that the morphology marks is a change in evaluation parameters”

After all, (transparent) wishes are desires in the actual world.

But what is the “somewhat meta-linguistic way”?

In the case of transparent *ought*:

“if we were in a context in which the secondary ordering source was promoted, then **it would be a strong necessity that . . .**”.

The blue part in the case of transparent *ought* is the strong necessity modal which carries the X-marking.

This means that in the case of transparent wishes, the bouletic verb (which is the carrier of X-marking) goes there:

“if we were in a context in which ..., then **I would want . . .**”.

But what would be the missing antecedent?

Before we continue, an important note. So far, we have come here:

44. [If]_{antecedent} [then want+X-marking]_{consequent}

and asked the question of what the missing antecedent is.

In (44), the antecedent is presented as a missing *if*-clause adjunct with a syntactic presence. This is misleading. What we are looking for is a restriction on the modal. There is no reason to believe that this restriction is necessarily syntactically represented.

It could be a contextual restriction (and represented however one likes to represent contextual restrictions, for example with the variable C.)

After all, we can say (45a) with the intention of (45b):

45a. Every student was late today

b. Every student who is in my class was late today

But usually we do not say that (45a) has to look like (45b) in the syntax.

A contextual restriction is taken to be able to do the job.

Similarly, when we say that we are looking for the missing antecedent in (44):

44. [If]_{antecedent} [then ... want+X-marking]_{consequent}

we mean that we are looking for the restriction of the modal, and make no claim about the nature of its syntactic presence.

In fact, on general grounds, one might say that if (45a) can be dealt with in whichever way one deals with a contextual restriction, one should choose the same path for (44).

However, one might object to this.

One might object on the following grounds:

“A contextual restrictor on *every boy* does not leave any threads untied. However, a contextual restrictor on a modal would not be able to cause the X-marking on the modal. For a restrictor to affect the morphology of the modal, it has to be syntactically present”.

If that is the objection, our answer is:

It is not the *if*-clause that triggers the X-marking morphology on the modal. The X-marking on the modal is correlated with a certain operation.

What operation?

We will stay away here from debates like *Past-as-Past* versus *Past-as-Modal* and stick to the more neutral description along the lines of von Stechow 1998:

46. X-marking shows that the domain of quantification of the modal reaches outside the context set

In other words, the *if*-clause is not the cause of the X-marking on the modal. It only gives information about the worlds outside the context set that the modal quantifies over.

In other words, taking the “missing antecedent” of (44) to be a metaphor for a missing contextually supplied restriction, rather than an actually syntactically present *if*-clause, will not cause problems with the morphology.

44. [If]antecedent [then ... want+X-marking]consequent

Therefore, we will take the simpler path that the restriction is contextually supplied, rather than syntactically present as in (44).

Even so, we will continue using the term “missing antecedent”!

What we propose is that the missing antecedent makes reference to a presupposition of the consequent, specifically the presupposition of *want*.

Already at least Kasper 1992 discussed cases where a missing antecedent contained presuppositions of the consequent:

47. Your brother wouldn't have failed the exam

As Kasper points out, the missing antecedent of (47), when it is clear that you took the exam and failed it, is (48):

48. If your brother had taken the exam

Failing an exam presupposes having taken it.

The missing antecedent of (47) is not (49) or (50) (unless the context is sufficiently rich):

49. If your brother had had enough sleep

49. If your brother had put more effort in his studies

So what presupposition of *want* is satisfied in the missing antecedent?

That its complement is attainable. (to be enriched)

So we propose that the felicitous use of *want* means that the attainability presupposition is satisfied.

If the attainability presupposition is not satisfied, the missing antecedent takes you to the worlds where it is.

Take French. As we said, the difference between an infinitive or a subjunctive complement is a function of the (contra)indexing of the subjects:

51a. Je veux aller à Paris.

I want go.inf to Paris

b. Je veux que tu ailles à Paris.

I want that you go.subj to Paris

When the embedded event is not attainable anymore, plain *want* is out:

52. *Je veux être arrivé mardi passé.

I want be arrived Tuesday passed

intended: 'I want to have arrived last Tuesday'

53. *Je veux qu'il soit arrivé mardi passé.

I want that he be.subj arrived Tuesday passed

intended: 'I want you to have arrived last Tuesday'

Instead, X-marking on *want* must be used:

54. Je voudrais être arrivé mardi passé.

I want+X be arrived Tuesday passed

'I wish I had arrived last Tuesday'

55. Je voudrais qu'il soit arrivé mardi passé.

I want+X that he be.subj arrived Tuesday passed

'I wish he had arrived last Tuesday'

(54-55) have missing antecedents which take us to the worlds where arriving on Tuesday is attainable, so that in those worlds, *want* can be used felicitously.

Here are some other examples:

56. *Je veux être à Paris maintenant.

I want be in Paris now

57. *Je veux que tu sois à Paris maintenant.

I want that you be.subj in Paris now

These sentences are bad when *maintenant* is used strictly speaking as 'now', and not as 'very soon', and when the speaker (56) or the addressee (57) is not in Paris at the moment. Instead, X-marking must be used:

58. Je voudrais être à Paris maintenant.

I want+X be in Paris now

59. Je voudrais que tu sois à Paris maintenant.

I want that you be.subj in Paris now

And as expected, in (59), only the immediate future reading of *now* is possible, whereas in (60), there is in addition, the reading of the X-desire, where *now* is taken as being simultaneous with the time of utterance

59. Je veux être le président de la République maintenant.

I want be the president of the republic now

60. Je voudrais être le président de la République maintenant.

I want+X be the president of the republic now

One potential inconsistency:

Recall that we gave the meaning of X-marking as in (46) (to avoid the Past-as-Past vs Past-as-Modal debates):

46. X-marking shows that the domain of quantification of the modal reaches outside the context set

In the cases of transparent wishes, the X-marking on *want* reflects that the modal quantifies over worlds outside of the context set, specifically over worlds where the complement of *want* is attainable.

But now we have set up a potential conflict with a common treatment of bouletic verbs which goes back to Heim 92, but which continues in other works that have modified other aspects of Heim's initial account.

Here is an informal version of Heim's analysis from Rubinstein 2017:

"Basic idea for want:

Compare the desirability of the q -worlds most similar to w to the desirability of the $\neg q$ -worlds most similar to w , for every world w in the subject's belief worlds.

Additional ingredients:

- (i) Only compare the desirability of worlds that agree with the subject's beliefs.
- (ii) Presuppose that the subject believes neither q nor $\neg q$."

In effect, this means that if I felicitously utter *I want q* , it is because in my doxastic alternatives, I have both q and $\neg q$. That is, in the quantificational domain of the modal there are both q and $\neg q$ worlds.

This fits what we have said so far:

If the actual world is believed by the speaker to be a $\neg q$ world, the speaker needs to reach out of the context set to find q worlds. This reaching out of the context set, is accompanied by X-marking, as we said.

Earlier, we put this in terms of finding worlds where the complement of *want* is attainable.

However, it could also be put in the terms we are using now: the domain of quantification of the modal reaches outside the context set, to find q worlds that are required for the comparative semantics of *want*.

But then we are predicting that if the actual world is a q world, and the domain of quantification needs to reach outside the context set to find $\neg q$, we should also expect X-marking.

But this is not so. Consider the following sentences (from Iatridou 2000):

61. I live in Bolivia because I want to live in Bolivia

62. I have what I want to have

In (61, 62) the domain of quantification of the modal needs to reach outside the context set to find worlds in which I don't live in Bolivia, and worlds in which I don't have what I want.

But in these sentences, no X-marking on *want* is possible:

French:

63. J'habite en Bolivie parce que je veux/*voudrais habiter en Bolivie
I live in Bolivia because I want/*want+X live in Bolivia

64. J'ai ce que je veux/*voudrais
I have this that I want/want+X

And even in English, the verb *wish* cannot be used (Iatridou 2000):

65. *I live in Bolivia because I wish I lived in Bolivia

66. *I have what I wish I had

In other words, if we connect the appearance of X-marking to the modal needing to find both q and $\neg q$ worlds for the comparative semantics of *want*, we get an asymmetry:

- reaching outside the context set in search of q worlds triggers X-marking
- reaching outside the context set in search of $\neg q$ worlds does not trigger X-marking

This seems to be a problem. Why would there be such an asymmetry?

It seems that the way out of this problem is to not connect the appearance of X-marking to reaches outside the context set in order to satisfy the comparative semantics of *want*.

Instead, the original idea of reaching outside the context set to find worlds that satisfy the attainability presupposition of *want* seems to deliver better results:

If we are in a $\neg q$ world, we need to include q worlds in the domain of quantification in order to satisfy the attainability presupposition of *want*.

But when we are in a q world, there is no equivalent but symmetrical presupposition that needs to be satisfied.

So much for the *want* part of the C/D generalization.
That is, transparent wish languages.

The consequent X-marking of the modal reflects (put somewhat neutrally)

“Perhaps, then, the counterfactual marking is co-opted here in a somewhat meta-linguistic kind of way: “if we were in a context in which **the attainability presupposition of *want* is satisfied**, then **I would want that. . .**” . . .”

One may want to raise the question:

Under this description, the desire is asserted to take place in a CF world, where the attainability presupposition of *want* is satisfied. If the latter, why does it feel like the desire is a desire in the actual world?

The answer to this may be that the attainability presupposition needs to be slightly enriched to “the only missing factor is attainability”.

Connection to *fast* etc with X-marking.

In the little remaining time, let us briefly go to the *complement* part of the C/D generalization.

C/D generalization:

16. X-marked conditional: if p_{m1} , q_{m2}

17. CF wish: I want_{m2} that p_{m1}

How real is the complement part of C/D?

Originally, support for it came from languages like Spanish and Greek

Spanish X-marked conditionals:

67. Si **fuera** más alto sería un jugador de baloncesto.

If be.3.sg.**PAST.SUBJ** more tall be.3.sg.COND a player of basketball

'If s/he was taller, s/he would be a basketball player'

Spanish X-marked desires:

68. Querría que **fuera** más alto de lo que es.

Want.3.sg.COND that s/he **be.3.sg.PAST.SUBJ** more tall than it s/he is

'I wish s/he was taller than s/he is

Greek X-marked conditionals:

69. An **efevge** avrio, tha eftane methavrio
If **leave.PAST.IMP** tomorrow, FUT arrive.PAST.IMP day after tomorrow
'If s/he left tomorrow, s/he would get there the day after tomorrow'

Greek X-marked desires:

70. Tha ithela na **efevge** avrio
FUT want.PAST NA **leave.PAST.IMP** tomorrow
'I wish he would leave tomorrow'

However, these data are at most consistent with the complement part of the C/D generalization and do not provide direct evidence for it.

The reason is that these are SoT languages.

Given that Spanish X-marking contains Past tense morphology, it could be that X-marking on *want* triggers Past tense morphology on its complement, which would as a result look like X-marking.

Indeed, in Spanish, the embedded (subjunctive or indicative) verb always shifts to a past (subjunctive or indicative).

And this happens also with verbs that have nothing to do with X-marking.

The verb *doubt* takes subjunctive:

71. Sofía duda que Rafael pueda venir.

Sofía doubts that Rafael can:PRES.SUBJ.3SG come.

Sofía doubts that Rafael can come.

The verb *to be glad* takes subjunctive :

72. Marcela se alegra de que la hayan invitado.

Marcela SE glad of that PRO her have:PRES.SUBJ.3PL invited.

Marcela is glad that they have invited her.

And under past, past subjunctive:

73. Sofía dudaba que Rafael pudiera venir.

Sofía doubted that Rafael can:PAST.SUBJ.3SG come.

Sofía doubted that Rafael could come.

74. Marcela se alegraba de que la hubieran invitado.


Marcela SE glad of that PRO her have:PAST.SUBJ.3PL invited.

Marcela was glad that they had invited her.

So maybe the shift from present subjunctive to past subjunctive under X-marked *want* is nothing more than SoT?

A similar concern arises for Greek as well. Here antecedent X-marking consists of Past+Imperfective. And it is possible to set up an SoT context where Past+Imperfective appears (Iatridou 2000):

75. Prin apo mia vdhomadha ipe oti tha efevye /fiyi se dhio meres
 before one week said that FUT leave.PAST.IMP/Non-PAST.IMP in 2 days
 ‘A week ago s/he said that she would/will leave in 2 days’



So languages like Greek and Spanish do not provide direct evidence in favor of the complement part of the C/D generalization.

However, support for it can be found in languages where X-marking does not contain Past.

We already saw that Hindi is such a case:

76. kaash vo lambaa ho-**taa**

wish he tall be-**Hab**

'I wish he was tall'

The appearance of X-marking *ta* is not the result of SoT.

77. agar vo lambaa ho-**ta**, to army use bhartii kar le-tii
if he tall be-Hab then army he.Dat admit do TAKE-Hab.f
'If he was tall, the army would have admitted him.'

But *ta* cannot appear on IL predicates outside these contexts (it can appear only on derived generics):

78. *vo lambaa ho-**ta** (hai)
he tall be-Hab (is)

Another argument can be found in Turkish.

X-marking in Turkish: Turkish has fake Past.

X-marking on the consequent: **aorist+past**

X-marking on the antecedent: **SA+past** (past-SA in epistemic conds.)

79. John önümüzdeki salı gel-**se-ydi**, annesi çok mutlu ol-**ur-du**

John next Tue come-SA-PST his.mom very happy be(come)-AOR-PST

'If John arrived next Tuesday, his mom would be very happy'

Turkish has undeclinable *keşke* (reminiscent but slightly different from Hindi).

80. Keşke önümüzdeki salı gel-se-ydi

I.wish next tuesday come-SA-PST

'I wish he would come next Tuesday'

And in (80) the speaker believes that her wish will not come true.

The past tense in (80) is clearly not the result of SoT.

Finally, support for the complement part of the C/D generalization can also be found in English. The appearance of (fake) past is not the result of SoT, since the embedding verb is not in the past:

81. She wishes she had a car now

82. She changes her mind about cars all the time. Yesterday she wished she had a Mercedes. Today she wishes she had a Bentley. Tomorrow she will wish she had a Lamborghini.

So quite possibly, the complement part of the C/D generalization is real.

What are some of the things it might tell us?

There may be a point to be made about the Past-as-Past versus Past-as-Modal debate.

When there are two occurrences of X-marking but only one modal operator (which is the case, arguably, in both conditionals and transparent wishes), Past-as-Past has to treat one occurrence as “non-semantic”, some kind of agreement or reflection of the one true PAST operator (which shifts the time of accessibility).

In both cases, there’s a question of why it is only the time of accessibility that is shifted into the past and not the time of the ordering/preference structure.

We suspect that P-as-P will have a harder time with transparent wishes than with X-marked conditionals. But this debate is still ongoing.

Summary!