Autumn Term
This is the web page for the honours option given by Richard Holton at Edinburgh University. Apologies for the lateness of the posting. Links to articles here are normally provided through the JSTOR database. To get them you will need to use a machine that is licenced to access that database. Any machine that is operating through a University of Edinburgh server should work. Articles that are marked with an asterisk (*) are on reserve in the Psychology and Philosophy Library in George Square.
The last three sessions of the course will be given by Bill Pollard.
Session One: Motivation (Week Four)
For alternatives that do try to accommodate intentions within a belief/desire framework see:
*Michael Ridge 'Humean Intentions' American Philosophical Quarterly 1998
M. Muraven and R. Baumeister, 'Self-Regulation and Depletion of Limited Resources: Does Self-Control Resemble a Muscle?', Psychological Bulletin 126 (2000) pp. 247Ð59. (In journals section of Psychology and Philosophy Llibrary.)
*R. Holton 'How is Strength of Will Possible?' Forthcoming in S. Stroud and C Tappolet (eds.) Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality (Oxford University Press, 2003). [Acrobat version]
*M. Bratman 'Toxin, Temptation and the Stability of Intention' in Faces of Intention pp. 58-90.
*J. Broome, 'Are Intentions Reasons? And How Should We Cope with Incommensurable Values?', in C. Morris and A. Ripstein (eds.), Practical Rationality and Preference: Essays for David Gauthier (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) pp. 98-120. Online version
*L. DeHelian and E. McClennen 'Planning and the Stability of Intention: A Comment', Minds and Machines 3 (1993) pp. 319-33.
*R. Holton 'How is Strength of Will Possible?' Forthcoming in S. Stroud and C Tappolet (eds.) Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality (Oxford University Press, 2003). [Acrobat version]
Session Six: Addiction (Week Nine)
*G. Watson, 'Disordered Appetites' in J. Elster (ed.) Addiction
Session One: Self-Deception and Self-Knowledge
A. Mele, 'Real Self-Deception', Behavioural and Brain Sciences 20, 1997 pp. 91-136. Electronic Version (Note: this is a pre-print, and doesn't include the peer commentary that appeared with the printed version).
*M. Johnston, 'Self-Deception and the Nature of Mind' in Perspectives on Self-Deception, edd. B. McLaughlin and A. O. Rorty.
*A. Bilgrami, 'Self-Knowledge and Resentment'
A. Mele, 'Recent Work in Self-Deception', American Philosophical Quarterly 24, 1987.R. Holton, 'What is the role of the self in self-deception?' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2000/1. Acrobat version
Sessions Two and Three
The aim of these two sessions is to look at the implications for moral theory of various recent findings in psychology. I am going to assume that people have a working grasp of most of the relevant meta-ethical positions (emotivism; subjectivism; internalism); these were discussed in my 2B Metaethics class. If you need a reminder, the handouts for those are available on the 2B webpage. There are quite a lot of readings listed here for Session Two. I have given suggestions as to what is most important. If you don't have time to read much, then look at the first part of the Nichols, the Kennett, and the Gordon sympathy paper. We might well find that we don't get through all of the topics listed here for Session Two, in which case they can spill over into Session Three.
Psychologists have found that, from a very young age, children tend to discriminate between judgements of conventional obligation (e.g. about dining table etiquette) and judgements of moral obligation. To get an idea of the literature here, have a look at the first part of
Think about the implications of this for emotivism and subjectivism. Can they make the distinction that ordinary people seem to make so readily?
These findings also have implications for the doctrine of internalism (the idea that anyone who judges that an action is morally right will be motivated to perform it), which will be our second focus. Advocates of this doctrine have had to give some explanation of those who seem to be counterexamples, especially psychopaths. There are two good things to read on this. However, the first
(Hoffman's position is developed in detail in his book, Empathy and Moral Development, which is in the psychiatry library. A copy of the 'Introduction and Overview' is in the Psychology and Philosophy library.)
Some scepticism arising from the application of these ideas to the case of animal ethics is given in:
Session Three: Situations and Virtue Ethics
Readings:
*John Campbell, 'Can philosophical accounts of altruism accommodate experimental data on helping behaviour?', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (1999)
Session 4: Reasons Externalism
We explore the suggestion that what motivate actions are not psychological states at all, but states of the world.
John McDowell, Might There Be External Reasons?
Chapter ? of Rowland StoutÕs ÒThings That Happen Because they ShouldÓ
Jonathan DancyÕs Practical Reality (2002) is also highly relevant.
Session 5: Virtues and Rationality
We assess the view that the operations of rationality might be understood non-deductively
Bill Pollard, Can Virtuous Actions be Both Habitual and Rational?
Session 6: Explaining Habitual Actions
We assess the merits of an explanatory paradigm centred around habits rather than reasons
Essay Questions
Autumn Term
Last updated 29 October 2003