Assistant Professor of Operations Management
MIT Sloan School of Managment
Prior to this I was a post-doc fellow at Harvard Business School. My advisor was Alvin E. Roth.
Before that I was a graduate student in Operations Research at the Technion. My advisors were Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz.
I am a recipient of the NSF CAREER award and a Franz Edelman Laureate.
Research interests: market design, matching, auctions and mechanism design and game theory.
100 Main St.
Cambridge, MA 02139
Email: iashlagi at mit dot edu
I also worked with Vahideh Manshadi. She was a Post-doc and now in Yale SOM.
- Unblanaced Random Matching Markets: the Stark Effect of Competition, with Yash Kanoria
and Jacob D. Leshno (extended abstract in EC 13).
- See blog posts
- Finalist (winners announced in November 2014) in 2014 INFORMS Junior Faculty Interest Group (JFIG) best paper competition.
- A Dynamic Model of Barter Exchange, with Ross Anderson, David Gamarnik and Yash Kanoria
- Optimal Allocation Without Money: an Engineering Approach, with Peng
Shi (extended abstract in EC 14), Minor Revision at Management Science.
- First place: 2013 INFORMS Section on Public Programs, Services and Needs (SPPSN) best paper competition
- Kidney Exchange in Dynamic Sparse Heterogeneous Pools, with Patrick Jaillet and Vahideh Manshadi (extended
abstract in EC 13), R&R at Management Science.
The Need for (Long) Chains in Kidney Exchange, with David Gamarnik, Michael
A. Rees and Alvin E. Roth, R&R at Operations Research
- Ascending unit demand auctions with budget limits, with Mark Braverman
and Avinatan Hassidim, Technical report.
Nead Chains in Transplantation, with Duncan S. Gilchrist, Alvin E. Roth and Michael
A. Rees, American Journal of Transplantation, December, 11, 2780-2781, 2011.
Manipulability in Matching Markets: Conflict and Coincidence of Interests, with
Flip Klijn, Social Choice and Welfare, 39(1), 23-33,2012.
A Noncooperative Support for Equal Division in Estate Division, with and Bettina Klaus, Mathematics of Social Sciences, 63(3), 228-233, 2012.
Characterizing Vickrey Allocation Rules by Anonymity, with Shigehiro, Social Choice and Welfare, 28(3),
Simultaneous Ad Auctions, with Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz, Mathematics of Operations Research, 36(1),
Monotonicity and Implementability with Mark Braverman,
Hassidim and Dov Monderer, Econometrica,
78(5), 1749-1772, 2010.
Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness with Mark Braverman,
Hassidim, Ron Lavi and Moshe Tennenholtz, B.E.
journal of Theoretical Economics – Advances, forthcoming.
Mediators in Position Auctions, with Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz, Games
and Economic Behavior, 67(1), 2009, (extended abstract in EC 07).
Routing Games with Unknown Active
Players , with Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz, Artificial
Intelligence Journal, 173(15), 1441-1455, 2009.
On the Value of Correlation, with Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz, Journal
of Artificial Intelligence, 33, 575-613, 2008, (extended abstract in UAI 05).
- Improving Community Cohesion in School Choice via
Correlated-Lottery Implementation, with Peng Shi. Operations Research, forthcoming.
- Stability in Large Matching Markets with Complementarities, with Mark Braverman and Avinatan
Hassidim, Operations Research, forthcoming (extended
abstract in EC 11).
- Previously called "Matching Markets with Couples - Revisited".
- Free Riding
and Participation in Large Scale, Multi-Hospital Kidney Exchange, with Alvin
E. Roth, Theoretical Economics, forthcoming (extended abstract in EC 11).
and Match, with Felix
A. Kash and Ariel D. Procaccia,
Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming (extended abstract in EC 10).
New Challenges in Multi-Hospital Kidney Exchange, with Alvin
E. Roth, American Economic Review (P&P), 102(3), 354-359, 2012
Lower Bounds for Anonymous Scheduling Mechanisms, with Shahar Dobzinski and Ron Lavi, Mathematics of Operations Research, 37(2),
- Winner of the outstanding paper award of EC 09.
Chains and Dominos in Kidney Paired Donation – Revisited, with Duncan S. Gilchrist, Alvin E. Roth and Michael
A. Rees, American Journal of Transplantation, 11(5), 984-994,
Covered in Nature
Papers in refereed conference proceedings (not appearing above)
Kidney exchange source code. Instructions for how to compile can be found here. An older version in c# can be found here (for both cycles and chains), which also generates
patient-donor pairs as well as compatibility matrices. The software finds an
allocation that maximizes the number of transplants using cycles and chains each of
a different bounded length. CPLEX is needed to use.