

TRUST II

WHEN IS TRUST JUSTIFIED?

Baier's *Expressibility Test*: trust is only justified if it could survive both parties knowing what the trust is relying on (e.g. on the other's fear of revenge).

Worries: Isn't this too strong a condition? Who knows what we would do if we fully understood ourselves and our relations with others? The idea of the *second best*.

Isn't it in some sense too weak? Mightn't some people be so afraid that even knowing that others are relying on their fear would not be enough to change their trust? (But is it meant as a sufficient condition?)

SECOND-HAND MORAL KNOWLEDGE

Four considerations against:

- (i) we need to grasp the *reasons* for our moral opinions; and these can't be given by testimony
- (ii) taking moral knowledge on trust is inconsistent with our responsibility
- (iii) taking moral knowledge on trust is inconsistent with its practical application
- (iv) taking moral knowledge on trust is inconsistent with our autonomy

The case of Peter

Is this a case of simply lacking certain descriptive facts (not knowing who is sexist)? Can that distinction be made?

TESTIMONY

Is the knowledge that we gain from testimony just another instance of general inductive knowledge. (I rely on the thermometer because I have inductive grounds for thinking that it is reliable; I rely on an informant because I have inductive grounds for thinking that she is reliable.)

Or is the knowledge gained from testimony of a quite different kind? Is testimony a distinct source of knowledge, as various Classical Indian traditions claim?

One way of approaching this: do we start with a default stance of distrust (as you might expect if it were an inductive argument); or a default stance of trust.

Coady's transcendental argument for the latter option: we could never come to understand our language if we did not trust those we learned it from. Even if this is right, does it bear on the issues we have been discussing?)