

## V Intention

### Functional Benefits of Intention

(I) Deliberation curtailment

Two aspects: don't spend too much time; control when you deliberate. Do you need to form an intention to obtain these benefits? Why not just a judgment?

(II) Interpersonal and intrapersonal coordination

Do one's intentions need to be *known* to achieve these benefits? Does one need to know that they will be successful?

(III) Self-knowledge (Velleman)

(IV) Resolving indifference and incommensurability

How do these differ? John Broome's Abraham example.

(V) Resisting temptation

### Features needed to achieve (at least the first two of) these results

Control

Stability

Consistency

Means-Ends Coherence

### Why aren't they desires?

Consistency requirement; volitional control

### Why aren't they beliefs?

Motivating; volitional control; determinacy in cases of indifference and incommensurability. Do they, however, entail beliefs?

### Empirical Work

Stability: Alloy and Abramson on delusions of control. Gollwitzer on deliberative and implementational mindsets.

Control: Gollwitzer on goal intentions and implementational intentions.

### Intentional Action and Acting with an Intention

The video game example (from 'Two Faces of Intention'): I play a game in which the goal is to hit either of two targets with either of two guns. I am ambidextrous, and so can simultaneously shoot with each hand. If both targets are about to be hit simultaneously, the game shuts down. But I

consider that it is worth risking this slight risk in order to increase my chance of hitting one of the targets. Do I intend to hit both targets? Bratman argues that I don't. Do I intend to hit one rather than the other? But which? So I have no intention, though I do *endeavour* to hit them both. But, Bratman argues, if I did hit one of the targets, I would intentionally hit it. Are endeavours really distinct from intentions?

Other examples: the doctrine of double effect. The Knobe effect. The intentional as a moral category.

### Intention and Belief

If they are not identical to beliefs, do intentions at least bring beliefs with them? The fallen tree example; the library example. Believing not *v.* Not believing. All-out belief. What happens if we work with credences? What becomes of the video game example?

### What has become of the Humean Theory of Motivation?

Modest revision: all intentions must result from desires. More radical revision: they need not. Couldn't we just start out with intentions? What is the status of the claim that we *must* start with desires?