to appear (with editorial improvements) in Natural Language Semantics 23, 3 283-341
Economy and Scope* 

Danny Fox
MIT

This paper argues in favor of two claims (a) that Scope Shifting Operations (Quantifier Raising and Quantifier Lowering) are restricted by economy considerations and (b) that the relevant economy considerations compare syntactic derivations that end up interpretively identical.  These ideas are shown to solve several puzzles having to do with the interaction of scope with VP ellipsis, coordination and the interpretation of bare plurals.  Further, it suggests a way of dealing with the otherwise puzzling clause-boundedness of Quantifier Raising.

Introduction

In this paper I will provide evidence that the syntactic scope of quantifiers is affected by economy considerations.  In particular, I will argue that altering this scope at LF incurs a cost which economy considerations seek to minimize.

	There are basically two operations which have the determination (and the altering) of scope as their sole purpose.  One is Quantifier Raising (QR); the other is Quantifier Lowering (QL).  I will claim that these Scope Shifting Operations (SSOs) are restricted by economy considerations.  What could be the content of such a claim?  In general, economy considerations are believed to choose the most optimal derivation from a set of competitors (a “reference set”).  It is also believed that optimality is achieved by reducing instances of movement or by minimizing their length.   The content of the claim is, therefore, that minimizing SSOs, both in quantity and length, enters among the considerations that choose the most optimal derivation from the reference set.

	Here a highly controversial issue arises.  How is the reference set constructed, and what are its members?  This issue shows up in almost every approach to economy, and, in fact, is central to the question of optimality in general (cf. Chomsky (1994), Grimshaw (1993) and Pesetsky (in progress) among others).  This paper will argue that the reference set (at least the one relevant for SSOs) includes only derivations that end up with the same semantic interpretation. In this respect I follow Golan (1993) and Reinhart (1994) who have also argued for a semantic determination of the reference set.  

	I will show that Economy seeks to reduce the cost associated with SSOs.  More specifically,  I will show that an instance of an SSO is blocked if there is a competing derivation in the reference set (i.e., a derivation that ends up with the same semantic interpretation) which involves a shorter SSO, or avoids it altogether.  Put simply, an SSO can apply only if it yields a semantic interpretation which would be impossible without its application.  In other words, SSOs are allowed only when necessary (as a last resort) for achieving a designated interpretation.

	Following Chomsky (1994, 1995), I will assume that the reference set is constructed on the basis of an initial choice of lexical items to be used throughout the derivation (a Numeration).  All the derivations in the reference set must be constructed with the use of all and only those lexical items in the Numeration.  The paper will extend Chomsky’s suggestion by assuming that the designated Numeration is accompanied by a designated interpretation as well.  In other words, under the assumptions made in this paper, all derivations in the reference set are going to use the same lexical items and end up with the same interpretation. 

	To understand the nature of the claims that are going to be made in this paper, consider  QR and its relevance for sentences such as those in (1) and in (2).  These sentences differ in that in (1) the interpretations are the same when the subject has scope over the object and when the scopal relation is reversed, while in (2) the interpretations under the two scopal relations are identical.  This paper will try to show that sentences such as those in (2) differ from their counterparts in (1) in not allowing their objects to move by QR over the subject.

(1)  	a.	A boy loves every girl.
	b. 	Many boys love every girl.

(2)  	a.	John loves every girl.
	b.	Every boy loves every girl.

	To see how this follows from the version of Economy that is herein suggested, let us compare the effects of Economy on (1a) and (2a).  Consider first (1a).  As mentioned, this sentence will have different interpretations when the subject has scope over the object and when the scopal relation is reversed.  Call these two interpretations MS and MO respectively.  If the reference set is constructed with MS as the designated interpretation, the  optimal derivation will be the one ending with the LF in (1’a)./  If the reference set is constructed with MO as the designated interpretation, there would be no way of avoiding QR over the subject and the optimal derivation would be the one ending with the LF in (1’b).  Because the results are not logically equivalent, the derivation without QR over the subject is not compared to the one involving this movement; both LFs in (1’) are possible.

(1’)	a.	[IP A boy1.....[VP every girl2 [VP t1 loves t2]]]
	b.	[IP every girl2 [IP A boy1....  [VP t1 loves t2]]]

	Consider now (2a).  Contrary to (1a), this sentence will have the same interpretation under its two possible scopal relations.  Call this interpretation M.  Because every interpretable LF that might result from (2a) will have M as its interpretation, we need to consider only one reference set (the one constructed with M as the designated interpretation).  This reference set includes (among others) the derivations resulting in the LFs in (2’).  Economy considerations prefer (2’a) over (2’b), and the latter is blocked. 

(2’)	a.	[IP John1.... [VP every girl2 [VP t1 loves t2]]]
	b.	*[IP every girl2 [IP John1....  [VP t1 loves t2]]]

	The same claim is going to be made with respect to QL.  In other words, it will be claimed that QL distinguishes between (3) and (4) in the same way that QR distinguishes between (1) and (2).  In (3), QL will yield an interpretation which would be impossible without its application.  The two derivations do not compete; they result in the two admissible LFs in (3’).  In (4), by contrast, the derivations with and without QL result in logically equivalent LFs; they compete, and Economy blocks the LF in (4’b).  

(3)	An American runner seems to Bill to have won a gold medal. 
(4)	John seems to Bill to have won a gold medal.

(3') 	a.	An American runner1 seems to Bill [IP t1 to have won a gold medal] 
	b. 	  __ seems to Bill  [IP[An American runner] to have won a gold medal]
      
(4') 	a.	John1 seems to Bill [IP t1 to have won a gold medal] 
	b.  * __ seems to Bill  [	         [John]          to have won a gold medal]
      
	The nature of the claim being made ensures that simple evidence will not be found. The claim is that SSOs are blocked when their application doesn’t have semantic effects.  Evidence for the claim could, therefore, be found only if we had ways for deciding on the LF position of a quantifier in the cases in which semantics could not distinguish between the different possibilities. We need to utilize our knowledge about other mechanisms (besides the mechanisms that interpret LFs) that might be sensitive to the syntactic position of quantifiers.  What could such mechanisms be?  I can think of two possibilities.  

	The first possibility is that there are grammatical constraints which are sensitive to the LF position of syntactic elements.  If such constraints exist, they could perhaps tell the location of a quantifier even when semantics fails to differentiate among the possibilities.  In this paper I will utilize two constraints of this form.  One constraint will be the widely discussed constraint on parallelism in ellipsis constructions, and the other will be the coordinate structure constraint.  

	The second possibility is more complicated.  Before going into it, I think it is important to understand that the ideas presented in this paper go against a prevailing assumption regarding the architecture of the grammar.  According to this assumption, the workings of the computational system are not affected by the workings of later performance systems which interpret its outputs.  In particular, the workings of the syntax are not affected by semantics -- syntax is autonomous.  Here the claim is that syntax is not completely autonomous.  The computational system that constructs the reference set sees certain aspects of interpretation.  The question is, obviously, to what extent syntax is non-autonomous.  That is, how much of interpretation is syntax capable of seeing?/ 

	 It seems to me that the prevailing assumption regarding the autonomy of syntax is correct as a null hypothesis.  Further, it seems to me that counterevidence of the type I will present will not motivate total abandonment of this null hypothesis.  Rather, it will motivate a very local amendment.  I will demonstrate that  syntax must see the semantic effects of the relative scope of two quantifiers (the difference between (1) and (3), on the one hand,  and (2) and (4) on the other).  However, this will not motivate the claim that syntax can see everything that has to do with the workings of later interpretative mechanisms.  In the absence of further evidence, the amendment of the autonomy hypothesis would be that syntax can see the semantic effects of quantifier scope (and perhaps other aspects of compositional semantics which form a natural class with the interpretation of scope) but nothing else.

	Such an amendment provides us with our second method for demonstrating that quantifiers move only in order to get a semantically significant scopal relation.  Suppose that some interpretive mechanism of the type that syntax doesn’t see (i.e., a mechanism other than the one that interprets scope), call it INT, is sensitive to the position of NPs.  We predict that an SSO will not be licensed in order to get the semantic effects of INT.  Further, we predict that a scopal semantic effect might independently license the SSO and as an accidental by-product bring about the effects of INT.  INT will thus have the potential of distinguishing between (1, 3) and (2,4) .

	 I will show that existential closure (Heim (1982), Kamp (1981)) can play the role of INT.  Existential closure, I would suggest, is not part of the mechanisms that interpret an LF structure.  Rather, it is part of the mechanisms that interpret the output of an initial interpretation of LF.  The reference set, on the other hand, is constructed with a designated set of instructions to the performance systems that interpret LF.  It doesn’t care about the content of instructions that are going to come up at later stages of interpretation.  Therefore, getting into the scope of existential closure will not have the kind of semantic effects which would license an SSO.  Nonetheless, it would have semantic effects.  I will show that these assumptions can explain an interesting distinction between (1) and (2) and solve certain puzzles for an account of the interpretation of bare plurals. 

	The paper has four sections and an Appendix.  In section 1, I discuss certain well-known and puzzling phenomena regarding the scopal interaction of quantifiers in VP ellipsis contexts.  I go over some previous unsatisfactory attempts at an explanation and present some new data that will argue  for an explanation in terms of semantically sensitive Economy, as described above.  Once the explanation is presented, the idea that parallelism could tell us where a quantifier is even in the cases in which there are no semantic effects to movement will become evident.  In section 2, I will present some new data that have to do with the scope of quantifiers in coordinated structures.  These data will follow from an interaction of Economy and what I will argue is the proper account of the coordinate structure constraint.  In section 3, I will discuss the interpretation of bare plurals.  Section 4 will discuss some issues that have to do with the formalization of the Economy principle.  The Appendix will be devoted to a suggestive way in which the ideas presented in the paper could be utilized to derive the clause-boundedness of QR.

1. 	VP Ellipsis 

It is widely known that ellipsis sometimes disambiguates constructions involving multiple quantification.  More specifically, a construction involving multiple quantification, which would normally show scopal ambiguity, sometimes looses this ambiguity when it serves as an antecedent for ellipsis.

	Consider the fact exemplified in (5-6).  The standard scopal ambiguity in a sentence like (5) disappears when the sentence is the first conjunct of a VP ellipsis construction like (6).  For  (6) to be true, there must be a single boy that admires all of the teachers, whereas in (5) the boys can vary with the teachers.  

(5)	Some boy admires every teacher.							(ambiguous)
(6)	Some boy admires every teacher and Mary does too.	(unambiguous)

This phenomenon has already been noted in Sag (1976) and Williams (1977).  However, as we will see, it has not yet received a satisfactory explanation.  
	
	Williams wanted the contrast in (5-6) to follow from a general constraint which bars the existence of free variables in syntax.  His idea was that in order for the object to get wide scope in (5), it must QR over the subject, as represented in (7a).  Such QR would be followed in (6) by LF reconstruction of the elided VP.  This reconstruction, presented in (7b), would result in an unbound variable in the second conjunct, t', and would thus be ruled out.  The only way to reconstruct the elided VP in (6) without violating the ban on free variables is by adjoining the quantifier to VP as demonstrated in (7c).  The resulting structure allows only narrow scope interpretation for the object of the first conjunct in (6), and the contrast is thus explained. 

(7)	a.	[IP every teacher [IP Some boy [VP admires t ]]]. 
	b.	*[IP every teacher [IP some boy [VP admires t ]]] and 
		Mary [VP  admires t' ] . 
	c.	[IP some boy [VP every teacher [VP admires t ]]] and 
		Mary [VP every teacher [VP admires t ]]. 

	It is important to note that this explanation relies crucially on LF reconstruction of the elided VP being the last operation at LF.  If one allows LF reconstruction to take place before QR, one could reconstruct the VP with the quantifier in situ and then apply QR independently in both conjuncts.  With such an ordering, the object in (6) should be allowed to have wide scope and the explanation for the contrast with (5) disappears.  

	This, in and of itself, is not a strong enough argument against the explanation given by Williams.  The reason is that, assuming a theory of VP ellipsis as involving LF reconstruction, there might be independent reasons for believing that reconstruction must be the last operation at LF, or at least that QR out of a reconstructed VP should not be allowed. 

	However, there are strong empirical reasons for abandoning this explanation.  The crucial feature of this explanation is that it is based on a theory of ellipsis whereby moving the object over the subject in (6) yields a VP that cannot be reconstructed.  If this account is right, ambiguities should always disappear in VP ellipsis constructions.  Hirschbühler (1982) showed that this consequence is false.  Despite ellipsis, the sentences in (8) allow the object to have wide scope with respect to the subject. 

(8)	a.	A Canadian flag is in front of every building and an American flag is too. 
	b.	One guard is standing in front of every building and one policeman is too.
 	b.	Some boy admires every teacher and some girl does too. 

	As noted by Hirschbühler, the sentences in (8) cannot be analyzed as involving across-the-board-scope, an analysis that, under a certain set of assumptions, could perhaps salvage the original approach to (5).  In other words, it is impossible to claim that the object quantifier in the first conjunct has scope over both the conjuncts, with an interpretation paraphrasable (in the case of (8a)) as for every building, it is the case that there is a Canadian flag in front of it and an American flag in front of it too. This is demonstrated by the sentences in (9).  (9a) can be true when there is no building which has both an American and a Canadian flag on it, as long as there are two sufficiently large subsets of buildings (one with a Canadian flag on each of its members and one with an American flag).  For this truth to hold, the LF of (9a) must be something like (9’a1) and not like (9’a2).  The same can be shown for (9b) though it requires considering a more complicated situation (See Hirschbühler (1982)). 

(9) 	a.	A Canadian flag is in front of many buildings and an American flag is too. 
	b.	A Canadian flag is in front of most buildings and an American flag is too. 

(9’)	a1.	many buildings1 [a Canadian flag is [VP in front of  t1]] and 
		many buildings2 [an American flag is [VP in front of  t2 ]]. 
	a2.	* many buildings1 [[a Canadian flag is [VP in front of  t1]] and 	
		[an American flag is [VP in front of  t1 ]]. 

	We therefore confront a puzzle: what is the difference between (6) and (8)? Why can’t (6) have wide scope for the object quantifier while (8) can? In other words, why is (6’) an impossible LF for (6) and (8’) a possible LF for (8)?  

(6’) 	*every teacher1 [some boy admires t1] and
	every teacher2 [Mary admires t2]. 

(8’)	every teacher1 [some boy admires t1] and
	every teacher2 [some girl admires t2]. 

	Previous attempts to deal with this puzzle (e.g.  Cormack (1984) and Diesing (1992)) assumed that the relevant difference between (6) and (8) has to do with the grammatical properties of the subject of the second conjunct.  In (6) the subject of the second conjunct is a referring expression.  In (8), by contrast, the subject is a quantifier. 

	However, this assumption is wrong.  Although the relevant difference does concern properties of the second conjunct, it is not determined by the properties of the subject alone.  Rather, as we shall see, it relates to a semantic property of the conjunct as a whole.  I will argue that the crucial difference concerns the fact that in (6) the second conjunct Mary admires every teacher does not display any semantically relevant scope ambiguity, whereas its counterpart in (8) some girl admires every teacher does.  In other words, the truth conditions of Mary admires every teacher are the same whether Mary has wide scope with respect to every teacher or vice versa.  In contrast, the two possible scopal relations yield different truth conditions for some girl admires every teacher. 

1. 1. The Ellipsis Scope Generalization:  Here we will see that the relevant difference between (6) and (8) has to do with whether or not the second conjunct is semantically ambiguous.  In other words, we will see that the correct generalization is the following:  

(10)	Ellipsis Scope Generalization (ESG):  The relative scope of two quantifiers, one of 
	which is in an antecedent VP of an ellipsis construction, may differ from the surface c-
	command relation, only if the parallel difference will  have semantic effects in the elided 
	VP.

The ESG states that a second conjunct disambiguates the first conjunct (in constructions such as (6) and (8) above) if and only if it is itself semantically unambiguous.  To see that this is the correct generalization, we will go over the paradigm in (11-18).  This paradigm is constructed by minimally varying the semantic properties of the second conjunct.  Scopal ambiguity is once more possible in the first conjunct only when a similar ambiguity is possible in the second conjunct.  

	In the (a) sentences of (11-12) the first conjuncts are unambiguous, because the second conjuncts (the organizer of the film festival admires every movie (11a) or the principal knows the capital of every country (12(a))) have the same meaning under both scopal relations.  

(11)	a.	One of the film reviewers admires every movie and the organizer of the film 				festival did too.         										(unambiguous)
	b.	One of the film reviewers admires every movie and the director/the audience did 		too. 														(ambiguous)

(12)	a.	One student (in the school) knows the capital of every country and the principal 		(of the school) does too. 									(unambiguous)
	b.	One student knows the capital of every country and the prime minister (of that 			country) does too.		 									(ambiguous)

The second conjuncts of the (b) sentences, by contrast, have different truth conditions under the two scopal relations.  To see this, consider the second conjunct of (11b).  Under one scopal relation (subject wide scope) the sentence can be true only if there is a single director that admires all of the movies.  Under the other scopal relation (object wide scope) the directors can vary with respect to the movies.  Because of the ambiguity of the second conjunct, the first conjunct can be ambiguous as well.

	It is important to point out that there is probably a syntactic difference between the subjects of the second conjuncts in the (a) and the (b) sentences in (11-12).  The difference is that in the (b) sentences the subjects of the second conjuncts can contain an implicit variable, which can get bound by a quantifier.  One might suggest that this difference could be utilized for an account in the spirit of  Diesing and Cormack.  However, this is the wrong way to go.   First, consider (13).  In this sentence there is an implicit variable within the subject of the second conjunct.  Nevertheless, the second conjunct still disambiguates the first conjunct.  The reason is that the variable in the subject of the second conjunct cannot be bound by the object quantifier.   For this reason, there is no ambiguity in the second conjunct and the first conjunct is unambiguous as well.

(13)	At each festival, one of the film reviewers praised every movie and the organizer did 	too.

Consider now (14).  In this sentence the subject of the second conjunct is a bona fide quantifier.  Nonetheless, contrary to Diesing and to Cormack, the first conjunct is unambiguous.  The reason for the lack of ambiguity is that the second conjunct every girl admires every teacher doesn’t show a parallel ambiguity.  (The relative scope of two universal quantifiers doesn’t affect truth conditions.) 

(14) 	Some boy admires every teacher and every girl does too.   	(unambiguous)

Now consider (15-16).  

(15)	a.	One of the film critics admired every movie and everyone in the film festival did 		too.  													(unambiguous)
	b.	One of the film critics admired every movie and everyone in the audience did 				too. 														(ambiguous)
	
(16)	a.	One student (in the school) knows the capital of every country and every teacher 		(in the school) does too. 									(unambiguous)
	b.	One student knows the capital of every country and every minister (in that 				country) does too.											(ambiguous)

The (a) sentences in (15-16) are just like (14) in that the second conjuncts involve two universal quantifiers, and are thus not semantically ambiguous.  The second conjuncts of the (b) sentences involve two universal quantifiers as well.  However, in these cases wide scope for the object allows the domain of quantification of the subject universal quantifier to be determined by the elements that the object quantifies over.  In other words, in (15b) wide scope for the object allows the audiences to vary with respect to the movies.  Similarly, in (16b) wide scope for the object allows the ministers to vary with respect to the countries.  In both (15b) and (16b), there are semantic consequences to object wide scope in the second conjunct, and, thus, object wide scope is possible in the first conjunct as well.

	The sentences in (17-18) differ minimally from (12) and from the (a) sentences in (15-16).  The difference is that the semantic properties of the subject quantifier in the second conjuncts in (17-18) make the truth conditions different under the two different scopal relations.  
 
(17) 	a.	One of the film critics admired every movie and almost everyone in the film 			 	  	festival did too.  											(ambiguous)
	b.	One of the film critics admired every movie and most visitors to the film festival  		did too. 													(ambiguous)
 
(18)	a.	One student (in the school) knows the capital of every country and almost every 		teacher (in the school) does too. 							(ambiguous)
	b.	One student knows the capital of every country and most/many teachers do too.																	(ambiguous)

In the (a) sentences, the fact that we inserted the modifier almost into the second conjunct’s subject allows for scopal ambiguity within this conjunct.  When the subject in (17a), for example, has wide scope, the sentence can be true only if there is a set of people in the film festival that is sufficient in cardinality to be considered 'almost everyone', and that each member of this set admires all of the movies.  However, when the object of (17a) has wide scope, the sentence can be true also when the set of admiring people vary with respect to the movies.  In other words, the sentence can be true even when there is no single sufficiently large set of people that admires all of the movies.  All that is required is that for each movie there would be a sufficiently large set of admirers.  The second conjunct is thus semantically ambiguous and therefore allows for the first conjunct to be ambiguous as well.  The other sentences in (17-18) are parallel to (17a) and again the first conjunct can be ambiguous.

To summarize, (11-18) demonstrate that the first conjunct of a VP ellipsis construction can show a scopal ambiguity only if the second conjunct can show a parallel ambiguity.  To make this point clear, I list the second conjuncts that disambiguate the first conjunct in (A) and those that do not in (B).  The difference is that in (A) wide scope for the object does not affect truth conditions, while in (B) it does.  

(A)	a.	Mary likes every teacher. 									(unambiguous)
	b.	The organizer of the film festival praised every movie.	(unambiguous)
	c.	Everyone in the film festival enjoyed every movie. 		(unambiguous)

(B)	a.	Some girl likes every teacher.								(ambiguous) 
	b.	The audience/the director admires every movie.			(ambiguous) 
	c.	Everyone in the audience admires every movie.			(ambiguous)
	d.	Almost everyone in the film festival admires every movie	(ambiguous)
	e.	Most visitors to the film festival admire every movie		(ambiguous)
	d.	An American flag is in front of many buildings. 			(ambiguous)

1.2.  Explaining the ESG:  The paradigm in (11-18) demonstrated the correctness of the ESG which is repeated in (19).

(19)	Ellipsis Scope Generalization (ESG):  The relative scope of two quantifiers, one of 
	which is in an antecedent VP of an ellipsis construction, may differ from the surface c-	command relation, only if the parallel difference will  have semantic effects in the elided 	VP.

	What are the principles from which the ESG follows?  I would like to argue that it has two parts.  One part follows from a well known constraint which requires parallelism between elided/reconstructed material and its antecedent (See, among many others, Tancredi (1992), Rooth (1992) and Fiengo and May (1994)).  The other part follows from the principle of Economy outlined at the start of this paper.  The two principles interact in the following way to yield the ESG.  From Economy it follows that the object can move by QR over the subject only if the movement yields an interpretation which would be unavailable otherwise.  From parallelism it follows that the object moves by QR over the subject in one of the conjuncts, if and only if a parallel instance of QR applies in the other conjunct.  The ESG is derived from these two principles in the following way.  If the second conjunct is ambiguous, Economy is not at stake, and the first conjunct can have both scopal interpretations as long as parallelism is maintained.  If, on the other hand, the second conjunct is not ambiguous, then

	(a)  Economy doesn’t allow long QR in the second conjunct.   Therefore,
	(b)  parallelism doesn’t allow long QR in the first conjunct.  And consequently,
	(c)  the first conjunct cannot be ambiguous.

	Let us illustrate how Economy and parallelism interact to explain the ESG by a look at the way they affect (6) and (8).  Consider first (8) and its four conceivable LFs in (20).  Since the two conjuncts are ambiguous, Economy allows QR in both.  Parallelism rules out non-parallel QR; thus (c) and (d) are ill-formed.

(20)	a.	some boy1		[every teacher2 	[t1 admires t2]]  and 
		some girl1		[every teacher2 	[t1 admires t2]] 
	b.	every teacher2	[some boy1		[t1 admires t2]]  and 
		every teacher2	[some girl1		[t1 admires t2]] 
	c.* some boy1		[every teacher2 	[t1 admires t2]]  and 
		every teacher2	[some girl1		[t1 admires t2]] 
	d.* every teacher2	[some boy1 		[t1 admires t2]]  and 
		some girl1		[every teacher2 	[t1 admires t2]] 

Consider now (6) and its four potential LFs in (21).  Parallelism rules out the non-parallel scopal relations (c,d) just as it did in (20).  Economy now takes over and disallows QR of the object over the subject in the second (unambiguous) conjunct, thus ruling out (21b).

(21)	a.	some boy1		[every teacher2 		[t1 admires t2]]  and 
		Mary1		[every teacher2 		[t1 admires t2]]
	b.* every teacher2	[some boy1			[t1 admires t2]]  and 
		every teacher2	[Mary1				[t1 admires t2]] 
	c.* some boy1		[every teacher2 		[t1 admires t2]]  and 
		every teacher2	[Mary1				[t1 admires t2]] 
	d.* every teacher2	[some boy1 			[t1 admires t2]]  and 
		Mary1		[every teacher2 		[t1 admires t2]] 

	The ESG provides strong evidence that QR is restricted by the particular consideration of Economy outlined in the beginning of this paper.  The evidence is strong because parallelism is needed independently of the ESG and because Economy is exactly what is needed to fill in the gap between the results of parallelism and an account of the ESG (i.e., the ruling out of LFs such as (21b)).  

	Let me conclude this subsection with a short discussion of pseudo-gapping and the way it further supports the explanation I provide for the ESG.  Pseudo-gapping is a construction similar to VP ellipsis in its compliance to parallelism.  In that respect pseudo-gapping can serve the same role that ellipsis did in the arguing that QR is allowed only when it yields a semantically significant scopal relation.   However, pseudo-gapping is also different  from VP ellipsis (and superficially similar to gapping) in that part of the VP is not elided.  This property of pseudo-gapping is important for our purposes because it allows us to vary the semantic properties of a sentence (which must comply to parallelism) while keeping its subject constant.  Such an experiment can give the final blow to the possibility that the difference between the ambiguous and unambiguous sentences in ellipsis is solely related to properties of the subjects in the second conjunct. 

 	Consider the instance of pseudo-gapping in (22a).  In this sentence there is ambiguity in the first and in the second conjunct.  The sentence thus conforms to the ESG.  It also exemplifies the fact that pseudo-gapping obeys parallelism.  In this sentence there must be parallelism between the two conjuncts with respect to  the relative scope of the two quantifiers.  If the sentence allows the boys to vary with respect to the professors, it must also allow the girls to vary with respect to the parents.  Similarly, if variance is disallowed for the boys it is also disallowed for the girls.  

(22)	a.	A boy was introduced to every professor and a girl was to every parent. 																	(ambiguous)
	b.	A boy was introduced to every professor and a girl was to Jane.
															(unambiguous)
	c.	A boy was introduced to every professor and a girl was to some parent. 																		(unambiguous)

Consider now (22b) and (22c).  In both cases the subject must have wide scope over the object.  The reason should by now be clear.  In both sentences the second conjunct is unambiguous (a girl was introduced to Jane in (22b) and a girl was introduced to some parent in (22c)).  Thus, according to the ESG, the first conjunct cannot be ambiguous as well.  These examples are important because they show decisively that the relevant difference between (6) and (8) cannot be traced to properties of the subject of the second conjunct.  All of the sentences in (22) have the same subject and yet some group with (6) and some with (8).

1.3.  Scope relative to Negation:  To this point I have demonstrated that the ESG is a correct generalization.  I have also shown how this generalization follows in a natural way from an interaction between parallelism and Economy as conceived in this paper.  In this subsection I would like to eliminate in advance a possible approach for constructing an alternative explanation.

	What I have in mind is an approach which would try to link the ESG to the syntax of  scopal dependency.  We notice that whenever a scopal relation is distinct from its reversal there is some variance going on.  In other words, in all the cases we have seen in which subject wide scope differed semantically from subject narrow scope the latter was interpreted with the semantic denotation of the subject varying with respect to the choice of the elements quantified over by the  wide scope operator.  Thus, the object wide scope interpretation of a sentence like a boy likes every professor has the boys varying with respect to the professors.  Suppose we viewed this variance as an instance of bound-variable anaphora.  Suppose that when every professor has wide scope something forces  some girl to be interpreted with a variable bound by every professor (the interpretation paraphrasable as for every professor x there is a boy y chosen for x (such that y=f(x) for some choice function) and y likes x).  We notice also that in the cases in which the alternative scopal relations are semantically equivalent there is no variance going on.  Suppose we argue that something blocks the bound variable interpretation in this case.  Under such a view, the ESG could (with a few further assumptions) follow from parallelism without recourse to Economy.   
	
	The nature of such an approach is that it is specific to the interaction of operators which can (perhaps) be analyzed as having implicit variables within them.  One operator which cannot be analyzed this way, at least not in any plausible manner, is negation.  Here I would like to show that the scopal interaction of negation and other quantificational elements is affected by ellipsis exactly as predicted by the Economy account.  Once this is demonstrated, the possibility of constructing an alternative along the lines described above will be eliminated in advance.    

	Consider the sentences in (23).  Both sentences are ambiguous with respect to the relative scope of the object quantifier and of negation.  To illustrate with (23a), the meaning could be either that it is not the case that there are more than three languages that I speak or, alternatively, that there are more than three languages that I do not speak.  Although both sentences are ambiguous, there is a difference between them which has to do with our knowledge of the world, and which helps us in conducting an important experiment.  The sentence in (23a) is true irrespective of the relative scope of the object and of negation.  The sentence in (23b), by contrast, is true only if the object has wide scope over negation.  We can thus examine the truth value of (23b) in ellipsis constructions and know which of its readings are available.  

(23)	a. 	I don’t speak more than 3 languages.								(True)
	b. 	Ken Hale doesn’t speak more than 3  languages.					(True or False)

	Compare the two sentences in (24).  While (24a) is true, (24b) must be false.  This indicates that the first conjunct must be interpreted with the object having narrow scope with respect to negation.  Why should this be the case?  Again, Economy and parallelism provide the answer:  The second conjunct is unambiguous.  For this reason Economy blocks QR to a position over NegP in the second conjunct, and parallelism blocks QR over NegP in the first conjunct.  In (24c), where both conjuncts are ambiguous, QR over NegP is possible in both conjuncts and thus the sentence could be either true or false.

(24)	a.	I don’t speak more than 3 languages and Rob Pensalfini does.	(True)	
	b.	Ken Hale doesn’t speak more than 3 languages and Rob Pensalfini does.
																		(False)
	c. 	Ken Hale doesn’t speak more than 3 languages and Rob Pensalfini doesn't as well. 																		(True or False)

1.4. Quantifier Lowering In the previous section we have seen evidence from VP ellipsis that Quantifier Raising is restricted by economy considerations and is allowed only when it yields an interpretation which would be unavailable otherwise.  In this section we will see that the same holds for Quantifier Lowering. 

	 Consider the sentence in (25).  This sentence is ambiguous with respect to the relative scope of the subject quantifier and of the attitude verb seems.  If the subject quantifier has wide scope, the sentence can be true only if Bill has some American runner in mind, and only if it seems to Bill that that particular American runner won a gold medal.  If the attitude verb has wide scope the sentence merely requires that Bill have the belief that some American runner or other won a gold medal.  Bill need not have any particular American runner in mind.  The sentence would be true in a situation in which Bill sits in the Olympic cafeteria, hears the American anthem and concludes that an American runner won the medal.

(25) 	An American runner seems to Bill to have won a gold medal. 

	The two readings of the sentence in (25) are the result of the two positions in which the subject can be interpreted.  If the subject is interpreted in its SS position, it has wide scope with respect to the attitude verb.  However, if it is lowered to the embedded IP at LF, the attitude verb has wide scope. (See, among others, May (1985) and Diesing (1992). See also notes 6 and 7.)  The two LFs for (25) are thus represented in (26).

(26) 	a.	An American runner1  seems to Bill  [t1 to have won a gold medal].
	b.	__ seems to Bill  [[An American runner] to have won a gold medal].	     

	Consider now what happens if we embed (25) in a VP ellipsis construction such as  (27).  (27) is ambiguous, just as (25) is.  However, since parallelism must be maintained, the relative scope of the subject and the attitude verb must be the same in the two conjuncts.  Bill could know the identity of the Russian and the American runner, or alternatively he could be sitting in the cafeteria hearing the consecutive playing of the two anthems.  What is important, however, is that if Bill is required to know the identity of the American runner, he must also know the identity of his Russian colleague and vice versa.  (28a,b) are possible LFs for (27) while (28c,d) are impossible. 

(27) 	An American runner seems to Bill to have won a gold medal and a Russian 	
	athlete does too. 		(ambiguous, with parallelism)  

(28)	a.	An American runner1	seems to Bill	[t1 to have won a gold medal] and     			a Russian athlete1		seems to Bill	[t1 to have won a gold medal].  

	b.	__seems to Bill [[An American runner]	to have won a gold medal] and 
 		__seems to Bill [[a Russian athlete]		to have won a gold medal].  

	c.	 * An American runner1 seems to Bill [t1 to have won a gold medal] and 
	    	__seems to Bill [[a Russian athlete] to have won a gold medal]. 
		
	d.	* __seems to Bill   [[An American runner] to have won a gold medal] and 
		a Russian athlete1 seems to Bill [t1 to have won a gold medal].  

Consider now (29).  (29), contrary to (27), is not ambiguous.  For the sentence to be true, Bill must know the identity of the American runner. 

(29)	a.	An American runner seems to Bill to have won a gold medal and Sergey does 			too. 														(unambiguous)

This follows naturally from the assumption that QL is restricted by Economy considerations.  If QL, just like QR, is a costly operation, it can apply in a structure only if it has semantic consequences.  Since in a sentence such as (30) the meaning remains the same whether or not QL takes place, QL is impossible.  For the same reason QL cannot apply to the second conjunct in (29), and because of parallelism it cannot apply to the first conjunct.  (31c,d) are ruled out  by parallelism and (31b) is ruled out by Economy.

(30)	Sergey seems to Bill to have won a gold medal. 

(31)	a.	An American runner1	seems to Bill	[t1 to have won a gold medal] and     			Sergey1				seems to Bill	[t1 to have won a gold medal].  

	b.	*__seems to Bill [[An American runner]	to have won a gold medal] and 
 		  __seems to Bill [[Sergey]				to have won a gold medal].  

	c.	*An American runner1 seems to Bill [t1 to have won a gold medal] and 
	    	__seems to Bill [[a Russian athlete] to have won a gold medal]. 
		
	d.	* __seems to Bill   [[An American runner] to have won a gold medal] and 
		Sergey1 seems to Bill [t1 to have won a gold medal].  

1.5. Parallelism:  In the previous section we have seen that Economy together with Parallelism account for certain otherwise puzzling phenomena.  The fact that parallelism is needed independently of these phenomena led us to conclude that we have a strong argument for Economy.  This could be stated slightly differently.  Along the logic outlined in the beginning of this paper, we were looking for constraints that can tell us the location of a quantifier even when semantics fails to distinguish the different possibilities.  Parallelism is such a constraint.  Therefore, if we believe in parallelism, we have a direct test for the claim that an SSO doesn’t apply when its application would not bring about semantic effects.
	
	What parallelism requires is that  an elided structure will be isomorphic at LF to its antecedent.  In other words, it requires that the syntactic elements in the elided material will be in parallel positions (within the structures in which they are embedded) to the position of the parallel syntactic elements in the antecedent.  Informally, this constraint insures that in VP ellipsis we have two structures, one of which is the syntactic image of the other (see, however, notes 31 and 67).

	Suppose an SSO does not yield a distinct interpretation within a structure S.  Semantics cannot tell us if this operation applied.  However, suppose we had an image of S, S’, in which the parallel operation did have semantic effects.  We could now look at S’ and see what happened in S.  This is exactly what we have done.  What we have discovered is that whenever there were no semantic effects  in S,  S’ indicated that the SSO could not apply.

	Fiengo and May (1994) argue that the requirement of Parallelism is an irreducible fact about ellipsis.  They state a constraint of Parallelism (I-identity) and argue that its empirical scope goes way beyond what would follow from previous claims about the mechanism of reconstruction (such as the claims of Williams (1977)).  Whether Parallelism could be derived from deeper principles is an open question.  However, it is clear that it holds as an empirical generalization.  This could be demonstrated by any case of ellipsis that involves structural ambiguity.  The basic observation is that the ambiguities do not multiply in such cases.  This is demonstrated by the sentences in (32) which are two-ways and not four-ways ambiguous, as one would expect if parallelism were not required.  The elided VP in both these cases resolves the ambiguity in the same way that the antecedent VP does.  

(32)	a.	John likes flying planes and Bill does too.
	b.	I introduced one of the boys to every teacher and Bill did too. 

	The obvious question is whether the correct account of Parallelism would interact with Economy in the way I suggested to yield the observable phenomena of scope.  From the definition of parallelism offered by Fiengo and May (and argued for on the basis of the distribution of sloppy identity interpretations for pronouns)  it follows that a quantifier can raise out of an elided VP only if an isomorphic operation took place in the antecedent VP.  However, I would like to point out that the proposal made here could probably use any account of the phenomena in (32).

	The reason is that scopal ambiguities which relate material in the elided VP with VP external material behave just like the ambiguities in (32).  Any account of (32) must explain the fact that structural ambiguities do not multiply in (33) as well.  It would be hard to imagine how an account of parallelism in (33) would fail to interact with Economy in the way I suggested above./
	
(33)	a. 	One of the boys was introduced to every teacher and one of the girls was too.
	b.	An American runner seems to Bill to have won a gold medal and a Russian athlete does 		too.

1.6.  Existential Quantification over Events:  A potential counter-example to the ESG was reported in work by Lappin (1993).  In (34) there doesn’t seem to be ambiguity in the second conjunct.  However, contrary to the ESG, the object can have wide scope in the first conjunct.  

(34)	At least one MP attended every committee meeting, and Bill did too.	(Lappin (1993: 265)

	I would like to argue that (34) is only an apparent counter-example to the ESG.  The crucial difference between (34) and the cases we were looking at in section 1.1. is that the latter all involved individual level predicates, whereas (34) involves a stage level predicate.  Suppose we make the common assumption that stage level predicates have event arguments which are existentially quantified over.  The thing to figure out is the exact position of the existential quantifier over events (the EQE).  Suppose that this quantifier is above the subject position.  If this is the case, the universal quantifier would be allowed to QR in both conjuncts in order to have wide scope over the EQE.  The structure of (34) before QR is presented in (34’a).  The EQE licenses QR in both conjuncts, and we get the structure in (34’b), which obeys parallelism.  

(34’)	a.	$e [At least one MP attended every committee meeting at e] & 
		$e [Bill attended every committee meeting at e]
	b.	every committee meeting1 $e [At least one MP attended t1 at e ] & 
		every committee meeting1 $e [Bill attended t1 at e]

	In (34’b) the object QRs in order to have scope over the EQE.  The fact that it has scope over the existential quantifier is only a byproduct of movement over an EQE.  It is surely not implausible to claim that (34) is understood with the events varying with respect to the commitees.  In other words, independent of the account I have proposed, we can say that the universal quantifier in object position has scope over the EQE.  Further, we can provide direct support for our explanation by the observation that when the object has narrow scope with respect to the EQE, the second conjunct disambiguates the first one.  To see this consider the following.  Suppose that you are in a film festival in which three movies are featured A, B and C and in which there is a focused discussion featuring Pauline Kael and three film critics from the New-York Times, a, b, and g.  Suppose that  a argues in his speech that A was a great movie and that B and C were terrible,  b argues that B was great and that A and C were terrible and g argues that C was great and A and B were terrible.  Suppose that after a, b and g finish speaking Pauline Kael goes up to the stage and makes the following two-sentence speech: “You are all crazy.  All of the movies were great.”  In this situation, a  sentence such as (35a) would be false.  The intuition is that the sentence would be true only if there would have been a single NYT film critic who had praised all of the movies.

(35)	a.	One NYT film critic praised every movie and Pauline Kael did too.
	b.	Throughout this year, one NYT film critic praised every movie and Pauline Kael did 		too.
The explanation for the falsehood of (35a) in the situation described is that Pauline Kael is involved in only one event of praising.  Therefore, it is hard to interpret the universal quantifier as having scope over the EQE in the second conjunct of (35a).  For this precise reason, I would like to claim, it is hard for the object to have scope over the subject in the first conjunct.  QR over the subject (and not over the EQE) is not allowed in the second conjunct and is, thus, blocked by parallelism in the first conjunct.  Further, an interpretation of QR over the EQE is made difficult in the second conjunct given our knowledge that for Pauline Kael there is only one event of praising.

	 Consider now (35b) when uttered out of context.  In this sentence, our knowledge of the world enables us easily to imagine multiple events of praising (probably identified by the different issues of the relevant newspapers).  Therefore, (35b) can have an LF similar to that of (34’b), with object wide scope in both conjuncts. The contrast in (35) demonstrates that (34) is only an apparent counter-example to the ESG.  Once EQEs are considered we see that (34) is consistent with the ESG, and that (35) further supports it.

1.7.  Wide Scope Existentials:  Another potential counter-example for the ESG involves wide scope existentials.  Consider the interpretation of the sentences in (36).  In these sentences, the object can have wide scope over the subject in apparent violation of the ESG.  Consider (36b).  In this sentence, the existential quantifier can have wide scope with respect to the universal quantifier in the first conjunct.  We can see this by the observing that the sentence could be true when there is a certain professor who is admired by exactly half the boys.  (Under such a reading, there is no special requirement with respect to the attitudes that other boys might have towards other professors; the sentence would be true even if it were the case that every student admires some professor, as long as there exists at least one professor who is admired by exactly half of the students.)  

(36)	a. 	Every boy admires a certain professor and Mary does too.
	b.	Exactly half the boys admire a certain professor and Mary does too.

	I think that (36) is a real counter-example for the ESG.  However, it is not a counter-example for the explanation we provided for the ESG.   There are very good reasons for believing that there are mechanisms other than movement that bring about the effects of wide scope for existentials in sentences such as (36).  There is no reason to believe that the application of these mechanisms is restricted by Economy.  As far as Economy is concerned, these mechanisms can apply in parallel in both the conjuncts of the sentences in (36), and the ESG should not hold.  
	Reasons for believing that such mechanisms exist were first noted in Fodor and Sag (1982).  These authors have observed that existential quantifiers escape standard islands for movement in general, and for QR in particular.  This is exemplified in (37a,b) where the existential can take wide scope over the matrix subject, and in (37c) where the universal cannot take scope outside of the complex-NP in which it is embedded.

(37)	a.	Every professor heard the rumor that a certain student of mine failed the test.
	b.	Exactly half the professors heard the rumor that a certain student of mine failed the test.
	c.	Some professors heard the rumor that every student of mine failed the test.

	To account for the fact that existentials can have extremely wide scope (EWS), Fodor and Sag suggest that existentials can show the effects of wide scope without movement.  A strong argument supporting this claim is made in Reinhart (1995a), based on observations of Ruys (1993).  The observation is that EWS doesn’t yield all of the interpretations predicted by a QR analysis.  In (38), for example, the existential three relatives of mine can have wide scope with respect to the conditional.  However, the existential can have only what is called the collective interpretation.  (The wide scope interpretation can be paraphrased as there are three relatives of mine, such that if they all die, I will inherit a house but not as there are three relatives of mine, such that for each of them, if he dies, I will inherit a house.)  This observation cannot be explained, if the mechanism that allows for EWS is QR.  

(38)	If three relatives of mine die, I will inherit a house.

	To account for (38) (as well as many other things) Reinhart suggests that EWS is achieved via existential closure over choice functions (in a similar vein to a proposal made independently in Kratzer (1995) ).  QR cannot escape islands and the wide scope interpretation of (38) is the result of an LF such as (38’).  This LF is true just in case there exists a choice function, such that if the three people which are the value of this function when applied to the set of relatives die, I will inherit a house. (See Winter (1995) for a precise formalization.)  Because EWS is the result of wide scope for a choice function and not for the existential itself, there is no way to get the wide scope distributive interpretation.

(38’)	($f) if three f(relatives of mine) die, I will inherit a house. 

This is further demonstrated by the contrast in (39).  In (39a), just as in (37), we can get EWS (three students > every professor).  In (39b), three students can’t have wide scope with respect to one professor (the professors can’t vary with respect to the students).  This contrast follows from the assumption that EWS is achieved via wide scope for a choice function, as illustrated in (39’).  

(39)	a.	Every professor heard the rumor that three  students of mine failed the test.
	b.	One professor heard the rumor that three  students of mine failed the test.

(39’)	a.	($f) Every professor heard the rumor that three f(students of mine) failed the test
	b.	($f) one professor heard the rumor that three f(students of mine) failed the test

Wide scope for an existential quantifier over choice functions gives the same result as QR when  relative scope with respect to a universal quantifier is concerned (39a).  However, when  relative scope with respect to an existential quantifier is at issue (39b), the interpretations can differ.    
	The cases described above provide compelling evidence that there is a mechanism other than QR for achieving wide scope for existentials.  There is no reason to believe that this mechanism is limited to EWS.  Therefore, we can safely assume that this mechanism is at work in explaining the violation of the ESG in (36).  In other words, we can assume that when we get the effects of wide scope for the existential, the LFs are as in (36’)

(36’)	a. 	($f) Every boy admires  f(professor) and ($g) Mary admires g(professor).
	b.	($f) Exactly half the boys admire f(professor) and ($g) Mary admires g(professor).
 
	(36) can obviate the ESG, because QR is not involved.  Support for this explanation is given by the observation that in the cases in which we can distinguish the interpretation of QR from that of wide scope via choice functions, we can tell that only the latter obviates the ESG.   In (40) the boys cannot vary with respect to the professors.  This is for two reasons:  (a) wide scope for an existential quantifier over choice functions doesn’t allow for this variance; (b) QR is not an option, given Economy and Parallelism. 

(40)	Some boy admires three professors and Mary does too.

	Although apparently problematic at the outset, (36) turned out to support our explanation of the ESG.  This sentence, especially when combined with (40), shows that where our explanation doesn’t predict the ESG to hold, it, in fact, doesn’t hold.  

1.8. Generic Quantification:  Fiengo and May (1994) provide an additional case which, under their analysis, would be problematic for the ESG.  They point out that (41) can be true even when the tours vary with respect to the guides.  They take this to mean that the object of the first conjunct can have scope over the subject of its clause.  If this is the case, it would be a counter-example to the ESG, since a parallel ambiguity doesn’t exist in the second conjunct.  Further, we can’t deal with (41) by appeal to EQEs, as we did in subsection 1.6., since (41) has a generic interpretation, and as such does not involve an existential quantifier over events. 

(41)	A guide accompanies every tour to the Eiffel Tower, and Jeanne does, too.

Although (41) doesn’t involve an existential quantifier over events, it involves some quantification over time, or world-time pairs (namely, generic quantification).  I will show that this generic quantification can account for the judgment in (41) in a way that is consistent with our explanation of the ESG.  

	Assume, following Enç (1986) and Heim (1991), among others, that nominals can have a  world-time pair as an argument.  Under this assumption (41) could have an LF such as that in (41’).

(41’)	GENw,t ( ($x) guide at (w,t) (x), ("y) tour to the Eiffel tower at (w,t) (y)) (x accompanies y) 	& GENw,t                  ( Jeannex, ("y) tour to the Eiffel tower at (w,t) (y)) (x accompanies y) 

(41’) obeys Economy and Parallelism.  Therefore it should be licensed.  Further (41’) is true in a situation in which guides vary with respect to tours as long as it is the case that for each world-time there is no variance.  To see this, let us concentrate on times (or better, time-intervals).  Suppose that there are 4 relevant time-intervals that are being quantified over (t1-t4).  Suppose that each time-interval, ti, includes 2 tours to the Eiffel Tower (Ti,1-Ti,2).  Suppose further that there are four different guides (g1-g4).  If for each ti, it is the case that gi accompanies both Ti,1 and Ti,2, (41’) would be true.  We get the result that the guides vary with respect to the tours without the object having wide-scope with respect to the subject.  I would like to claim that (41’) is the only LF which allows the guides to vary with respect to the tours.  In other words, I would suggest that QR over the subject in the first conjunct in (41) is not allowed, given Economy and Parallelism.  
	
	In principle, we should be able to put this suggestion to direct empirical test.   After all, (41’) is not logically equivalent to an LF that would result from movement of the object over the subject in the first conjunct of (41).  In principle, the world could be such that the latter is true and the former is false.  Such would be the world if there were a specific time-interval for which the guides varied with respect to the tours.  However, it is well-known that history does not present itself with a pre-determined periodization.  In other words,  one can divide history into time-intervals in a variety of ways.  There are probably certain cognitive constraints.  However, without knowing them it is impossible to see whether the guides can vary with respect to the tours.  In other words, it is practically impossible to conduct the test.  
	Nevertheless, I will try to provide independent evidence that the LF in (41’) is a possible LF.  This evidence will not demonstrate that it is the only possible LF, but it will suffice to convince us that (40’) is not a serious counter-example.  To understand this evidence, it is important to see what brought people like Enç and Heim to postulate the existence of a world-time argument for nominals.  Consider, for example, (42) (Heim’s (68)).  

(42)	Each time, it could have happened just as easily that the player on the left would have been 	on the right.

If one wanted to account for the salient interpretation of (42) without world-time arguments for nominals, one would have to claim that the definite description has to have wide scope relative to the modal could (thus avoiding a contradictory interpretation) and narrow scope relative to Each time .  In particular, one would have to claim that definite descriptions escape standard islands for scope.   Just as in the case where existentials appear to escape islands for scope, there is a way out.  In particular, it is possible to claim that the wide scope effects of the definite description are achieved via long distance binding of the world-time pair; the salient reading of (42) is the result of an LF paraphrasable as in (42’).

(42’)	At the actual world, w, it is the case that for each time, t, there is a possible world, w’, 	such that the player on the left at w and at t is on the right at w’ and t. 

	World-time pairs have been used to account for the scope of definite descriptions relative to  adverbs of quantification and to quantifiers over world-time pairs, such as modals.  However, to the best of my knowledge, they were never used to get the effects of wide scope for universal relative to existential quantifiers, as in (41’).  To show that this extension is justified, I will demonstrate that the effects of wide scope for a universal quantifier in generic contexts are not sensitive to islands.  In other words, I will show that the argument in favor of an additional mechanism for wide scope extends to environments such as (41’).

	Consider the contrast in (43).  In (43a) the universal quantifier in the embedded clause cannot take scope over the matrix subject.  This follows from the clause-boundedness of QR, whatever its explanation is (see appendix).  In (43b), by contrast, it appears that the guides can vary with respect to the tours.  I would like to suggest that the difference between the two sentences is that in (43b) there is generic quantification over time-intervals.  Therefore, just as in (41), we can get the effects of wide-scope without QR.  

(43)	a.	Yesterday, a guide ensured that every tour to the Eiffel Tower will be enjoyable.
	b.	In general, a guide ensures that every tour to the Eiffel Tower will be enjoyable.

2.  Coordination

In this section I will show that the coordinate structure constraint (CSC), when properly understood, can serve as a further test for Economy as perceived in this paper.  To see this, consider the well-known generalization regarding extraction out of coordination exemplified in (44).  The generalization is that such extraction is possible only if it occurs across the board (ATB).   

(44) 	a.	* Who do you think Mary likes t and Bill hates Sue?
	b.	Who do you think Mary likes t and Bill hates t. 

I will make the two assumptions in (45), which are shared by many of the principled accounts of the contrast in (44).  

(45)	a.	Extraction is possible out of a coordinate structure only if there are two independent 		structures, each composed of one of the coordinates together with material above it up 		to the antecedent (henceforth, Derivative Structures). 
	b. 	Grammatical constraints are checked independently in the two Derivative Structures.

  	With these assumptions, the contrast in (44) follows as a direct consequence of the constraint against vacuous quantification.  When movement takes place only out of one of the coordinates, as in (44a), the Derivative Structures are those in (46).  As we see, the second Derivative Structure involves vacuous quantification.  When movement is ATB, both Derivative Structures are okay, as we can see in (47).

(46)	Derivative structures of (44a)
	1.	Who do you think Mary likes t
	2.	Who do you think Bill hates Sue

(47)	Derivative structures of (44b)
	1.	Who do you think Mary likes t
	2.	Who do you think Bill hates t

	If the assumptions in (45) are right, we can construct further tests for Economy.  Given (45b),  Economy, like any other grammatical constraint, should be tested independently in the two Derivative Structures.  The prediction is that an SSO that occurs ATB must be motivated independently in each Derivative Structure by a shift in the semantic interpretation.  If a shift in interpretation is not achieved in either of the Derivative Structures, the SSO would not apply.  We could observe the ban on the SSO by a look at the semantics of the Derivative Structure in which the SSO would have semantic effects (or by a look at other by-products of ATB movement, as will become clear soon).

2.1.  ATB Quantifier Lowering:  May (1985) and Ruys (1993) have argued that QR obeys the coordinate structure constraint (see also Lakoff (1970) and Rodman (1976)).  One of the arguments is based on the observation that an object quantifier within a coordinated VP cannot take scope over the subject.  Thus, the quantifier scope ambiguity in (48a) disappears in (48b).  

(48)	a. 	A different student likes every professor.
	b.	A (#different) student [[likes every professor] and [hates the dean]]
            	(unambiguous)	

This observation supports the claim that QR obeys the coordinate structure constraint, and, thereby supports the claim that QR is a syntactic movement. However, when we consider quantifier lowering and VP internal subjects, there is a gap in the explanation of (48).  We understand why in (48b) the object can’t raise by QR over the subject, but we don’t understand why the subject can’t lower by QL under the object.

	In order to deal with this, one might want to seek a principle that in general blocks the subject in coordinate structures from lowering into the coordinates.  Example (49), however, shows this to be a wrong strategy.  In (49), although the object quantifier is  within a coordinated VP, it can have scope over the VP external subject.  Assuming that QR obeys the coordinate structure constraint, the subject must be lowered under the object.  Further, we can see directly from the interpretation of (49) that it is the subject that lowers under the object and not the object that QRs over the subject.  To see this, we must first observe that in order for the subject to have narrow scope with respect to the object of one of the VPs, it must have narrow scope with respect to the other object as well.  Putting aside the coordinate structure constraint, there are two principled ways for the subject to have narrow scope with respect to both objects.  One would be by moving both objects over the subject as in (50a) and the other would be by combining VP-level QR in both conjuncts and ATB lowering of the subject to the two coordinated VPs, as in (50b).

(49)	A guard is standing in front of every church and sitting at the side of every mosque.

(50)	a. 	every mosque1 every church2 [A guard is 	[standing in front of t2] and 
													[sitting at the side of t1]
	   
	b.__ is 	[VP every church1 	[VP [a guard] standing in front of t1]] and
			[VP every mosque1 	[VP [a guard] standing at the side of t1]]

There is an obvious difference in the interpretation of the LFs in (50a) and in (50b).  For the LF in (50a) to be true, each pair of a mosque and a church must have a single guard standing both in front of the church and in front of the mosque.  For the LF in (50b) to be true, the guards can vary independently with respect to the churches and the mosques.  (50b) is an LF equivalent to the one achieved by independent wide scope for the object in the two conjuncts of (51). 

(51)	A guard is standing in front of every church and 
	a guard is sitting at the side of every mosque.

Now, it is clear that the interpretation of (49) is that of (50b) and not that of (50a).  We must conclude that the LF of (49) is achieved by ATB lowering and not by QR out of both conjuncts.  So (49) doesn’t raise any problem for the claim that QR obeys the coordinate structure constraint.  However, we want an explanation for the difference between (48) and (49).  Why is ATB lowering allowed in (49) and not in (48)? 
	Economy together with the two assumptions in (45) provide the answer.  First notice that from the assumptions in (45) it follows that lowering is possible into a coordinate structure only if it is ATB.  To see this consider (50b) and its two Derivative Structures in (52).  Had lowering taken place only in one of the Derivative Structures, the trace in the other Derivative Structure would not have an antecedent (as we see in (53)).  

(52)	1.	__ is 	[VP every church1	[VP [a guard] standing in front of t1]]    	
	2.	__ is 	[VP every mosque1 	[VP [a guard] standing at the side of t1]]

(53)	1.	__ is 	[VP every church1	[VP [a guard] standing in front of t1]]    	
	2.	__ is 	[VP every mosque1 	[VP 	t	    standing at the side of t1]]

	 Consider the point in the derivation of (49) at which the object has already undergone QR to the pre-VP position, but the subject has not yet undergone ATB lowering.  The structure at this point is presented in (54).  To determine whether QL is allowed in both conjuncts we must take an independent look at each of the Derivative Structures.  Since Economy, like any other grammatical constraint, is checked independently in the two Derivative Structures, QL must yield a distinct interpretation in each Derivative Structure.  As we see in (54), both Derivative Structures involve an interaction between an existential and a universal quantifier such that lowering alters the scope relation.  As we know, altering the scope relation of a universal and existential quantifier has semantic effects.  Thus, QL is allowed in both structures.

(54)	a guard2 is 	[VP every church1 	[VP t2 standing in front of t1]] 	and
				[VP every mosque1 	[VP t2 standing at the side of t1]]
	The two Derivative Structures:
	1. a guard2 is 	[VP every church1 	[VP t2 standing in front of t1]] 
	2. a guard2 is 	[VP every mosque1 	[VP t2 standing at the side of t1]]

	In (48), by contrast, lowering the subject into the second conjunct will not yield a distinct interpretation within the second Derivative Structure and is thus ruled out.  Consider now the minimal pair in (55).

(55)	a.	A guard is standing in front of every church and sitting at the side of every 			mosque.
	b	# A guard is standing in front of every church and sitting at the side of this 			mosque.

In (55a) (a repetition of (49))  Economy licenses QL in both Derivative Structures in (54).  ATB QL is licensed and results in (50b).  In (55b), by contrast, QL into the second conjunct is not allowed.  Therefore, since the coordinate structure constraint doesn’t allow the object to undergo QR, the subject cannot have narrow scope relative to the object.  Consequently, the sentence is semantically anomalous (since our knowledge of the world does not allow a single guard to be standing in front of every church).

2.2.  The CSC and Quantifier Raising:  Ruys (1993) has observed that a pronoun in one of two conjuncts can license QR out of the other in apparent violation of the CSC.  This is demonstrated by the contrast in (56).

(56)	a.	A (#different) student [[likes every professor] and [hates the dean]]
            	(unambiguous)	
  	b.	A (different) student [[likes every professor1] and [wants him1 to be on his 			committee]]							(ambiguous)	

(56b), in contrast to (56a), allows the object to QR over the subject in apparent violation of the CSC.  Ruys suggests that the pronoun in the second conjunct allows the quantifier to move out of the first conjunct without violating the constraint on vacuous quantification in any of the Derivative Structures.  More specifically, he suggests that the pronoun is analyzed in LF as a resumptive pronoun. The two Derivative Structures are given in (57), and in each there is no vacuous quantification.

(57)	1.  Every professor1, a student likes t1.
	2.	Every professor1, a student wants him1 to be on his committee.

Although Ruys doesn’t point this out explicitly, I think that his observation lends strong support to an explanation of the CSC along the lines discussed above.  (56) shows that there is no requirement of ATB movement.  The appearance of a requirement is an artifact of the fact that the two Derivative Structures are checked independently for vacuous quantification.  In (56b), where vacuous quantification is avoided by a resumptive pronoun, there is no need for ATB movement.  

	In (56b), movement takes place only out of one of the conjuncts.  However, the principles from which the CSC follows do not require ATB movement.  What they require is that each of the Derivative Structures obey all grammatical constraints, in particular the constraint on vacuous quantification.  Movement takes place only out of one of the Derivative Structures.  However, the other Derivative Structure doesn’t suffer from vacuous quantification due to the presence of the pronoun.

	Ruys' suggestion is further supported by his observation that quantifiers behave like in situ Wh-phrases.  (58a), just as (56a), involves vacuous quantification in one of the Derivative Structures and is thus ruled out.  In (58b), just as in (56b), a resumptive pronoun obviates the CSC. 

(58)	a.	*Which student likes which professor and hates the dean?
	b.	Which student likes which professor and wants him to be on his committee?

	With this much background, we could put the claim that QR can apply only when semantically motivated to a further test.  We notice that in (56b) QR applies in one of the Derivative Structures.  It is semantically motivated within the structure in which it applies and does not violate the CSC because there is no vacuous quantification in the other structure.  What would happen in a sentence which differed minimally from (56b) in that there was no motivation for QR of every professor in the Derivative Structure that contained this DP.  We would predict that movement of every professor would not be licensed, and, subsequently, binding of the pronoun in the second Derivative Structure would be impossible.  All things being equal, we predict that (59) will be ill-formed.

(59) 	Mary likes every professor1 and wants him1 to be on her committee.   

	This prediction is false.  As noted by Reinhart (1987) and by Ruys (1993) constructions such as (59) are well-formed.  However, (59) is not a controlled experiment.  The reason is that universal quantifiers can sometimes bind pronouns even in cases where c-command undoubtedly fails to hold.  This kind of discourse binding, which was named telescoping in Roberts (1987), is illustrated in (60).

(60) 	a.	Every graduating student walked up to the stage.  He shook the dean’s hand and 		returned to his seat.
	b.	Every story pleases these children.  If it is about animals, they are excited.  If it is about 		witches, they are enchanted, and if it is about humans they never want it to stop. (ref.)

	The precise restrictions on telescoping are not clear (cf. Poesio and Zucchi (1992)).  It is therefore unclear whether it can apply in (59).  If we want to conduct a controlled experiment, we would have to look at cases which distinguish between discourse binding and actual syntactic binding.  We should look at downward entailing operators, such as only one.  With such operators, there is an interpretive difference between the cases of discourse and of syntactic binding.  This is illustrated in (61).

(61)	a.	Only one student walked up to the stage.  He shook the dean’s hand and returned to his 		seat.
	b.	Only one student walked up to the stage, shook the dean’s hand and returned to his 		seat.

	In (61a) only one student doesn’t c-command the pronoun.  Still, the pronoun is somehow related to the operator.  This relation, however, is not that of syntactic binding, which exists in (61b).  The two are semantically distinguishable.  (61a) makes a stronger claim.  For this utterance to be truthful, there must be no more than one student that walked up to the stage.  Further, the unique student that walked up to the stage is required to do two other things.  (61b) makes a weaker claim.  For this sentence to be true, there could be 50 students who walked up to the stage, as long as only one did the two other things.  This difference follows naturally from the assumption that in (61a) the pronoun is outside the scope of the operator and is related to it by discourse binding.  This is illustrated in the pseudo-logical paraphrases in (61’).

(61’)	a. 	[Only one x: (student(x) & walked up to the stage (x))] & [the unique student  that 		walked up to the stage shook the deans hand and returned to his seat]
	b.	Only one x: [student(x) & walked up to the stage (x) &  walked up to the stage (x) & 		shook the deans hand (x)  and returned to his seat (x)]

	We could thus replace a downward entailing quantifier in a position such as that of every professor in (59) and see whether we get discourse or syntactic binding.  That only discourse binding is possible can be seen in (62).  The second sentence of this utterance contradicts the first one.  The reason is that only discourse binding is available.  Had syntactic binding been available, the meaning of the second conjunct would be parallel to that of (61b).  In other words, the sentence would merely require that there be no more than one woman that has two properties (One of these properties is that of being loved by John and the other is that of being expected by him to show some love in return.)  The existence of no more than one woman who has both properties doesn’t contradict the existence of 50 who have one of them.  Therefore, had syntactic binding been available in the second sentence of (62), we would expect there to be no contradiction with the first sentence.  What (62) would mean, had syntactic binding been possible, can be illustrated by an utterance which involves syntactic binding but is parallel to (62) in all other respects.  In (63), we see that such a discourse involves no contradiction.

(62)	John loves 50 women.  However he loves only one and expects her to love him back. 															(contradiction)
(63)	John loves 50 women.  However, there is only one that he loves and expects to love him 	back.													(no contradiction)

	The lack of syntactic binding in the second sentence of (62) demonstrated that only one cannot QR out of the coordinate structure, although no vacuous binding would result.  The reason, I suggest, is that the movement is not licensed within the Derivative Structure in which it would take place.  To see that this is the case, consider the way (64) contrasts with (63).

(64)	John can love 50 women.  However he can [love only one] and [expect her to love him 	back].													(not necessarily a contradiction)

In this case only one has motivation for QR (within its Derivative Structure).  The motivation for QR is to have scope over the modal can.  A by-product of QR is that syntactic binding is possible in the second Derivative Structure, and there is no contradiction with the first clause.  (65) contrasts with (64) in the size of the constituent that is being coordinated.  In (65) this constituent includes the modal can  (as we can tell by the appearance of the agreement marker s  in the second conjunct).  Therefore, although QR is licensed, only one cannot get beyond the coordination and bind the pronoun in the second conjunct.  Only discourse binding is possible and we get a contradiction.

(65)	John can love 50 women.  However he [can love only one] and [expects her to love him 	back].													(contradiction)

	In this section we have seen that the proper account of the CSC provides a test for the claim that SSOs are allowed only when necessary for a given interpretation.  The basic idea was that the  CSC is a by-product of the necessary formation of Derivative Structures.  These structures must independently obey all grammatical constraints.  In particular, movement within a Derivative Structure must be motivated (internal to the structure).  However, once movement takes place it has effects also outside of the Derivative Structure (binding of a pronoun and scope in the other Derivative Structure).  I tested for these and got exactly what is predicted under Economy.  When movement didn’t have semantic effects within a Derivative Structure, it couldn’t have the effects that it would normally have outside of the Derivative structure.  I conclude that when movement doesn’t have semantic effects in the domain that is relevant for the testing of grammatical constraints (such as Economy) it is not licensed.   

3.  Existential Closure 

	In previous sections we have seen how certain grammatical constraints could indicate where a quantifier is, even when semantics can’t distinguish between the different possibilities.  In this section, I would like to suggest that although Economy can see the semantic aspects of the relative scope of quantifiers, there are aspects of interpretation that are invisible to Economy.  In particular, I will suggest that Economy can’t see the semantic effects of existential closure.  The prediction is that SSOs are not going to be licensed in order to get the semantic effects of existential closure.  We will see the effects of existential closure only when there are also effects that Economy could see.  I will show that this line of reasoning can fill in a gap in Diesing’s account of the interpretation of Bare Plurals.  Further, it will generate some surprising predictions which will turn out to be true.
	If we assume a Heim/Kamp type analysis of quantification, involving tripartite structures, a  bare plural can receive an existential interpretation only when it is within the nuclear scope (the domain of existential closure).  Under Diesing’s Mapping Hypothesis, the VP constitutes the nuclear scope.  Thus, bare plurals receive an existential interpretation when and only when they are within VP at LF.  With this in mind, consider Diesing’s explanation of the contrast in the interpretation of (66a) and (66b).  Diesing assumes that subjects of stage level predicates differ from those of individual level predicates in that only the latter have the option of lowering to VP at LF.  Given this assumption, it follows that in (66a) the subject can optionally lower to VP and receive an existential interpretation.  In (66b), by contrast, the subject cannot lower and is mapped to the restrictive clause where it receives a default generic interpretation.

(66)	a.	Firemen are available.								(Existential, or Generic)
	b.	Firemen are intelligent.							(Only Generic)

	Why can't the subjects of individual level predicates lower to VP?  Diesing's explanation is based on the suggestion that subjects of individual level predicates are assigned a thematic role by INFL and are associated with a PRO in spec VP.  However, this assumption has no independent motivation and is conceptually unwanted.  Further, there might be empirical reasons for believing this to be false.  To see this, consider one of the more persuasive arguments in favor of the hypothesis that subjects are base-generated VP internally.  The argument, which is made in Burton and Grimshaw (1992), is based on the observation that standard VPs could be coordinated with predicates that contain an NP trace.  This is demonstrated in (67).

(67)	a.	John [saw Bill] and [was seen t by Mary].
	b.	John [is a genius] and (nevertheless) [seems t to be a fool]. 

	If subjects are base-generated in Spec of IP, the sentences in (67) should violate the CSC.  However, if subjects are generated within VP, the sentences in (67) involve ATB movement and are predicted to be well-formed.  If this line of reasoning is correct, it can serve as a test for the claim that subjects of individual level predicates are generated VP externally.  As we can see, already in (67b), the claim fails the test.  Is a genius is an individual level predicate and, nevertheless, it can be coordinated with a predicate which contains a trace of the subject.  To avoid the prediction that (67b) would violate the CSC, we must conclude that it, too, includes a trace of the subject.  In (68) below we show some other cases in which the claim that subjects of individual level predicates are base-generated in SPEC of IP, fails the test of the CSC.  In (68a) an individual level predicate is coordinated with a stage level predicate, which presumably includes a VP internal trace.   In (68b) an individual level predicate with a bare-plural subject is coordinated with a passive sentence.  Nevertheless, the sentences are well-formed.

(68)	a.	Firemen [are intelligent] and [therefore hired t for dangerous jobs all over the world].
	b.	John is [intelligent] and [nevertheless likely t to fail the test].

	So there is a gap in the explanation provided by Diesing’s mapping hypothesis for the contrast in (66).  I would like to suggest that Economy can fill the gap.  In particular, it can be argued that Economy considerations allow QL in (66a), but disallow it in (66b).  Suppose we accept the standard assumption according to which stage level predicates differ from individual level predicates in involving an existential quantifier over stages, events or location arguments.  Suppose further that this existential quantifier is located between the surface and base position of the subject (i.e., between spec of IP and spec of VP), perhaps in a Tense projection.  In a sentence involving a stage level predicate, such as (66a), the plural subject will be allowed to lower in order to have narrow scope with respect to the existential quantifier in the Tense projection (TP).  In a sentence involving an individual level predicate, there is no quantificational element in TP, and QL is disallowed.

	This explanation makes a very surprising prediction:  subjects of individual level predicates should be allowed to lower if some other quantificational element intervened between their surface- and base-position.  Consider an individual level predicate that takes two arguments.  Suppose the subject is a bare plural and that the additional argument is a universal quantifier.  The universal quantifier will have to adjoin to VP for interpretation.  Assume that movement from the VP adjoined position to a position above the subject is not cheaper than lowering of the subject to SPEC VP.  It follows that the subject will be allowed to lower to SPEC VP and get an existential interpretation.  This prediction is right.  The (a) sentences in (69-72) do not get an existential interpretation, because the subject can’t lower to SPEC VP.  In the (b) sentences, however, the subject is allowed to lower in order to have narrow scope with respect to the universal quantifier.  The subjects of the (b) sentence can, thus, get an existential interpretation in addition to the generic one.   

(69)	a.	MIT professors know about biology.													(False)
	b.	MIT professors know about every field of science.						   (perhaps True)

(70)	a.	MIT students know Chinese.															(False)
	b.	MIT students know almost every foreign language.						   (perhaps True)

(71)	a.	MIT professors practice Judaism.														(False)
	b.	MIT professors practice almost every form of Judaism.					   (perhaps True)

(72)	a.	Jewish women are related to Chomsky.												(False)
	a.	Jewish women are related to every Jewish man.		 (Perhaps True - by definition)

	Interestingly, as predicted, the existential interpretation in (69-72) is possible only when the subject has narrow scope with respect to the second argument.  To see that this is the case, consider what happens when the subject binds a pronoun within the object and is therefore forced to have wide scope.  We can see that in such a case the generic interpretation is forced:

 (73)	a.	MIT professors know about every field of science they practice.					(False)
	b.	MIT students know almost every foreign language they’ve heard of.		(False)
	c.	MIT  professors practice every form of Judaism they are familiar with.		(False)
	d.	Jewish women are related to every Jewish man they know						(False)

4. Formalizing The Economy Principle

In the previous sections I have tried to motivate the idea that the reference set for Economy should be limited to derivations whose LFs are semantically equivalent .  In this section I will try to make this idea more precise.  The discussion will be focused primarily on VP ellipsis constructions.   However, it can be carried over to the other constructions, as long as one keeps in mind our assumptions about the explanation of the CSC and the aspects of interpretation that are invisible to the computational system (see, however, note 64).
	I would like to begin this discussion by noting that not all formalizations of this idea lead to the desired results.   Consider the LFs in (74). 

(74) 	a.  Some boy [every teacher1 [admired t1]]  and 
		Mary [every teacher1 [admired t1]] 
	b.  *every teacher1 [Some boy [admired t1]]  and 
		[every teacher1  [Mary  [admired t1]] 
	c.  *Some boy [every teacher1 [admired t1]]  and 
		[every teacher1  [Mary  [admired t1]] 
	d.  *every teacher1 [Some boy [admired t1]]  and 
		Mary [every teacher1 [admired t1]] 

Recall that (c) and (d) were ruled out for parallelism and that (b) was to be ruled out by Economy.  However, once one tries to move from intuition to formalization, it seems that not every plausible definition of the reference set leads to the right results.  Consider, for example, a definition according to which the reference set includes all converging derivations that end up with a designated meaning.  Such a definition might be problematic.  Suppose that a derivation that doesn’t obey parallelism fails to converge.  Consider, now, the case in which the designated meaning is the one in which the first conjunct is interpreted with wide scope for the universal quantifier.  If that is the designated meaning, the reference set would include one converging derivation, namely (74b).  The quantifier would raise in the second conjunct, in order for parallelism to be satisfied with the meaning which requires QR in the first conjunct.  (74b) would thus be allowed.  
	What I implicitly assumed in section 1 was that QR should be allowed only if it generates within the minimal clause in which it takes place a meaning which would not be available otherwise.  QR should not be allowed in one clause in order for it to be applicable in another.  (74b) should be ruled out because QR in the second conjunct does not generate a new meaning within that conjunct.  How can we capture this idea? 
	I can think of two potential ways.  One way is to assume that convergence doesn’t care about parallelism.  Under such a view parallelism is not required by the computational system, but rather by performance systems that interpret LFs.  If that is the case, (74d) would be in the reference set for the interpretation in which the object has wide scope over the subject in the first conjunct.  Because (74d) is more optimal than (74b), (74b) would be blocked by Economy.  However, (74d) will be ruled out by the later performance systems that care about parallelism.
	Another way to capture the basic idea is to assume that there is some constraint on the size of the constituents that the computational system can look at when it tries to decide whether movement is allowed.  This idea is the one I would like to explore.  More specifically, I would like to explore a particular implementation of this idea using Chomsky’s (1994) derivational notion of comparison. Chomsky (1994) has proposed that the reference set for optimality should be redetermined for each step in the derivation:

(75)	Let N be a set of  lexical items (those are the items designated to be selected from the 	lexicon throughout the derivation) and D be a structure at a certain point in the derivation.
  
	The Reference Set, for N and D, RN,D, is the set of possible transformations,  D',  of D, 	such that D' is Derived from D using only elements from N, and that D' is further 	extendible to a converging derivation using the remaining elements of N.

This definition would be modified for our purposes if  the reference set, which is now limited to derivations using a designated set of lexical items, would be further limited to derivations with a designated meaning for the minimal clause containing D:

(76)	Let N be a set of  lexical items, M a meaning of a clause and D a structure at a point in 	the derivation.

	The Reference Set, for N, M and D, RN,M,D, is the set of possible transformations ,  D',  	of D, such that D'  is derived from D using only elements from N, and that D' is further 	extendible to a converging derivation using the remaining elements of N and having M as 	the meaning of the minimal CP dominating D.  

	Let us assume that some version of the cycle is operative at LF (cf. Bures (1993), Bobaljik and Jonas (forthcoming) and Tsai (1994), among others).  This means that after the point at which the derivation branches out to PF, a new LF cycle begins.   The principles from which the LF cycle follows are not obvious.  I will assume that at LF the computation precedes in reverse to the c-command relation.  In other words, it operates on the complement of a head before it can operate on its specifier.  Suppose that at SPELL-OUT we had a structure like (77).  The LF computation starts out by considering KP (when D in (76) is KP).  It then, in turn, moves to consider Z', ZP, X’ and XP.  From such a cycle it follows, for example, that LF operations apply to WP before they can apply to YP.

(77)	

Let us now see how this notion of the cycle together with a derivational construction of the reference set, as in (76), gives us the right results.  Consider (74) again.

(74) 	a.  Some boy [every teacher1 [admired t1]]  and 
		Mary [every teacher1 [admired t1]] 
	b.  *every teacher1 [Some boy [admired t1]]  and 
		[every teacher1  [Mary  [admired t1]] 
	c.  *Some boy [every teacher1 [admired t1]]  and 
		[every teacher1  [Mary  [admired t1]] 
	d.  *every teacher1 [Some boy [admired t1]]  and 
		Mary [every teacher1 [admired t1]] 

At the point of the derivation in which QR in the second conjunct is considered, D consists of the second conjunct before QR.  The meaning of the minimal clause containing D is the same whether QR applies or doesn't; call it M.  There is, thus, one reference set, RN,M,D, that includes both the second conjunct of (74a) and that of (74b).  The more economical (74a) is chosen.  

	This formalization has an interesting prediction.  As noted by many (e. g., Larson (1990) Kayne (1995), Moltmann (1992)) there is an inherent asymmetry in coordination.  This asymmetry, demonstrated in (78), follows from Kayne's proposal that there must be a link between linear precedence and asymmetrical c-command. 

(78) 	a.	John saw every girl1 and her1 mother in the department store.   
	b. * John saw her1 mother and every girl1 in the department store. 

(78) leads us to the assumption that in coordination the first conjunct always asymmetrically c-commands the second.  This means that in the LF cycle, by the time QR is considered in the first conjunct, D already includes the second conjunct.   

	Consider, therefore, the contrast in (79).  (79a) is a regular case where quantifier ambiguity in the first conjunct disappears due to the lack of  potential ambiguity in the second conjunct.  (79b), by contrast, is ambiguous.  In (79b), contrary to (79a), the boys can vary for every choice of a teacher.  

(79)	a.  Some boy admires every teacher and Mary does too. 
	b.  Mary admires every teacher and some boy does too. 

This is exactly the prediction given the definition in (76).  The points in the derivations of the (a) and (b) sentences in (79) in which QR is considered in the second conjunct are given in (80) (a) and (b) respectively.  

(80) 	a.  D79a: Mary admires every teacher. 
	b.  D79b: Some boy admires every teacher. 

In (80b), there are two different meanings associated with the two possible scopal relations; call them M2 and M3.  In (80a) there is only one meaning; call it M1.  Therefore, we have two different reference sets for (80b) and only one reference set for (80a).  The reference set for (80a) includes (a) and (b) in (81) and, as mentioned, the more optimal (a) is chosen.  

(81)	RN,M1,D79b: 	{a = Mary [every teacher1 [admired t1]], 
				 b = every teacher1 [Mary [admired t1]] }

The reference sets for (80b) each include one derivation and they are thus both licensed.  The reference sets are represented in (82). 

(82)	a.  RN,M2,D79b: 	{ Some boy [every teacher1 [admired t1]] }
				 
	 b.  RN,M3,D79b:	{ every teacher1 [Some boy [admired t1]] }

Notice that by the time QR is considered in the first conjunct, meaning doesn't play a role at all.  By the time the cycle reaches the first conjunct the position to which the quantifier moves is determined by the second conjunct.  Parallelism forces the quantifier in the first conjunct to imitate the operation which took place in the second conjunct; all other derivations crash./ 
	Looking at the contrast in (79), one might suggest that it is not related to an asymmetry between two conjuncts but rather to an asymmetry between overt and elided material.  One might suggest that the generalization is that ambiguity in the conjunct including the elided VP, contrary to ambiguity in the conjunct with the antecedent VP, can exist independently of the other conjunct (see note 67).  To see that this generalization is not correct, consider the following contrast:

(83)	a.  Because some boy did, I denied that Mary baked every cake. 
	b.  Because Mary baked every cake, I denied that some boy did. 

(83a), contrary to (83b), is not ambiguous.  In (83a), contrary to the alternative suggested above, the ambiguity in the clause containing the elided VP cannot exist, and that is due to the non- ambiguity of the clause that includes the antecedent VP.  The contrast between these sentences is predicted by our analysis.  It is easy to show that the because clause c-commands the clause embedded under deny.  Therefore, the availability of QR in the embedded clause is determined first.  Only if such QR yields a new meaning within the embedded clause is it licensed.  Thus only (83b) is ambiguous.  

Appendix:  The Clause-Boundedness of QR

It is a well known fact that quantifier raising tends to be clause-bound.  This fact, which is exemplified by the lack of ambiguity in the sentences in (84), has never received a satisfactory explanation.  The main puzzle is to explain what distinguishes QR from other cases of A-bar movement which appear to be unbounded.  In this appendix, I will show that the ideas presented in this paper provide a potential solution for the puzzle.  

(84)	a.	One girl said that every boy is a genius.
	b.	One girl said that John talked to every boy.

	What I suggest is that QR is restricted by exactly the same constraints that apply to other cases of A-bar movement (A-bar Constraints).  This means that successive QR, just like successive WH-movement, should be allowed.  The difference between QR and other cases of A-bar movement is that QR is driven by interpretation.  Other cases of A-bar movement are driven by something else, call it feature checking.  

	Suppose that each step in successive cyclic movement has to be motivated.  In the case of WH-movement, each step must be motivated by feature-checking.  In the case of QR, each step must be motivated by a shift in semantic interpretation.  

	These assumptions can derive the clause-boundedness of QR.  Recall that in the previous section we have seen that Economy is constrained with respect to the size of the constituents it sees.  In particular, Economy sees only the semantics of minimal clauses.  This means that in order for a movement operation to apply, it must bring about a semantic effect within the minimal clause that contains the landing site.  In (84) every boy can’t undergo QR within the embedded clause because such QR will not yield semantic effects within this clause.   The only way that QR could be licensed is if it took place in one swoop over the matrix subject.  However, such movement would violate A-bar Constraints.  

	This suggestion makes a very surprising prediction.  The prediction is that clause-boundedness should be obviated in cases where there is semantic motivation for each step in successive cyclic movement.  Suggestive evidence that this prediction is correct can be drawn from an observation made in Moltmann and Szabolcsi (1994).  Consider the contrast in (85). 

(85)	a.	One girl knows that every boy bought a present for Mary.
	b. 	One girl knows what every boy bought  for Mary.

 In (85a), just as in (84),   the universal quantifier in the embedded sentence cannot take scope over the existential quantifier in matrix subject position.  The reason for this is that there is no motivation for the first step in successive cyclic movement, and one swoop movement violates A-bar Constraints.  In (85b), by contrast, movement of the universal quantifier over the WH operator is semantically motivated (it provides a pair list reading).  This movement could then serve as an escape hatch for satisfying A-bar Constraints.  After the universal quantifier moves over the WH-operator, it can undergo movement over the matrix subject, which would be semantically motivated and accord with A-bar constraints./

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Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, 
20D-219
MIT
Cambridge, MA 02139
e-mail : fox@mit.edu