Almost three decades ago, the Morris Worm infected thousands of UNIX workstations by, among other things, exploiting a buffer-overflow error in the `fingerd` daemon [Spafford 1989]. Buffer overflows are just one example of a larger class of memory (corruption) errors [Szekeres et al. 2013, van der Veen et al. 2012]. The root of the issue is that systems programming languages—C and its derivatives—expect programmers to access memory correctly and eschew runtime safety checks to maximize performance. There are three possible ways to address the security issues associated with memory corruption. One is to migrate away from these legacy languages that were designed four decades ago, long before computers were networked and thus exposed to remote adversaries. Another is to retrofit the legacy code with runtime safety checks. This is a great option whenever the, often substantial, cost of runtime checking is acceptable. In cases where legacy code must run at approximately the same speed, however, we must fall back to targeted mitigations, which, unlike the other remedies, do not prevent memory corruption. Instead, mitigations make it harder, i.e., more labor intensive, to turn errors into exploits.

Since stack-based buffer overwrites were the basis of the first exploits, the first mitigations were focused on preventing the corresponding stack smashing exploits [Levy 1996]. The first mitigations worked by placing a canary, i.e., a random value checked before function returns, between the return address and any buffers that could overflow [Cowan et al. 1998]. Another countermeasure that is
now ubiquitous makes the stack non-executable. Since then, numerous other countermeasures have appeared and the most efficient of those have made it into practice [Meer 2010]. While the common goal of countermeasures is to stop exploitation of memory corruption, their mechanisms differ widely. Generally speaking, countermeasures rely on randomization, enforcement, isolation, or a combination thereof. Address space layout randomization is the canonical example of a purely randomization-based technique. Control-Flow Integrity (CFI [Abadi et al. 2005a, Burow et al. 2016]) is a good example of an enforcement technique. Software-fault isolation, as the name implies, is a good example of an isolation scheme. Code-Pointer Integrity (CPI [Kuznetsov et al. 2014a]) is an isolation scheme focused on code pointers. While the rest of this chapter focuses on randomization-based mitigations, we stress that the best way to mitigate memory corruption vulnerabilities is to deploy multiple different mitigation techniques, as opposed to being overly reliant on any single defense.

3.1 Software Diversity

Randomization, or software diversity [Cohen 1993, Larsen et al. 2014], essentially hides implementation details, such as the memory layout, from adversaries. This means that adversaries cannot rely on code, variables, or other program artifacts residing at a known location. This idea has similarities with biodiversity wherein some fraction of animals in a herd will have immunity against environmental hazards due to random differences in their immune systems. One can also draw parallels to kinetic warfare insofar that belligerents seek to conceal their locations to avoid becoming an easy target.

Because adversaries in the digital domain seek to exploit implementation flaws that trigger invalid memory accesses, the inputs that cause the unintended behavior are highly implementation dependent. This is why randomization of the code layout has a destabilizing effect on code-reuse attacks that depend on code snippets (gadgets in ROP parlance [Shacham 2007]) residing at known addresses.

Adversaries generally have two ways to bypass diversified binaries: guessing or reconnoitering their target. Repeatedly mounting an attack that crashes the victim program [Bittau et al. 2014, Shacham et al. 2004, Evans et al. 2015a] has visible side effects that often facilitate detection. Information leakage, on the other hand, is often silent and leaves few traces, if any, on the victim system. In the rest of this chapter, we focus on bypasses of diversity relying on information leakage, particularly code layout disclosure, and the countermeasures available to defenders.
3.2 Information Leakage

In their seminal paper on stack guards, Cowan et al. mention that their techniques are not impossible to bypass, but to do so would require the attacker to examine the entire memory image of the program [Cowan et al. 1998 (p. 4)]. The tacit assumption is that the attacker cannot easily leak the memory contents of a running program. Their follow-up work focusing on pointers also cites the difficulty of accessing process memory in their security argument: “To obtain the key, the attacker would either have to already have permission to manipulate the process with debugging tools (e.g., ptrace) or would have to have already successfully perpetrated a buffer overflow attack against the process” [Cowan et al. 2003]. Strackx et al. [2009] were the first to examine what they termed the “Memory Secrecy Assumption” underpinning randomizing defenses at the time. The gist of their argument is that memory secrecy relies on the absence of memory corruption vulnerabilities, an assumption that, if valid, would also obviate the need for memory corruption mitigations, such as ASLR, stack canaries, and other diversity techniques. Information leakage can arise from format string vulnerabilities that cause the defective program to print out internal data or code rather than the intended output. Strackx et al. point out that buffer over-reads are a more common source of information leakage and demonstrate a concrete attack in which ASLR and ProPolice [Etoh and Yoda 2000] can be bypassed thanks to such over-reads.

Serna [2012] highlighted that type confusion and use-after-free vulnerabilities as well as application-specific vulnerabilities also facilitate information leakage. The presentation also highlighted that the widespread deployment of ASLR and stack canaries in all modern operating systems had made information leakage a requirement to write reliable exploits. Most importantly, Serna noted that the combination of attacker-controlled scripting and memory corruption errors put adversaries in a powerful position.

Snow et al. [2013] translated Serna’s observation into practice by using an overflown buffer object to systematically scan the memory of the process running a malicious script. Just-in-time code-reuse, JIT-ROP, attacks generalize previous attacks and are worth summarizing here. The general goal of JIT-ROP is to find as many mapped code pages as possible by starting from a small root set of known pages. The discovery of additional code pages happens by recursively scanning each page for references to other pages and adding these pages to a working set. In context of browsers, the JIT-ROP technique is used to break out of a sandboxed scripting environment, such as a JavaScript VM hosted by a browser. This lets the adversary execute arbitrary code with all permissions granted to the operating system process. To do so, the adversary tricks an unsuspecting user into visiting a web page
serving a malicious script. The script constructs a write-what-where primitive out of a memory corruption vulnerability such that the adversary can access any mapped location within the virtual address space of the process. Since the code layout is not known to the adversary a priori, the exploit fails if it touches unmapped memory and the resulting segmentation fault is not handled by the program. Segmentation faults are avoided by scanning for pointers to code in the data memory surrounding the overflowed object (using a priori knowledge of the heap layout). Next, the exploit scans the code page identified by the code pointer. Since the virtual-to-physical memory mapping happens at the page granularity, it is always safe to scan an entire page, which is usually 4KiB in size. Snow et al. realized that they could implement a disassembler in JavaScript to recover references between code pages and use the recovered references to discover additional code pages recursively. The recursive disassembly step terminates when the script has discovered enough code snippets to mount a traditional code-reuse attack.

### 3.3 Mitigating Information Leakage

Backes and Nürnberg [2014] were first out of the gate with a response to JIT-ROP attacks. Their technique, Oxymoron, splits the code segment into 4KiB pages. Furthermore, any code reference to another page is indirected through a lookup table. The base of the lookup table is hidden using the vestiges of x86 segmentation. This prevents the recursive disassembly step in the JIT-ROP attack. An interesting aspect of Oxymoron is that the scheme was designed to allow code pages to be shared among processes. This is an important optimization for shared libraries and one that is overlooked by most of the academic literature although it is crucial in practice.

Davi et al. [2015] presented a different response to JIT-ROP attacks—Isomeron—motivated by their finding that the original JIT-ROP technique could be modified slightly to bypass Oxymoron. The key to the Oxymoron bypass was the finding that data memory contains enough pointers to discover enough code pages to mount an attack, even if it is not possible to discover additional pages through inter-page references thanks to Oxymoron. Virtual method tables for the C++ dispatch mechanism, for example, enable pointer harvesting and lessen the need for recursive disassembly. The Isomeron defense [Davi et al. 2015] frustrates return-oriented programming techniques by cloning each program function and randomly picking between original and function clones during execution. Code-reuse exploits need
not use returns to chain gadgets, so the Isomeron technique has shortcomings of its own.

Backes et al. [2014] advocated for a more principled way to counter information leakage: preventing read accesses to code pages. Their implementation—execute-no-read or just XnR—presented a work-around for all x86 processors whose memory management units lack native support for executable, non-readable pages. To work around this limitation, XnR prevents reads by clearing the present bit for nearly all code pages. Normally, the CPU uses the present bit to track which pages are present in RAM and or paged out to disk. Accesses to a page with the present bit cleared, causes the CPU to generate a page fault which the operating system handles by reading the missing page from the pagefile. XnR modifies the operating system’s page fault handler to mark XnR pages present (without evicting their contents) if and only if the present bit was cleared to prevent read accesses and if the page fault was triggered by an instruction fetch, i.e., an attempt to execute the page was made. If, on the other hand, the fault was generated by a read access to an executable page, the XnR page fault handler terminates the program before any memory contents can be leaked. The number of page faults to handle determines the overhead of the XnR approach. To avoid excessive slowdowns, XnR keeps a small window of recently executed pages readable and executable—and thus exposed to information leaks. However, XnR uses a sliding window of two to eight pages to limit the amount of code that can be leaked at any point in the execution.

Gionta et al. [2015] developed a system—HideM—that similarly made code pages unreadable but does so by using the Translation Look-aside Buffer (TLB) in a special way known as TLB-desynchronization. On processors that use separate TLBs for data and code, the two TLBs are usually kept in sync, which gives an executing process the same view of its address space regardless of the type of access. HideM configures the memory management unit such that accesses to the same virtual address translate to different physical addresses depending on the access type. This way, instruction fetches proceed as intended whereas read accesses—whether malicious or not—go to a different physical copy of the text section. To ensure that legitimate reads to constant data stored on code pages function correctly, HideM zeros out all instructions in the readable copy of the text section while preserving all embedded constant data. This is a point in favor of HideM since XnR does not explicitly address the problem of reading embedded constants. On the other hand, most modern processors have unified TLBs and thus do not support TLB-desynchronization as required by HideM.
While XnR and HideM go a long way toward preventing *direct* leakage through adversarial reads, adversaries can also make inferences about the code layout by inspecting code pointers stored in the data segments of a running process. The difference between these two types of leakage is illustrated in Figure 3.1. The defenses we've discussed so far have protected the code pages and references between them (top half of figure) but not references from data pages to code pages (bottom half of figure). The utility of leaking a function pointer or return address when code pages cannot be read directly depends on the granularity of the code layout diversity. If each individual instruction is placed at a random location [Hiser et al. 2012], such leaks mainly facilitate whole-function reuse. However, the most granular diversity techniques tend to have high overheads [Larsen et al. 2014] and may prevent page sharing between processes [Backes and Nürberger 2014, Crane et al. 2016].

Crane et al. [2015] built a system—Readactor—that explicitly seeks to prevent both direct and indirect leakage of code layout. Rather than emulating execute-no-
3.3 Mitigating Information Leakage

read permissions, Readactor leverages the extended page translation mechanisms found in modern processors (circa 2008 and onward) to accelerate hypervisors. Memory accesses inside virtual machines undergo two levels of address translation: (i) guest virtual to guest physical translation and (ii) guest physical to host physical translation. The effective permission of an access to host physical memory is the intersection of the permissions used in the two translation steps. Unlike the first translation step, which forces read permissions on executable pages, the second translation step can represent true execute-only memory permissions. The Readactor system used a lightweight hypervisor to activate the extended page tables on a per-process basis to protect individual applications running on a traditional host system, i.e., outside a traditional hypervisor. Rather than allowing accesses to constant data on code pages, Redactor used a modified compiler to eliminate all such reads. The major open source C/C++ compilers later stopped emitting constants on code pages for performance reasons, which also benefits execute-only techniques.

Readactor tackles indirect leakage by introducing a pointer indirection layer so no pointer stored in a readable memory region points directly to its target. All that adversaries can observe are pointers into a special execute-only area containing trampolines (direct jumps) to the actual functions. Because the trampolines are stored on pages with execute-only memory, they cannot be dereferenced by an exploit. Adversaries therefore cannot learn the locations of functions in the absence of hardware-level side channels [Gras et al. 2017] or implementation errors. Readactor also demonstrated that just-in-time compiled code can be made compatible with execute-only memory with modest effort; the need to also protect JITed code from indirect disclosure was highlighted but not implemented. The necessity of avoiding indirect disclosure of JITed code was reiterated by Maisuradze et al. [2017].

A few variations of and extensions to the basic ideas behind XnR, HideM, and Readactor are worth mentioning. Schuster et al. [2015] demonstrated a new type of code-reuse attack called Counterfeit Object Oriented Programming (COOP), which is capable of bypassing control-flow integrity defenses that are not C++ aware. C++ awareness, in this context, simply means using information about class hierarchies to further constrain the set of outgoing control-flow edges at a C++ virtual method call site. C++-aware CFI is straightforward to implement when program source code is available, whereas techniques to recover class hierarchies via binary analysis took a while to appear [Pawlowski et al. 2017]. Since COOP attacks execute entire C++ methods without regard for the actual code layout, such attacks can also bypass defenses such as Readactor. COOP attacks are not entirely layout agnostic, however; they require knowledge of the layout of C++ objects and the layout of C++ virtual
method tables. Since objects must be stored in RW memory, their layouts are difficult to hide. Vtables, on the other hand, contain a mix of data and pointers to code, the latter part of which can be hidden and randomized along the lines of the Readactor system. Crane et al. [2015] presented a counter to COOP attacks called Readactor++ that splits virtual method tables into two parts: one containing data and another containing code (direct jump trampolines to virtual methods). The code part, called the xvtable, is protected by execute-only permissions, and randomized. To prevent brute force attacks, dummy entries that are never activated during normal program execution are added to each xvtable [Crane et al. 2013].

Supporting execute-only memory is not always straightforward and most approaches rely on using the memory management unit in unconventional ways. For systems where MMU “tricks” are infeasible, such as systems having a simpler memory protection unit, execute-only permissions can be enforced in software [Braden et al. 2016] using techniques conceptually similar to software-fault isolation [Wahbe et al. 1993, McCamant and Morrisett 2006].

Lu et al. [2015] demonstrated that it is possible to use a pointer indirection layer to prevent indirect leakage without using execute-only memory to protect against direct leakage. Their proposed solution, ASLR-Guard, uses the vestiges of x86 segmentation support to hide the location of a table that translates between code locators (visible to adversaries) and actual code addresses (hidden). Lu et al. argue that without a way to disclose code addresses, there is no need to prevent against direct leakage since a 64-bit virtual address space is large enough to resist brute force attempts at finding an ASLR’ed code segment. Later research on crash resistance and allocation oracles have undermined that assumption [Gawlik et al. 2016, Oikonomopoulos et al. 2016, Göktaş et al. 2016]. On a practical level, the ASLR-Guard implementation does not bound the growth of code locators and thus its memory overhead.

Chen et al. [2017] demonstrated support for execute-only memory for sourceless binaries. Specifically, their NORAX system is able to protect 64-bit ARM (AArch64) binaries. Notably, the AArch64 platform offers native support for execute-only memory, unlike current x86 CPUs. A general challenge of binary analysis and assembly is to accurately separate code and data. Code misclassified as data (data misclassified as code) can lead to page faults when using DEP (execute-only memory) to mitigate exploits. NORAX addresses this challenge using a combination of offline binary rewriting and online load/runtime monitoring. The offline step conservatively estimates code regions and moves data bytes embedded in these regions to a new data section. The original data bytes are overridden with unique magic numbers that are recognized by the NORAX loader and runtime monitor.
This lets the NORAX loader adjust any references to the original data bytes, which are now inaccessible since all code is mapped with execute-only permissions. If an attempt to read a code page happens at runtime, the NORAX runtime monitor determines whether the associated access violation was generated by a legitimate access (missed by the offline analysis) or whether it is a malicious access, which should cause program termination.

### Address Oblivious Code Reuse

Rudd et al. [2017] explored the security properties of an ideal version of leakage-resilient code diversity, i.e., one that is not weakened by implementation-level flaws. Their finding was that even an ideal implementation does not stop all types of code reuse. The reason is that code-hiding mechanisms, such as execute-only memory, only apply to code pages, not code locators (e.g., function pointers and return addresses or pointers to Readactor trampolines). Code locators must be readable and writable for the program to function properly. Even with defenses such as Readactor and ASLR-Guard in place, adversaries can manipulate code locators used in place of traditional code pointers.

Rudd et al. used a data memory disclosure vulnerability to observe the state of a protected program as it executes. The fact that programs execute in a way that inherently leaks information about the state of execution enables profiling of the code indirection layer. Adversaries can correlate the execution state of their own unprotected program instance to that of a remote, protected instance at the time of the memory disclosure. Therefore, profiling can inform adversaries that a code identifier points to a function \( F \) in the protected program (without revealing the address of \( F \)). Adversaries can use this mapping from code identifiers to the underlying functions to construct a position-independent, whole-function code-reuse attack. Rudd et al. called this **Address-Oblivious Code Reuse (AOCR)** since the attack executes all code through code identifiers without any knowledge of the actual code layout.

Although AOCR attacks are possible, they require more effort to construct than their position-dependent equivalent. First of all, the state of the system changes rapidly, which makes it challenging to correctly time memory disclosures of code identifiers. If the target application is multi-threaded, however, memory corruption allows an adversary to manipulate the variables controlling entry to a critical section. Mutexes, for instance, are usually set by a thread as it enters the mutex such that other threads wanting to enter will suspend until the first thread has exited the critical section protected by the mutex. For instance, an adversary may
use one thread $T_A$ to manipulate the mutex in a way that causes another thread $T_B$ to block. This gives the adversary a chance to inspect memory without the timing unpredictability resulting from the execution of $T_B$.

Once the adversary has discovered a mapping from code locators to functions, he must find a way to (i) hijack the control flow, (ii) pass proper arguments to functions used in the exploit, and (iii) chain function calls. The control flow can be hijacked by using memory corruption to swap a code locator with the code locator corresponding to the first function in the malicious call chain. Rudd et al. solved the second challenge by reusing functions that read all their arguments from global variables. This requires knowledge of how global variables are laid out, but that too can be profiled and, in contrast to code, global variables must be readable. The third challenge, chaining calls through code locators, was solved using Malicious Loop Redirection (MLR). This technique requires the vulnerable application to contain a loop whose body contains an indirect call site. Specifically, the loop must (1) have a loop condition that is attacker controllable and (2) call functions through code pointers/locators. An ideal loop looks like this:

```c
while (task) { task->fptr(task->arg); task = task->next; }
```

where `task` points to a linked list of `(fptr, arg)` pairs in attacker-controlled memory. Note that register randomization is not an effective defense because the semantics of the call dictates that the first argument is taken from `task->arg` and moved to `rdi` to conform to the x86_64 ABI. Note that MLR is conceptually similar to the loop-gadget concept in COOP and Subversive-C code-reuse attacks [Lettner et al. 2016, Schuster et al. 2015].

Using these techniques, Rudd et al. demonstrated working AOCR attacks against two popular web servers protected by Readactor: Nginx and the Apache HTTP Server. Readactor served as a stand-in for leakage-resilient diversity techniques in general since it is the most comprehensive implementation of leakage-resilient diversity available. Note that approaches based on destructive code reads [Tang et al. 2015, Werner et al. 2016] are also vulnerable to AOCR since these attacks never attempt to read the actual code. Snow et al demonstrated additional attacks specifically targeting destructive-code-read techniques [Snow et al. 2016].

### 3.5 Countering Address-Oblivious Code Reuse

Recall that code-pointer hiding via trampolines already limits the set of addresses that are reachable from an attacker-controlled indirect branch. Even if an attacker discloses all trampoline pointers, only function entries, return sites, and individual
instructions inside trampolines are exposed. We therefore implemented an extension to the Readactor code-pointer hiding mechanism, which we call Code-Pointer Authentication (CPA). CPA adds authentication after direct calls and before indirect calls to prevent the control-flow hijacking step as explained in Section 3.4 and thus mitigate AOCR attacks. One of the benefits of randomization-based defenses is that they do not rely on static program analysis, an advantage which helps them scale to complex code bases. To avoid relying on static program analysis, we must use different techniques to authenticate direct and indirect calls since we do not know the set of callees in advance.

### 3.5.1 Authenticating Direct Calls and Returns

Our general approach to authenticate direct calls uses cookies. A cookie is simply a randomly chosen value that is loaded into a register by the caller and read out and checked against an expected value by the callee. For returns, the callee loads another cookie into a register before returning, and the register is checked for the expected value directly after the return. Each function has two unique, random cookies: one to authenticate direct calls to the function (forward cookie, FC) and another to authenticate returns (return cookie, RC). Because the instructions that set and check cookies are stored in execute-only memory and the register storing the cookie is cleared directly after the check, attackers cannot leak or forge the cookies.

Our prototype implementation chooses cookie values at compile time and inserts these values into the execute-only code. A full-featured implementation could randomize the cookie values at load time so they vary between executions. This could easily be accomplished by marking all cookie locations during compilation, iterating over these locations during program initialization, and writing new cookies into the code before re-protecting the memory with execute-only permission.

The left side of Figure 3.2 shows how we authenticate an example direct function call from `foo` to `bar`. Dark gray labels indicate how we extend the Readactor code-pointer hiding technique with authentication cookies. Before transferring control to the direct call trampoline `t_bar` along control-flow edge ₁, we load `bar`’s forward cookie into a scratch register. Edge ₂ transfers control from `t_bar` to `bar`. The prologue of `bar` checks that the register contents match the expected forward cookie value and clears the register to prevent spilling its contents to memory. Before the `bar` function returns along edge ₃, we load the backward cookie for `bar` into the same scratch register. At the return site in `foo`, we check that the register contains the backward cookie identifying `bar` as the callee. The return site then clears the register.
Chapter 3  Diversity and Information Leaks

Figure 3.2 Code-pointer authentication. Direct calls and returns are illustrated in the leftmost third of the figure; indirect calls and returns are shown in the rightmost two-thirds. Light gray boxes contain execute-only code and white boxes contain data. Dark gray labels show where we insert additional instructions to prevent address harvesting attacks. The \(=_{32}\) operator in the check after edge 9 indicates that we only check the lower 32 bits of the return cookie.

The return address pushed on the stack by the call instruction in \(t\_bar\) leaks the location of the following jump instruction as well as the direct call itself. If the adversary manipulates an indirect branch to execute control-flow edge \(\overrightarrow{2}\), the check at the target address will cause the forward cookie check to fail and thus the attack to fail. Analogously, redirecting control to flow along edge \(\overrightarrow{4}\) will cause the check at \(r\_foo\) to fail.

3.5.2 Securing Indirect Calls and Returns

Without static program analysis, we don’t know the target of an indirect call at compile time and thus enforce bounds on the program control flow. Cookies, as used in the direct call case, are therefore not applicable to indirect calls. However, we can still authenticate that the function pointer used in an indirect call was correctly stored and not maliciously forged without requiring any static analysis.

All function pointers in a program protected by Readactor are actually pointers to trampolines that obscure the true target address. Inspired by the techniques of CCFI [Mashtizadeh et al. 2015], we change the representation of trampoline pointers (which are stored in attacker-observable memory) to allow for authentication.
In Readactor’s code-pointer hiding mechanism, a trampoline pointer is simply the address of the forward trampoline. With CPA, the trampoline pointer representation is composed of a 16-bit index (\texttt{idx}) into a table of trampolines (starting at \texttt{t_base}) and a 48-bit Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC). We show two such pointers on the right side of Figure 3.2. Using a trampoline index prevents leakage of the forward trampoline pointer address since the base address of the array of forward trampolines \texttt{t_base} can be hidden in execute-only code. We found that programs need less than $2^{16}$ forward pointers in practice, so it suffices to use the lower 16 bits of a 64-bit word for the index (this can be adjusted as needed for larger applications). We compute the HMAC by hashing the index along with the least significant 48 bits of its virtual memory address. With this HMAC we can detect if the adversary tries to replace a code pointer with another pointer harvested from a different memory location. We find that SipHash [Aumasson and Bernstein 2012], which is optimized for short messages, is a good choice of HMAC for our approach.

The middle third of Figure 3.2 illustrates the case where the function \texttt{foo} calls \texttt{bar} indirectly through a function pointer. Again, dark gray labels highlight our extensions to Readactor’s code pointer hiding technique. The indirect call site in \texttt{foo} loads the (HMAC, index) pair from memory, recomputes the HMAC using the (address, index, key) tuple, and compares the two (see rightmost third of Figure 3.2). If HMACs match, the index is used to lookup the address of the forward pointer which is subsequently used to execute control-flow edge \textcircled{6}. Note that the forward trampoline that creates edge \textcircled{7} does not target the first instruction in \texttt{bar}; instead, we add a delta to the address of \texttt{bar} to skip the forward cookie check that authenticates direct calls to \texttt{bar} (e.g., edge \textcircled{2}).

As explained in Section 3.4, AOCR attacks swap two pointers to hijack the program control flow. Because the address of the pointer is used to compute the HMAC, moving the pointer without re-computing the HMAC will cause the HMAC check before all indirect calls to fail unless the two (address, index) pairs collide in the hash. Attackers can still harvest and swap (HMAC, index) pairs stored to the same address at different times. See Section 3.6.1 for a more complete security analysis.

Returns from indirect calls make up the fourth and final class of control flows that we must authenticate. The callee sets a return cookie before the callee returns and checks the cookie at the return site; see edges \textcircled{8} and \textcircled{9} in Figure 3.2. We again clear the cookie register directly after the check to prevent leaks. The cookie check at the end of arrow \textcircled{9} must pass for all potential callees. Therefore, we set the lower 32 bits of all backward cookies to the same global random value and only
check the lower halfword of the backward cookie at the return site. This ensures that returns only target return sites; however, any return instruction can target indirect-call-preceded gadgets under this scheme. We did not reuse any indirect call-preceded gadgets in our harvesting attack since these are also protected by register randomization and callee-saved stack slot randomization. It is possible to further restrict returns from indirect calls by taking function types into account. Rather than setting the lower 32 bits of return cookies to the same random value, we can use different random values for different types of functions.

3.6 Evaluation of Code-Pointer Authentication

3.6.1 Security

Code-pointer authentication prevents reuse of the remaining exposed trampoline pointers, even if the attacker has harvested all available trampoline locations. This authentication mitigates AOCR attacks. To show how, we systematically consider each possibly exposed indirect branch target in turn.

Direct call trampoline entry (edge 1 in Figure 3.2). An attacker can harvest the location of the backward jump (jump r_foo) in the call trampoline from the return address on the stack. In the original Readactor defense, it is possible to compute the address of the previous instruction from this pointer and invoke t_bar.

With direct call authentication, each direct callee function checks that its specific, per-function cookie is set prior to calling it. If the attacker cannot forge the callee function’s cookie, this check will fail. We store the cookie as an immediate value in execute-only memory and pass it to the callee in a register. After performing the cookie check, the callee clears the register. Thus, direct call cookies cannot leak to an adversary, and the attacker has a $2^{-64}$ chance of successfully guessing the correct 64-bit random cookie value. Since the attacker cannot forge a correct cookie before an indirect branch to a direct call cookie, direct call trampoline entry points are unavailable as destinations for an attack.

Direct call trampoline return (edge 3 in Figure 3.2). Harvesting a return address corresponding to a direct call trampoline gives the attacker the location of the backward jump in a call trampoline. In Readactor, this destination allows the attacker to invoke a call-preceded gadget beginning at r_foo in the example.

We also protect these destinations with an analogous, function-specific return cookie. Directly before a callee function returns, it sets its function-
specific return cookie. The return site verifies that the expected callee's return cookie was set before continuing execution. This prevents the attacker from reusing this destination unless the control-flow edge would be allowed during normal program execution.

**Indirect call trampoline entry** (edge \(\circ\) in Figure 3.2). Similarly, an attacker can harvest indirect call trampoline locations from the stack and dispatch to the beginning of an indirect call trampoline. However, this destination is trivial to attackers, since they must set another valid, useful destination for the indirect call before invoking the trampoline. The attack could always dispatch straight to this final destination instead of to the indirect call trampoline. Thus, we do not need to protect indirect call trampoline entry points from reuse.

**Indirect call trampoline return** (edge \(\circ\) in Figure 3.2). Analogous to the direct call case, the attacker can dispatch to the backward edge of an indirect call trampoline to invoke an indirect-call-preceded gadget. This is a more challenging edge to protect without static analysis, since the indirect call site cannot know which function-specific return cookie to check.

Since the caller does not know the precise callee, we enforce a weaker authentication check on indirect call return destinations. By splitting return cookies into a global part and function-specific part, we can still ensure that the return site must be invoked by a return, not an indirect call. We believe that the fine-grained register randomization implemented in Readactor largely mitigates the threat of indirect-call-preceded gadget reuse, since the attacker cannot be sure of the semantics of the gadget due to execute-only memory.

**Function trampolines** (edge \(\circ\) in Figure 3.2). Function trampoline harvesting and reuse is the easiest attack vector against code-pointer hiding schemes. In Readactor, after harvesting function trampolines, the attacker can overwrite any return address or function pointer with a valid function trampoline destination and perform whole-function reuse.

We prevent reuse of function trampolines by changing the function-pointer format to include an HMAC tying the function pointer to a specific memory address. This prevents reuse of function pointers from returns as well as most swaps of function pointers in memory.

Since function pointers are no longer memory addresses in our authentication scheme, the attacker cannot use a function pointer as a return address
at all. The return would interpret the address as an HMAC-Idx pair and fail to verify the HMAC, crashing the program.

Function pointers cannot be swapped arbitrarily under this defense, since the pointer is tied to its address in memory by the HMAC. If a pointer $P$ at address $A$ is moved to address $B$, the HMAC check will fail when loaded from address $B$. Thus the attacker must either forge a valid HMAC or have harvested $P$ from the targeted location in memory at a previous point in execution.

**HMAC Forgery.** We first address the possibility of forging a valid HMAC for a function and pointer address pair without ever having seen a valid HMAC for that pair. SipHash is designed to be forgery resistant, thus the probability of correctly forging a valid HMAC for a pointer at an address not previously HMACed is expected to be $2^{-48}$, based on the size of the HMAC tag. Additionally, since we can store the HMAC key in execute-only memory, an attacker cannot disclose the 128-bit key and thus is limited to brute-forcing this key.

**Replay Attacks.** As in other pointer encryption schemes [Mashtizadeh et al. 2015, Cowan et al. 2003], HMACs do not provide temporal safety against replay attacks on function pointers. That is, a function pointer can be harvested at one point in program execution and later rewritten to the same address.

### 3.6.2 Performance

To evaluate the performance of our code-pointer authentication, we applied the protections on top of the Readactor++ system. We measured the performance overhead of both direct call authentication and function-pointer authentication on the SPEC CPU2006 benchmark suite. These results are summarized in Figure 3.3. All benchmarks were measured on a system with two Intel Xeon E5-2660 processors clocked at 2 Ghz running Ubuntu 14.04.

With all protections enabled, we measured a geometric mean performance overhead of 9.7%. This overhead includes the overhead from basic Readactor call and jump trampolines and compares favorably with the 6.4% average overhead reported by Crane et al. [2015]. We also measured the impact of direct call authentication and indirect call authentication individually (labeled DCA and ICA in the figure, respectively). We found that indirect code-pointer authentication generally adds more overhead (6.7% average) than direct code-pointer authentication (5.9% average), although this is strongly influenced by the program workload, specifically the percentage of calls using function pointers.
3.6 Evaluation of Code-Pointer Authentication

![Performance overhead of code-pointer authentication on SPEC CPU2006. All measurements include the overhead of the Readactor++ transformations [Crane et al. 2015].](image)

Figure 3.3

We observed that h264ref stands out as an interesting outlier for indirect call authentication. This benchmark repeatedly makes a call through a function pointer in a hot loop. To make matters worse, the target function is a one-line getter, thus our instrumentation dominates the time spent in the callee. This benchmark in particular benefits greatly from inlining the HMAC verification to avoid the extra call overhead. To speed up HMAC verification, especially in this edge case, we implemented a small (128 byte), direct-mapped, hidden cache of valid HMAC entries. This hidden cache is only accessed via offsets embedded in execute-only memory and is thus tamper resistant. Before recomputing an HMAC, the verification routine checks the cache to see if the HMAC is present.

We found three corner cases in SPEC where we could not automatically compute a new HMAC when a function pointer was moved. This is because the program first casts away the function-pointer type and then copies the pointer inside a struct. We had to insert a single manual HMAC in gcc and another in povray to handle these edge cases. perlbench stores function pointers in a growable list, which is moved during reallocation. Since our prototype does not yet instrument the libc realloc function, we had to manually instrument these operations. The CCFI [Mashtizadeh et al. 2015] HMAC scheme requires similar modifications. Finally, Readactor is not fully compatible with C++ exception handling, so we were not able to run omnetpp and povray, which require exception handling.
3.7 Conclusion

There are three ways to bypass diversity-type mitigations. The first is to target unprotected areas, the second is to employ brute force guessing, and the third relies on information leakage. The first two ways are relatively straightforward to counter through good engineering. The third option, however, remains the most challenging to fully address. Although it is possible to prevent leakage (perhaps modulo hardware side channels) of the code layout, address-oblivious attacks, though technically complex, are feasible. It is possible to mitigate address-oblivious code reuse, too, although the solution we designed and evaluated adds overhead and complexity to what was initially a fairly simple defense strategy.

If history is any guide, retrofitting security into fundamentally insecure languages without hampering performance will remain an open research challenge in the foreseeable future. The specific strand of research presented here is not the "one true answer" to all security problems; just as is the case with mitigation alternatives, such as CFI and CPI. Instead, we describe our broader expectations for the short, medium, and long term based on recent industry developments:

- In the short term, deploying better mitigations is the best option. This is not a particular insight of ours; one simply has to look at the direction in which major software developers are headed. At the time of writing, work is under way to improve the granularity of code randomization schemes, and hardware support for execute-only memory is forthcoming for Intel and already available for ARM. Although deployment of leakage-resilient diversity, as enabled by these techniques, is unlikely to stop all exploits, it does considerably raise the bar on attackers. At the same time, control-flow integrity techniques are supported by all major compilers, and hardware support is similarly forthcoming from both Intel and ARM. Diversity and CFI are not mutually exclusive techniques, and either will stop a sufficiently determined adversary on its own. Rather, we believe a combination of disparate exploit mitigations will offer the best return on investment.

- Unlike the short-term options, medium-term options will require some source code changes. Access control mechanisms, such as SELinux, when correctly implemented, help implement the principle of least privilege such that vulnerabilities in unprivileged code cannot be used to carry out privileged operations. Legacy applications are unlikely to be broken into independent submodules based on the privileges they require, however. Therefore, manual refactoring may be required to realize the full potential of access control mechanisms. Similarly, techniques that retrofit type and memory
3.7 Conclusion

Safety into legacy C/C++ code require that bad casts and invalid memory accesses are removed from the application before a protected version can be released.

- Whereas medium-term options may require minor changes and fixes to existing source code, the best long-term option is likely to very gradually retire C/C++ code. This will take multiple decades, and some code bases may simply be abandoned as the software landscape changes anyway. The reason we mention language mitigation, however long it may take, is that it brings with it several important secondary benefits. Reduction of technical debt and the resulting productivity benefits are chief among these. C and its derivatives reflect the age in which they were designed. For instance, C programmers must declare variables and functions defined outside the current translation unit such that the compiler can emit code in a single pass over the input files. Modern programming languages reflect the current reality that computing cycles are cheap and programmer attention scarce. Moreover, Balasubramanian et al. [2017] show that the features of the Rust systems programming language can support security capabilities, such as zero-copy software fault isolation, that cannot be implemented efficiently in traditional languages. Only by abandoning the languages in the C family, which have been spectacularly successful at any rate, can we make systems programming more productive, safe, and accessible.

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