Alan Natapoff, Research Scientist
| Jan/23 | Wed | 04:00PM-05:30PM | 37-212 |
Enrollment: Unlimited: No advance sign-up
The Electoral College delivers large individual voting power in battleground states, but it destroys it in poorly-contested, i.e., in most states. Small numbers turned Florida and the presidency in 2000, but they could never turn a national election under simple majority voting which destroys all individual voting power, everywhere, in any large election. The solution is to have the winner, A, of a state receive one vote for every popular vote cast in it plus the equivalent (600 thousand votes in 2012) of two Senatorial Electoral votes. If A is sure to carry the state, a voter that rejects him can cast a blank ballot that will not count for anyone. This rewards candidates (and presidents) vote-for-vote for the consent of their opposition and saves the voting power of individuals. We trace the paradoxes and delicious oddities of individual voting power, and the resolution of Florida's deadlock in 2000 by Fermat's Rule.
Sponsor(s): Political Science
Contact: Alan Natapoff, 37-147, 617 253-7757, NATAPOFF@MIT.EDU