Itai Ashlagi
I am an Assistant Professor of Operations Management in MIT Sloan School Management affiliated with the ORC.

I was a post-doc fellow at Harvard Business School, advised by Alvin E. Roth.

Before that I was a graduate student at the Technion, advised by Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz.

 

I am a recipient of the NSF CAREER award and a Franz Edelman finalist.

Research interests: Im interested in market and mechanism design, game theory and matching.

 

 

CV

 

Students

 

Peng Shi

Ross Anderson

I also work with Vahideh Manshadi who is a Post-doc at MIT.

 

Working papers

Unbalanced random matching markets: the stark effect of competition, with Yash Kanoria and Jacob D. Leshno (extended abstract in EC 13). Blogged about here and here.

A dynamic model of barter exchange, with Ross Anderson, David Gamarnik and Yash Kanoria.

Optimal allocation without money: an engineering approach, with Peng Shi (extended abstract in EC 14), Minor revision at Management Science.

Kidney exchange in dynamic sparse heterogeneous pools, with Patrick Jaillet and Vahideh Manshadi (extended abstract in EC 13), R&R at Management Science.

The need for (long) chains in kidney exchange, with David Gamarnik, Michael A. Rees and Alvin E. Roth, R&R at Operations Research.

Ascending unit demand auctions with budget limits with Mark Braverman and Avinatan Hassidim. Technical report.

 

Published and forthcoming papers

Improving community cohesion in school choice via correlated-lottery implementation, with Peng Shi. forthcoming in Operations Research.

Stability in large matching markets with complementarities, with Mark Braverman and Avinatan Hassidim, forthcoming in Operations Research (extended abstract in EC 11).

Free riding and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange, with Alvin E. Roth, forthcoming in Theoretical Economics. Covered in TheMarker (Haaretz), (extended abstract appears in EC 11).

Mix and match with Felix Fischer, Ian A. Kash and Ariel D. Procaccia, forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, (extended abstract in EC 10).

New challenges in multi-hospital kidney exchange, with Alvin E. Roth, American Economic Review (P&P), 102(3), 354-359, 2012.

Optimal lower bounds for anonymous scheduling mechanisms, with Shahar Dobzinski and Ron Lavi, Mathematics of Operations Research, 37(2), 244-258, 2012. Winner of the outstanding paper award of EC 09.

Nonsimultaneous chains and dominos in kidney paired donation revisited with Duncan S. Gilchrist, Alvin E. Roth and Michael A. Rees, American Journal of Transplantation, 11(5), 984-994, 2011. Covered in Nature Reviews.

Nead chains in transplantation with Duncan S. Gilchrist, Alvin E. Roth and Michael A. Rees, American Journal of Transplantation, December, 11, 2780-2781, 2011.

Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests, with Flip Klijn, Social Choice and Welfare, 39(1), 23-33, 2012.

 

A noncooperative support for equal division in estate division, with Emin Karagozoglu and Bettina Klaus, Mathematics of Social Sciences, 63(3), 228-233, 2012.

Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity with Shigehiro Serizawa, Social Choice and Welfare, 28(3), 531-542, 2012.

Simultaneous ad auctions with Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz. Mathematics of Operations Research, 36(1), 1-13, 2011.

Monotonicity and implementability with Mark Braverman, Avinatan Hassidim and Dov Monderer, Econometrica, 78(5), 1749-1772, 2010. Supplementary material.

Position auctions with budgets: existence and uniqueness with Mark Braverman, Avinatan Hassidim, Ron Lavi and Moshe Tennenholtz, B.E. journal of Theoretical Economics Advances, forthcoming.

Mediators in position auctions with Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz, Games and Economic Behavior, 67(1), 2009, (extended abstract in EC 07). slides

Two-terminal routing games with unknown active players with Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz, Artificial Intelligence Journal, 173(15), 1441-1455, 2009.

On the value of correlation with Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz, Journal of Artificial Intelligence, 33, 575-613, 2008, (extended abstract appears in UAI 05).

 

Papers in refereed conference proceedings (not appearing above)

K-NCC: stability against group deviations in non-cooperative computation with Andrey Klinger and Moshe Tennenholtz (WINE 07).

Learning equilibrium in resource selection games with Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz (AAAI 07).

Routing games with an unknown set of active players  with Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz (AAMAS 07).

Robust learning equilibrium  with Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz (UAI 06).

Resource selection games with unknown number of players with Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz (A shorter version appears in AAMAS 06).

 

Software:

Kidney exchange source code. Instructions for how to compile can be found here. An older version in c# can be found here (both cycles and chains)

which also generates patient-donor pairs as well as compatibility matrices. The software finds an allocation that maximizes the number of transplants using cycles

and chains each of a different bounded length. CPLEX is needed to use.

 

 

Contact Information:

Itai Ashlagi

E62-577,

Sloan School of Management, MIT

e-mail: iashlagi [at] mit  [dot] edu