Autumn Term

Wednesday Sep 7th

M. Smith 'The Humean Theory of Motivation' Fifteen Sermons Sermon XI JSTOR
Further Readings

Monday Sep 12th

E. Fehr & U. Fischbacher 'The Nature of Human Altruism' Nature 425 (2003) JSTOR

Wednesday Sep 14th

M. Smith 'The Humean Theory of Motivation' Mind (1987) JSTOR
Further Readings



Week Three Intention (Week Five)

Wednesday Sep 21st

M. Bratman, 'Two Faces of Intention' Philosophical Review (1984)JSTOR
Further Readings

Bratman's position is developed more fully in his Intention, Plans and Practical Reason (Harvard University Press, 1987). (For a quick way into this, see the review by David Velleman in the Philosophical Review 1991, JSTOR)

For alternatives that do try to accommodate intentions within a belief/desire framework see:

*Michael Ridge 'Humean Intentions' American Philosophical Quarterly 1998


David Velleman, Chapter Four of Practical Reflection

For some discussion and criticism of Velleman, see Rae Langton Intention as Faith, unpublished


Week Four: Akrasia and Weakness of Will (Week Six)

Monday 26th September

*D. Davidson, 'How is Weakness of the Will Possible?' in his Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford, 1980)

Notes on Davidson's account of akrasia

G. Watson, 'Skepticism about Weakness of Will', Philosophical Review 1977, JSTOR
Further Readings

R. Holton, 'Intention and Weakness of Will', Journal of Philosophy 1999 Online version


Session Five: Strength of Will (Week Seven)
Monday 3rd October
*George Ainslie 'Beyond Microeconomics' in J Elster (ed.) The Multiple Self


M. Muraven and R. Baumeister, 'Self-Regulation and Depletion of Limited Resources: Does Self-Control Resemble a Muscle?', Psychological Bulletin 126 (2000) pp. 247Ð59. (In journals section of Psychology and Philosophy Llibrary.)

Further Reading
*M. Bratman, 'Planning and Temptation' in Faces of Intention.

*R. Holton 'How is Strength of Will Possible?' Forthcoming in S. Stroud and C Tappolet (eds.) Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality (Oxford University Press, 2003). [Acrobat version]





Session Five: Strength of Will, Normative Issues (Week Eight)
Essential Reading
*G. Kavka, 'The Toxin Puzzle', Analysis 43 (1983), pp. 33-6.

*M. Bratman 'Toxin, Temptation and the Stability of Intention' in Faces of Intention pp. 58-90.

Further Reading

*J. Broome, 'Are Intentions Reasons? And How Should We Cope with Incommensurable Values?', in C. Morris and A. Ripstein (eds.), Practical Rationality and Preference: Essays for David Gauthier (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) pp. 98-120. Online version

*L. DeHelian and E. McClennen 'Planning and the Stability of Intention: A Comment', Minds and Machines 3 (1993) pp. 319-33.

*R. Holton 'How is Strength of Will Possible?' Forthcoming in S. Stroud and C Tappolet (eds.) Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality (Oxford University Press, 2003). [Acrobat version]


Session Six: Addiction (Week Nine)

Essential Reading
*J. Elster and Ole-Jorgen Skog, 'Introduction' to Getting Hooked

*G. Watson, 'Disordered Appetites' in J. Elster (ed.) Addiction






Spring Term


Session One: Self-Deception and Self-Knowledge (Week Two)

Essential Reading


A. Mele, 'Real Self-Deception', Behavioural and Brain Sciences 20, 1997 pp. 91-136. Electronic Version (Note: this is a pre-print, and doesn't include the peer commentary that appeared with the printed version).

*M. Johnston, 'Self-Deception and the Nature of Mind' in Perspectives on Self-Deception, edd. B. McLaughlin and A. O. Rorty.

Further Reading
*S. Shoemaker, 'On Knowing One's Own Mind'

*A. Bilgrami, 'Self-Knowledge and Resentment'

A. Mele, 'Recent Work in Self-Deception', American Philosophical Quarterly 24, 1987.

R. Holton, 'What is the role of the self in self-deception?' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2000/1. Acrobat version




For a full bibliography on self-deception see the Self-Deception Bibliography produced by the Consciouness in the Natural World Project at Stirling.






Sessions Two and Three

The aim of these two sessions is to look at the implications for moral theory of various recent findings in psychology. I am going to assume that people have a working grasp of most of the relevant meta-ethical positions (emotivism; subjectivism; internalism); these were discussed in my 2B Metaethics class. If you need a reminder, the handouts for those are available on the 2B webpage. There are quite a lot of readings listed here for Session Two. I have given suggestions as to what is most important. If you don't have time to read much, then look at the first part of the Nichols, the Kennett, and the Gordon sympathy paper. We might well find that we don't get through all of the topics listed here for Session Two, in which case they can spill over into Session Three.




Session Two: Moral Judgements, Internalism and Empathy (Week Three)

Psychologists have found that, from a very young age, children tend to discriminate between judgements of conventional obligation (e.g. about dining table etiquette) and judgements of moral obligation. To get an idea of the literature here, have a look at the first part of

Shaun Nichols Norms with Feeling, Cognition 84 (2002)

Think about the implications of this for emotivism and subjectivism. Can they make the distinction that ordinary people seem to make so readily?

These findings also have implications for the doctrine of internalism (the idea that anyone who judges that an action is morally right will be motivated to perform it), which will be our second focus. Advocates of this doctrine have had to give some explanation of those who seem to be counterexamples, especially psychopaths. There are two good things to read on this. However, the first

J Deigh Empathy and Universalizability
is rather long. You might do better to go straight to:
Jeanette Kennett, Autism and Empathy Philosophical Quarterly July 2002, vol. 52, pp. 340-357. (If this link doesn't work, try going to the Philosophical Quarterly via the library Electronic Journals page.)

Lying behind this is a general question about the role of empathy in moral thought. On this see
R Gordon Sympathy, Simulation and the Impartial Spectator Ethics 105 (1995)
Empathy is seen as central to moral thinking in the theory developed by the psychologist Martin Hoffman. A brief summary of his position is given in
*M. Hoffman, 'Moral Development' in M. Bornstein and M Lamb (eds.) Social, Emotional and Personality Development (1988). See esp. pp. 509 ff.

(Hoffman's position is developed in detail in his book, Empathy and Moral Development, which is in the psychiatry library. A copy of the 'Introduction and Overview' is in the Psychology and Philosophy library.)

Some scepticism arising from the application of these ideas to the case of animal ethics is given in:

R. Holton & R. Langton 'Empathy and Animal Ethics'
For the idea that we might in general understand other people by means of empathy ('Simulation theory') see:
*Robert Gordon, 'Folk Psychology as Simulation', Mind and Language 1 (1986)
(For much more detail on the problems in understanding just what simulation theory is, see:
*M. Davies 'The Mental Simulation Debate' in C Peacocke (ed.) Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness)

Finally, for some different empirical considerations that seem to count against internalism, see
*Adina Roskies, 'Are ethical judgements intrinsically motivational? Lessons from acquired sociopathy'



Session Three: Situations and Virtue Ethics (Week Four)

Readings:

J. Doris, 'Persons, Situations and Virtie Ethics', Nous 32, 1998

*John Campbell, 'Can philosophical accounts of altruism accommodate experimental data on helping behaviour?', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (1999)

Session 4: Reasons Externalism (Week Five)

We explore the suggestion that what motivate actions are not psychological states at all, but states of the world.

Arthur Collins, On the Psychological Reality of Reasons, Ratio, 10, 1997, pp. 108-23.

Rowland Stout, 'The Possibility of Externalist Explanation of Action', Things That Happen Because they Should, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, Chapter 1.

John McDowell, 'Might There Be External Reasons?', in J. E. J. Altham and Ross Harrison (eds.) World, Mind and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams, CUP, 1995, pp. 387-98. Reprinted in McDowell's Mind, Value and Reality, Harvard UP, 1998, pp. 95-111.

Jonathan Dancy's Practical Reality (OUP, 2000) is also highly relevant, especially Chapters 5 & 6.

Session 5: Virtues and Rationality (Week Six)

We assess the view that moral action need not involve the operation of intellect, but instead requires a certain practical sensitivity to reasons.

John McDowell, 'Virtue and Reason' The Monist, 62, 1979, pp. 331-50. Reprinted in McDowell's Mind, Value and Reality, Harvard UP, 1998, pp. 50-73.

Margaret Little, 'Virtue as Knowledge: Objections from the Philosophy of Mind', Nous, 31, 1997, pp. 59-79. (JSTOR)

John McDowell, 'Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Voilume, 52, 1978, pp 13-29. Reprinted in McDowell's Mind, Value and Reality, Harvard UP, 1998, pp. 77-94.

Session 6: Reasons and Rationality (Week Seven)

We assess the suggestion that moral action may not require judgements of reasons (even when conceived externally)

Joshua Gert, 'Brute Rationality', Nous, 37, 2003, pp. 417-46.
Bill Pollard, 'Can Virtuous Actions be Both Habitual and Rational?', Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 6, 2003, pp. 411-25.

Essay Questions

1. Is there a problem of akrasia?
2. Are we only ever motivated by our desires?
3. When is it rational to persist in one's resolutions?
4. Are intentions reducible to beliefs and desires? If not, how should we think of them?
5. How can we resist temptation?
6. Are desires really what move us? Or do we just ascribe them after the fact?
7. What is weakness of will?
8. Can addicts be properly described as choosing their actions? Might these choices be rational?
9. Gary Watson says, of addiction, that "we are not so much over-powered by brute-force as seduced". Is this right?

1. What is paradoxical about self-deception? Can the paradox be resolved?
2. How do we gain knowledge of our own selves?
3. What is the role of empathy in moral understanding and moral motivation?
4. Are there resons for thinking that internalism must be wrong?
5. Is virtue ethics a viable approach in the light of empirical findings?
6. Can beliefs be reasons?
7. Are virtues motives?
8. When is it rational to act habitually?
9. Do we always act for reasons?