Itai Ashlagi
I’m an Assistant Professor at the MIT Sloan School. Prior to this I was a post-doc fellow at Harvard Business School, advised by Alvin E. Roth, and before that I was a graduate student at the Technion, advised by Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz.
Working Papers
The
Need for (long) Chains in Kidney Exchange, with David Gamarnik, Michael
A. Rees, and Alvin
E. Roth
Free riding and participation
in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange, with Alvin E. Roth,
(Extended abstract appears in EC 11.)
Covered in TheMarker (Haaretz)
Stability
in large matching markets with complementarities (previously called Matching
with Couples - Revisited) with Mark
Braverman and Avinatan
Hassidim (Extended abstract appears in EC 11.)
Ascending unit semand auctions
with budget limits with Mark
Braverman and Avinatan
Hassidim.
Published and forthcoming papers
New challenges in multi-hospital kidney exchange, with Alvin Roth, American Economic Review (P&P), forthcoming.
An
optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanisms, with Shahar Dobzinski and Ron Lavi, Mathematics of
Operations Research, forthcoming, 2012. Winner of
the outstanding paper award of EC 09.
Nonsimultaneous
chains and dominos in kidney paired donation – revisited with Duncan S. Gilchrist, Alvin E. Roth and Michael
A. Rees, American Journal of Transplantation, 11(5), 984--994,
2011. Covered in Nature
Reviews.
Nead
chains in transplantation with Duncan S. Gilchrist, Alvin E. Roth and Michael
A. Rees, American Journal of Transplantation, December, 11,
2780-2781, 2011
Manipulability
in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests, with Flip Klijn, Social
Choice and Welfare, forthcoming.
A noncooperative support for equal division in estate
division, with Emin
Karagozoglu and Bettina Klaus, Mathematics
of Social Sciences, forthcoming.
Characterizing vickrey allocation rule by anonymity with Shigehiro
Serizawa, Social
Choice and Welfare, forthcoming.
Simultaneous ad auctions with Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz.
Mathematics of Operations Research, 36(1),
1-13, 2011.
Monotonicity and
Implementability with Mark Braverman, Avinatan Hassidim and Dov Monderer, Econometrica, 78(5), 1749-1772, 2010. Supplentary material.
Position
auctions with budgets: existence and uniqueness with Mark Braverman, Avinatan Hassidim, Ron Lavi and Moshe Tennenholtz, B.E.
journal of Theoretical Economics – Advances, forthcoming.
Mediators in
position auctions with Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz, Games
and Economic Behavior, 67(1), 2009, (a shorter version appears in the
proceedings of EC 07). slides
Two-terminal
routing games with unknown active
players with Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz, Artificial
Intelligence Journal, 173(15), 1441-1455, 2009
On the value of
correlation with Dov
Monderer and Moshe
Tennenholtz, Journal of Artificial Intelligence, 33, 575-613,
2008, (a shorter version appears in
the proceedings of UAI 05).
Papers in Refereed Conference
Proceedings (not
appearing above)
Mix
and match with Felix
Fischer, Ian
A. Kash and Ariel D. Procaccia
(EC 10)
K-NCC:
stability against group deviations in non-cooperative computation with Andrey Klinger and Moshe Tennenholtz (A
shorter version appears in the proceedings of WINE 07).
Learning equilibrium
in resource selection games with Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz
(AAAI 07).
Routing games with an unknown set of active players with Dov
Monderer and Moshe
Tennenholtz (AAMAS 07).
Robust
learning equilibrium with Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz
(UAI 06)
Resource
selection games with unknown number of players with Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz (A
shorter version appears in the proceedings AAMAS 06).
Software:
Kidney
exchange (both cycles and chains).
To use (i) one should have cplex and (ii) please cite Individual rationality and
participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange” and Nonsimultaneous Chains and Dominos in Kidney Paired Donation
– Revisited. The
software either generates simulated patient/donor pairs as well as a
compatibility matrix, or alternatively gets as an input such data. It finds an
allocation that maximizes the number of transplants using cycles and chains
each of a different bounded length. (Chains begin with non-directed donors.)
Contact Information:
Itai Ashlagi
E62-577,
Sloan School of Management, MIT
e-mail: iashlagi [at] mit [dot] edu