STRANDS OF THEORY AND RESEARCH IN COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

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INTRODUCTION

A recent survey indicated that relatively few sociologists identify "collective behavior" as one of their two areas of specialization, or teach courses with this title (Quarantelli & Weller 1974). Nevertheless, there has been a large amount of research in this and related areas over the last decade or so. National and international events have heightened awareness of social movements, riots, and protests, and have offered rich data to be analyzed. Increased funding for research, advances in quantitative methodology, and larger numbers of people working in the field have all helped make collective behavior one of the more vigorous areas of sociology in the last 15 years.


There has also been a great amount of work on more specialized topics such as particular social movements and riots. A large part of the nearly 4000 items listed in a collective behavior bibliography of Hornback & Morrison (1974) are of recent
origin. Two newsletters, *The Critical Mass Bulletin*, from the Department of Sociology, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, and *Unscheduled Events*, from the Disaster Research Center at Ohio State University, circulate among many of those interested in the area. And there seems to be increased interest in forming a section on collective behavior in the American Sociological Association. Collective behavior topics have been stressed at numerous scholarly meetings.

The emphasis of the field has changed. At the turn of the century it was dominated by higher status theorists threatened by social change. In the 1950s its spokesmen were more or less detached researchers. These have given way to an increasing number of more activist researchers, who view the study of collective behavior as a way to encourage social change.

Given the abundance and diversity of works that touch the area of collective behavior, the word "strands" in our title is aptly chosen. In this abbreviated essay we cannot begin to review all the literature falling broadly within the area of collective behavior. We are concerned mainly with developments since the early 1960s, especially since the publication of the major works by Turner & Killian (1957), the Langs (1961), and Smelser (1963). Our focus follows the thrust of recent research, which has centered much more on contemporary American social movements than on the "emergent," less organized, elementary forms of collective behavior such as crazes, panics, fashion, rumor, and behavior in disasters.

Even within the area of social movements, our emphasis is primarily on movements of a protest and "rights-seeking" nature, rather than those of a more expressive, personal, or other-worldly orientation. Our purpose is to offer a broad review and analysis of selected developments in the field rather than a polemical evaluation inspired by a particular theoretical perspective. We seek to answer the question, "What's new in the study of collective behavior," particularly with reference to social movements.

Our concern is primarily with theoretical developments in the field and with efforts to test theory, rather than with specific movements as such. For those interested in specific social movements there are extensive bibliographies such as Altbach & Kelly (1973) and Keniston (1973) on student movements, Meier & Rudwick (1973) on the Civil Rights Movement, Lipset & Raab (1970) on the radical right, and Ehrlich (1973) and Hochschild (1973) on the Women's Liberation Movement. A bibliography by Pfautz (1969) lists a large number of social movement case studies, as does the Literature Cited section of this article.

In developing the key analytic and temporal aspects of collective behavior, our discussion is organized around the following topics:

1. Some New Approaches to Conceptualizing and Studying Collective Behavior
2. Strains Underlying Collective Behavior
3. Ideology
4. Mobilization
5. Recruitment
6. Dynamics, Development, and Consequences
7. Smelser's Theory in Light of a Decade's Research
8. Conclusion
SOME NEW APPROACHES TO CONCEPTUALIZING AND STUDYING COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

In this section we consider some broad efforts to conceptualize the field of collective behavior, new ways of classifying crowds and social movements, and new empirical approaches to the study of crowds. In contrast to our general emphasis on social movements, this section emphasizes less organized forms of collective behavior.

Because of the large number of dimensions that can be brought into play, the disappearance of old forms and the appearance of new ones, shifts within the same collective behavior event, and lack of clear boundaries between collective and conventional behavior, there is no widely agreed upon generic classification scheme for collective behavior phenomena. Yet progress has been made in the last decade in defining both collective and conventional behavior in light of common frameworks, and in more clearly delineating types and major dimensions of collective behavior. We now have a greater number of better nominal concepts than a decade ago.

Collective and Conventional Behavior: A Vanishing Distinction?

The major collective behavior works published over a decade ago by Turner & Killian, the Langs, and Smelser moved the study of collective behavior more toward the mainstream of sociological analysis. This trend has continued and accelerated to a point where important aspects of collective and conventional behavior can be conceptualized within common frameworks. The areas of collective behavior and social organization are no longer so distinct.

Most writers on short-term episodes of collective behavior (e.g. panics, lynch mobs) and longer-term social movements (e.g. revolutions, religious cults) have regarded these phenomena as noninstitutionalized group behavior, and, as such, to be contrasted with conventional group behavior. Recently, however, this distinction between collective and institutionalized behavior has been challenged, and their fundamental similarities have been identified.

Weller & Quarantelli (1973) offer a thoughtful discussion of traditional approaches and definitions, and suggest a parsimonious typology which helps link collective and conventional behavior. They argue that sociologists have tended to conceptualize collective behavior in individual rather than collective terms, even when they claim to be doing the opposite. The social consequences and social sources of collective behavior have been dealt with, but not the social nature of collective behavior itself. Collective behavior tends to be analyzed in terms of the psychological states of the participants, or as atypical forms of interaction. When the focus is on individual participants, attention is drawn away from the social properties of the behavior as such, which they feel are "comparable but not identical" to those of institutionalized behavior. They argue that both kinds of behavior are "... contained within and predicated on social organization." They suggest a "social organizational conception of collective behavior" based on two major aspects of social organization: norms and social relationships. For them, collective behavior is associated with new norms, new relationships, or both.

The first factor follows Turner's emphasis on emergent norms as the essence of collective behavior (1964a,b). Noting that the difference between collective behavior
and other forms of human behavior is less clear cut than previously believed, he argued that collective behavior should be analyzed with the same model of interactive and individual behavior as is found in institutionalized behavior. In crowd situations the individual acts not because he or she is automatically infected by group emotion, but rather because certain lines of behavior are seen as appropriate. New norms appear in an undefined context. The norms are there, as in any complex human endeavor, but the differentiating factor is whether or not they are new.

To the dimension of whether or not new norms exist, Weller & Quarantelli add the dimension of whether or not new relationships are present. When these two dimensions (norms and relationships) are combined, four types of collectivity emerge: three representing forms of collective behavior, and a fourth referring to routine patterns of action in existing organizations.

One type of collective behavior involves both emerging norms and emerging relationships—such as those characterizing search and rescue groups in disasters, mass hysteria and delusion episodes, and some crowds. A second type involves emerging norms among those with enduring social relationships—as can be seen in hospital responses to disaster, rioting in police units, and many episodes of fad and fashion. A third type involves emergent social relationships with enduring norms—as is often the case with lynchings, coups d'etat, and looting groups in civil disturbances. The confluence of previously disassociated norms and relationships, as when a well-established professional association becomes a militant social movement, gives rise to a fourth type of collective behavior, though one not as logically derived.

For Weller & Quarantelli, collective behavior is defined as social action by one of the above four types of collectivity. It is defined from a perspective of social organization that also applies to institutionalized behavior. Such an approach focuses attention away from the crowd as the prototype of collective behavior, and considerably broadens the scope of the field. It is more parsimonious than many past schemes, and does not use the same variable to classify and to explain, as does Smelser's use of generalized beliefs. Such an approach can help link the study of collective and more conventional behavior. It offers a way of defining collective behavior in relation to organizational characteristics, rather than by their absence.

Zald & Ash (1966), McCarthy & Zald (1973), and Wilson (1973), among others, have similarly shown the usefulness of approaching social movements through an organizational perspective. There is probably a greater natural affinity between social movements and organizations than among other forms of collective behavior. But lately even the most spontaneous forms of collective behavior, such as riots, are described and analyzed in organizational terms.

Carl Couch (1970), from an interactionist perspective, argues for the need to see the crowd as an organized social system. He argues against traditional taxonomies of collective behavior, and against the use of unique concepts for understanding collective behavior. There are "no activities, relationships, or beliefs unique to collective behavior"; instead, instances of such behavior "simply represent associations within which particular combinations of relationships predominate." Crowds differ from other units not because of the absence of "aligned conduct," but in the
way such alignment occurs. He argues that the emphasis should be on how people taking coordinated actions relate to each other.

Couch suggests seven dimensions that characterize how persons mutually align themselves in instances of concerted behavior. The dimensions are: monitoring, acknowledgment, parallel and reciprocal alignment, parallel and reciprocal role taking, identifying, directing, and evaluating. These dimensions are seen to represent a continuum of "bondness" between participants. The bondness or unity of a group within which collective behavior occurs is seen to "rest primarily upon parallel role-taking, whereas in other situations it is based upon the reciprocal acknowledgment, differentiated identities and accountability to the directives and evaluations of others" (Couch 1970:468). Hopefully these concepts can be operationalized and propositions using them developed.

Pfautz (1975:19), however, has questioned this blurring of the distinction between collective and traditional behavior. He argues that the acting crowd is not a social system, if by social system we mean the existence of a persistent, normatively governed social structure. He calls attention to the difference between traditional and collective behavior norms. The latter are concrete and behavioral. The power of a behavioral-situational norm is seen to lie in "... the heightened socialized excitement and the close physical proximity of large numbers of others." The process of mutual influence is seen to be "uniquely direct, immediate, visual, and thus, highly involving" relative to the influence of traditional norms that are "indirect, mediate, conceptualized and thus, relatively dissociating." Although he raises salient issues, Pfautz is in the minority among those who have recently tried to conceptualize collective and conventional behavior.

While not yielding concepts as specific as Couch's, others in the interactionist or phenomenological tradition have argued for the need to focus on the social situation. Brissett (1968) notes the close affiliation of "collective behavior" subject matter to that of dramaturgical approaches and feels that the former concept should be dropped. Both are concerned with the transitory and concrete aspects of social relations, with interpersonal relations and interactional careers, and with elements beyond traditional roles. This is in contrast to the sociologist's usual concern with norms that go across situations.

In a somewhat similar vein, Brown & Goldin (1973) offer a useful review of the field and then suggest viewing collective behavior as situated social action. They draw on ideas from the sociology of knowledge and the work of Garfinkle and Goffman, which are applicable to noncollective behavior situations as well. For Brown & Goldin, collective behavior occurs when there are competing collective constructions of the social situation.

In this connection, a recent literature has focused on rational motivation underlying collective behavior (e.g. Oberschall 1973, Berk 1974a,b). This is a response to the presumed irrationality of collective behavior participants depicted by theorists such as Le Bon (1895). Elaborating on Freud's (1914) early insights, Couch (1968) notes that there are rational and irrational motivations behind both collective and conventional behavior. Thus collective behavior is not so distinct from conventional behavior in terms of the rational or irrational motivations leading to the behavior.
A dominant theme in the last decade has thus been to show that collective behavior may be approached with the same set of categories as those applying to more traditional behavior. This is a healthy corrective to past tendencies to compartmentalize collective behavior, to define it as a negative residual category, to focus on its more exotic or atypical characteristics, and to focus excessively on the individual. Yet it is well to keep in mind that sociological analysis requires the identification of variation. The excesses of those who saw collective behavior as totally unlike conventional behavior, whether at the social or psychological level, should not now be counterbalanced by seeing it as exactly the same. The important thing is to be able to analyze whatever differences or similarities are present within a common theoretical and conceptual framework.

In sum, the literature in collective behavior still singles out particular kinds of noninstitutionalized behavior for investigation. But common theoretical frameworks are now used to analyze both types of behavior (e.g. symbolic interactionism, Marxist theory, structural-functional analysis, and even cost-benefit analysis). Also, social organization is a part of collective behavior as well as conventional behavior; collective behavior is thus not as spontaneous as previously characterized (e.g. Lang & Lang 1968). Finally, similar types of motivation can be seen to underlie both types of behavior. As a result the boundaries are clearly breaking down between collective and conventional behavior.

Continuing the Taxonomic Tradition

From Le Bon (1895) to Park & Burgess (1924) through Blumer (1951) and Brown (1954) a major concern of collective behavior theorists has been the delineation of types of crowds or social movements. Until recently most energy at the theoretical level went into forming concepts rather than developing propositions about how concepts interrelate.

The taxonomic tradition has continued, but not without difficulties. Chief among these difficulties are the frequent failure to indicate how definitions can be operationalized, the analytic level at which they apply, how they relate to a body of theory, and the failure to develop categories that are logically derived, mutually exclusive, and that can be specified on a continuum. In addition, the formulation of typologies tends to be abstract and not well related to systematic analysis of empirical data.

Another problem in classification of events involving fluidity is the time- and culture-bound nature of most concepts. Our taxonomies tend to be static, whereas collective behavior is not. Roger Brown gave the lynch mob a prominent place in his scheme, yet this form has practically disappeared. New forms such as sit-ins, kneel-ins, park-ins, and swim-ins have emerged. Dramatic newsworthy events have helped focus attention on forms such as "unresponsive bystander crowds." People bound together as victims of terror or highjacking at public transportation routes are an increasingly common type of collectivity that could be analyzed in collective behavior terms. The increased availability of resources from foundations and the government may be making social movements with a minimal mass base more common. A focus on the more analytic elements (some of which we consider in the next subsection) that can characterize any crowd or movement helps avoid this
problem, but also misses the richness and even the essence of given forms of collective behavior.

In his early ground-breaking essay Blumer (1939) distinguishes between general and specific social movements, and among reform, revolutionary, and expressive movements. Similarly Gusfield (1968) distinguishes "directed" from "undirected" movements, or segments of a movement. A directed movement consists of an organized group with formal leadership, specific programs, ideology, and members of the organization. The undirected phase calls attention to the reshaping of partisans' perspectives, norms, and values distinct from a specific associational context. Heberle (1968) distinguishes between classical social movements that become "true" mass movements of historical significance, and more limited protest movements that never attract more than small groups of people. He further distinguishes three types of movements in light of the prevailing motivation of members: the value-rational spiritual community, or fellowship of believers; the emotional-affectual inspired by a charismatic leader; and the purposive or utilitarian association in pursuit of private interests.

Turner (1969b) suggests two types of contemporary general movements by reference to the ends sought. In a liberal humanitarian tradition the first is concerned with themes of freedom of speech, assembly, and press. The second, in a socialist tradition, is concerned with demands from society for material needs.

Smelser (1963) uses the nature of the generalized beliefs to classify movements as value- or norm-oriented. The latter is concerned with more limited normative changes, whereas the former attempts to change broad social values.

In analyzing the peyote cult of the Navaho Indians, Aberle (1966) suggests a useful and comprehensive typology of social movements based on two dimensions: the locus of the change desired (the individual or the social structure) and the amount of change desired (partial or total). Combining these two dimensions yields four types of movement:

1. **transformative** movements seeking total change in the social structure;
2. **reformative** movements seeking partial change in the social structure;
3. **redemptive** movements seeking total change in individuals; and
4. **alternative** movements seeking partial changes in individuals.

This is developed out of a concern with theories of relative deprivation and change.

Zald & Ash (1966) refer to "social movement organizations" as one type of complex organization. Two important dimensions of movement organization are: (a) the extent of membership requirements (inclusive organizations require minimum levels of commitment, and exclusive organizations hold the recruit in a long novitiate period, require submission to organizational discipline, and draw from those with strongest commitments); and (b) whether the emphasis is on changing the individual or changing society.

McCarthy & Zald (1973) argue that the increased funding available for social movements from foundations, churches, and the government has facilitated the emergence of a professional class whose careers involve social movement leadership. As a result they argue that the "professional social movement" has lately become
much more widespread. Such a movement is characterized by a full time leadership, a large proportion of resources coming from outside the aggrieved group that the movement claims to represent, a very small mass membership base, attempts to speak for a potential constituency, and efforts to affect policy on its behalf. The War on Poverty is an example (Moynihan 1969).

Turner (1974:849–51) distinguishes among: (a) primitive and millenarian movements (b) movements of the spirit (c) interest-group movements (d) revolutionary movements, and (e) nationalist movements. Earlier Turner & Killian (1957, 1972) suggested three inductively obtained types of movement: value-, power-, and participation-oriented movements, with the last subdivided into passive reform, personal status, and limited personal movements. Finally, Turner & Killian distinguish four types of social movements based on varying public definitions of the movements: (a) respectable-nonfactional, (b) respectable-factional, (c) peculiar and (d) revolutionary.

In the case of crowds, Park & Burgess (1924) differentiated between passive and active crowds. Blumer (1951) made a distinction between the casual, conventionalized expressive crowd and the “acting,” aggressive crowd. Turner & Killian differentiate among the individualistic/solidaristic, focused/volatile, and active/expressive dimensions of crowds. Roger Brown (1954) makes a distinction between audiences and mobs, and sees four types of the latter: aggressive, escape, acquisitive, and expressive.

Ghetto violence in the 1960s resulted in increased attention on types of mass violence. Tilly (1969) uses the nature of the organizational base (communal or associational) and its relation to the structure of power (acquiring, maintaining, or losing position) to trace the historical development from "primitive" to "revolutionary" to "modern" forms of collective violence. Gurr (1970) differentiates among turmoil, conspiracy, and internal war.

Recent ghetto violence has been characterized in various ways. The twentieth century has seen a shift from white-dominated riots, where the primary objects of attack were blacks, to biracial rioting, to black-dominated property-oriented rioting (Masotti et al 1969). Janowitz (1968) distinguishes between earlier "communal" and more recent "commodity" riots. Louis Goldberg (1968) classifies riots as general upheavals, political confrontations, expressive rampages, fulfillment of anticipations, and riots that didn't happen but were reported by the media. Mattick (1968) considers five types of riot: rational, expressive, reified, irrational, and interracial.

Marx (1970b) suggests a typology of riots based on whether or not a generalized belief is present and whether or not the riot is instrumental. This calls attention to the varying relations of riots to ideology and social change. Marx offers some hypotheses and discusses three types of riot: instrumental riots in which a generalized belief is present, as in the eighteenth and nineteenth century European food and industrial riots studied by Rudé and Hobsbawm; riots in which a generalized belief is present, but which are not instrumental in resolving a group's problems, such as most pogroms and communal riots; and issueless riots, such as those occurring in victory or when social control is weakened, which lack a generalized protest belief and have slight implications for social movements and change.
Quarantelli (1973) notes that collective behavior has traditionally been concerned with the emergence of new groups. Yet it has focused primarily on conflict groups at odds with, or engaged in a struggle with, the dominant order, and has tended to ignore another common type of emergent group—that of an accommodative nature. Such a group shows highly cooperative internal relations, and its external behavior seeks to be integrative. The many informal groups that arise to help during emergencies or disasters are good examples. By combining the dimensions of situational context (consensus or dissensus) and involvement (primary or secondary participation) Quarantelli suggests four ideal types of accommodation groups. One type involves primary participants in a consensus situation, such as the new groups formed in the wake of a community disaster; another involves primary participants in a dissensus situation, as with the citizen anti-crime patrols and youth patrol groups that emerged during many recent racial disturbances (Marx & Archer 1971).

While not offering rigorous conceptual definitions, several empirical studies have called attention to previously neglected collective behavior phenomena. Hobsbawm (1959), using historical data on "archaic" or incipient social movements, analyzes the following forms: social banditry, mafia, millenarian movements, urban "mobs," and labor sects. In addition, Hobsbawm has pointed to the distinction between "prepolitical" and political protests.

Leon Mann (1970, 1974b) has considered two generally neglected types of group: the queue and the baiting crowd. The former is among the most ordered forms of collective behavior. It can be short term (waiting at a bus stop) or longer term (lining up to buy season's tickets a day before the sale starts). Strangers come together and norms emerge to regulate butting-in, peace-keeping, and brief absences from the queue. Canetti (1962), though seemingly oblivious to the work of social scientists on collective behavior, has produced an imaginative, if unsystematic and not carefully documented, book on crowds. He suggests a number of types according to their "prevailing emotion." These are the flight, prohibition, reversal, feast, and baiting crowds. Mann (1974b) has considered one form of the baiting crowd (which taunts and torments a victim) in analyzing the morbid gatherings at the foot of a building or bridge who urge a would-be suicide to actually jump. Also, Latané & Darley (1970) have studied bystander crowds.

Thus we have seen a proliferation of taxonomies of collective behavior phenomena. The eventual utility of this work will depend on how the taxonomies are used. In many cases the concepts must be further operationalized. But even with improved indicators, such taxonomies must eventually be more closely tied to efforts at explanation.

Recent Empirical Approaches to the Study of Crowds

New concepts and methods are also present in the increased number of systematic micro-empirical studies of crowd behavior. Such studies are a reaction against past research that has de-emphasized crowd behavior, and focused instead on the often nonobservable, static prior conditions of collective behavior or ideology, or that has focused on the consequences of crowd action.
Collective behavior, unlike many other areas of sociology, emphasizes a type of behavior. It is therefore ironic that crowd behavior as such has been so little directly studied. Of course, there are exceptions. Among the few studies of the actual crowd, Seidler, Meyer & MacGillivray (1974) divided crowds at several political rallies into aerial segments by zones and sectors, then sampled within each. They note variation in degree of commitment to the cause according to zone and sector, with central sectors and front zones having the most committed participants. In another example, Peele & Morse (1969) interviewed participants on the bus ride to a demonstration. Similarly, Heirich (1971) taped interviews of crowd discussions during the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley. In general, however, data used to study crowds are gathered before or after the crowd behavior occurs. This is all the more striking when one considers that theories stressing convergence, emergent norms, contagion, or generalized beliefs depend on data acquired during the occurrence of the collective behavior.

In their thoughtful review, written less than a decade ago, Milgram & Toch (1969) wrote, "...a field that consists only of scholars contradicting each other from the armchair can easily degenerate into sterile scholasticism. The most important need in the study of crowds is to get the main questions off the debating rostrum and move them to a level at which measurement, controlled observation, and imaginative experiment can begin to play some part in choosing among competing views." Past efforts have helped frame the right questions and have offered potentially useful theories and concepts. But systematic empirical research during instances of crowd behavior has been significantly lacking.

Unfortunately even the recent emphasis on studying actual crowds has not generally helped link them to the study of social movements. In looking for observable and measurable features of emergent groups that have general applicability, attention has not been focused on symbols, meanings, or the larger context in which the behavior occurs. Instead attention has been given to neglected factors such as size, density, structure, spatial features, duration, and entrance and exit from the crowd. Variables of an ecological and physical nature have been emphasized in the effort to discover underlying principles and structures that characterize humans when they gather together.

In arguing for a quantitative approach to the study of crowd behavior, Milgram & Toch (1969) discuss regularities in the properties of the crowd such as shape, internal structure, rates of growth, dispersion, and boundary conditions. Noting that "nature abhors a square crowd," they consider the tendency of crowds to form a ring around a common object, and to expand in the form of accretions around the initial core (Milgram & Toch 1969:520). They hypothesize that those who are most intensely motivated will be disproportionately at the crowd's core. Over time a "distillation effect" may occur, where reduced crowd size results in a purer concentration of the most ardent supporters, who are most ready for action. They suggest the concept of "laminated crowds" composed of antagonistic subgroups. Here a circle of supporters may surround their leader and be encircled by a hostile group. Boundaries, which set the limit of a crowd, are seen to have two major characteristics: permeability and sharpness of definition.
Milgram & Toch suggest that observation and experimentation with crowds of mental patients, children, the deaf, and those not speaking the same language could be used to explore ideas about the supposed irrationality and childlike nature of crowds, and the importance of language and symbolic meaning.

In an effort to deal with the unpredictability of events, some fire-brigade-type research teams, ready to attend any event, have been established. The Disaster Research Center at Ohio State University and the riot-ready researchers at several universities are examples. The former has significantly advanced our understanding of behavior in disaster and has helped shatter myths about widespread mass panic during community disasters (Quarantelli & Dynes 1970a; see also Brown & Goldin 1973:34–105). However, there have been no published evaluations of such research-ready approaches. There are likely problems: cost; keeping morale up when nothing happens for a long period of time; the fact that when something does happen, the dispersion of collective behavior and its occurrence at a large number of locales may make comprehensive studies impossible; and, as outsiders, the researchers lack familiarity with the local situation. Yet in the absence of efforts such as these one must wait for the rare and happy coincidence of collective behavior occurring in a setting where collective behavior researchers are available to study it, as in Kerskoff & Back's (1968) very useful analysis of an instance of hysterical contagion.

The unpredictability of collective behavior, and the practical and ethical difficulties of doing research in the middle of it, suggest the need for an experimental approach, where the researcher sets up conditions and manipulates the variables thought to be important. Short of this, hypothesis testing must wait upon when, and what, the natural world chooses to yield. There are limitations to the experimental approach however, including the artificiality of experiments; the inability to create the genuine conditions of spontaneity, indignation, or fear that are often involved in "real" collective behavior; the moral problems involved in even attempting to create such conditions; and the fact that experiments do not deal with the historical events that are at the crux of much sociological interest in collective behavior.

There have been scattered efforts at laboratory and field experiments. For example, Swanson (1953) made an early attempt at laboratory experimentation. Much of the social psychological work on group processes, social influences, communication, and perception has relevance to collective behavior.

A number of studies on panic have been done. Conditions conducive to a form of panic can more easily be created than those making for revolution (Mintz 1951, Kelley et al 1965, Gross et al 1972). These laboratory studies suggest that both a rational appraisal of one's chances, and emotional interference due to fear, may be associated with panic.

Harrel & Schmitt (1972) used a laboratory setting to test the expression of aggression in light of contagion, social facilitation, and emergent norm approaches. Contrary to what Le Bon might have predicted, the expression of aggression was greater under low rather than high anonymity conditions.

The murder of Kitty Genovese while a large number of witnesses looked on has led to research on the bystander crowd. Latané & Darley (1970) simulated a medical emergency (an epileptic seizure) and varied the conditions under which subjects in
a laboratory saw this. Their data suggest that the larger the bystander crowd, the less the likelihood of intervention. This is explained in terms of the diffusion of responsibility in larger groups. Piliavin, Rodin & Piliavin (1969), in staging an emergency on the Eighth Avenue Subway in New York City, however, found the reverse.

Other field experiments have also shown size to be an important factor for various outcomes. Milgram, Bickman & Berkowitz (1969) have shown that up to a point, as the number of people involved in nonverbal gestures in a common direction increases, so does the number of passersby who will look in that direction. Elsewhere Milgram & Toch (1969) suggest that rates of crowd aggregation be studied by playing records of crowd noises and that aerial photography be used. Other field experiments in this tradition include Knowles (1973) and Mann (1970), who has affected waiting line behavior at bus stops and libraries.

Beyond experiments as such we have seen more precise field observation procedures. Several studies have employed film. Smith, McPhail & Pickens (1972) found film to be more advantageous than trained observers working with conventional pencil and paper techniques. Film records which can be repeated and decelerated offer a unique means of analyzing the complex and changing patterns of crowd action. Mann (1974a) had judges rate behavior in 27 television news films of riots from four countries. The troubles, of course, are that one must know what to look for, and that the camera can "lie," or at least distort (e.g. Lang & Lang 1953).

In a provocative call-to-battle paper McPhail (1972) argues that the concept of the crowd should be abandoned "as a useless tool in establishing or slicing up behavior sequences into manageable units for systematic description and analysis." He maintains that the observer now lacks criteria for knowing and recording the "existence, continuation, or termination of the crowd". The interest in types and attributes of crowds is seen to have focused attention on the substantive content of crowd events, or on their unique and idiosyncratic features, rather than on precise observation of "the formal and recurrent behavior sequences which are observable wherever human beings are co-present." These behavior sequences include the physical movements and vocal utterances of "co-present collections of individuals" regardless of whether they are in a hotel lobby, a shopping center, or a riot. "Alterations in the direction, frequency and velocity of behavior sequences" should be specified.

McPhail argues that concepts which break the crowd up into smaller units more conducive to systematic observation are needed. Among the concepts McPhail suggests are the following: assembling and dispersing of the group, focusing (convergence of body or gaze orientation), and alignment of behaviors such as cheering, clapping, chanting, gesturing, or throwing. Using such an approach, an elementary but fundamental question for students of collective behavior arises: "does the commonality of gaze orientation increase or diminish when chanting, clapping or singing affect the continuity of gaze orientation?"'

In an empirical study of one assembling process, McPhail & Miller (1973) call systematic attention to communication processes and ecological factors. Rather than looking at people's "reason" for being there, they discuss some of the ways
people may learn about events, may be directed toward or away from them, and may have access to them. In their study of an unplanned sports rally at an airport, they show that indices of "space-time proximity" to the assembly location are more strongly related to presence at the event than is usually the case with background and attitude variables. Indices of social density, assembling instructions, transportation access, and relative availability were used to analyze this crowd activity.

The above work represents an important departure from traditional approaches. It calls attention to, and helps systematize, some of the behavior that can be observed in crowd situations. Such factors have occasionally been alluded to, but have rarely been developed in a systematic way. Beliefs and motivations can tell us only so much about collective behavior—they are hard to measure accurately, and their link to concrete behavior is often problematic.

Ecological factors of size and space have effects on crowd behavior. To participate people must learn that collective behavior is going to occur or is occurring; they must be available to participate; and they must have some means of getting to the location. Even when a crowd has already formed, it is true we do not have very adequate concepts to describe what people do in relation to each other in the crowd. A number of regularities and ideal-typical patterns are present, however, regardless of the type of gathering. Using the same categories to analyze collective and conventional behavior is a step forward. It offers parsimony in theory construction, and helps to deflate the mystique that has surrounded the study of crowds.

Such research should certainly be encouraged. Yet it is well to note that thus far we have only a bare beginning. This emphasis has not produced any counter-intuitive or very surprising results. Even when it does, the level of abstraction involved and the kind of nonsubstantive phenomena usually focused on may not be of interest to those who are drawn to the study of collective behavior in order to understand social change. For many observers the truly important questions have to do with the consequences of collective behavior, the meaning people give to their behavior, and the kinds of ideology involved. The micro-emphasis discussed above, while needed as a corrective and balance, can lead one to miss the symphony for concentrating on the instruments. To know that common focusing and assembling characterize both the Watts riot and the Rose Bowl parade is not sufficient. With regard to the broader picture, much attention within the area of collective behavior has been paid to social movements, and this occupies most of the remaining discussion.

STRAINS UNDERLYING COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

Most recent analysts agree that social movements have their origins in social conditions perceived to be problematical. In reacting against the excessively individualistic approaches of earlier theorists, sociologists with quite divergent theoretical perspectives look to difficulties in social organization for conditions leading to social movements.

Collective behavior has often been associated with strains resulting from economic crises, war, domination, mass migration, catastrophes, and technological
change. When a group's traditional or anticipated way of life is disrupted, the likelihood of collective behavior is increased. As expectations that previously guided actions fail, pressure for change is exerted.

Smelser (1963) referred to structural strain as the existence of ambiguities, deprivations, tensions, conflicts, and discrepancies in the social order. From the standpoint of the individual, strain refers to the existence of perceived ambiguities, deprivations, tensions, conflicts, and discrepancies. Thus the concept of strain—at the social or psychological levels—is a broad concept encompassing many types of problems.

Social movements are often linked to social change and are seen as efforts at collective problem-solving. In fact, social movements can be defined as noninstitutionalized group attempts to produce or prevent social change. There is disagreement, however, as to the type of strain that should be emphasized, the ways in which different types of strain relate to different types of movements, the link between strain and people's perception of it, and the utility of social movements as mechanisms to solve problems.

Various types of strain have been shown to be associated with social movements. Thus it is difficult to make general statements beyond ones such as "social movements are more likely to appear when strains occur in a conducive context, when an ideology interpreting the strain develops, when people are available for mobilization, and when social control is not unduly repressive." Still, we do know that when only strain exists—apart from ideology, a conducive context, mobilization, and weak social control—social movements are not likely to emerge.

The 1960s witnessed the development of a large literature on the role of strain in producing protests and social movements. The concept received much theoretical and empirical elaboration. A central issue has been whether or not a more specific type of strain, such as relative deprivation, should be substituted for the more general category of strain. In the following discussion we review some of the major contributors to the literature on strain.

Davies (1962, 1969, 1974) has advanced the "J-Curve" hypothesis of revolutions and rebellions which seeks to integrate Karl Marx's observation that revolutions would occur as conditions became worse, and Tocqueville's observation that revolutions were likely after conditions improved. Davies (1962:6) argues, "Revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal."

Davies selectively illustrates the J-Curve idea by reference to events as varied as Dorr's Rebellion of 1842, the Pullman Strike of 1894, the Russian Revolution, and recent black and student protest movements. He concludes that the J-Curve is a necessary condition of many rebellions and revolutions. His analysis is phrased at such a general level, however, that he can pick and choose examples consistent with the theory and omit inconsistent examples. Nevertheless, the data favorable to his thesis are suggestive of the role of the J-Curve in helping to explain at least some rebellions and revolutions.

Gurr (1970) calls this pattern of success and then failure "progressive relative deprivation." It is one of a number of patterns he considers in an elaborate theoreti-
cal and integrative work which greatly extends the concept of relative deprivation. He is concerned with explaining forms of political violence—turmoil, conspiracy, and internal war—rather than only explaining social movements. His analysis is relevant, nevertheless, to understanding strains underlying social movements.

Political violence is explained by the politicization of discontents, and the ensuing reaction of authorities. These are not just any discontents, but discontents derived from relative deprivation. Gurr (1970:13) states: “Discontent arising from the perception of relative deprivation is the basic, instigating condition for participants in collective violence.” Relative deprivation, in turn, is defined as “a perceived discrepancy between men's value expectations and their value capabilities” (Gurr 1970:13). Social conditions which increase expectations without increasing capabilities to realize them, or which reduce capabilities without reducing expectations, thereby increase the intensity of discontent.

Among factors responsible for a drop in value capabilities or a rise in value expectations are conditions such as declines in production, increased taxes, loss of social status, exposure to new beliefs about what a group is due, and knowledge about gains of other groups. What people perceive is the important factor, rather than objective relationships, though there is obviously a relation between them. Social forces such as the extent of cultural sanctions for overt aggression, the degree of success of past political violence, the legitimacy of the regime, and the kinds of responses the regime makes to those who feel relatively deprived, affect the focusing of discontent on political objects.

An emphasis on the J-Curve and relative deprivation unfortunately can focus attention away from analyzing the specific class, ethnic, status, and power factors that may underlie conflicts and the synchronization of discontents among different groups (Snyder & Tilly 1972). In contrast, the important work of Rudé (1960, 1964), Hobsbawm (1959), Tilly (1964), and Moore (1966) focuses on specific antagonisms underlying specific conflicts.

Differing from most earlier discussions of strain, Gurr’s work offers instructions for operationalizing the concept of relative deprivation. He suggests two ways that this can be calculated, although he does not offer us guidelines for choosing between them. Neither does he tell us how much relative deprivation is required to help generate political violence; nor does he use these operational definitions consistently throughout the book. In spite of these problems, Gurr’s attempts at operationalization should be a guide for future research.

His first operational definition of relative deprivation ($RD$) is

$$RD = \frac{(Ve - Vc)}{Ve},$$

where $Ve$ = expected value position and $Vc$ = value position perceived to be attainable (Gurr 1970:64). This is illustrated by an example of Italian workers who made $80$ a month but who think they should have made $176$ a month. This amounts to a “degree of $RD$” of $.55$ [i.e. $(176-80 = 96)/176 = .55$]. Similarly, French workers made $114$ a month but they think they should have made $170$ a month, which is a “degree of $RD$” of $.33$ [i.e. $(170 - 114 = 56)/170 = .33$]. Also, Gurr says that an unemployed worker with no prospects of other
income or future employment "would experience the maximum possible degree of RD, 1.00" (Gurr 1970: 64–66). Presumably the Italian workers would be more likely to protest than the French workers, but Gurr does not actually use this operational definition to analyze differential rates of rebellion between the two groups.

Furthermore, Gurr does not often cite relevant data about people's perceptions when he discusses relative deprivation, even though perceptual data are implied by his general definition and appear in his operational definitions. Instead he frequently uses "objective" data, such as employment rates, to infer the psychological state of relative deprivation, which is a methodological problem also plaguing other similar recent analyses (e.g. by Davies 1962, 1969, 1974, Feierabend, Feierabend & Nesvold 1969), as well as a classic discussion by Tocqueville (1955; see Smelser, forthcoming). Others, however, have used subjective data to indicate a contribution of relative deprivation to protests (Pettigrew 1971: chapter 7, Caplan 1971, Seales & Williams 1962, Matthews & Prothro 1966, and Forward & Williams 1970). But these studies have primarily indicated that relative deprivation is a contributing condition of protests, not a necessary or sufficient condition (Sellitz et al 1959:80–87). That is, these studies indicate that relative deprivation contributes to the occurrence of protests, but is neither required nor fully determinative of protests.

Gurr's second operational definition involves use of an ordinal scale to examine the level of political participation a person engages in, compared to what a person expects to engage in. A person who expected to attain a fifth-ranked position but attained only the third rank would have a relative deprivation score of two (Gurr 1970:66).

In drawing upon a vast amount of data to support his numerous propositions, Gurr uses the term relative deprivation in many different ways. At times Gurr argues for the importance of relative deprivation, but he actually seems to be talking about absolute deprivation. For example, he notes that high wheat prices and high unemployment corresponded with severity of mass protests in England from 1790 to 1850; that variations in bread prices were associated with mob violence in revolutionary France; that lynchings in the American South were inversely associated with indices of economic well-being; and that a strong correlation of −.93 existed between per capita income and Communist vote in sixteen Western democracies in the late 1940s. These could easily be examples of more extreme, or absolute, deprivations underlying the protests rather than relative deprivation.

In fact, it should be pointed out that the literature on relative deprivation has emphasized forms of deprivation less extreme than those emphasized by the literature on absolute deprivation. Though there is some overlap between treatments of absolute and relative deprivation, as in Gurr's (1970:46–50) discussion of decremental relative deprivation, and in his previously discussed measure of the maximum degree of relative deprivation (Gurr 1970:64–66), many who stress relative deprivation wish to set it off from more extreme deprivations underlying protests. Theorists such as Tocqueville (1955) and Brinton (1952) have indicated the role of less extreme deprivations underlying even the most extreme protests. Furthermore, they often argue that improving conditions are associated with relative deprivation and protests.
If the relative deprivation theorists were correct, then it would be possible to agree with the basic implication of Gurr's work: to replace the general concept of strain with the more specific term, relative deprivation (or the J-Curve or another similar concept). But the weight of the evidence does not warrant this. Underlying various protests are other types of strain that cannot be reduced to relative deprivation.

Various theorists have emphasized the importance of absolute rather than relative deprivation as the crucial precondition for protests. For example, in his discussion of the "cargo cults," Toch (1965) points to extreme deprivations underlying these protests. In his discussion of the revolutionary crowds in France, Rudé (1960) focuses on rising bread prices and hunger, which reflect the most extreme form of absolute deprivation—minimum human survival. In his analysis of the *lumpen-proletariat* in colonial society, Fanon (1968) clearly emphasizes the role of extreme deprivations in generating their revolutionary protests. In analyzing various protests, Oberschall (1973) focuses on fundamental political and economic discontents while explicitly rejecting the importance of relative deprivation. He argues for the importance of a combination of widespread and fundamental economic and political grievances, which affect different groups and strata. Movements are most likely to arise and produce changes when institutions of conflict regulation are unable to handle these multiple severe strains.

Blumer (forthcoming) suggests another type of perceived strain underlying protests: social unrest. He is critical of the idea of "objective strains" underlying collective protests, as well as of the idea of relative deprivation. He does agree that social inequities can generate discontents. But conditions must not only be perceived as difficult for the affected group; the group must also go the next step and change its views about the legitimacy of the existing order. Those who are discontented and view the existing social order as illegitimate are said to be in a state of unrest.

Because social unrest involves a widespread feeling of the illegitimacy of the social order, social unrest can be a revolutionary state of mind. Blumer stresses, nevertheless, that collective or revolutionary protest is only one of several possible outcomes of social unrest (e.g. the aggrieved population can withdraw to hedonistic satisfactions).

Blumer clearly sets off his analysis of protests from a relative deprivation approach. Relative deprivation emphasizes the importance of perceived inequities in protests. But Blumer argues that people can perceive inequities between themselves and other groups and still not engage in protests. It is when discontented people begin to perceive the social order as illegitimate—a condition not stressed by relative deprivation theory—that their likelihood of protesting significantly increases.

Johnson (1966), offering a somewhat different emphasis than relative deprivation, sees strain, in the form of a "disequilibrated social system," as being the crucial precondition for revolution. This occurs when a society's value system and its environment are out of harmony. Economic and technical changes (among others) can introduce the process of "dissynchronization." The disequilibrium of the system will create demands for change that, if unmet, will lead to a revolutionary situation. Johnson does not offer a clear operational definition of "disequilibrium," but argues
that such a condition can be inferred from factors such as rising suicide and crime rates and the expansion of social control forces.

Finally there are those who argue that for certain kinds of collective behavior no strain at all may be necessary. McCarthy & Zald's (1973) discussion of the role of career professionals in generating social movements, and Marx's (1970b, 1974) discussions of riots in victory and the contributions of "agents provocateurs" to particular protest actions, suggest this. Similarly, recent work by Tilly and his associates has de-emphasized the importance of discontents in protests, emphasizing instead the importance of power struggles underlying collective violence and protests (Tilly 1969; Snyder & Tilly 1972, 1974; Shorter & Tilly 1974). Also, some discussions have explicitly rejected the importance of relative deprivation in protests (Muller 1972; Oberschall 1973:3; Blumer, forthcoming; Ransford 1968; Wilson 1973:68–69). Once again we see situations where collective episodes—even violent collective episodes—do not require relative deprivation.

In summary, theorists such as Gurr and Davies have clearly made important contributions about specific types of strains underlying various protests. Yet the many kinds of strains underlying different protests cannot all be reduced to concepts such as relative deprivation and the J-Curve. The J-Curve and relative deprivation are contributing conditions of protest, but not necessary or sufficient conditions. Hence the more general term strain should be retained as the basic analytical category.

There is disagreement over the link between a given type of strain and a given type of collective behavior. Smelser sees this relationship as indeterminant. For example, norm-oriented movements can be triggered by strains in values. Lipset & Raab (1970:23–24), however, argue that strains involving social status are likely to be associated with right-wing movements. In contrast, strains involving economics are more likely to be associated with left-wing movements. Others, such as Useem (forthcoming), Aberle (1966), Gurr (1970), and Worsley (1968) have also discussed the relationship between strains and outcomes, and the issue is yet to be resolved.

There are at least two broad ways of testing ideas about strain. One is to take a sample of places and time periods, and then assess the relationship between strains and the appearance of social movements (or more commonly, the appearance of emergent forms of collective behavior, such as riots or demonstrations, from which the presence of a social movement is then inferred). Another method is to look within a given place and time period at the relationship between individuals' perceptions of strain and the extent and type of their social movement participation. The latter is considered in the section on recruitment; here let us briefly look at some of the place and time-period studies.

To provide quantitative support for his deprivation thesis, Gurr (1969) analyzed political violence and deprivation, measured by conditions such as new limitations on political activity and rapid inflation, for over 100 countries. He reports that internal conflict was highest in countries where deprivation was highest.

In contrast, Snyder & Tilly (1972) found that over a 130-year period in France, deprivation (as measured by changes in prices and productivity) was a poor predictor of collective violence. Rather than stressing the gap between expectations and
achievements, as do analysts such as Gurr and Davies, Snyder & Tilly emphasize struggles for power as a main source of French collective violence. However, differing from either position, at least one recent analysis has attempted to synthesize the grievance and power struggle approaches, which is a potentially fruitful development (Korpi 1974). Those who are aggrieved periodically engage in struggles for power, although there are varying levels and types of grievances that can lead to power struggles.

A common form for aggregate studies of American urban riots and college protests has been to link social structure, strains, and protest. Spilerman (1970–1972), in analyzing characteristics of riot cities, found that the objective characteristics of cities, such as nonwhite unemployment rates or ratio of white to nonwhite income, were poor predictors of riots. Size of nonwhite population and region were the best predictors. This and other work sheds doubts on direct links between structural characteristics of cities, specific strains, and riots. Among many riot studies with varying findings, but using a similar logic of inquiry, are Downes (1968), Lieberson & Silverman (1965), Bloobaum (1968), Wanderer (1969), and Morgan & Clark (1973). Stark et al (1974), using an interesting array of data, have analyzed temporal and spatial patterns of riot activity within a given city.

A number of studies have examined the characteristics of colleges and universities that experience protests. Some have indicated that structural characteristics generating strains on students are important causes of protests. For example, Scott & El-Assal (1969) focused on large size and bureaucratic structure as conditions leading to protests. But Astin (1968:158–61) and Somers (1965, 1969) are critical of this approach. Furthermore, other research indicates that university quality is a stronger determinant of protests than size or bureaucratic structure (Bowers & Pierce 1974). An emphasis on university quality does not point to severe strains on students as sources of protests. Some structural characteristics may generate strains that underlie specific protests. But there are also many negative cases. Relationships among social structure, perceptions, strains, and protests are complex, and research thus far has not been very effective at sorting them out.

Unfortunately what we can do with our methods at hand is not necessarily what is most conducive to testing ideas about strain. We see after-the-fact interpretations of particular cases, where strain is either inferred from a movement’s ideology or imputed to exist as a result of the analyst’s personal observations. Or at the aggregate level, we see studies of strain dealing with the more emergent and ephemeral forms of collective behavior such as sit-ins and riots. There may also be the problem of the quality of data, which are often drawn from newspaper accounts. Indeed one study suggests that most of the correlations between riots and prior city characteristics disappear when one controls for whether or not a national news wire service is present in the city (Danzger 1974).

Rarely do we see studies at the aggregate level concerned with strain as related to the development of social movements. Incidents such as riots, demonstrations, and sit-ins are easier to identify in the aggregate than are social movements. Many movements do not engage in dramatic outbursts, and even the occurrences of such outbursts do not necessarily imply the presence of a specific movement organization.
Ideas about the social movement-strain linkage could be more appropriately tested if we had more effective operational measures both for strain and for various dimensions of the social movement dependent variable, such as the presence or absence of a movement (which necessitates a broad and representative sample of time periods and places beyond the purposive samples now usually drawn), as well as the size, resources, and number of social movement organizations. Greater specification of the strain-social movement link is thus clearly needed.

IDEOLOGY

Ideology is a crucial component of social movements. Beliefs focus and interpret the strains people feel. They guide participants' and leaders’ actions, and justify the purposes of the movement. When there are profound strains in a society and many movements are seeking supporters, some movements will be more effective in recruitment than others. Ideology can be an important differentiating factor between movements that attract, or fail to attract, mass support.

Various empirical studies have explicitly shown the importance of beliefs in social movements. These include Lipset & Raab's (1970) focus on conspiratorial beliefs underlying right-wing movements; studies of radical feminist, Marxist, or reformist beliefs underlying different branches of the Women's Liberation Movement (Firesstone 1970, Koedt 1973: 318–21, Hole & Levine 1971: 108–9, Morgan 1970a: xiv–xvi, xxxv); Wood's (1974b) analysis of radical, reformist, and radical-reformist ideologies underlying different phases of the student movement; Bell's (1968), and Pinkney's (1968) analyses of nonviolent protest beliefs underlying the Civil Rights Movement; Somers's (1965) analysis of civil libertarian beliefs underlying the Free Speech Movement; Gerlach & Hine's (1970: 174–75) discussion of the anti-system beliefs in the Black Power Movement; and Ash's (1972) analysis of the class ideology underlying various American labor movements.

Yet in comparison with other areas, the study of ideology has been relatively neglected by sociologists, who generally feel more comfortable studying social structure and behavior than studying symbols and belief systems. As indicated by our earlier discussion of taxonomies, however, this has not stopped sociologists from emphasizing ideas (defined broadly as generalized beliefs, emergent norms, ideologies, or espoused purposes) more than any other single factor in classifying social movements. Ideological distinctions have been useful in distinguishing movements, in pointing out the rational or purposive nature of much collective behavior, and in linking the study of social movements to social change.

Nevertheless, ideology has not been nearly as useful in helping understand the actual dynamics of collective behavior. As researchers move out of the library and into the streets, ideology, as a static concept, is much less helpful. There are difficulties in examining the role of ideology, especially when it is assumed that: (a) ideology is the main factor explaining the type of movement an individual joins; (b) there is a strong fit between official ideology, beliefs of leaders, and beliefs of followers; and (c) the rank and file all have similar beliefs.

The increase in the quantitative attitude studies of activists and of mass constituencies has called attention to the heterogeneity of beliefs and motivations among those in the same social movement. Tilly (1964), for example, in his analysis of the
Vendée, is very critical of the notion of similar motives underlying the counterrevo-

dution in France. Stallings (1973), in a study of environmental groups, found it
difficult to classify them as either value- or norm-oriented because of the existence
of participants with both types of orientation. Similarly, Wood (1974b) found that
the Student Movement of the 1960s had members attached to radical, reformist, and
radical-reformist ideologies. In her analysis of the Women's Liberation Movement,
Firestone (1970) indicated the existence of women attached to Marxist ideology and
to radical feminist ideology, as well as to more moderate reform views. Jacobs (1970)
discusses the dramatic ideological split between the Weatherman and Progressive Labor factions of SDS. Finally, Marx (1974) shows that "agents provocateurs" in
a movement may actually reject movement ideology while appearing to be committed
members. In general, the variation in movement ideology partly explains the
tendency of movements to splinter.

Others have stressed homogeneity in beliefs and motivations. Rudé (1960: 22, 43,
199, 208–9) argues that high bread prices and high costs in general were unifying
motives of the revolutionary crowds in France at the time of the revolution, al-
though the motives of the sans-culotte masses were different from those of the
bourgeois leaders. Also, Heirich (1971:429) and Somers (1965) tend to argue that
the common motives of the desire for free speech and political liberties in general
underlay much Free Speech Movement agitation at Berkeley in 1964. Similarly,
Flacks (1967) emphasizes the role of left-wing beliefs among student activists.

Heterogeneity versus homogeneity in beliefs among protestors often depends on
the level of abstraction involved, type of protest, and stage of the movement. In
addition, Smelser's (1963: 289–301, 356–58) distinction between a "real" and
"derived" phase of collective behavior—wherein the participants' motivation in the
"real" phase is closer to "official" movement ideology, but in the "derived" phase
begins to vary from official ideology—suggests one type of distinction needed to deal
with this issue. Also an analytical separation between beliefs and motivation may
be useful. Thus, most collective protests probably attract, at least eventually, people
who have varying personal motivations, but who may nevertheless share some
common political goals and values.

Aside from the diversity of attitudes among the rank and file, there is often a
discrepancy between the beliefs of the leaders of a movement and the beliefs of the
followers. Marx (1969:233–37) summarizes a number of studies that result in this
finding. The ideas of the leaders of a movement are usually more sophisticated and
complex than those of the followers, and one cannot automatically equate the two
belief systems. Finard (1971:231–33) shows that there was little relationship between
a right-wing Canadian movement's official ideology and the beliefs of its mass base.
Similarly, Wikler (1973) found a difference between the official ideology of groups
such as the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, and the mixed, often confused
ideology of various rank and file antiwar Vietnam veterans. Even the term "antiwar"
had diverse and contradictory meanings for the various veterans studied. On the
other hand, some studies have reported stronger correlations between leaders' ideas
and those of the rank and file (Wood 1974a,b, forthcoming a). Yet even when partici-
pants indicate agreement with an ideology, the actions they take may be for other
reasons. Research on the relationship between leaders' ideology and the masses'
ideology could be more developed by quantifying the ideology of the movement (e.g. by content analysis of speeches, pamphlets, and other movement literature), and correlating it with the members’ ideology and motivation.

Finally, we know relatively little about the conditions associated with a greater or lesser congruence between attitudes of leaders and followers, about congruence among attitudes of followers, or to which aspects of a belief system activists with varying characteristics will respond positively or negatively. These are important topics and deserve attention.

As with so many other variables important to collective behavior, we are left in the ambiguous position of having to say that ideology is important, but isn’t the only important factor, and for some purposes isn’t important at all. Furthermore, we cannot say much in propositional form about the conditions under which it is important. Smelser’s position is probably the most cogent in this regard. He argues that for generalized beliefs to affect the occurrence of collective behavior, they must fit within existing strains and precipitating factors—i.e. for the beliefs to contribute to collective behavior, they must help explain and translate the strains for the aggrieved population, and must be given concrete substance by precipitating factors.

Beyond empirical issues such as the above, the analytical interest of some researchers contains at least an implicit critique of ideology. Thus, in looking for similarities among left- and right-wing antidemocratic movements, pluralists have tended to blur, or play down, ideological differences while focusing on such factors as social alienation, the absence of secondary groups, low education or sophistication, and authoritarianism (Lipset 1960, Bell 1962, Kornhauser 1959). Similarly, Bittner (1963) discusses a number of organizational solutions that both left- and right-wing radical movements may impose on members to insulate ideological purity in the face of a heterogeneous and potentially disconfirming external environment.

In an important empirical monograph, however, Regin (1967) has shown that, at least in the case of some specific American movements, the practice of collapsing radical-left and radical-right movements is unwarranted. His work indicates that the right-wing McCarthyist movement had a very different social base of support than the left-wing agrarian Populist movement. Their different goals (for the farmers, economic justice; for the McCarthyites, conservative control of Communists and other “left-wingers”) were intimately related to basic ideological differences between the two groups. Although we should be sensitive to commonalities in social and psychological characteristics across ideological groups, ideology is important in understanding social movements and should be recognized as such.

MOBILIZATION

Movements come into being through a process of mobilization. Although there are strains, conducive social arrangements, beliefs, and precipitating factors, a social movement has not yet arisen until the affected group is actually organized to obtain collective goals.

The literature on mobilization has a paradoxical quality to it. On one hand, the concept of mobilization has received elaborate theoretical development. A major
contribution of Oberschall (1973) is his consideration of the conditions influencing—or inhibiting—the mobilization of social movements. Yet the literature has not produced much in the way of tested—or even testable—propositions about mobilization.

As a sort of "substitute" for propositions, various discussions have attempted to establish the relative importance of leaders versus masses in transforming a potential movement into an actual movement. As a polemic directed against a previous emphasis on the role of the masses, recent discussions have strongly emphasized the role of leaders in mobilization. Etzioni (1968:298), in stressing the mobilization of elites, minimizes the importance of mass mobilization—even in crisis situations. He criticizes what he calls the "Cecil B. De Mille version of history." He argues that "the image of the popular uprising as involving 'the' peasants, workers, Negroes, or colonial people is almost invariably inaccurate" (Etzioni 1968:298).

Among the issues which have attracted attention is the role of the professional leader in recent movements. McCarthy & Zald (1973), in an important and suggestive paper, see the rise of the "social movement entrepreneur." They set themselves off from the "classic hearts and minds" model of mobilizing a movement, where money, manpower, and leadership come from the base of the movement—i.e. from the masses. They argue, by way of selective illustration, that "modern movements can increasingly find these resources outside of self-interested (mass) memberships concerned with personally held grievances" (McCarthy & Zald 1973:18). For example, early civil rights organizations had white members and white leaders, as well as white financial support, although the prime beneficiaries were black (Marx & Useem 1971, Rudwick & Meier 1970).

McCarthy & Zald argue that professional movements may even create grievances rather than respond to them. In a version of Parkinson's Law, they state: "we suggest that the definition of grievances will expand to meet the funds and support personnel available . . ." (McCarthy & Zald 1973:23). Therefore, outside funding, from the government or foundations, mobilizes the professional social movement, which is comprised more of the leaders than of the members. Leaders will often give the impression that there are many members of the movement when, in fact, "the membership may be nonexistent or existing only on paper."

Oberschall attempts to analyze conditions under which educated professionals become available for protest activities. When such professionals cannot obtain the jobs they desire, they become more available for protest activities. Oberschall (1973:160–61) finds that this is particularly true in "segmented societies" where mobility is blocked. Using a game theory approach, he suggests that talented and ambitious individuals have little to lose and much to gain by overthrowing the system, or at least by making it more flexible. There are more risks, however,—and hence less active opposition by the talented—in "vertically integrated structures," where there is greater mobility and access to the elite.

Some of the leadership literature focuses specifically on the role of the agitator. This is an unfortunate term, given its popular connotation of a self-interested troublemaker rousing the masses against their ultimate interests. Toch (1965:87), for example, discusses how agitators can exploit the predispositions of the masses in
organizing a movement. Turner & Killian (1972:389–91) show the effect of charismatic leaders in generating support, although the leaders' protection from criticism can also eventually lead to serious blunders that can destroy the movement. Blumer (forthcoming), on the other hand, tends to de-emphasize the role of the agitator while stressing the role of social interaction among those in a state of social unrest.

Analytical and empirical work is needed in this area. There are different types of leaders, just as there are different types of followers. For example, a study of leaders in the Russian Revolution from 1905 to 1917 identified six role types: rebel, striker, propagandist, intelligentsia, party organizer, and upper-level politicians (Strauss 1973). Some specific questions which could be addressed in future research are: in what ways do agitators differ from other types of leaders such as professional leaders; what techniques do they employ to mobilize movements, spread beliefs, etc; and how do they maintain power?

This emphasis on the role of leaders in the recent mobilization literature tends to minimize existing evidence on mobilization of the masses. Of course, the importance of mass mobilization depends on the context involved, on the type of movement, and even on one's definition of mobilization. Also the importance given mass mobilization is partly related to the politics of the observer. Those with anti-elitist, populist positions are more likely to emphasize the role of the masses, whereas those with more hierarchical views tend to down-play it.

It is true that most people do not devote their lives to social movements. Yet during exceptional periods large numbers of people are in some way involved in, and supportive of, social movements.

While less than a thousand people stormed the Bastille, thousands were involved in the French Revolution in 1789. In the 1968 version of the French Revolution, according to two estimates, between 7 and 8 million workers and students participated (Adam 1970, Wall 1973:14). Estimates of participation in American ghetto riots suggest that up to 20% or more of the ghetto population was involved, with many others offering passive support. In 1967–1968, an estimated 10% of the American college population (over 500,000 students) had taken part in demonstrations [Peterson 1970:63 (Table 1), 78]. And by 1970 literally millions of American students had taken part in some form of protest (Wood 1974b:145–46, Lipset & Ladd 1971:103–4, Lipset 1972:45, Table 3).

The threat of mass mobilization, even when it is not actually carried out, can be important in negotiations for social change. Those in power sometimes offer concessions in hope of defusing future mass protests. The professional leaders in the antipoverty movement discussed by McCarthy & Zald did have a real constituency "out there" with real grievances, even if it was not highly organized or self-conscious. Its presence made it easier for professionals to raise funds and accomplish goals. There is clearly variation among movements, but some have considerable grass-roots, mass participation.

Mass mobilization is given direct attention in the rationalistic collective decision-making approach. Drawing on the work of economists such as Boulding (1962) and Olson (1965), as well as on the work of Coleman (1966; see also 1973), Oberschall (1973:3) has called attention to the utility of a "game theory" model to analyze mobilization. He applies a "resource management" approach, whereby resources
are assembled by a group for purposes of collective goal achievement. In a model stressing cost-benefit analysis by collective actors, people are seen to invest resources to protect their own interests. In doing this, they consider a risk/reward ratio (Oberschall 1973:168–70). The discontented group assembles all the resources at its disposal (from inside and outside the group) to achieve its goals. Forces of social control also assemble their resources to combat the discontented group. This dual mobilization sets up the dynamics of the movement.

Berk (1974b) also argues for the utility of a gaming approach which relies on decision theory and “group problem solving.” Ideas such as the mini-max concept are used to understand crowd strategy (i.e. the crowd tries to maximize its advantages and minimize its losses). The crowd is seen as wanting to “win” at the complex “game” and acts accordingly. It is argued that game theory is best used where cooperation is necessary.

In reacting against the idea of the presumed irrationality of crowds, favored by earlier theorists, recent endeavors have stressed the extent to which crowd behavior is a rational means for obtaining goals. Yet there is a danger here in substituting a super-rationalistic model for an irrational model. As Parsons (1949) showed early in his attack on utilitarianism, other considerations than fully economic (or risk/reward) considerations motivate action. The focus on purely means-ends considerations draws attention away from such factors as ideology and social pressure.

Clearly, crowds have rational and irrational aspects. Heirich (1971), in his classic study of the Berkeley Free Speech Movement, has tried to bridge the gap between those theorists emphasizing highly rationalistic decision-making, and those who stress less rational and irrational aspects of collective behavior. He presents much useful data on decision-making in crowds and was much closer to his crowd data than is usually the case.

He argues that the participants saw their actions as rational means for obtaining the goals of free speech. But he also sees a tendency for crowds to simplify the causes and solutions of their problems. The existence of people with common interests in crowds increases the likelihood of a common response to a situation. Yet people in crowds may not have all the information necessary to make a full assessment of the situation. The Langs (1968:564), for example, argue that “the ecology of the crowd is such that persons experience it from different perspectives and no participant can have an overview of all that is going on.” Thus, in crowds, participants can be more easily deluded and make decisions they would not necessarily make as isolated individuals. This narrow information available to crowds explains why participants can be deluded in making collective decisions, yet act according to rational decision-making models. Nevertheless, we should note that the extent of crowd delusion depends, case for case, on: (a) what the crowd was told; (b) what the “actual” situation was; and (c) the distribution of beliefs and actions within the crowd. Crowd delusion, like crowd rationality, is variable by context—neither is a universal quality of crowds. And, as abstractions generally applied to what is often a diverse group of people, they will usually be wanting in some degree.

One potentially useful and generally neglected source of data on mass mobilization lies in the role of the “underground” press. The Newspaper Division of the General Library at the University of California, Berkeley has on microfilm an
invaluable collection of underground newspapers and journals. It would be interesting, at least retrospectively, to see how mass political consciousness and readiness for mobilization—for antiwar, civil rights, educational reform, and other social movements—were affected by the leftist underground press of the 1960s. This press reached millions of potential social movement adherents. More generally, the role of the mass media in rapidly and widely diffusing protest activities has not received adequate attention.

In assessing the mobilization literature, we have seen a tendency to emphasize either the independent role of leaders or that of masses, and unfortunately to ignore the interaction between them. Future research should focus more explicitly on this interaction. It should focus, for example, on how elites relate to the masses; how they enlist support among masses; how they get the masses to commit resources such as time, money, and energy to the movement; what the elites ask of the masses to help the movement; and what the masses ask of—and get—from the leaders for their participation in the movement. The best discussion of this interaction remains Lenin's (1902) *What is To Be Done?*. Lenin viewed mobilization in terms of a smaller group of leaders consciously interacting with the masses to prepare them for revolution. This analytical focus on leader-mass interaction transcends an undue emphasis on either leaders or masses, and clearly deserves further attention.

RECRUITMENT

Recruitment relates to mobilization (whereby an entire new movement comes into existence) and also to the growth or decline of a movement. Yet our interest here is the issue of *differential recruitment*—i.e. why do some people rather than others join already existing movements? Prior to the 1960s, little systematic attention was usually paid to recruitment, though among the exceptions are Cantril (1941) and Heberle (1951). Classic works such as those of Le Bon (1895) and Brinton (1952:101-33) supplied little in the way of precise data on recruitment. In the first edition of *Collective Behavior* Turner & Killian (1957) included such studies dealing with recruitment as those by Neibur, Barber, Boisen, McCormack, Messinger, and Binkley, though the level of quantitative evidence was generally low.

In the absence of data, one person's claims about social movement adherents are as acceptable as the claims of the next. People are free to make statements about "true believers" (Hoffer 1951), to offer mental-patient analogies whereby people are attracted to a movement's ideology to reduce their feelings of diffuse terror (Toch 1965), and to suggest "penis envy" or "riff-raff" explanations of racial rioters (Sterba 1947; McCone 1965).

One of the most prominent characteristics of collective behavior research in recent years has been the proliferation of quantitative recruitment studies. Two groups in particular have been the focus of quantitative studies: student political activists and black urban rioters. Other protesters, such as those in the Women's Liberation, ecology, and the earlier nonviolent civil rights movements, did not receive nearly as much attention from quantitative social scientists. Likely it is not accidental that government and foundation money was very available for the study
of the two most socially threatening groups of the 1960s: rioters and student activists.

Our discussion focuses primarily on the social and cultural, rather than on the personality characteristics of activists. The former are easier to measure, and better data, having less of an ideological aura are available on them. Still, some recent studies have systematically tried to assess the personality characteristics of activists (Kerpelman 1972, Abramowitz 1973, Haan, Smith & Block 1968).

Indicative of the explosion of information available on the recruitment of students into noninstitutionalized political activities are two recent book-length bibliographies on student politics by Keniston (1973) and by Altbach & Kelly (1973). There are literally hundreds of empirical studies of activists reported, and they do not exhaust the field. Keniston's (1973) work focuses primarily on quantitative empirical research regarding activists since World War II. Altbach & Kelly (1973) report on quantitative and qualitative discussions since 1900, including approximately 200 discussions of the University of California at Berkeley, which probably makes it the most studied campus of all time.

Activism discussions have gone into great detail on the sources of recruitment to the New Left movement. Authors have been concerned with the socio-economic background of activists, their political and ideological background, the activists' own political ideology, the cultural orientations of the activists and of their parents, the nature of their family relations, the impact of the multiversity, the role of social alienation, the impact of permissive childrearing practices, and the effect of the larger society, all as they relate to recruitment to activism.

Some of the main trends of recruitment to activism are as follows. The socio-economic background of activists in the earlier part of the movement (approximately 1960–1964) tended to be upper-middle class (Flacks 1967, Westby & Braungart 1966, Mankoff & Flacks 1971). However, in the later phase of the movement (approximately 1965 to the early 1970s), the social class base of the movement broadened (Mankoff & Flacks 1971, Dunlap 1970b, Lipset 1972:83–87). But the political-cultural base of the movement did not seem to broaden as much as the socioeconomic base. That is, even by the late 1960s, activists were recruited more often from politically left-wing and culturally unconventional families than from politically moderate or conservative families, or from "Protestant Ethic" families (Wood 1974b:83–101; Lipset 1972:93, Table 13, Bowers & Pierce 1974).

The studies showing political or cultural similarity between activists and their families emphasize the importance of continuity between the generations as a source of recruitment to activism. Other work, however, has argued for the importance of conflict between the generations in the families of activists (Feuer 1969, Block, Haan & Smith 1969).

There have been few, if any, systematic data to support Feuer's argument that unresolved Oedipal crises underlie much student activism. Keniston (1968) comes closest to getting the in-depth psychoanalytic data needed to test such an idea, but he concludes that there is no evidence for the Oedipal theory of activism (Keniston 1973:xvi) [for an application of the Oedipal theory to a few adult Indian and Russian revolutionary leaders, see Bald (1974) and Wolfenstein (1967)].
Conditions of continuity and conflict between the generations are not necessarily contradictory approaches to activism. Activists may adhere to the political or cultural ideology of their parents, yet come into conflict with parents over the activists' perception that the parents have failed to live up to their own values (Keniston 1967, Wood 1974b:11–20). Thus there is evidence of conflicts in families of activists, but at present this evidence points to political and cultural sources of conflict instead of to unresolved Oedipal complexes.

Although there is empirical support for activists coming from unconventional cultural family backgrounds, there is more doubt about the student's own unconventional cultural values as a source of recruitment to the New Left. Wood (1974b:84–92) systematically examined this cultural theory of activism, primarily derived from the ideas of Roszak (1969), and found it to be weak among Berkeley students. In simplified terms, "hippies" did not usually emerge as political radicals of the 1960s. Other investigators, however, have seen the unconventional cultural values of the student as sources of recruitment to activism (Flacks 1967, Keniston 1971, Roszak 1969). Nevertheless it was argued that those attached to unconventional cultural values, such as romanticism and humanitarianism, could find other outlets for their values than noninstitutionalized politics (e.g. through artistic endeavors or through institutionalized social reform causes). It is likely that a synthesis of the findings would show that the cultural rebels who engaged in activism translated their cultural views into political terms (Flacks 1970). But certainly not all cultural rebels made this translation, and hence many did not emerge as politically conscious activists. In summary, activism is based more on a student's unconventional political values than on his or her unconventional cultural values.

With regard to the intellectualism and high grade point average of activists, hypothesized by some, there are mixed findings. Earlier reports stated that activists were unusually intellectual with high GPAs (Somers 1965:544, Flacks 1967:55–56, Keniston 1967:117–19). Other studies suggest that activists are closer to average students than was previously believed (Lipset 1972:108–9, Lipset & Altbach 1966:333–34). There may have been a higher relationship between GPA and activism in the earlier phase of the movement than in the later phase; this would be similar to other findings indicating a broadening socioeconomic base of the movement by the late 1960s (Robert H. Somers, personal communication). Nevertheless, it is likely that the intellectual stereotype of activists is more accurate for graduate than undergraduate students (Wood 1974b:90–91).

Some have argued that social alienation (Lipset 1965:5–6) is a source of recruitment to activism. That is, those dislocated from solidary social structures, who are faced with problems of isolation and loneliness, have been seen as recruits to the New Left.

Also those who were raised by permissive parents have been seen as likely recruits to the movement (Flacks 1967, Keniston 1967:120–21). The connection between permissive childrearing practices and activism may be partly explained by religion (Liebman 1974, Lipset 1968:49–50). For example, Jewish students disproportionately have had permissive childrearing experiences and have been activists. Although the empirical studies examining permissiveness are complex, recent data
have indicated only a limited, if any, role for permissive childrearing as a determinant of activism (Braungart 1971).

Similarly, there is only limited support for the social alienation hypothesis. At Berkeley, for example, the most support regards a condition of "objective" social alienation whereby those who live in isolated living arrangements such as apartments are more likely than others to be recruited to activism (Heirich 1971:62–66, 348, 350–51, 410; Lipset 1965:5–6). But at Berkeley those who felt socially alienated were not especially likely recruits to activism, and the relationship between radical ideology and student activism could not be explained away by either objective or subjective social alienation (Wood 1974b:98).

Finally, the structure of the modern multiversity and the structure of the larger society have been seen to greatly aid recruitment to the New Left. There have been two versions of the impact of education on recruitment to the movement. One focuses on the strictly educational deficiencies of the multiversity, and the other associates educational deficiencies and activism with the larger society.

Much has been written about student discontent over educational problems. Ironically, these problems were described in detail by former University of California President, Clark Kerr (1964). The problems include student dissatisfaction over large class size, bureaucratic and impersonal treatment by multiversities, indifferent, research-oriented professors, poor education in the multiversity, and faculty and administration that cannot be trusted with students' welfare.

Some studies have indicated that students with more educational dissatisfaction were likely recruits to the student movement (Dubin & Beisse 1967, Scott & El-Assal 1969, Schwab 1969). Yet Somers (1965, 1969) and Dunlap (1970a) raised serious criticism of this educational dissatisfaction approach. Somers (1965, 1969) found that a great many students at U.C. Berkeley—the prototype of the modern multiversity—were satisfied with their education. Similarly, Wood (1974b:130, 134–36) found that among U.C. Berkeley students, educational criticisms, apart from more radical criticisms of the social system, were not highly associated with recruitment to activism. Thus, a purely educational approach to activism is about as weak as the cultural, permissive childrearing, and social alienation approaches.

There is another approach to activism that includes educational discontents, but ties these discontents into an analysis of the larger society. The New Working Class theory of activism sees the modern multiversity as attached to and dominated by corporate capitalism. As a result, students are seen as exploited and alienated in a Marxist sense. Therefore, students are seen to develop a class consciousness of their exploitation and alienation, and hence to engage in protests against the university and the larger society (e.g. by opposing university complicity with the Vietnam War). Much discussion on the New Working Class has been theoretical, with only occasional illustrations used to support the main ideas (Gintis 1970, Rowntree, no date).

One attempt to empirically test some of the propositions of the theory indicated that the theory could predict ideological tendencies of activists rather well—i.e. activists were likely to be critical of both the educational system and the larger society (Wood 1974b: 134–35). But various problems with documenting the basic
ideas of student alienation and exploitation, as well as dubious assumptions about the fully repressive nature of modern universities, make the New Working Class theory a less convincing theory of activism than the previously discussed theory focusing on the unconventional family backgrounds of activists.

One consequence of the many recruitment studies has been a lack of empirical support for Kornhauser's influential mass society theory. Kornhauser (1959) argued that large-scale processes such as urbanization and industrialization loosened many individuals from solidary social groupings, and that this social alienation and isolation made them available for recruitment to mass movements. Recent literature has generally shown, however, that membership in secondary or even primary groups can facilitate recruitment to political movements that are radical or reformist in nature. Thus Oberschall (1973:106–7, 112–13, 135), Gerlach & Hine (1970:79–97), Pinard (1971:195–219), Freeman (1973: 794–95, 803), Marx (1969), and Orum (1972) reject Kornhauser's position.

The bulk of recent research points to the positive role of secondary organizations in recruitment to radical (or reformist) movements. It is not the absence of these organizations that produces such recruitment. Although Regin & Shover's (1970) mass society analysis of right-wing movements in Southern California is an exception, mass movements do not seem to usually originate among those who are most socially isolated. Instead members of stable organizations—who experience some discontent—are likely to be early recruits. The sophisticated organizer can use existing organizations to build a movement which, only later, appeals to the socially disinherited.

In contrasting rates and types of protests across societies, Kornhauser's argument is more persuasive. He argued that in societies where few secondary organizations mediated between the state and the family or individual, mass and totalitarian movements (i.e. value-oriented movements) were more likely to arise. In comparison, societies like the United States, which have strong networks of secondary organizations such as trade unions, business associations, and recreational groups, were less likely to generate such movements. Instead, protest would be of a more limited (i.e. normative) variety. This is related to Smelser's discussion of societal differentiation as a factor conditioning the type of social movement that emerges.

With regard to the characteristics of black rioters, beyond the obvious finding that they are disproportionately young and male, research suggests that they tend to be representative of the community in which the riot occurs. They are not disproportionately recent migrants, outsiders, or criminals (Fogelson & Hill 1968). It is difficult to generalize beyond this point, given different settings, different types of riot participation, changes in characteristics as the riot develops, and the varied measures that researchers have used (e.g. self reports vs arrest records). A large number of these studies are summarized by Caplan (1970), and the strength of the relationships is generally rather weak (McPhail 1971).

Finally, there have been some outstanding historical studies of recruitment to protest movements. These include works by Rudé (1960, 1964), Tilly (1964), Hobsbawm (1959), Smelser (1959), and Thompson (1964). Although the historical and political context varies from the French Revolution to the French Counterrevolution to English working class protests to "prepolitical" protests, all of these studies
document the role of grievances in recruiting people to social movements. The grievances vary from rising bread prices in France to worker exploitation and the breakup of the traditional family structure in England. As such, they can be considered well-documented examples of real grievances that move people to seek redress through social protest. Hence these social historians emphasize the rational aspects of recruitment to crowd behavior instead of the irrational (in this connection, see Rudé 1964:10–11).

In the above section we have tried to review some of the recent research on recruitment in light of theories of protest. Yet, broad generalizations must be made with care. We usually have studies done on one campus or in one city at one point in time, taking unvalidated reports of protest or attitudes, and using different definitions and operational indicators of protest. Or we have broad national or regional samples devoid of a specific context, considering protest in the abstract. There are different types of protesters [e.g. Lipset & Raab’s (1970) “Joiners, Supporters, Approvers”] protests (e.g. institutionalized and noninstitutionalized forms), and movements. What is true at one stage in a movement’s career may not be true later. For example much of our empirical review of students referred to noninstitutionalized protests. By the time of the Cambodian invasion, literally millions of students were involved in protests—both institutionalized and noninstitutionalized. As a result, the differentials in recruitment patterns were less accentuated during Cambodia.

It would be foolish to look for a Rosetta stone of recruitment that could account for all or most of the variation in differential recruitment. Yet such limitations aside, the field has at least begun quantitative testing of theories of recruitment. This emphasis on quantitative research on recruitment clearly distinguishes the 1960s from prior decades of research on collective behavior.

While we have significantly increased our knowledge about recruitment to social movements, this knowledge has been selective, especially in relation to black rioters and student activists, and appears to be at a point of diminishing returns. The work also has not been as cumulative as possible. Partly because of the wide array of places in which people publish research, partly because of variation in historical contexts and methods, and perhaps partly out of a failure to review much prior research, or because of a narrow commitment to one perspective, all too many recruitment studies do not demonstrate thorough familiarity with past research, nor do they sufficiently develop the implications of their findings for a general body of knowledge.

Beyond becoming more cumulative, future research on recruitment might also try to:

1. Test Klapp’s (1969) argument that social movements represent a “collective search for identity.”
2. Understand differences between those drawn to norm-versus value-oriented movements.
3. Understand differences between those drawn to movements open to everyone, such as the Pentecostals, versus more restricted groups such as the Birch Society.
4. Deal more explicitly with differential appeals for activists in the same group, and see changes over time among types of people recruited to the same movement.

5. Understand differential recruitment to different social movements such as the Women's Liberation Movement, the Civil Rights Movement, the Black Power Movement, and the New Left: all social movements do not draw on a common base of, say, the socially alienated; and we know little about differential recruitment patterns to different branches of the same movement [e.g. the younger women in the Women's Liberation Movement tend to be in more radical women's groups than the older women (Freeman, 1973:795–97)].

6. Further test Lipset & Raab's (1970:23–24) proposition that recruitment to right-wing movements is especially likely among those who feel status strains.

7. Test Gamson's (1968:154–57) idea that, for some groups, those high on political trust and those high on political alienation are likely recruits to social movements.

DYNAMICS, DEVELOPMENT, AND CONSEQUENCES

Work on the internal processes, dynamics, and development of social movements has of necessity been less quantitative, and more speculative, with fewer propositions, than work dealing with static cross-sectional questions such as the characteristics of activists, cities, or universities with protest activities.

Social movements are more dynamic than most other social forms. As such, generalizations are more difficult to make because over a period of time, movements are likely to change significantly. Sects become churches. Successful revolutionaries can become the old guard. A highly solidarity movement may split into factions, whose hatred of each other far exceeds their dislike of those the movement initially saw as the enemy. Reform movements may become increasingly radical as they fail to obtain their goals, and then become reform-oriented again as they face repression and the threat of extinction, or as they get new opportunities for social reform. Spontaneous uprisings may give rise to more planned and organized forms of protest, or occur simultaneously with them. A movement with a strong beginning may simply collapse.

To what extent do movements go through predictable, or at least identifiable, stages of development? The literature is rather better at identifying various stages and possible outcomes that different movements may experience, than at predicting them. In this regard, the natural or life-history approach to social movement phenomena, particularly to revolutions, is one of the oldest (Edwards 1927, Hopper 1950, Brinton 1952).

Hopper, for example, identified four phases of revolutionary movements: 1. the preliminary stage of mass (individual) excitement; 2. the popular stage of crowd (collective) excitement and unrest; 3. the formal stage of formulation of issues and formation of publics; and 4. the institutional stage of legalization and societal organization. He argued that each phase was a prerequisite to the next.

Turner & Killian (1972) suggest that the life-cycle approach can be used to analyze social movements in general, beyond just revolutionary movements. But
they do not argue that any given categorization of the life cycle of social movements, such as Hopper’s, is applicable to all movements. Still, an interesting example of this approach is Lammers’ (1969) comparison of two types of natural history in the development of strikes and mutinies.

Zald & Ash (1966) list three general possibilities of movement development: growth, decay, and change. The first two concepts refer primarily to increases or decreases in membership, but the bulk of their analysis focuses on “change.” Among hypotheses they suggest are:

1. “movements created by other organizations are more likely to go out of existence following success than movements with their own linkages to individual supporters”;
2. “movements with relatively specific goals are more likely to vanish following success than movements with broad general goals”;
3. “movements which aim to change individuals and employ solidary incentives are less likely to vanish than are movements with goals aimed at changing society and employing mainly purposive incentives”;
4. “inclusive organizations are more likely to fade away faster than exclusive organizations; the latter are more likely to take on new goals.”

These are interesting hypotheses and deserve operational specification and empirical testing.

Wilson (1973:359–60), in stressing the dynamic character of social movements, argues that they “cannot therefore continue as such indefinitely.” He suggests that movements either succeed (without disbanding), or reach a “stalemate” (keeping the organizational structure, but not achieving goals), or fail (disband or become a sect).

Wilson uses Parsons’ functional systems-problems of adaptation, goal-attainment, integration, and latency to analyze the development of social movements. From his analysis, propositions can be derived about the success, or about the less studied decline, of movements. In general, the less the movement (treated as a system of action) meets these four functional exigencies, the more it is likely to decline. As an example, the less a movement can retain member commitment to ideology, the more likely it is to lose membership; in this case, the movement would have difficulty with the latency system-problem.

Jackson et al (1960), in an analysis of an incipient tax protest movement that collapsed after an impressive beginning, cite conditions that are the obverse of Parsons’ four conditions of social system survival. They indicate specific circumstances that led to the demise of the movement: a failure of communication, leadership, ideology, and public image. These would be parallel to the systems-problems of integration (communication and public image), goal attainment (leadership), and latency (ideology).

Similarly, Brill (1971) shows how ineffective leadership was important in the failure of a rent strike. In another study, Useem (1973) has shown how strategic failures in recruitment and amorphous membership criteria contributed to the downfall of the draft resistance movement. Finney & McGranahan (1973) show how various failures led to goal displacement in a poor people’s cooperative farm.
Though Smelser rejects a temporally based life-history approach in favor of analytical determinants, his variables can be used to predict movement development and changes. Thus we would predict movement failure when some or all of Smelser's six conditions leading to movement origin are significantly reduced. It has been argued, for example, that the end of the American student movement of the 1960s, as well as of movements of the 1930s, was due to a significant reduction in structural strains, precipitating factors, and mobilization efforts (Wood 1974b:148–50, Messinger 1955). In a similar vein, Statera (1975) argues that a reduction in utopian beliefs was associated with the decline of the European student movement of the 1960s.

Conversely, it is reasonable to argue that movements can be renewed, even after a major decline, as these conditions come to operate at increased levels. The topic of social movement renewal has hardly been studied and is a topic well worthy of research attention. If economic strains increase in the United States, or if there is another war such as Vietnam, it is possible that the student, minority, and working class movements will be rejuvenated.

Beyond decline from repression, from the inability to mobilize, or from inappropriate strategies, movements may change form so as to be almost unrecognizable, as they become institutionalized. One form of institutionalization involves the incorporation of a movement into the existing political and social system. For example, Roth (1963) has analyzed processes by which the Social Democrats of Imperial Germany moved from a smaller Marxist fringe party to an institutionalized member of the German party system. Institutionalization can also refer to the routinization of a movement's activities and to its acceptance by the larger society, as in the change from sect to church.

Organizational and Ideological Changes

Two broad changes that movements may experience over time involve changes of an internal organizational and ideological nature. Whether or not movements go through predictable sequences, they tend to undergo many of the same social processes related to organizational and ideological issues.

Zald & Ash (1966) discuss various internal changes that movements may undergo. Their discussion considerably extends the traditional models of social movement transformation inspired by Weber and Michels, which focused on shifts to more conservative goals, organizational maintenance, and oligarchy. Zald & Ash consider these, but in addition they consider factional splits, increased radicalism, and relations with other social movements. They seek to specify some of the conditions under which alternative movement transformations occur. Among hypotheses offered are:

1. "routinization of charisma is likely to conservatize the dominant core of the movement while simultaneously producing increasingly radical splinter groups";
2. "the more insulated an organization is by exclusive membership requirements and goals aimed at changing individuals, the less susceptible it is to pressure for organizational maintenance or general goal transformation";
3. "the more the ideology of the movement leads to a questioning of the bases of authority, the greater the likelihood of factions and splitting";
4. "exclusive organizations are more likely than inclusive organizations to be beset by schisms."

Zurcher & Curtis (1973), in a study of two local antipornography crusades, found data generally consistent with the Zald-Ash hypotheses. They suggest, however, that in small or emerging movements, organizational leadership orientation, goal specificity, and incentive structure are likely to be particularly important variables. They hypothesize that in such social movements, where the leadership is oriented toward goal diffuseness and solidary incentives, the movement will show the following characteristics: an expressive orientation; charisma; radical tactics; inclusive membership criteria; mergers and coalitions with other social movements; longer duration; susceptibility to pressures for organizational maintenance; goal transformation; an emphasis on person-changing goals; and the lack of a parent organization. In contrast, similar movements, where the leadership is oriented toward goal specificity and purposive incentives, should show opposite characteristics.

Rather than stressing a movement's internal dynamics or relation to its environment as sources of movement transformation, Nelson (1974) notes that the activation of previously latent "premovement factors" can have a divisive effect. He suggests that such factors are most likely to emerge at critical "junctures" in a movement's career. A juncture represents the point at which a movement, having achieved one goal, begins planning to pursue the next goal. He hypothesizes that at this time a movement's receptivity to the effect of premovement factors is increased: if it is characterized more by inclusive than by exclusive membership; the heterogeneity of the membership is greater; the stress is more on societal than on individual transformation; the tendency is more toward group than toward individual recruitment; and the centralization of the leadership and authority structure is less.

In a useful study of the impact of organizational structure on movement dynamics, Rudwick & Meier (1970) have analyzed why, when both CORE and NAACP came under pressure from black power advocates to reorient themselves away from integrationist goals, only the former changed. The NAACP, having a much more formalized and centralized bureaucratic structure and less direct member participation than CORE, was able to resist pressures to adopt a separatist position.

Often related to organizational changes, though analytically distinct, are the ideological changes that movements may undergo. Zald & Ash (1966) hypothesize, contrary to Michels' linking of oligarchy with increased conservatism, that "if a leadership cadre are committed to radical goals to a greater extent than the membership-at-large, member apathy and oligarchial tendencies lead to greater rather than less radicalism."

The Zald & Ash article offers the kind of testable middle-range propositions that the field of collective behavior has generally lacked. It is an interesting commentary on the field that, although the article was published nine years ago and is well known, there has been little in the way of quantitative efforts, using aggregate data across movements, that seek to test the propositions put forth.
Among the most dramatic of ideological shifts are those from a norm- to a value-oriented belief system, or the reverse. Smelser (1963:307–10) argues that when norm-oriented movements are prevented from pursuing normative changes, then a switch to a value-oriented movement can occur. The recent history of segments of major American social movements clearly bears this out. The United States, in spite of its relatively differentiated and democratic social structure, saw the emergence of strident value-oriented movements among a proportion of blacks, students, and women. The general social movements of the New Left, the Black and Third World Movements, and the Women’s Liberation Movement all came to have their radical factions, which called for overthrowing such social systems as capitalism, racism, imperialism, and the family.

Movement literature seeks to explain ideological change in terms of such phenomena as the “cultural crisis of capitalism,” “the role of reactionary male chauvinism,” and “the racism built into all American institutions.” Yet such structural characteristics have existed for a long time, and therefore cannot easily interpret the change from a norm-oriented to a value-oriented focus.

The source of change in each of these movements was the view that authorities had closed off avenues of normative change. Segments of the New Left, the Women’s Liberation Movement, and the Black and Third World Movements at least eventually perceived that avenues for normative change were blocked in American society. Though each movement began as reformist, the movements later developed radical factions opposed to the entirety of American society, or to some major aspect of it.

For example, the New Left initially hoped that major changes in poverty and race relations, and an end to the Vietnam War, would come about rather quickly after organized protest; but they were, of course, disappointed. This was repeated in the Civil Rights Movement, even to the extent that Martin Luther King (1967:1–22) began to wonder if American society would ever achieve racial justice. In the Black Movement there is the interesting case of the Black Panthers, or at least of their founding segment, moving from a reform to a revolutionary to a reform movement in less than a decade. Many Panthers remain committed to revolution, although the group is now engaged in reform activities. Similarly, in the Women’s Liberation Movement many younger women, previously involved in New Left activities, felt that men in the New Left would never give up their positions of power (Thorne 1972, Freeman 1973:800–2, Congressional Quarterly Inc. 1973:8–10). Such women went beyond the moderate reformism of the National Organization for Women (NOW) to positions such as radical feminism (Hole & Levine 1971:143, Koedt, Levine, & Rapone 1973, Carden 1974:47–56, Deckard, forthcoming).

Our discussion thus far has enumerated some of the broad stages and specific changes that movements may experience. To an important extent these are determined by factors such as social control, tactics and recruitment, relation to other movements, interest groups and publics, and effectiveness in attaining goals. These factors are of course often highly interrelated in complex ways. It is to these issues that we now turn.
Social Control

One of the most important issues stressed in collective behavior research in the last decade has been the need to view social movements in their environmental contexts. An important part of this environment has to do with the social control apparatus of the state. As has often been noted, the state can be a crucial determinant of the type, and even of the occurrence, of social movements. But here our concern is with the effect of social control on social movement development, size, and consequences. Agents of social control can serve to contain, prolong, alter, or repress movements.


In an interesting study, Smith (1968) has shown how police response to adolescent beach crowds contributed to crowd conventionalization. The crowd is permitted to put up expressive resistance, which police accept, in exchange for a minimum degree of public order. He hypothesizes that crowd conventionalization is most probable when there is a strong public reaction to the expression of unrest and when unrest has very generalized sources.

The career of a social movement can often be usefully approached from a standpoint of social control interactions. The Black Panthers are a good example. They started as a local reform-oriented, self-defense group, but became increasingly radical. The movement's radical development was in part a function of the personality and attitudes of leaders and members, and of the general position of blacks in American society. But more importantly, the police helped make true their original assessment of the Panthers as a violent revolutionary group. The killing of Panthers by police, raids on their offices, surveillance, denial of basic civil liberties, general harrassment, stigmatization by political leaders, and use of undercover agents (the FBI, with agents on both sides, apparently played an important role in the split between the Huey Newton and Eldridge Cleaver factions of the Panthers) gave the Panthers little choice but to become what they were labeled. Helmreich (1973) offers a case study of the short unhappy life of another black group which started with broad reformist goals, but could not get beyond police definitions and actions that treated them as violent revolutionaries.

Studies of police behavior in riots have shown how police may be subject to the same crowd processes as rioters (Marx 1970a, Stark 1972). The particular twists and turns of a given crowd incident have an emergent quality which cannot be very well predicted by a consideration of static structural variables such as the income gap between two groups. Rather, interaction within and between protesters and social control agents must be considered.
An examination of police behavior in American racial riots from 1900 to 1967 indicates a number of ways that police behavior helped to create collective behavior rather than to control it. Such behavior could be organized into categories of (a) inappropriate control strategies, (b) lack of coordination among and within various control units, and (c) the breakdown of police organization. It is hypothesized that the breakdown of police organization, the excessive use of force, and the "police riot" were related to such factors as the extent to which police disagreed with or were threatened and offended by the issues raised by protesters, how organizationally removed the control force was, the use of police officers who did not share the religious, racial, ethnic and/or regional origins of the rioting community, the extent of injuries and provocation faced by the police, the size and stage of the riot, the strength of leadership from civil authorities, the clarity of orders stressing restraint, the tightness of the command structure and whether or not high level officers were on the scene, whether or not it was made clear to police that they would be punished for misbehavior, and whether or not police expected disturbance participants to be sufficiently punished by the legal system (Marx 1970a).

One facet of social control about which little is known is the role that "agents provocateurs" and informants may play. There has been some work of an ethnographic nature, but for obvious reasons of access, little systematic data collection (Donner 1971; Marx 1974; Karmen, forthcoming).

The range of consequences which a theory of the agent provocateur must account for can be suggested, even if such a theory is now lacking. Agents provocateurs can have varied consequences: they may help perpetuate or strengthen a movement by offering resources and moral support; organizations may profit from dramatic protests that agents inspire; the discovery of an agent may help to reduce the legitimacy of the government; the repression that the agent helps produce may create martyrs and call attention to the group.

Yet the negative effects of agents are likely to be more damaging. Perpetuation of the myth of the agent and the discovery of agents can lead to feelings of demoralization and paranoia. The agent, if not discovered, can create internal divisiveness and self-defeating lines of action. A democratic form of organization may be impossible. Agents can help stigmatize a movement as being violent, alienate it from its potential constituency, and focus attention away from the basic issues. The agent can entrap or frame a movement's leaders, and can produce a reorientation of a movement's resources into security, self-defense, and legal needs, even when activists are not convicted.

Wilson (1974) argues that criminalization (the labeling and treating of protest actions as deviant by formal agents of social control) can have an important effect on the bargaining, persuasion, and coercion that goes on between a social movement and its target group (the group it is trying to defeat or win over). He suggests a number of hypotheses regarding the effects of social control on individual attitudes, mobilization, and changes in movement goals and organization. For example: 1. violence of social control agents is likely to increase support of the movement by both activists and by sympathetic bystanders; 2. the more completely criminalization separates political goals from deviant acts, the less the likelihood of mobiliza-
tion; 3. the closer the identification of target group and social control agents during criminalization, the more radicalization is increased; 4. the more criminalization, the less moderate support and/or potentially supportive elites; 5. the greater the criminalization, the lower the integration of the movement; 6. the more movements are open, and lacking in centralized policy-making machinery, formal structure, and opportunities for the release of emotional tensions, the more damaging the effects of social control efforts. These are interesting hypotheses that should be empirically tested.

Thus the relationship between social control and social movement development and decline is indeed complex. What is clear, nevertheless, is that no linear relation exists between social control and social movement development or decline. Under certain conditions, agents of control can successfully dissipate a movement. But we have also seen where social control agents obviously contributed to movement growth and even to attainment of goals. As such, this crucial relationship between social control and social movement development or decline should be the focus of future research.

Strategies of Movement Growth and Development

Recruitment of new members is the most visible and commonly treated indicator of movement growth. However, growth should probably be defined more broadly in terms of a movement's strength as measured in various ways—such as number of adherents, degree of their commitment, power and prestige of adherents, financial resources of the movement, support (or at least lack of opposition) of various noninvolved publics, interest groups and other movements, ability to influence key decision-makers or media, and quality of the organizational structure. The strength of a movement at any given point in time is a composite of variables such as the above, and they do not necessarily all move simultaneously in the same direction (e.g. mass membership could be in opposition to tightness of organizational structure). Thus many other factors besides recruitment indicate movement growth.

Nevertheless, recruitment of members is important to movement growth and development. Among recruitment strategies considered by Wilson (1973: 167–93) are involvement via friends or relatives, attendance at public meetings, approaches at the doorstep or place of work, uses of the mass media, and circulation of movement literature. These can be aimed at selective audiences or they can be broad appeals to the larger society in general. Wilson, in using a classification scheme similar to Etzioni's (1968:369), sees three general types of recruitment: normative (relying on moral obligations), utilitarian (payments), and coercive (physical force). He hypothesizes that only the development of commitment can keep a member's long-term involvement in the movement. Kanter (1972), in a study of utopian communities, has enumerated a number of commitment mechanisms that can be applied to other types of movements.

There are few hypotheses from the social movement literature about the relative impact of different recruitment strategies in different contexts, on different kinds of people, and for the many kinds of possible movement participation. Yet as movements become more "professional" it is likely that techniques from marketing
research and mass persuasion will be increasingly drawn upon, as they are now in political campaigns. The same techniques that have sold deodorant may also sell social movements, if other conducive factors are present.

The way the larger society responds to a social movement influences its choice of strategies. Turner (1969a:827) suggests that the response of the dominant public will partly be conditioned by whether the social movement's activities are seen as legitimate protest or illegal disruption. He lists five possible reactions of the dominant group to the protest group: 1. to ignore or depreciate the conflict; 2. to suppress it; 3. to join the protest, at least symbolically; 4. to conciliate 5. to surrender (which he omits as a viable choice) (Turner 1969a:819).

With respect to conditions that produce—or fail to produce—the social perception of protest when disturbances occur, Turner hypothesizes that 1. the more a disturbance is credible as a protest, the more it will be perceived as a protest; 2. the more a disturbance has elements both of appeal and of threat, the more it will be viewed as a protest; 3. the more a disturbance is an aspect of conciliation, the more it will be viewed as a protest; 4. when groups are trying to form coalitions, a protest definition is likely; 5. when official agencies wish to bargain, they are likely to view disturbances as protests and validate a public definition of protests. Altheide & Gilmore (1972) derived and tested propositions related to the credibility of protest, and found support for all but one derived proposition.

One relatively unstudied issue in a movement's development is its relation to other movements, interest groups, and counter-movements (Heberle 1951, Turner & Killian 1972, Cameron 1966). The Civil Rights Movement, for example, was able at times to form effective coalitions (such as COFO) among its various branches, as well as to gain the support of many labor unions and religious groups. Future research might well focus on the different organizations' goals, tactics, material resources, broader values, and political styles as they affect attempts at coalition formation, mergers, cooperation, competition, and factionalism. There is a relevant literature from political science and economics that could be usefully drawn upon, such as work by Olson (1965), Riker (1962), Schattschneider (1960), Downs (1957), Boulding (1962), and Tullock & Buchanan (1962).

One interesting hypothesis is that a synchronization among the more and less radical factions of the same general social movement is conducive to gaining limited reforms (Walker 1963). The extreme statements and actions of the radical factions may make the demands of the moderate groups more acceptable. Yet there is likely to be a delicate balance involved. Too strident, or powerful, a radical group may lead to backlash and repression by the dominant group, and to attention being focused away from the normative changes sought by the moderates.

On the other hand, factions within a general social movement may have to compete with each other for a limited, or contracting membership base. Hypotheses drawing on an ecological perspective might be developed about the size of the potential membership pool required to sustain a given number of movements or factions.

Turner (1973) has discussed determinants of movement strategies, classified as bargaining, coercion, and persuasion. At this point in the development of collective
behavior theory, we are in a better position to classify such strategies and discuss their determinants than to predict their consequences. Movement strategies as related to movement growth and success are rather indeterminant. This results partly from a lack of systematic study, partly from the historical uniqueness of each situation, and partly from the fact that what happens to a social movement may be only slightly related to its strategies (political shifts at a higher level may operate to favor or disfavor it, crucial tactical errors by authorities may aide it, etc).

While it can be costly and requires courage, the effort to nonviolently provoke attack on one's group by authorities has often been an effective tactic, when the group is seeking goals consistent with broader societal values. A major factor in the seemingly greater effectiveness of the black civil rights protest in the South than in the North lies in the fact that nonviolent protest strategies were used in the South in such a manner as to implicate police as the aggressors and to create martyrs (Hubbard 1968, King 1958). More generally, Sharp (1973) has examined the effects of nonviolent protest in a wide variety of contexts, and indicates various benefits to the protesters.

There is often an inherent changeability of tactics and strategies as movements develop over time. Some movements seem guided by a trial and error method rather than by a fixed set of principles. There are few studies that try to link types of strategies with types of outcomes, although Safilios-Rothschild (1974) has attempted to do so for the women's movement. But there remains a clear need for organizing principles and hypotheses concerning the impact of general types of strategies on various dimensions of social movement growth and success.

Consequences

Given the variety of places that one can look, the extreme difficulty in most cases in determining causal relations, and the long time periods that may be involved, most statements about the consequences of social movements are primarily descriptive or taxonomic. The systematic study of social movement consequences is much less developed than that of the prior conditions that give rise to movements.

Although he had less than eight years to assess the effects of the Russian Revolution, Sorokin's *The Sociology of Revolution* (1925) offers a classic model for research on the impact of social movements on change. Sorokin attempts to see the effect that revolutionary movements have on a wide variety of social and personal phenomena. He attempts to assess the impact of revolutions on factors such as patterns of speech, property ownership, poverty and wealth, sexual activity, work activity, authority relationships, crime rates, execution rates, religious activity and belief, economic, psychological, and demographic patterns, family relationships and structure, political relations between social classes, relations between political parties, civil and political liberties, education, valuation of the dollar, productiveness of the food supply, and the nature of ideology. In short, he tries to assess the impact of revolution on essentially all important phases of life in a society.

Sorokin examines various impacts in light of two phases of the revolution. The first corresponds to the initial period of revolutionary take-over; the second refers to a phase of "reaction" whereby the revolutionary government stabilizes its control.
These distinctions, as well as Sorokin's attempt to get quantitative data on various changes, make it a study worth repeating on other populations.

Greer (1949) has examined the specific demands of a number of American social movements, and the extent to which the demands were institutionalized over a long period of time. For example, the National Labor Union called for an eight-hour day in 1866 and two years later this was instituted for government employees; but it was not until 72 years later (1938) that the eight-hour day became federal law.

In 1867 the National Grange demanded railway regulation, a Department of Agriculture, and cooperative farm marketing associations (Greer, 1949:282). Railway regulation actually came about in 1887, the Department of Agriculture was created in 1889, and cooperatives received exemption from antitrust laws in 1922.

He also considers movement demands that were not met, such as the International Workingmen's Association's call for the overthrow of capitalism. In addition, he discusses reforms that took place independently of social movements, such as the Gold Reserve Act of 1934.

In successful cases, Greer does not argue that movements as such necessarily were the main causal factors, but he feels they have at least hastened many changes. Causal problems aside, his approach is useful, and points out the need for a long-range perspective in considering the consequences of social movements.

Ash (1972) has summarized the goals of various movements and discusses their successes and failures. For example, she shows that the American Federation of Labor, consciously working within the capitalist system, achieved better hours, wages, and collective bargaining for skilled workmen. Her analysis is imaginative in its attempt to specify the social class factors influencing the success and failure of many American movements.

Marx (1970d), in analyzing riot consequences in cities studied by the Kerner Commission, uses a typology that emerges from combining two dimensions: degree of racial polarization and degree of change beneficial to blacks. Where a city fell on the typology is related to the size of the disturbance and the preriot racial climate. Cities with a maximum of change and a minimum of polarization were those with medium-sized riots and a relatively liberal racial climate. In addition, Anderson (1973) has shown how riots triggered internal changes in black communities.

Gamson (1974) discusses various American reform movements from 1800 to 1945 in terms of their success or failure, with particular concern for the consequences of violent tactics. He drew a sample of movements and provided operational definitions. He notes that violence users (with the exception of revolutionary groups that aim to displace their opposition) were successful in winning new advantages, and that violence recipients were unsuccessful. He also notes, however, that most successful groups had no violence in their history. In a recently published book, Gamson (1975) develops these and related themes.

Finally, Jackson (1973) examines the impact of a specific social movement strategy—that of Affirmative Action—on occupational mobility rates in sociology. Affirmative Action has been backed by women's and Third World groups. Jackson finds only modest gains for women and few for ethnic minorities. This type of study should be expanded to other occupations to gauge social movement impact on occupational changes.
Among some hypotheses that could be tested are:

1. Reform movements are more likely to succeed when they gain the support of political and economic elites (Ash 1972:231, Turner & Killian 1972, Oberschall 1973:206–7).

2. A reform movement will affect lasting changes to the extent that (a) vested interests are involved in the changes, and (b) it can offer society something to bargain with (Turner & Killian 1972).

3. The less a movement challenges basic political-economic values and interests, the more likely it will be to succeed (Ash 1972:12).

4. At the level of the individual, social movements can (a) satisfy the need for security, (b) offer an identity, (c) help individuals find meaning in their lives (Milgram & Toch 1969, Klapp 1969, 1972).

5. When no movement for the discontented exists, the likelihood of riots increases.

6. For angry crowds to produce lasting effects on society, in contrast to extracting only short-term concessions, the groups must develop an ideology (Turner & Killian 1972:420).

7. The less formally organized a radical or conspiratorial social movement is, the more likely it is to survive (Gerlach 1971:834).

In considering the consequences of protest actions by American racial minorities, Marx (1971) suggests a number of factors which may have more general applicability. He suggests that the challenges of relatively powerless groups are more likely to meet with success to the extent that:

1. Their demands can be seen as consistent with the broader values of the society.

2. They can gain the support of more powerful third parties and/or show how their demands will benefit other groups as well.

3. Their demands are concrete and focused.

4. They can clearly fix responsibility for the situation they are protesting (e.g. protesting against an urban renewal project as compared to protesting over inadequate housing).

5. Pressure is brought to bear on the responsible party, and there is minimum discomfort to those not responsible.

6. They adopt new techniques which authorities have not had experience in dealing with.

7. Neutral third parties are present who have an interest in restoring harmony.

8. The powerless group is willing to negotiate, and its demands do not have a zero-sum quality.

9. Their demands involve a request for acceptance of social diversity, equal treatment, or inclusion, rather than domination over, or change in the practices of, the dominant group towards itself, or fundamental redistributions of income and power.

10. The powerless group seeks to veto a proposed policy rather than to see a new policy implemented.

11. The minority population is large enough to organize itself for conflict but not large enough to be perceived as a serious threat to the dominant group.
A number of other topics could profit from systematic study. One broad problem noted in the literature concerns when social movements can be viewed as causes of social change and when they can be viewed as effects of social change. It can be argued both ways (e.g. Gusfield 1970a, Smelser 1959, 1974, Oberschall 1973). Jackson (1969) offers a useful summary of diverse views on the topic, and he indicates that there is little agreement.

There is no necessary incompatibility between seeing social movements as causes and effects of change. At one point in time broad change can give rise to social movements, which may then help generate additional specific changes (e.g. the change from feudalism to capitalism—i.e. the industrial revolution—could be seen as a cause of the working class movement, but this social movement has generated various changes in the structure of industrial society such as improving wages and working conditions for laborers).

Another unstudied consequence of social movements is the diffusion of protest models. There are spin-off effects where one movement that gains prominence sets an example and serves to inspire others. For instance, the effect that the labor movement of the 1930s and the Indian Independence movement had on the Civil Rights Movement could be studied, as could the latter's effect on the more recent anti-civil rights, student, antiwar, feminist, gay liberation, and ecology movements. Howard (1974) discusses this topic to some extent.

Another idea, from Durkheim and Simmel, could, with imagination, be quantitatively assessed: collective behavior, by permitting tensions to be released and by testing the group's commitment to the value system, can unify and stabilize a group by attacking—and defending—the values of the system or attacking other values (Turner & Killian 1972:424–25).

In summary, the topics of dynamics and effects of social movements are surprisingly understudied. Yet their significance calls for more empirical studies, which could draw upon a few classic models discussed here, as well as on the many theoretical propositions we have enumerated.

SMELSER'S THEORY IN LIGHT OF A DECADE'S RESEARCH

Any assessment of the field of collective behavior must consider the theory put forth and elaborated by Smelser (1963). His work has probably inspired more research in the last decade than any other single approach. Into a loosely organized field which was dominated by social-psychological and even psychological theories, Smelser introduced a more sociological approach to collective behavior. Where there was previously little systematic analysis, Smelser introduced a highly systematic and broad, yet parsimonious, schema, in between middle-range theories and entire systems analysis. A perspective on collective behavior over the last decade may be achieved by considering the current state of Smelser's theory in light of some of the empirical and theoretical developments of recent years.

There have been various attempts to empirically apply and test Smelser's approach. In a very impressive study, Pinard (1971) used much of Smelser's framework to help analyze the rise of a right-wing political party in Canada. Overall,
Pinard's study shows the usefulness of Smelser's theory, although Pinard also brought in supplemental concepts. Quarantelli & Hundley (1969), in analyzing a riot, found four of Smelser's six conditions present, although they did not find evidence of the type of belief and mobilization that Smelser would predict.

Furthermore, in analyzing an antipornography movement, Zurcher et al (1971) used, and tended to verify, Smelser's theory. Smelser (1974) himself used part of his theory to explain conflict in California higher education. Also, in an intriguing study, Kerckhoff & Back (1968) used the theory to analyze an example of hysterical contagion—the widespread imagining of being bitten by an insect in June when no such poisonous insect existed. Similarly to Pinard, they used quantitative data with regard to many of the basic concepts. Also, two analyses of the Kent State crisis tend to verify the approach (Rudwick & Meier 1972, Lewis 1972). Finally, Smelser's theory has been used to analyze the development, decline, and possible renewal of the New Left in general (Wood 1974a:22–48, 1974b:143–51).

While most of the above represent efforts to apply the theory rather than to rigidly test it, the theory has clearly been useful in ordering and helping to understand collective behavior phenomena. It calls attention to six crucial variables, hypothesizes that they must be present if collective behavior is to occur, and states that when they are present, collective behavior will occur (i.e. Smelser's six conditions are necessary conditions of collective behavior, that when combined, constitute a sufficient condition of collective behavior). Finally, there have been a few conscious tests of the theory, which indicated possible modifications in such categories as generalized beliefs (Stallings 1973, Quarantelli & Hundley 1969).

**Generalized Beliefs**

In fact, among the most prominent criticisms of Smelser's theory are those related to generalized beliefs. Smelser has been accused of focusing on exaggerated, irrational, and unrealistic beliefs (Currie & Skolnick 1970, Oberschall 1973:22–23, Brown & Goldin 1973:21–24), and he has responded to such criticisms (Smelser 1970). The issue of rationality of beliefs aside, collective behavior in the form of a hostile outburst is defined by Smelser in terms of a generalized belief, which is one of the very factors then drawn upon to explain the existence of collective behavior. Yet it has been argued that certain types of expressive crowd behavior such as riots in victory can occur without a generalized belief (Marx 1970b).

Smelser's discussion of generalized beliefs has also been criticized for insufficiently dealing with heterogeneity of beliefs among, and within, the rank and file and the leaders. He argues that generalized beliefs "create a 'common culture' within which leadership, mobilization, and concerted action can take place" (Smelser 1963:82). Furthermore, he suggests that "this principle (is) readily observable in the ideological indoctrination of political and religious movements ..." (Smelser 1963:82). When citing beliefs of specific movements, such as the Townsend or Technocracy movements, Smelser cites studies of movement ideologies, or statements from the movement's literature, rather than data on the beliefs of the rank and file. The use of general statements of movement ideologies seems to imply that most, if not all, of the participants share these generalized beliefs.
Yet as we have noted there is usually appreciable variation among and between
the rank and file and the leaders. There is a need to more carefully analyze the
interrelations of beliefs. The variation of beliefs also makes more problematic the
immediate classification of a movement as value- or norm-oriented.
A number of modifications of the concept of generalized belief might usefully be
made:

1. The norm-value distinction must be applied separately to different factions within
   a general social movement, to the extent that such factions exist.
2. The norm-value distinction must be supplemented by the recognition that a given
   movement, or even a faction in the movement, can be simultaneously character-
   ized by its desire to change norms and values.
3. Recognition must be given to the fact that certain kinds of collective behavior
   can occur without the presence of a generalized belief that interprets strains;
   attention must be given to analyzing situations where beliefs play a more or less
   important role.
4. Generalized beliefs can be classified with respect to the degree to which they are
   exaggerated and irrational, as against realistic and rational, and the correlates of
   various types of beliefs should be examined.

Structural Conduciveness

Smelser argues that societies whose institutions are highly differentiated are likely
to experience norm-oriented movements, whereas societies whose institutions are
less differentiated are likely to experience value-oriented movements. In differenti-
tated societies there is the "structural possibility of demanding normative change
alone" (Smelser 1963:278). In contrast, in less differentiated societies, normative
change is discouraged; therefore if a movement emerges, it is likely to be a more
basic, value-oriented movement.

What has the literature said about the condition of structural conduciveness? By
and large the literature has agreed with Smelser on the role of differentiation in
producing norm-versus value-oriented movements. For example, Oberschall
(1973:47–48) and Gurr (1970:274) argue that authoritarian (i.e. less differentiated)
societies are more likely than democratic societies to generate radical movements.
(For our purposes, an authoritarian regime does not permit political protests,
whereas a democratic regime does.) Oberschall (1973:47–48) points out that Hun-
gary experienced an attempted revolution because more moderate civil liberties
gains were difficult to obtain within the existing system. In authoritarian regimes
conflict is less likely to occur than in democratic regimes, but the conflict will be
more intense when it occurs (Coser 1956, 1967).

The concept of a social structure permissive of collective behavior is potentially
useful but also ambiguous. On one hand, the term points to situations where
collective behavior is possible as opposed to impossible (or highly unlikely). For
example, it is necessary to have a fluid money market for there to be an "economic
crash" like the 1929 depression; traditional societies where barter is the main mode
of exchange would be most unlikely to have a depression.
However, the term *permissiveness* can also be tautological when used to analyze collective behavior. Smelser offers somewhat different examples of social arrangements that are similarly conducive to collective behavior. For example, strong governmental control against protests is seen to facilitate value-oriented movements (Smelser 1963:324–37). However, strong governmental control plus governmental ineffectiveness is also seen to facilitate value-oriented movements (Smelser 1963:364–79). Although both conditions may well be conducive to value-oriented movements, the concept of a permissive social structure does not guide us to choose between the two situations of governmental control—or indicate that both situations are of equal importance to value-oriented movements.

Clearly, the concept must be better operationalized if it is to help predict collective behavior. A good operational definition for structural conduciveness regarding social movements must empirically indicate the extent of independence or differentiation among major social institutions. This is certainly consistent with Smelser's usage of the term.

**Precipitating Factors**

The literature has produced various examples that serve to illustrate Smelser's (1963) initial formulation of the role of precipitating factors in collective behavior. Tilly (1964:4) has shown how the French revolutionary government's call for 300,000 men "to meet the menace on France's frontiers" was a focal issue for the developing tension in the Vendée region of France and that it triggered the counter-revolution. Similarly, Rudé (1960:21–26) showed how the sudden increase in bread prices in France just prior to the revolution ignited popular riots. Heirich (1971:91–186) shows the arrest of Jack Weinberg as the focal point crystallizing the tension that arose between students and the Berkeley administration, and that culminated in the Free Speech Movement of 1964. In her analysis of the Women's Liberation Movement, Freeman (1973:794–95) shows how a crisis, or leaders using rudimentary organizations, can serve as precipitants to develop a group actively fighting for women's rights.

There have also been some elaborations of the concept. Milgram & Toch (1969:602) suggest that precipitating factors for crowds may differ from those for social movements. Precipitants for crowds are specific, whereas precipitants for social movements may be more gradual. Oberschall notes that once precipitating incidents occur, or once a protest movement has shown signs of initial success, protest actions may break out in other parts of the social system; hence a protest at one point in the system could be a precipitating factor for protests in other parts of the system (Oberschall 1973:298). As the topic of precipitating factors did not receive great conceptual attention in the past decade, there is a need for more systematic study and classification of types of precipitants and their consequences.

In giving "additional thoughts" to the study of collective behavior with respect to the Kent State crisis, Smelser suggests that precipitating factors should be eliminated from the analysis of collective behavior. He argues that "many of the instances of 'precipitating factors' I gave were nothing more than sudden intensification of one of the other determinants" (e.g. "the sudden imposition of strain") (Smelser
1972:101). He feels that this determinant was a way of "re-introducing the variable of 'time' into an essentially analytic model" (Smelser 1972:101). Yet in eliminating this factor to strengthen the nontemporal nature of the model, something is clearly sacrificed. Some concept is needed to deal with "the occurrence of a dramatic incident that represents 'evidence' that the forces posited in the generalized belief system are in fact at work . . ." (Smelser 1972:101). In addition, the mere fact that Smelser discusses precipitating factors in terms of other determinants of collective behavior does not necessarily reduce it to the other determinants. Brown & Goldin (1973:15) point out that Smelser often discusses determinants in terms of each other (e.g. a given strain must be within the realm of a given conducive structure in order for the strain to be implicated in collective behavior). Thus we suggest retaining the concept of the precipitating factor.

The Psychological Level

In developing a sociological theory of collective behavior Smelser tended to ignore the psychological level. It was not clear how the more or less "objective" external social structural conditions (strain, conduciveness, social control) related to the perceptions of the individual. This problem of bridging the gap between social conditions and individual perceptions haunts sociological inquiry in general. This is particularly true for the study of social movements where oppressive social conditions are thought to generate individual indignation. This certainly does happen, but not automatically.

Psychological conditions parallel to Smelser's social conditions of collective behavior may also be noted (Brown 1965). Stating parallel psychological conditions, however, does not show how social conditions get translated into psychological perceptions.

In a later essay Smelser (1968) added a psychological dimension to his sociological conditions of collective behavior. While this expansion of the theory makes it inclusive of a crucial level of analysis that had been more or less neglected before, it also makes the theory more complex and less determinate. Hopefully we see the beginning of greater integration between structural and social psychological approaches. Wood (1974a) offers an attempt to use this synthesis.

With the addition of the psychological determinants the necessary and sufficient conditions of collective behavior now are:

1. Structural conduciveness, or the permissiveness of social arrangements and personality systems to generate collective behavior.

2. Structural strain, or the existence of ambiguities, deprivations, tensions, conflicts, and discrepancies in the social order. From the standpoint of the individual, structural strain refers to perceived ambiguities, deprivations, tensions, conflicts, and discrepancies.

3. Growth and spread of generalized beliefs, or the existence in the population of beliefs that identify the source of strain, attribute certain characteristics to the source, and specify certain responses to the potential participants. From the standpoint of the individual, this determinant refers to the person being readied for action by attachment to these social beliefs.
4. Precipitating factors, or the occurrence of some type of specific event that gives the generalized beliefs concrete substance. From the standpoint of the individual, this determinant refers to the individual perceiving this event as a threat to cherished norms or values.

5. Mobilization of participants for action, or the organization of the effected group into action. From the standpoint of the individual, this determinant refers to the availability of the individual for recruitment into the activity.

6. The ineffective operation of control, or the ineffectiveness of the social counter-determinants that prevent, interrupt, or inhibit the accumulation of the other five determinants of collective behavior. From the standpoint of the individual, this determinant refers to the lessening of personal controls, for example, because the actions are viewed as "morally correct." In addition, the combination of harshness and weakness by authorities aggravates instances of collective behavior.

Although the six conditions of collective behavior have stimulated much discussion and research, these conditions are not well operationalized. For example, how are we to know when a given strain will influence an occurrence of collective behavior? All societies always have a certain amount of strain, but collective behavior is not continually in existence. Smelser would argue that for a given strain to influence collective behavior, it must fit within the realm of a conducive social structure, and it must combine with the other determinants of collective behavior. Even when these arguments are granted, however, we are still left with the problem of specifying how much strain needs to exist before it helps generate collective behavior. Thus future work on Smelser's theory should develop better operational definitions of the social and psychological dimensions of the six determinants of collective behavior.

Methods and Concepts

The methodology in Theory of Collective Behavior, that of systematic comparative illustration, did not emphasize quantitative scales to measure the main concepts. Smelser relied on others' studies, and most results cited are not quantitative. Furthermore, the range of studies cited precludes using the same units for easy quantitative comparisons. Hence, Smelser could point to the existence of some level of strain (or of beliefs, precipitating factors, etc), but could not easily say how much strain, etc, existed. He showed cases where several of the six conditions occurred together, but where there was no collective behavior, because the other necessary conditions were lacking. His illustrations all support his ideas. We are offered no negative cases where all the determinants were present yet no collective behavior occurred, or where only a few determinants were present and collective behavior occurred.

Were quantitative scales developed for the concepts, more specific testing, rather than citation of illustrations, would be possible. Such scales would help meet a persisting criticism of Smelser's theory: that it is not predictive or falsifiable.

There is a conceptual problem in Smelser's deriving a typology of collective behavior from the components of social action. One of his major arguments is that four components of action generate five types of collective behavior. That is, when there is strain with regard to a specific component of action, we can predict a specific
type of collective behavior, provided the other determinants of collective behavior are also operative. The four components of action are:

1. values, or the desirable ends which guide any human endeavor;
2. norms, or the more specific rules of conduct which guide action;
3. mobilization of motivation into organized action, or motivation of the agents who will pursue the desired ends and follow the rules;
4. situational facilities, or "the means and obstacles which facilitate or hinder the attainment of concrete goals in the role or organizational context" (Smelser 1963:28). The main types of collective behavior are the panic, the craze, the hostile outburst, the norm-oriented movement, and the value-oriented movement.

Although Smelser (1963:9) says that the types of collective behavior are derived from the components of action, only two of the types of collective behavior clearly correspond to the components of action—the norm-oriented movement and the value-oriented movement. Smelser stretches his argument when he says the panic or craze is generated from the component of situational facilities. There are two types of collective behavior derived here, but only one type in the other cases. Furthermore, other forms of collective behavior also involve facilities. Similarly, Smelser stretches the point when he says that the hostile outburst comes from "action mobilized on the basis of a belief . . . assigning the responsibility for an undesirable state of affairs to some agent" (Smelser 1963:9). Here Smelser is trying to include the term mobilization for action in both the component and the type of collective behavior. But the notion of action mobilized against some agent could also include norm-oriented movements and value-oriented movements, rather than just the hostile outburst.

Also questions can be raised about how distinct the types of collective behavior necessarily are. For example, Smelser analyzes hostile outbursts (such as racial violence) as distinct from either norm- or value-oriented movements. For some purposes this is adequate, but for others, riots can be very much a part of social movements.

There is also inconsistency in Smelser's treatment of the time-ordering of the six conditions of collective behavior. At some points he suggests that a definite time-ordering of the conditions must occur, with the time-order being: structural conduciveness, strain, growth and spread of generalized beliefs, precipitating factors, mobilization of participants for action, and breakdown of social control (Smelser 1963:15–16). At other points, however, he says that there must only be analytical time-ordering, not empirical time-ordering. Thus strain could actually appear before conduciveness in the latter formulation. Analytical time-ordering seems to represent Smelser's basic position, and it is the stronger formulation.

Finally, Smelser is not entirely clear about which of the six conditions of collective behavior are involved in producing norm-oriented versus value-oriented movements. On one hand, there is the implication that differences exist for each of the six conditions as they relate to norm- versus value-oriented movements. But on closer inspection, only three of Smelser's six conditions distinguish between the movements.
The three conditions that distinguish norm- from value-oriented movements are structural conduciveness, generalized beliefs, and social control. With respect to structural conduciveness, the more the structural differentiation, the greater the chance of a norm-oriented movement. Normative and value-oriented beliefs are associated with their respective types of movement. Finally, social control distinguishes the movements because authorities can influence the type of movement likely to ensue (i.e. when authorities permit norm-oriented movements to exist, the movements tend to remain norm-oriented and not to become value-oriented—and vice-versa).

But the other three conditions—structural strain, precipitating factors, and mobilization for action—do not distinguish the movements, and therefore cannot be used to predict the occurrence of a norm-oriented movement as opposed to value-oriented movement. All the conditions are necessary for some kind of movement to occur, but only three of the six conditions predict one movement rather than the other.

In spite of these criticisms, Smelser offers a comprehensive and systematic approach to collective behavior, and his theory clearly remains a useful guide for understanding collective episodes. He has located the key conditions leading to the development of collective behavior, and he has put these conditions into a perspective that transcends previous middle-range theorizing. Smelser's theory—and the various empirical studies supporting it—shows that just discontents, or just radical beliefs, or just sophisticated leaders, etc, are not sufficient circumstances to generate collective behavior. All six conditions in his value-added theory must be simultaneously operating at high levels of intensity for collective behavior to occur. This insight is probably Smelser's single most important theoretical contribution to understanding collective behavior.

CONCLUSION

Where does the field of collective behavior stand today, relative to where it stood 10 or 15 years ago? Taking earlier reviews as a point of departure—Blumer (1939, 1951, 1957), Brown (1954), Killian (1964), Turner (1964a), Gusfield (1968), Heberle (1968), Lang & Lang (1968), and Milgram & Toch (1969)—continuity, as well as a number of changes, can be seen.

With respect to the sheer quantity and diversity of material, we have had much more to choose from than other reviewers. The field is richer with respect to case studies and descriptions. For example, there is a great deal of factual and interpretive material available on the civil rights and student movements. Sociologists do not have to rely, to the extent they once did, on journalists, historians, or anthropologists for their case study materials. We know more now about historical and comparative instances of collective behavior. Much more quantitative data is available on the characteristics of people and places involved in collective behavior, if not often on the behavior as such. The field has continued in its eclectic nature and has more explicitly incorporated ideas from other disciplines. In addition, there has been, if not a breakdown in roles between activist and scholar, at least greater self-consciousness about the kinds of questions chosen for study and the possible uses of the scholar's work.
We are now better at classification and definition of collective behavior phenomena, and at identifying ideal-typical sequences and crucial variables than we were in the 1950s. There is an extensive body of work that elaborates and documents empirical possibilities and selectively illustrates theories after the fact. (Religion can inspire protest or can inhibit it; absolute deprivation can trigger protest or increase mere concerns for survival; police use of violence can mean effective repression or the spread of a movement as martyrs are created; some movements go through a life cycle model from unrest to organized protest to institutionalization, while others never get beyond unrest; social movements can lead to change or be a result of change, etc.) To be sure, laying out such possibilities is only an important first step. Trying to figure out under which conditions one or another outcome is likely is the crucial next step, and we have seen discussions in this direction.

We have also seen an elaboration of concepts and a proliferation of ways of thinking about collective behavior that go beyond the somewhat amorphous social psychological tradition that predominated until the early 1960s. The student seeking to understand collective behavior has a number of perspectives and methods to choose from, and can now draw more easily upon general social science concepts. The artificial intellectual boundary between collective and "noncollective," or conventional, behavior is breaking down. The incorporation of concepts and approaches from the study of organizations, interaction, coalition formation, decision-making, and social psychology is reducing the area's estrangement from general sociology. Conversely, efforts to understand social change and conflict draw heavily on the research traditions in the field of collective behavior.

We are seeing the development and use of improved methods for gathering and analyzing collective behavior data, whether in the historical archives or on the streets. For example, there is increased use of films, field experiments, controlled observation, research teams poised and waiting for an instance of collective behavior to occur, the coding of newspaper accounts and arrest records, and the use of mathematical models to plot the diffusion and patterning of multiple instances of collective behavior. In addition, the excellent historical studies by Tilly (1964), Rudé (1960, 1964), etc, using archival data, have shown the possibility of more systematic analysis of historical instances of collective behavior. All of these methods have helped bring new insights and vitality to the field.

Videotaping is a potentially fruitful method which should be used more extensively. A vast amount of primary data are available in the form of news filmed for television. The problem, of course, lies in figuring out how to systematically and theoretically approach videotaping. Martínez (forthcoming) explains how to use film and videotape for purposes of sociological teaching and research.

Archives on various social movements, particularly of the last decade, are developing, and loose networks exist among those collecting such material. The Critical Mass Bulletin newsletter of December 1974 lists various archives throughout the United States. Many of the surveys done on participation in collective behavior activities are in data archives such as those found at the University of North Carolina and the University of California at Berkeley's Survey Research Center. The creation of something along the line of a Human Relations Area File for collective behavior could greatly facilitate research.
We have seen the development of many testable propositions in the recent literature. Most of the propositions, however, remain to be tested, or at least to be more thoroughly tested. Yet the formulation—as well as some testing—of propositions has been a central aspect of the advancement of the field of collective behavior in recent years.

In spite of clear progress in the last decade, one can question whether a cathedral-building image of science applies as clearly here as it does to some other areas of sociological inquiry. We are wiser now about social movements than in the early 1960s, but the increased wisdom may not be commensurate with all the time and energy that has gone into studying them. We know more and we know more where to look, and we have seen some useful integrative and theoretical efforts. Still, the field has done a better job of developing nominal concepts than of developing theories, and it has been better at refuting old ideas than at establishing the truth of new ones.

Why should this be the case, at least to a greater extent in this area of sociology than in many others? There is no single answer, but among important factors would seem to be:

1. Our theories and methods for studying static structures are much more developed than those for studying change and process.
2. There is a lack of clear definition of, and agreement on, what collective behavior is and how it differs from conventional behavior; it has tended to be a residual, often negatively defined category, with diverse phenomena lumped together, to the exclusion of conventional phenomena with which it may share important characteristics.
3. Collective behavior phenomena tend to be vast, diffuse, and complex, and may go on unpredictably and simultaneously in many geographical areas, involving very large numbers of diverse people, and changing over time.
4. Probably to a greater extent than in most other areas of sociology, those drawn to the study of social movements have a personal interest in understanding or telling the story of a particular movement, and are less interested in theory as such.
5. Trying to understand a particular historic event such as the Watts riot or the Free Speech Movement is different from seeking to understand more enduring general group properties such as the division of labor or inequality.
6. We can say what is likely to occur given certain conditions, but we are usually not able to say when these conditions will occur.
7. The political and value-laden nature of the topic may make it harder to see clearly, ask the relevant questions, and accept answers contrary to what we would like the truth to be.

Finally, in light of the millenarian and spiritual quality of many social movements, it may be appropriate to close with twenty-two categorical imperatives along the line of the Ten Commandments for those who would study social movements and collective behavior:

I. Thou shalt be mindful of general theories in sociology and not treat collective behavior as a negatively defined residual category.
II Thou shalt study social movements in their organizational and environmental contexts.

III Thou shalt continue to make efforts to quantify, but thou shalt not be seduced by numbers unbounded by theory, nor necessarily associate wisdom with quantitative sophistication.

IV Thou shalt be mindful of prior research on the question studied.

V Thou shalt cease doing unvalidated attitude studies when they have the quality of abstracted empiricism, devoid of context, and lacking of implications for theory.

VI Thou shalt bring a compassionate skepticism to publicly available data on any given movement.

VII Thou shalt ground statements about social movements in careful empirical observations.

VIII Thou shalt seek to make and test statements about the relations among variables that can be falsified.

IX Thou shalt move from observed behavior or official ideology to presumed motives and attitudes with great hesitancy, and preferably only with data from known participants.

X Thou shalt not use the concept of strain unless it is operationalized, and thou shalt look for the ways in which various types of strains are related to types of collective behavior.

XI Thou shalt try to relate conditions of social strain to people's perceptions of strain and to their participation—or lack of participation—in collective behavior activities.

XII Thou shalt not confuse leaders with followers.

XIII Thou shalt be more sensitive to types of social movement participation, and thou shalt not confuse followers with sympathetic bystanders.

XIV Thou shalt be aware of the possible uses and misuses of research on social movements.

XV Thou shalt seek to more systematically link the study of social movements with the study of crowds.

XVI Thou shalt focus more research attention on the actual behavior of people in crowd situations.

XVII Thou shalt take insights where they can be found, and not assume that because approaches have been misused and unfruitful in the past—as have the focus on physiological changes among crowd members, or parallels to animal behavior—that they must continue to be so in the future.

XVIII Thou shalt seek to move from static cross-sectional to dynamic interactive models of social movement development.

XIX Thou shalt walk an intellectual tight rope that permits collective and conventional behavior to be viewed in light of common theoretical and conceptual frameworks, but that does not claim that no differences exist between them.

XX Thou shalt not restrict the study of crowds to those of an acting, aggressive, and ideological nature, nor treat the crowd as the only prototype of collective behavior.
XXI Thou shalt appreciate the interactive and emergent character of much collective behavior beyond the causal impact of history, of broad social structural conditions, and of the personality of participants.

XXII Thou shalt not be too optimistic about building a science of collective behavior but thou shalt try anyway.

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