I am an Assistant Professor of Operations Management in MIT Sloan School Management affiliated with the ORC.
I was a post-doc fellow at Harvard Business School, advised by Alvin E. Roth.
I am a recipient of the NSF CAREER award and a Franz Edelman finalist.
Research interests: I’m interested in market and mechanism design, game theory and matching.
I also work with Vahideh Manshadi who is a Post-doc at MIT.
Optimal allocation without money: an engineering approach, with Peng Shi (extended abstract appears in EC 14).
Unbalanced random matching markets: the stark effect of competition, with Yash Kanoria and Jacob D. Leshno (extended abstract appears in EC 13). Blogged about here and here.
Kidney exchange in dynamic sparse heterogeneous pools, with Patrick Jaillet and Vahideh Manshadi (extended abstract appears in EC 13).
Published and forthcoming papers
Stability in large matching markets with complementarities, with Mark Braverman and Avinatan Hassidim, forthcoming in Operations Research (extended abstract appears in EC 11).
Free riding and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange, with Alvin E. Roth, forthcoming in Theoretical Economics. Covered in TheMarker (Haaretz), (extended abstract appears in EC 11).
An optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanisms, with Shahar Dobzinski and Ron Lavi, Mathematics of Operations Research, 37(2), 244-258, 2012. Winner of the outstanding paper award of EC 09.
Nonsimultaneous chains and dominos in kidney paired donation – revisited with Duncan S. Gilchrist, Alvin E. Roth and Michael A. Rees, American Journal of Transplantation, 11(5), 984-994, 2011. Covered in Nature Reviews.
Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests, with Flip Klijn, Social Choice and Welfare, 39(1), 23-33, 2012.
A noncooperative support for equal division in estate division, with Emin Karagozoglu and Bettina Klaus, Mathematics of Social Sciences, 63(3), 228-233, 2012.
Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity with Shigehiro Serizawa, Social Choice and Welfare, 28(3), 531-542, 2012.
Position auctions with budgets: existence and uniqueness with Mark Braverman, Avinatan Hassidim, Ron Lavi and Moshe Tennenholtz, B.E. journal of Theoretical Economics – Advances, forthcoming.
Two-terminal routing games with unknown active players with Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz, Artificial Intelligence Journal, 173(15), 1441-1455, 2009.
Papers in refereed conference proceedings (not appearing above)
K-NCC: stability against group deviations in non-cooperative computation with Andrey Klinger and Moshe Tennenholtz (WINE 07).
Routing games with an unknown set of active players with Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz (AAMAS 07).
Resource selection games with unknown number of players with Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz (A shorter version appears in AAMAS 06).
Kidney exchange (both cycles and chains). To use (i) one should have cplex and (ii) please cite Individual rationality and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange” and Nonsimultaneous Chains and Dominos in Kidney Paired Donation – Revisited. The software either generates simulated patient/donor pairs as well as a compatibility matrix, or alternatively gets as an input such data. It finds an allocation that maximizes the number of transplants using cycles and chains each of a different bounded length.
Sloan School of Management, MIT
e-mail: iashlagi [at] mit [dot] edu