INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY
RICHARD HOLTON

Egoism I: Psychological Egoism

Psychological Egoism is the thesis that we always act from selfish motives. It holds that all desires are egoistic desires, or else derived egoistic desires. It is a descriptive thesis (i.e. a thesis about how things are, not about how they ought to be). It must be distinguished from the normative claim that we ought only to have egoistic desires. We shall look at this latter contention, Ethical Egoism, later.

Mr Lincoln once remarked to a fellow-passenger on an old time mud-coach that all men were prompted by selfishness in doing good. His fellow passenger was antagonizing this position when they were passing over a corduroy bridge that spanned a slough. As they crossed this bridge they espied an old razor-backed sow on the bank making a terrible noise because her pigs had got into the slough and were in danger of drowning. As the old coach began to climb the hill, Mr. Lincoln called out, "O river can't you stop just a moment?" Then Mr. Lincoln jumped out, ran back and lifted the little pigs out of the mud and water and placed them on the back. When he returned his companion remarked: "Now Abe, where does selfishness come in on this little episode?" "Why, bless your soul Ed, that was the very essence of selfishness. I should have had no peace of mind all day had I gone on and left that suffering old sow worrying over those pigs. I did it to get peace of mind, don't you see?"

Taken from Feinberg, 'Psychological Egoism'

Distinguish further the thesis that psychological egoism is a priori (or necessarily, or analytically) true, from the thesis that it is true a posteriori (or contingently, or synthetically).

A BRIEF DIGRESSION

Some terminology:

(i) a sentence is a priori true if and only if (iff) it can be known independently of experience (contrast: a posteriori: can only be known by experience).

(ii) a sentence is necessarily true iff it couldn't be false, i.e. it is true in every possible world (contrast: contingent: false is some possible worlds, true in others).

(iii) a sentence is analytically true iff it is true in virtue of its meaning (contrast: synthetic: neither true nor false in virtue of its meaning).

Note: these aren’t obviously the same. So, for instance, ‘Bachelors are unmarried’ is analytic, a priori and necessary. Statements of arithmetic like ‘2 + 2 = 4’ are a priori and necessary; but it’s not obvious that they are analytic. (It’s not obvious that it’s part of the meaning of ‘2 + 2’ that it is equal to 4.) Finally consider a sentence like ‘Goldbach’s conjecture is true’. Goldbach’s conjecture is the conjecture that every even number is the sum of two primes. No one has ever found a counter-example; but no one has ever given a proof. Perhaps the conjecture is true but there is no proof. Then ‘Goldbach’s conjecture is true’ will be necessary; but not a priori (since we cannot know that it is true, since we can give no proof of it) and not analytic (otherwise we could give a proof just by paying careful attention to the meanings of the words).

Feinberg and Rachels both play fast and loose with these distinctions. Feinberg argues that either psychological egoism is analytic, or it might be false (i.e. is contingent). But mightn’t it be a priori without being analytic? Rachels seems to suggest that if psychological egoism is irrefutable then it has no factual content and so ‘is not a new and exciting revelation after all’ (p. 74). It is a moot point what is to count as ‘factual’; but a priori truths can certainly be ‘new and exciting revelations’. Mathematical and logical discoveries can be. This is not to say that there are good a priori arguments for psychological egoism. But Feinberg and Rachels are a bit quick in dismissing them on such general grounds.
A FIRST, AND VERY SIMPLE, A PRIORI ARGUMENT

Premise: Everything I do is motivated by my desire to do that thing
Conclusion: Therefore everything I do is done for a selfish motivation.

There is a sense of ‘desire’ on which the premise here is false (we sometimes do things not because we want to, but because we feel we ought to). But there is also a wider sense of ‘desire’ in which it seems right: whenever we do something there is some concern which leads us to do it. So the question is whether the argument is valid. (Terminology: an argument is valid iff the conclusion follows from the premises; it is sound iff it is valid and has true premises)

Butler’s response:

If, because every particular affection is a man’s own, and the pleasure arising from its gratification his own pleasure, or pleasure to himself, such particular affection must be called self-love; [then] according to this way of speaking, no creature whatever can possibly act but merely from self-love; and every action and every affection whatever is to be resolved up into this one principle. But then this is not the language of mankind: or if it were, we should want words to express the difference between the principle of an action, proceeding from cool consideration that it will be to my own advantage; and an action, suppose of revenge or of friendship, by which a man runs upon certain ruin, to do evil or good to another. It is manifest the principles of these actions are totally different, and so want different words to be distinguished by.

Bishop Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons, (1726) Sermon XI

In short, distinguish:
Desiring the satisfaction of one’s own desires.
Desiring one’s own satisfaction.

The contrast is between the origin or location of the desires, and their contents. If egoism were simply a thesis about the location of desire, it would be uninteresting. Moreover, by ‘egoistic desire’ we don’t simply mean a desire that is owned by its owner; and to redefine the term so that it does mean that is just to make the thesis that all desires are egoistic into a trivial analytic truth. The interesting thesis is about the content of our desires. (Note also Butler’s observation that actions like revenge are typically not egoistic.)

WHAT IS THE RELEVANT CONTENT?

1ST ATTEMPT: AN EGOISTIC DESIRE IS A DESIRE FOR ONE’S OWN PLEASURE

So psychological egoism becomes the thesis that every desire is a desire for one’s own pleasure, or is derived from such a desire. This is the doctrine of psychological hedonism. It has had some support from people such as Hobbes, Bentham, Mill. But it’s pretty implausible, certainly as an a priori claim. What should we take pleasure to be? If we just take it to be the satisfaction of our desires, then we seem to be in an ungrounded loop when we say that our only basic desire is the satisfaction of our desires. (Compare: ‘The only thing I know is that I know something’; ‘The only true sentence is this one’; or consider a group of altruists all of whose only desire is that the others get what they want.) Alternatively we might take pleasure to be a certain sensation (this is what Hobbes and Bentham meant by it). Then we could make sense of the idea that that was all we wanted. But why should we think it is true, either a priori or a posteriori? Don’t we often want things (food, fame ...) directly, and not just as ways of getting ourselves pleasurable sensation? Mightn’t we even want things knowing that they won’t give us pleasure. For instance, can’t I want to go to sleep, or be drugged unconscious? Yet successfully attaining these ends exactly precludes me from having a pleasurable sensation. And in general: (i) trying to get pleasure very often doesn’t get it (the paradox of hedonism); (ii) pleasure is not always a separate state from the activity that one finds pleasurable: playing chess for pleasure ≠ playing chess and simultaneously having pleasurable sensations (indeed, these might get in the way).
Note that there is a weaker point here, which we shouldn’t confuse. The weaker point rests on
the idea that if I do what I want, I will get pleasure from it. Perhaps that is typically true. (Though
surely not always: consider the cases mentioned above, or even the two-year-old who expresses a
desire for a bowl of hot chilli pickle.) But it is beside the point. The psychological hedonist is
saying that all desires are desires for pleasure, not that the satisfaction of desires brings pleasure.
With every desire that is satisfied I get a little older, but that doesn’t make it a desire to get older.

2ND ATTEMPT: AN EGOISTIC DESIRE IS AN I-DESIRE

First step: reformulate all desires as attitudes to propositions. E.g. ‘I want an apple’ becomes ‘I
want that I have an apple’; ‘I want to see the Matterhorn’ becomes ‘I want that I see the
Matterhorn’. Then the suggestion is that egoistic desires are those that begin ‘I want that I ...’ Call
these i-desires (the term is from Bernard Williams). Suppose that I want to send money to the
starving. Is this an egoistic desire? It depends whether the fundamental state is: ‘I desire that I
send money to the starving’ (in which case it is); or whether it is simply: ‘I desire that the starving
are sent some money’ (in which case it isn’t).

Let’s return to Lincoln. What is the content of his desire? Feinberg thinks he must really desire
the well-being of the pigs; it is incoherent to think otherwise. But that doesn’t seem right.
Feinberg says that he is not indifferent to them, and of course that is right, since he is moved by
their plight. But it could be that he desires to help them simply because their suffering causes him
to feel uncomfortable (there is a brute causal connection) and the only way he has to relieve this
discomfort is to help them. Then he would, at bottom be moved by an i-desire (‘I desire that I no
longer feel uncomfortable’), and the desire would be egoistic. Here is a test to see whether the
desire is basically an i-desire. Suppose that he could simply have taken a pill that quietened the
worry, and so stopped him being uncomfortable; and taking the pill would have been easier than
helping the pigs. Would he have taken the pill and left the pigs to their fate? If so, the desire is
indeed an i-desire. There is nothing incoherent about this. The point is not that it is impossible
that there is a non-i-desire here. It is rather that, knowing what Lincoln was like, it is implausible
that he would have taken the pill and left the pigs to their fate. We can apply similar tests generally.
Whenever it is suggested that an apparently altruistic motivation is really egoistic, since it under-
pinned by an i-desire, imagine a way in which the i-desire could be satisfied without the apparently
altruistic desire being satisfied. Would the agent be happy with this? If they would, then it is indeed
an egoistic desire. if not, it isn’t. (The same goes for malevolent desires.)

So, we can make good sense of the idea of psychological egoism. But we haven’t yet seen a
good a priori argument that it’s true. Are there a posteriori arguments? Two possibilities:
(1) an argument from unconscious motives; Freud etc. This might give us reason for thinking
that we aren’t good at knowing our own motives. But will it give reason for thinking that
they must be egoistic?
(2) an argument from evolutionary biology; the selfish gene. This might give us grounds for
thinking that genes are in some metaphorical sense egoistic. But will it give reason for
thinking that we are?