

Committee Jurisdiction, Congressional Behavior and Policy Outcomes

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ABSTRACT

Although jurisdictional turf wars between congressional committees have long been recognized, scholars have largely overlooked the impact of jurisdictional fights on policy proposals and outcomes. This paper develops a theoretical perspective on how legislators balance the benefits of expanded committee jurisdiction against preferred policy outcomes. It shows why: a) senior members, and young members in safe districts are most likely to challenge a committee's jurisdiction; b) policy proposals may be initiated off the proposer's ideal point in order to obtain jurisdiction; c) policy outcomes will generally be more moderate with jurisdictional fights than without these turf wars. We empirically investigate these results with an examination of proposed Internet intellectual property protection legislation in the 106th Congress.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Congressional committees, as gatekeepers of policy, have enormous power to determine the shape of proposed legislation that reaches the House floor. Scholars have elucidated many reasons why the full membership of Congress might delegate its power to constituent committees. These include that committees offer advantages in cost-effectively obtaining and disseminating information (Krehbiel 1992; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989), in avoiding cycling in voting and promoting compromise and log-rolling through the politically efficient distribution of rents to constituencies (Weingast and Marshall 1988; Krutz 2001), and encouraging legislators to engage in long-term reputation building to create better information for voters (Kroszner and Strattman 2000). All of these models, however, have an underlying assumption: all jurisdictional boundaries for committees are static and clearly defined for all issues. There is no ambiguity as to the single committee that exercises agenda-setting power over any given bill.

In practice, however, committee jurisdictional boundaries are fluid and ambiguous (Baumgartner et al 2000). In order to increase power, committees attempt to expand jurisdiction to issues on the periphery of other committees' jurisdiction (King 1997). In addition, new issues and technologies come about where there is no clear responsible committee (e.g. nuclear power, computing, Internet) (Oleszek 2001). These jurisdictional "turf wars" between committees over continuing and new issues can have a profound impact on the behavior of legislators and the outcomes of policies only tangentially considered by the previous theoretical and empirical literature. For example, while static boundaries lead to monopoly agenda-setting power and policy for the controlling committee that may lead to extreme policy, jurisdictional fights

between committees introduce additional gatekeepers into the calculus that often results in more moderate policy.

This paper examines how jurisdictional conflict between committees affects policy proposals and policy outcomes. By considering legislators and committees as foresightful and strategic, the paper explores which congressional actors have incentive to challenge jurisdiction, and how these potential challenges affect the policy positions of the two committees engaged in a jurisdictional turf war. While several previous papers in the area have adroitly described the phenomenon of jurisdictional conflict (Adler and Still 2000, King 1994, Hardin 1998, Oleszek 2001) they have not linked the process of jurisdictional challenge with its effect on policy outcomes. A small number of other papers have recognized that jurisdiction may affect policy outcomes, but these works have only described the broad contours of this phenomenon (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, Bimber 1996, King 1997). If jurisdictional turf wars result in no differences in policy outcomes than those instances of no jurisdictional conflict, then they are of muted interest as a topic and a field. If jurisdictional turf wars result in large swings in policy outcomes than would otherwise happen, then the literature is quite sparse relative to its importance to policy.

The paper begins by developing a theoretical perspective of jurisdiction with forward-looking committees and legislators. From this perspective, hypotheses are generated related to the incentives to introduce new bills and the eventual policy proposals and outcomes. We consider under what conditions compromise will be likely and the nature of this compromise. The paper then tests the theoretical perspective with multiple pieces of evidence and statistical analyses from proposed database copyright protection legislation (also now known as Internet intellectual property legislation). In 1999, the House of Representatives encountered one of the most clear-cut instances of jurisdictional uncertainty and encroachment with H.R. 353 and H.R.

1858 covering database copyright protection. With hundreds of interest groups acting on each side of the issue, and legislators balancing jurisdictional issues against policy outcomes, the fight between the two bills typifies how jurisdictional battles play out in Congress.

This paper predicts theoretically, and demonstrates empirically, a number of interesting patterns in the behavior of legislators. First, it shows how committees and legislators balance the benefits from policy outcomes with the benefits and costs associated with challenging jurisdiction over a policy domain. Seeking jurisdiction is not a cost-free exercise, and legislators may be willing to accept a sub-optimal policy in order to obtain future jurisdiction over an agenda. This is not considered in other theories of committee power. The empirical evidence lines up behind this theoretical argument. Second, the paper argues those with the highest incentive to challenge an incumbent jurisdiction will be senior members, and young members who are in safe districts for whom jurisdiction and the political rents that come with it is most valuable. Statistical analyses support this prediction. These results stand in contrast to the current empirical literature, which generally assumes closed-rule, monopoly committee jurisdictions. Finally, policy proposals and outcomes can be greatly affected by the possibility of a challenging committee arising. In particular, the mere threat to introduce a challenger bill can serve to moderate the incumbent's proposal. This is important because it suggests that in many areas, policy outcomes may be the result of an equilibrium strategy that the incumbent committee plays in order to keep out potential challenger committees. Thus, introducing jurisdictional conflict serves to create more moderate policy positions than would occur in a model of monopoly, agenda-setting committee power. Introducing multiple pieces of empirical evidence, we show how this occurs.

In the next section, we offer some background on committee jurisdiction and develop a simple theoretical perspective that explicates the behavior when two competing bills are

introduced. Section III outlines the Internet database protection legislative fight that occurred in the 106th Congress is described. Section IV tests each of the hypotheses using descriptive and statistical evidence. Section V concludes.

II. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

A. INSTITUTIONAL DETAIL: THE BILL REFERRAL PROCESS

The process of bill introduction is extremely detailed and complex. In this section, we provide an overview of how bills are referred to committees. Potential legislation in the House is proposed by representatives in the form of bills. Bills are introduced onto the House floor, and then forwarded to the House Parliamentarian who refers the bill to a House committee for review, modification, or termination. The House Parliamentarian is an appointee of the Speaker of the House and generally considered an unbiased referrer of bills (King 1997), referring bills probabilistically on the merits, to committees.¹

The bill referral process is made up of two parts: a codified component and a discretionary component. Rule X of the House Rules allots jurisdiction covering pre-specified topics to certain committees. For example, the Judiciary Committee has formal jurisdiction over “patents, the Patent and Trademark Office, copyrights, and trademarks,” and the Commerce Committee has formal jurisdiction over “consumer affairs and consumer protection, interstate and foreign commerce generally.” Bills that fit squarely into one of the subject areas identified by Rule X are then allocated by the Parliamentarian to the committees with formal, codified jurisdiction over the issue.

Many bills, however, may not fit cleanly into the subject areas identified in Rule X. Some topics may be at the fringe of the jurisdiction of one committee, other bills may not fit into any jurisdiction. Figure 1 illustrates this with a Venn diagram. Imagine two committees, 1 and

2, which have jurisdiction over some set of issue areas. The span of issues is represented by the box. There are issues such as A that are at the fringe of one committee's jurisdiction (such as Internet intellectual property protection), there are other issues such as D that reside in no committee's jurisdiction (such as regulation of the accounting industry). It is in these types of cases that the Parliamentarian may exercise discretion in bill referral.

When there is jurisdictional ambiguity, the Parliamentarian turns to other factors in determining the weight of the bill for targeting the recipient committee (King 1997). The first factor is whether the current bill amends a public law over which a committee already has jurisdiction. The second factor is previous bill referral precedents, in a common law sense, to find guidance for the current bill. The third factor is committee expertise in the policy area, evidenced by oversight hearings (Talbert et al 1995), the strategic selection of committee staffers, and joining of special issue caucuses. The fourth factor is bill titles and preambles and matching these subject indicators to committees. The Parliamentarian takes all these factors into account when deciding where the "weight of the bill" resides, and which committee should receive the bill. It is for these reasons that legislators adjust their behavior and the language in their bills, to enhance the probability that a bill will be referred to their committee. We consider this in our theoretical framework in the next section.

B. THEORY

We begin by considering what legislators and committees value. A short formal model is provided in the Appendix that characterizes the equilibrium behavior of individual legislators and their respective committees. Here we outline the intuition. We make four simplifying assumptions. First, all legislators of a given committee prefer more jurisdiction to less jurisdiction for that committee. Second, jurisdiction is zero-sum. One committee's gain in

jurisdiction is another committee's loss. Third, the members of a committee may have differing incentives to introduce a bill. That is, bill introduction is not random, but there is a predictable process (with noise) that gives rise to bill introductions. Finally, the goal of a given legislator is to be re-elected.

With these four assumptions we can now analyze bill introduction. Any bill proposed by a legislator has three components of benefit that help the legislator become re-elected and that help the committee-members gain power. The first component is the benefit from the policy outcome. The second benefit is from legislative jurisdiction. The third is the benefit from oversight jurisdiction. However, policy creation is not free; it comes at a cost to the legislator. We consider each of these factors below.

The first benefit, policy outcomes, has been well-modeled in spatial location models (Snyder 1991, for example). In these models, legislators choose policies that are on or close to the ideal points of the median voter in their constituency. The closer the policy outcome is to the ideal policy of the median voter in the district, the more utility the legislator obtains.

The second benefit is from legislative jurisdiction. Legislative jurisdiction is the right of committee members to create, review, modify, and refer legislation on a given issue to the floor of the House or Senate. The codified and common-law processes of obtaining legislative jurisdiction are described in the previous section. There are multiple benefits conveyed through legislative jurisdiction. First, with legislative jurisdiction, committees can craft legislation close to their own likings, thus obtaining policy benefits. Second, committee members have control over bills they can use to logroll issues with other committees. Third, committee members can extract informational and financial rents from the constituencies they regulate. The benefit to the committee members is assumed to be increasing in jurisdiction.

A final type of benefit is oversight jurisdiction. Enacted laws are normally delegated to a surrogate for implementation and interpretation. For example, telecommunications policy is frequently delegated to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Intellectual property rules are sometimes delegated to the US Patent Office (USPTO), or are sometimes left directly to the federal courts. With each policy that is delegated, there is normally a congressional committee that provides oversight of the agency charged with implementation. So the Commerce Committee oversees the FCC and the Judiciary Committee oversees the federal courts. In most cases, the legislative jurisdiction is coupled with the oversight jurisdiction, but this does not necessarily have to be the case.²

The benefits obtained though this form of jurisdiction can yield both policy and political rents to committee members. To the extent that the agency can promulgate regulations affecting industry and interest groups, congressional committees with oversight can place pressure (hearings, budgetary) on agencies to administratively create policy that might have been difficult to implement within the legislative branch. Moreover, members of such committees can also obtain information and financial rents from interest groups that are regulated by the agency the committee oversees.

All of these benefits are not cost free to the committee members. In order to engage in policy-making and jurisdictional policy and oversight, members must exert some amount of effort and time, which is related to how much expertise the legislator has in the policy area, and the ease with which she has in crafting legislation (Hall and Wayman 1990). There is heterogeneity in costs across committees, as well as within committees.³

Thus, we can summarize the calculation made by an individual legislator. She values (and can trade-off) policy outcomes that are close to her ideal point, as well as (against) legislative and oversight jurisdiction over issues. These benefits come at a cost of exerting effort

in bill creation and introduction. A re-election maximizing legislator then weighs these benefits and costs and finds her own optimal bill introduction behavior.

With the behavior of legislators characterized, let us take a policy issue in the position A in Figure 1. This is an issue over which an incumbent committee would normally have jurisdiction. We assume a) that the incumbent committee already has a bill under consideration in its committee (this is not a necessary condition, but makes exposition easier), and b) that all bills referred to the incumbent committee end up at the ideal policy point of the incumbent committee (characterized by the median voter of the that committee) in the absence of a competing bill.

Now a potential challenger bill arises from a member of another committee. If the challenger does introduce a bill, there is a probability, p , that this bill will be referred by the Parliamentarian to the challenger committee, and a probability $(1-p)$ that it will be referred to the incumbent committee. To examine the effect of jurisdictional conflicts on policy outcomes, we consider two baseline cases. The first we is an open rule, unidimensional median-voter model, where one committee has monopoly agenda-setting power (can send bills to the floor), but any member on the floor can propose amendments at zero (or very, very low) costs. In this model, the equilibrium policy outcome is the median voter on the floor. This is because for any proposal off of the median voter's ideal point, there is another policy that can be introduced which the median prefers. This makes any proposal that is not on the median voter's ideal point unstable.

Let us consider a second baseline model common in the literature -- a closed rule, unidimensional median-voter model with monopoly agenda-setting power for the incumbent committee. This is equivalent in the theoretical perspective to the probability of a second bill referral to the challenger committee being zero ($p = 0$). This is similar to the previous case, except the policy proposed by the incumbent committee cannot be amended. Thus the

comparison for the median voter on the floor is between the status quo, x , and the bill proposed by the committee, y . As long as y is closer to the median voter than x , it will be an equilibrium.

Within this second baseline model, we could also assume an extreme form of jurisdictional conflict: a member of the challenger committee receives the second bill with $p = 1$. All parties know this member has a credible threat to introduce a competing bill, because by introducing this bill, the challenger's committee gains some legislative jurisdiction over the issue and the incumbent loses some legislative jurisdiction over the issue (even if the bill does not pass). This, in turn, enhances the bargaining position of the member of the challenger committee. To prevent this loss of jurisdictional claims, the incumbent committee members will move the position of their bill (through mark-up, for example) closer to the challenger's preferences so as to create little incentive for a challenger bill to arise in the first place. This "compromise" solution will be a position so that the member of the challenger committee is no worse off than the bill it would have introduced in the first place plus the expected jurisdictional gains the challenger would make (minus the costs of bill introduction).

What becomes evident is that as p increases, the incumbent is willing to introduce a bill closer to the challenger's ideal point. *That is, as the threat of a challenger committee member encroaching on the policy space increases, the more the incumbent committee members are willing to attenuate their initial policy position to prevent this encroachment.* Thus, members are willing to trade policy for jurisdiction. This is a form of compromise—offering a more moderate policy position to induce no jurisdictional challenge from a potential competitor. This leads to the first hypothesis.

ATTENUATION HYPOTHESIS

H1: The higher the probability a challenger bill will be referred to another committee, the more moderate the incumbent committee's policy position will be to prevent jurisdictional encroachment.

As the theory notes, legislators can engage in trade-offs. There are two prototypical types of models of legislator utility functions. The first is a spatial model in policy space, where legislators are trying to obtain their highest utility policy outcome. The second is a jurisdictional encroachment model, where legislators are trying to obtain the most legislative and oversight jurisdiction feasible. In this paper, we consider both factors as important, and legislators will be willing to trade one for the other. For example, if the members of the Judiciary Committee introduce a bill that is right on the ideal point of the Commerce Committee, the Commerce Committee members may still introduce a competing bill, similar to the Judiciary Committee bill, to obtain jurisdictional benefits. Indeed, there are instances that might arise when members of a challenger committee may introduce a bill that is far from its ideal point if it believes that the positioning of the bill will enhance its ability to obtain jurisdiction. It depends upon how the challenger committee weights the policy outcome with the costs and benefits from jurisdiction.

We can, moreover, predict who, within a challenger committee, will have the greatest incentive to act. Jurisdiction has two properties. First, as Hall (1998) notes, committee leadership positions play a leading role in jurisdictional grabs. That is, senior members of the challenging committee (those that are subcommittee chairs and ranking minority members) attempt to expand their current power through these jurisdictional games. In this view, bills which are likely to expand a committee's jurisdiction are sponsored by these high-ranking members. An alternative view, supported by King (1997), is that legislative jurisdiction takes time to build, through multiple bill referrals in many congresses. Oversight jurisdiction takes time to implement as well (Weingast and Moran 1983). If jurisdictions are a rent that may produce "revenues" over the long-term, then people who expect to receive that income stream for the longest time should find the highest value to engaging in jurisdictional grabs. This would suggest that junior members of the challenging committee in safe seats (who can expect to be

around for a long time) will have the highest incentive to engage in jurisdictional challenges.

These considerations are not taken into account in the previous theories of bill sponsorship. This leads to Hypothesis 2.

JURISDICTION HYPOTHESES

H2a: If legislative and oversight jurisdiction is highly enough valued by members of the challenger committee, the members of the challenger committee will introduce policy that is not close to its ideal point to gain jurisdiction.

H2b: Senior members in the challenger committee are most likely to sponsor challenger bills.

H2c: Young members in safe seats in the challenger committee are most likely to sponsor challenger bills.

III. BACKGROUND: INTERNET DATABASE PROTECTION

In January 1999, Howard Coble (R-NC) introduced (for a second time), his bill (H.R. 353) to strengthen Internet intellectual property protection (Baron 2000). A group of companies and interest groups, led by eBay, the Realtors Association, and Reed Elsevier, had been pressing Congress to act. The rise of the Internet made it particularly easy for pirates to extract and replicate on-line, electronic, and Internet databases. Indeed, many of these companies had become subject to “attack” from “pirates.”

For example, Bidder’s Edge, a rival to eBay, had built its business model upon auction aggregation. The company designed algorithms to search across 120 online auction sites, and then download the information of these target auction sites onto its own site. The “spiders” copied and downloaded about 80,000 web pages from eBay onto the Bidder’s Edge site daily. eBay estimated that Bidder’s Edge alone accounted for between 1% and 1.5% of the queries received by eBay. This imposed a heavy load on eBay’s servers and made its computers operate slower for customers accessing the site.

These “attacker” companies sought legal protection under a 1991 U.S Supreme Court decision known popularly as the “Feist” decision (Feist, 499 US 340). The key question before

the Supreme Court was the scope of copyright protection. What in databases could be protected?

The Feist Court ruled, "...all facts-scientific, historical, biographical and news of the day . . . are part of the public domain available to every person." They continued:

"The facts contained in existing works may be freely copied because copyright protects only the elements that owe their origin to the compiler -- the selection, coordination, and arrangement of facts."

Given that Bidder's Edge was using publicly available facts about auctions, it stood to reason, they argued, that the facts in the online databases were not protected by copyright, and thus could be copied, provided their selection, coordination, and arrangement were not.

Against this backdrop, these database companies such as Monster.com, NASDAQ, and the NYSE, sought a re-write of the copyright law, and turned to the chair of the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property, Howard Coble. eBay, the realtors, and the publishers prevailed upon Mr. Coble, in keeping with a long-held Republican belief that property rights should be preserved, to introduce a bill to strengthen the copyright protection afforded to electronic and online databases. In January 1999, Rep. Coble introduced a bill to increase intellectual property protection for electronic databases.

The Collections of Information Antipiracy Act (H.R. 353) introduced by Coble, did not copyright facts per se, but it did seek to protect databases and thus overturn Feist. It made illegal for any person to:

"make available to others, or extract to make available to others, all or a substantial part of a collection of information gathered, organized, or maintained by another person through the investment of substantial monetary or other resources, so as to cause material harm to the primary market or a related market of that other person, ...for a product or service that incorporates that collection of information and is offered or intended to be offered in commerce by that other person...."

Any person who was harmed under the terms of the Act could bring a civil court case against the alleged infringer, and ask for the profits attributable to the violation, treble actual damages, and a

fine and/or imprisonment. The Act was well received by database producers. As head of the Intellectual Property Subcommittee that had traditionally overseen copyright legislation, Coble was well-positioned to shepherd his bill through the 106th House of Representatives to a final, and expected winning vote in the Republican-majority floor.

H.R. 353, however, resulted in the organization of a competing interest group coalition of old and new economy firms and associations that opposed the bill, spearheaded by Yahoo!, NetCoalition (a consortium of ten large Internet companies, including AOL, Amazon), Bloomberg, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the American Research Libraries Association. These database users were concerned about how an increase in copyright protection might affect their business and their constituents. A large number of universities, including Harvard, Chicago, and Stanford, (and their associated research libraries) argued if database companies were able to compile and copyright the facts from their databases, scientific research of all types would be greatly hindered and might even be slowed to a snail's pace.

In May 1999, as H.R. 353 was working its way through the Judiciary Committee, this coalition persuaded Thomas Bliley (R-VA), chairman of the Commerce Committee, to introduce a competing bill that had the effect of codifying into proposed legislation the Feist decision with some small additional protections. This bill, the Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act of 1999 (H.R. 1858) was referred to the Commerce Committee, Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection. H.R. 1858 made it:

“... unlawful for any person or entity ...to sell or distribute to the public a database that--
(1) is a duplicate of another database that was collected and organized by another person or entity; and
(2) is sold or distributed in commerce in competition with that other database”

Enforcement of the Act rested with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and violators of the Act were punished under the rules respecting unfair or deceptive acts or practices under

section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, a much more lenient punishment than H. R. 353 prescribed. There were now two competing bills in Congress in two separate committees.

In Figure 2, we outline in a one-dimensional spatial diagram, the positions of the players. Feist (F) was a lenient outcome, offering very low protection to databases. The Judiciary Committee introduced a bill with very strong protection, which it manifested in the introduction of the H.R. 353 (C). We place C opposite F , but closer to the median voter, M , than F is to the median voter. Thus, an unopposed Coble bill would likely become law because it captures the median voter. Finally, the Commerce Committee introduced the H.R. 1858 (B), such that it was on the interval $[F, C]$. We place it to the right of Feist, and closer to the median voter than J .

IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

In this section, we empirically examine the predictions of the committee jurisdiction model on legislator and committee behavior, and policy outcomes. We test the two hypotheses posed in the theory section by examining the copyright fight that occurred between the two committees. We examine each hypothesis and bring to bear multiple pieces of evidence to assess the validity of the hypothesis in this setting.

A. ATTENUATION HYPOTHESIS

In examining the evidence for Hypothesis 1, we establish two main facts: the Judiciary Committee was the incumbent committee, and the probability of a challenger committee arising was small so the Judiciary Committee did not attenuate its extreme position. If the probability is high, then, in equilibrium, the Judiciary Committee should introduce a moderate bill, close to the preferences of the competing committee, to stave off a jurisdictional challenge. If the probability

is low that a challenger committee will arise, then the bill introduced by the Judiciary Committee can more closely reflect the preferences of the committee, and thus be more extreme.

There are three main factors that suggest the Judiciary Committee was the incumbent committee, and that it was likely to receive H.R. 353. First, Representative Coble had a long-expressed interest in the bill. This was not the first time a nearly-identical version of this same bill had gone through the House. The earlier bill was also referred to the Judiciary Committee in the 105th Congress, giving precedent for this bill to follow the same committee referral path. Second, Coble's staff, with the help of similarly-minded interest groups, had written the H.R. 353. King (1997) notes that bills are written with language so as to route the bill to certain committees. Finally, the Judiciary Committee had set a long-established precedent of handling bills covering copyright. Table 1 examines all legislative hearings covering proposed copyright bills in the 80th through 103rd congresses (1946-1994). The data includes every congressional hearing reported by the Congressional Information Research Service from 1946-1994. Each hearing is further categorized into 222 topics (of which copyright is one); we further limit our analysis to legislative hearings.⁴ During this nearly 50-year period, the Judiciary Committee received 86% (127) of copyright referrals. (We contrast this to more stable issues areas, such as agriculture, which has an 86% to 90% probability of bill referral to the Agriculture Committee.) We assume that this was the lowest probability that the Coble bill would have been referred to the Judiciary committee.

The second fact we try to establish is the degree and reasons for attenuation. If the somewhat extreme position of H.R. 353 is to be an equilibrium policy choice for the Judiciary Committee, then we must assess the probability (p) that a challenger bill would be referred to a second committee for consideration. If p is high, then Coble should have introduced a bill that was moderate; if p is low the bill can mirror the Judiciary Committee's preferences in

equilibrium.⁵ As noted in Table 1, 14% of legislative hearings on copyright bills were sent to another committee. Thus, there was an unconditional probability of 14% that another committee might get a second bill. The Science, Space and Technology Committee (under various names) received the second most number of copyright bill referrals at 5% (8) during 1946-1994, and posed perhaps the greatest threat for a competing bill. However, Representative James Sensenbrenner (R-Wis), Chairman of the Science, Space, and Technology Committee, was in line to ascend to the chair of the Judiciary Committee, and did not want to upset the possibility of this coming to fruition in the next congress. He was thus reticent to introduce a bill competing with the Judiciary Committee's bill. With the Science Committee unlikely to introduce a bill, the base probability that Coble faced was about $p = 9\%$ that another committee would introduce and receive a competing bill.⁶ Thus, the behavior of the Judiciary Committee in introducing a somewhat extreme bill is reasonable and therefore consistent with the Attenuation Hypotheses. We find additional evidence for this hypothesis in the next section's statistical analysis as well.

B. JURISDICTION HYPOTHESES

Hypothesis 2a predicts that challenger committee members may not support bills in their best policy interest, if they believe that such a position will increase the committee's legislative and oversight jurisdictional scope. While the theory in Section III does not exclude the possibility that bills will be introduced by challengers with policy positions they support, there are few theories that predict that bills that are not in the policy interests of legislators will be introduced.

To test this hypothesis, we examine bill co-sponsorship and its relationship to turf wars using multivariate statistical analysis focusing on the policy-jurisdiction trade-off. As noted in Section II, the oversight of the implementation of database copyright bills was to be delegated to

the courts in H.R. 353 and to the FTC in H.R. 1858. Hence, Coble and Bliley delegated implementation of their respective bills to agencies for which they had oversight.

If Hypothesis 2a has credibility, we should see the sponsors of H.R. 353 supporting their constituent preferences. They have an *ex ante* belief that there is a low likelihood of a challenge to the Coble bill, thus the jurisdictional benefits are moot to them. However, supporters of H.R. 1858 could be responsive to their constituents, or to jurisdictional issues at hand. If we find the former (constituency responsiveness), this is consistent with a host of different theories. However, if we do not find the former, and find only the latter (jurisdictional responsiveness), this is consistent only with a theory of jurisdictional conflict.

We begin by considering as our dependent variable whether a legislator co-sponsored H.R. 353 (1) or not (0). In a second set of specifications, we consider whether a legislator co-sponsored H.R. 1858 (1) or not (0). We consider four types of independent variables. The first variable, EDUCATIONAL EMPLOYMENT (from the Bureau of the Census), measures the amount of educational employment (in thousands) in a legislator's district. Given that within congressional districts, the number of school-age children does not differ vastly, any differences in educational employment across districts is usually due to the presence of one or more universities in the district. Recall that the only cleanly identifiable industry sector that was uniformly opposed to H.R. 353, and supported H.R. 1858, were universities. Over 100 universities publicly expressed opposition to H.R. 353 and support of H.R. 1858. Thus educational employment should be correlated with constituent preferences. The second set of variables is the committee assignments of the legislators, to control for jurisdictional disputes. Dummy variables for membership on the House COMMERCE COMMITTEE, JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, and SCIENCE COMMITTEE are coded from Congressional Quarterly. The third set of variables measures the ADA score of the representative (provided by Timothy

Groseclose), as a proxy for the ideology of legislator. Finally, a number of control variables for the representative's district are coded. These include the MEDIAN INCOME (in thousands of dollars) in the district, the MEDIAN HOME VALUE (in hundreds of thousands of dollars) in the district (as a measure of wealth), and the number of individuals (in thousands) with college degrees (EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT). All of these latter variables are derived from the STF3 file of the 1990 U.S. Census of Housing and Population.

The predictions of the theory with respect to Hypothesis 2a are threefold, and relatively stringent. First, to the extent that the incumbent committee members believe they are acting unchallenged, the bill proposed should reflect the true policy concerns of its sponsors' constituents. Therefore, we should find the coefficients on educational employment to be negative and statistically significant for the H.R. 353 regressions. Second, if the challenging (Commerce) committee members are seeking jurisdiction, and not actual policy, they should not be voting with their constituents. So the coefficients on educational employment for H.R. 1858 should not be statistically significant. Finally, jurisdictional conflict between committees should be manifested by committee memberships, with committee members splitting to support their own bills. Thus, in the H.R. 353 regression, there should be a positive coefficient on the Judiciary Committee variable and a negative coefficient on the Commerce Committee variable. The opposite should be true of the H.R. 1858 regressions. All three of these predictions together are consistent with the various predictions of Hypothesis 2a, and the latter two are inconsistent with theories of committee monopoly power.

We have run this model with a probit, logit, and rare events probit (King and Zeng 2001), and all have nearly identical results. We present the results of a probit analysis in Table 2. In all statistical models in this paper, the coefficients report the change in the probability of the dependent variable for an infinitesimal change in each independent, continuous variable and, by

default, the discrete change in the probability for dummy variables. The two-sided t-statistics are presented below the coefficient estimates, with the 95%, and 99% significance level noted for each coefficient. Models (1) and (2) use H.R. 353 as the dependent variable; Models (3) and (4) use H.R. 1858 as the dependent variable. Models (1) and (3) contain only the constituency and ideology variables; Models (2) and (4) include the committee assignment variables. H.R. 353 was cosponsored by 17% of the members of Congress; H.R. 1858 had only 4% of the congress supporting his bill.⁷ [NB: FOR REVIEWER: We include the correlation matrix in a “Reviewer Only Appendix R”, to demonstrate there is little multicollinearity between the variables.]

In Models (1) and (2) the coefficient on educational sector employment is negative and statistically significant as predicted. In no specification is the coefficient on ADA score or any other control variables statistically significant. Replacing ADA score with the party affiliation of the representative has not qualitative affect on the results. The large negative coefficient on educational employment for Models (1) and (2) is consistent with H.R. 353 co-sponsors voting with the preferences of the constituents. Every 10,000-person (about 1.5%) increase in educational employment (about the employment from a medium-sized university in the district) makes a legislator 7.7% less likely to sponsor H.R. 353. This is consistent with the first prediction and also provides further support for the Attenuation Hypothesis. In Models (3) and (4), the coefficients on educational employment are not statistically different from zero. This is consistent with H.R. 1858 supporters not sincerely voting with their constituents’ interests. This is consistent with the second prediction.

Finally, the four coefficients on the Judiciary and Commerce Committee membership variables are all large in magnitude, signed as predicted, and three of the four are statistically significant. Science Committee members show no discernible higher or lower cosponsorship tendencies for each bill than other members of the House. A Commerce Committee member is

10.1% less likely to cosponsor H.R. 353 than the average House member, and 23.4% more likely to cosponsor H.R. 1858 than the average member. A Judiciary Committee member is 33.5% more likely to cosponsor H.R. 353 and 1.1% less likely to the cosponsor H.R. 1858 than the average House member. This last coefficient on Judiciary Committee is negative as expected, but does not reach statistical significance. Rep. Rick Boucher, who sits on both the Commerce and Judiciary Committees, was the only Judiciary Committee member to co-sponsor the Bliley bill. The small number of sponsors (18) likely drives the lack of statistical significance on this coefficient. Other than this perturbation, all coefficients come out as expected. This last result on committee membership is consistent with the third prediction finding indications of jurisdictional fights between committees. Together, these three results suggest that turf wars are important, and that the incumbents, not expecting a challenge, acted more sincerely than the challengers did in the policy domain, consistent with Part 3a of the Jurisdictional Hypothesis.

Hypotheses 2b and 2c further refine the predictions about bill introduction. They predict that senior members overall and junior members in safe seats of the challenging committee will have the greatest incentive to exert effort in mounting a jurisdictional challenge. The legislators who gain the most from jurisdiction are those who can use the jurisdiction today, and those who value the property right over the long term.

To test this hypothesis, we conduct an econometric analysis of the cosponsorship behavior of members of the challenging committee. We consider who from the Commerce Committee ($n = 53$) cosponsored the H.R. 1858, the challenging bill, using as our dependent variable whether a member of the Commerce Committee cosponsored the H.R. 1858 (1) or not (0). The independent variables are as before, but this time we include three additional variables. The first is COMMITTEE RANK. This is an ordinal measure of Commerce Committee seniority (obtained from the Congressional Quarterly) and ranges from 1 (for the chairman or

ranking member) to 29 (for the most junior members). The second is ELECTION MARGIN. It is a measure of how safe the member is in her seat (margin of victory in thousands of votes in the last election) (obtained from the Clerk of the House). Finally we interact COMMITTEE RANK with ELECTION MARGIN. We predict that the coefficient on COMMITTEE RANK should be negative (more senior members are more likely to support challenging bills) and the coefficient on the interaction variable of ELECTION MARGIN*COMMITTEE RANK should be positive (junior members with higher margins of victory in the last election are more likely to support challenging bills).

The results of the probit analysis are presented in Model (5) of Table 3. Congruent with our earlier findings, legislator ideology, educational employment, and the control variables do not have statistically significant coefficients. There is, however, a statistically significant relationship between the two variables of theoretical interest and the dependent variable. Senior members of the Commerce Committee are more likely to sponsor H.R. 1858. Each step up on the committee makes an individual 4.4% more likely to sponsor H.R. 1858. Moreover, junior legislators with large margins in the last election are more likely to support H.R. 1858 than are others. These results provide evidence that is consistent with both the Hall (1998) hypothesis (Hypothesis 2b) and the King (1997) hypothesis (Hypothesis 2c).⁸

These results can also be juxtaposed to Krehbiel (1995), in his examination of budget co-sponsorship, which shows that electoral margins make no difference in bill co-sponsorship, while more junior members of committees are more likely to co-sponsor bills. One key factor that differentiates Krehbiel's work from this study is that there is no jurisdictional conflict in Krehbiel's budget vote. Indeed, it may be that precisely because there is jurisdictional conflict, the current paper refines the results of Krehbiel. Junior members get little benefit from jurisdiction (in this paper), but may get lots of benefit from high profile co-sponsorship on

budgeting issues (in Krehbiel's paper). However, being in safe districts makes enormous difference to junior members in jurisdictional disputes, and can lead to more co-sponsorship.

VI. CONCLUSION

Jurisdictional conflict between committees within Congress is common and increasing (Baumgartner et al 2000). The theoretical perspective developed in this paper extends upon a small but important body of literature examining congressional committee jurisdiction. It demonstrates that actors with foresight can have large impacts on policy outcomes by merely threatening to engage in jurisdictional turf wars. Moreover, legislators and committees will engage in jurisdictional turf wars even if it means introducing sub-optimal legislation from the sponsor's viewpoint. This is because the gains from obtaining a slice of legislative or oversight jurisdiction over an issue may result in a greater gain to utility than the loss of the policy position. In many cases, policy outcomes are predicted to be closer to the status quo than they would be in the unidimensional, closed rule, monopoly committee dominance literature.

The paper examines two Internet intellectual property protection bills before the 106th Congress, to test implications of the theory. The descriptive and statistical evidence illustrates how jurisdictional wars between committees play out. The evidence is consistent with the main tenets of the paper. This paper puts renewed spotlight on the committee jurisdiction literature. It suggests scholars examining the relationship between committee behavior and policy outcomes, should be careful to consider the jurisdictional disputes that could potentially arise and how that might affect policy outcomes. Without controlling for this effect, scholars may generate spurious results. This analysis will help guide thinking about how these effects play out.

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APPENDIX: A SHORT FORMAL MODEL

[NB: TO THE REFEREES AND EDITOR: I leave it your judgment as to whether this should be included in the main paper, as a printed appendix, as an electronic appendix, or omitted from the paper.]

We begin characterizing the general game, and then apply it to the expected equilibrium behavior of the H.R. 353 and 1858.

There are two committees (J and T), and there are three legislators (P , Q , and R). We note J as the “incumbent” committee, and T as the “challenging committee.” P is a member of J and fully embodies the preferences and policies of the J . P can be thought of as the median voter of J , or as the committee chair. For simplicity, as we explicate the game, we drop the subscript of P and refer only to J or to the “incumbent” or “incumbent committee.” Q and R are members of committee T .

The moves of the game are as follows. First, the incumbent chooses a policy C , and simultaneously, the challenging committee determines whether Q or R will represent the challenger committee to potentially introduce a bill to compete with the incumbent’s policy (we call this chosen legislator the challenger). Second, the challenger chooses whether or not to introduce a competing bill, B . Third, nature moves and with probability p refers B to the challenger’s committee (and to the incumbent’s committee with probability $1-p$). Finally, the incumbent and challenger choose to dispense with the bills choosing either a floor fight, a compromise, or to kill both bills.

We can characterize the utility functions for Q and R of the challenger committee as follows:

$$U_t^Q = -|Q - x_t^*| + F^Q(o) + G^Q(l) + \delta E[-|Q - x_{t+1}^*|, F_{t+1}^J(o), G_{t+1}^J(l)] - C^Q(e) \quad \text{eq (1)}$$

$$U_t^R = -|R - x_t^*| + F^R(o) + G^R(l) + \delta E[-|R - x_{t+1}^*|, F_{t+1}^J(o), G_{t+1}^J(l)] - C^R(e) \quad \text{eq (2)}$$

where U_t^j is the utility to legislator $j, j \in \{Q, R\}$ in period t, x_t^* is the equilibrium policy generated in period $t, F^j(o)$ is the benefit to oversight jurisdiction, $o, G^j(l)$ is the benefit to legislative jurisdiction, l, δ is the discount rate, and $C^j(e)$ is the cost, C , of effort, e , legislator j exerts in writing a bill. We can re-index the legislator who is chosen to represent the challenger committee, in equilibrium, T . Thus, the utility functions for the incumbent, J , and the chosen challenger, T , can be reduced to:

$$U_t^J = -|J - x_t^*| + F^J(o) + G^J(l) + \delta E[-|J - x_{t+1}^*|, F_{t+1}^J(o), G_{t+1}^J(l)] - C^J(e) \quad \text{eq (3)}$$

$$U_t^T = -|T - x_t^*| + F^T(o) + G^T(l) + \delta E[-|T - x_{t+1}^*|, F_{t+1}^T(o), G_{t+1}^T(l)] - C^T(e) \quad \text{eq (4)}$$

where U_t^i is the utility to committee $i, i \in \{J, T\}$ in period t , and all remaining terms are as before. Recall that eq (4) is just the winner of the subgame between Q and R in eq (1) and eq (2).

The first term of this utility function is the benefit that the committee (legislator) obtains from the equilibrium policy that will be passed. Committees (legislators) receive positive benefit the closer the policy outcome is to their ideal point. The second term is the discounted benefit obtained by the committee (legislator) from oversight jurisdiction, $\frac{\partial U_t^i(\cdot)}{\partial o} > 0$. The third term is the legislative jurisdiction a committee (legislator) has. Note that the benefits to the two committees are zero-sum—any gain in jurisdiction by one committee is a loss by a second committee (however, this is not the case for legislator that sit on the same committee).

In the fight between committees, we assume that the incumbent committee, J , has all the jurisdictional power, while the challenger committee, T , has none. This maps into policy A in Figure 1. Normalizing this, we say that $G^J(l) = 1, G^T(l) = 0$ at the outset and create a bound for all time periods such that $G^i(l) \in [0,1]$. So if the challenger bill is referred to J , there is no

change in utility to either committee. However, if the challenger bill is referred to T , then J loses utility and T gains that same amount of utility, so that $-\frac{\partial U_i^T(\cdot)}{\partial l} = \frac{\partial U_i^J(\cdot)}{\partial l} < 0$.

The fourth term is the discounted expected payoff to the committee (legislator) of waiting until the next congress to enact policy, and is a function of the policy outcome in the next period and both jurisdictional outcomes. Finally, there is a cost to bill introduction, and that is encapsulated in $C^i(e)$, such that the incumbent committee has lower marginal cost in writing a bill than all potential challengers $\frac{\partial C^T(e)}{\partial e} > \frac{\partial C^J(e)}{\partial e}$, but all challengers do not have the same marginal costs. This will induce the incumbent committee to introduce bills before the challenger will, *ceteris paribus*.

We can now discuss the first hypothesis of attenuation. There are two ways to analyze it. A simple and general way is to examine the utility function of the challenger. Recognize that the challenger can maintain the same utility levels if she gets less jurisdiction (second and third term) and more policy (first term). That is, the challenger is willing to trade jurisdiction for policy.

An alternative way to examine this is to apply it to the case being analyzed. We leave the challenger selection process aside for now and assume the best challenger has been selected. In the model, an incumbent committee member, J , proposes a bill that is referred to the incumbent committee (equivalent an issue in the position A in Figure 1). The challenger committee member, T , can choose either to introduce a bill at cost, $C^T(e)$, or not introduce a bill. If there is no bill introduction, then the equilibrium policy outcome is the incumbent's policy position, provided is closer to the median voter, M , than the status quo, F , is to M , will become policy.

If the challenger does introduce a bill, there is a probability, p , that this bill will be referred by the Parliamentarian to the challenger committee, will be pivotal in the behavior of

committees. If the bill is introduced to the incumbent's committee, the equilibrium is the same as the case above (when there is no challenger bill).

If the second bill is referred to the challenger committee, the challenger committee has obtained some amount of jurisdictional benefit because the Parliamentarian now recognizes T as a legitimate source of legislative jurisdiction over the issue. Conversely, J loses some jurisdictional benefit, because formerly its legislative jurisdiction was unchallenged.

With two bills in two committees, there are three possible outcomes. First, both bills could come to the floor and a floor fight would ensue, the costs to the majority party are very high (e.g. campaign finance reform), and we assume the Speaker, through his gate-keeping capabilities, will kill both bills. This would be equivalent to a second outcome—the leadership will kill both bills and the status quo will persist until the next year, when there is a possibility to introduce bills again.

To consider the effects of jurisdictional outcomes on policy, let us consider extreme effects of the bill referral process. Let us assume the probability of a second bill referral to the challenger committee, T , is $p = 1$. First, recognize that that even if no policy passes, T is better off and J is worse off, for reasonable bill introduction costs $C^T(e)$. This is because by merely having the second bill referred to T , the challenger gains some legislative jurisdiction over the issue and J loses some legislative jurisdiction over the issue. Second, on the policy-making front, the incumbent will introduce a bill so as to maximize its expected utility. In order to do this, the incumbent must introduce bill C so that the challenger is no worse off than the compromise policy solution plus the expected jurisdictional gains it would make (minus the costs of bill introduction) from introducing another bill. As the probability that T receives a second bill increases, the incumbent is willing to introduce a bill closer to T 's ideal point. The equilibrium policy when there is jurisdictional conflict will be on the interval $[T, F']$ where F' is

the same distance from F to T , but positioned on the opposite side of T than is F . This is a form of compromise—offering a more moderate policy position to induce no challenge from a potential competitor.⁹ This provides the intuition for Hypothesis 1. Thus, the compensation required for the jurisdictional gain moves the policy closer to T ; higher cost moves the equilibrium away from T . The higher T values jurisdiction, the closer is equilibrium policy to F .

We can now append the challenger selection process. In order to achieve sub-game perfection in the full game, we must know what is the Nash equilibrium in the first stage. It is clear that a Nash equilibrium strategy for the challenger committee is to choose a challenging legislator who generates the most policy compromise. That is going to be the legislator who obtains the most utility from challenging. The incumbent's equilibrium policy offer is as close to T as is necessary to stop a jurisdictional challenge. Both the incumbent and the challengers have no incentive to move off their strategies, given the other's strategy. Hence, we have a Nash equilibrium in the first stage. Thus, a complete characterization of Hypothesis 1 is that challenger forces the incumbent's attenuation to a point as close to T as possible with the selection of the challenging legislator.

While we cannot identify precisely who this legislator is theoretically, we can examine the comparative statics. These comparative statics are the same as they are for the fight between the two committees, as outlined earlier in the appendix. Specifically, a legislator on the competing committee is more likely to be selected the more she gains from jurisdiction, the more she gains from policy outcomes, and the more she values the future. This then leads us to Hypothesis 2.

ENDNOTES

¹ For a further discussion of this important assumption, see King (1997: 78-88).

² For example, antitrust enforcement of entertainment firms is left to the Department of Justice, though both Commerce and Judiciary Committees have legislative jurisdiction for antitrust.

³ If bill introduction is a cost free exercise, then the expected net benefit to introducing a bill is strictly positive for all members of congress for any $p > 0$. However, the cost is not zero.

Members with experience, expertise, and interest in the focal policy issue or related policy issues will likely have lower costs of formulating policy in the focal area. That is, it is very expensive for an Agriculture Committee member to write a bill regarding copyright, but it is less expensive for a Commerce Committee member.

⁴ The data was obtained from the Center for American Politics and Public Policy web page at the University of Washington, <http://depts.washington.edu/ampol/>.

⁵ H.R. 353 likely reflected the sincere preferences of the Judiciary Committee. To establish sincerity of the preferences, we turn to two main arguments. First, the current bill was almost identical to the bill introduced into the previous Congress, when there was no jurisdictional challenge. Second, H.R. 353 reflected the consistent behavior and rhetoric of the Judiciary Committee of strong intellectual property rights. Although the Coble bill had the support of the median voter (the voice vote in the previous Congress is an indicator of the capturing of the median voter) it was far stronger than the Feist decision. Thus, we map the policy supported by Judiciary, C , to the right of the median voter in Figure 1.

⁶ King has pointed out that in reality, the true probabilities are probably much lower than reflected in this paper, but highly correlated with the estimated probabilities.

⁷ The high number of legislators sponsoring Coble is not necessarily an indicator that it had broad support. Given the sequential introduction of the two bills, the first bill will gain many

sponsors because it is preferred H.R. 353 to Feist. Moreover, it can be show in Figure 1 that one would expect many sponsors for Coble, as the entire “right” of the spectrum would prefer H.R. 353 to Feist, but the “left” was divided between Feist and H.R. 1858.

⁸ A similar analysis done on Judiciary Committee H.R. 353 cosponsors finds that neither of these variables have a statistically significant effect. This is consistent with the theory, because only challenger committees stand to gain jurisdiction from these jurisdictional challenges.

⁹ In a one period game (without expectations), there will always be compromise, enforced by the Speaker’s gatekeeping power. However, politicians create policy today in the shadow of the future. If there is full information of these expectations in the next period, compromise is still reached. This is because both committees know the expectations about the outcome of the legislative game in the next period, and can factor this into the compromise they frame in this period. However, if there is uncertainty, and information is private, then compromise may be elusive. Assume each committee makes a private, unbiased assessment of its future prospects in the next congress, with some error, $\varepsilon \sim N(0, \sigma^2)$ (Priest and Klein 1984). If both sides have negative errors (private pessimistic draws about their prospects for the next period) then there will be more room for compromise in the current period. If both sides have positive errors (private optimism about their possibilities in the next period), then there will be no compromise and both bills will die. If one side is optimistic and one side is pessimistic, then it is the relative optimism and pessimism that will matter. With respect to the two focal bills, both bills were killed in the Rules Committee by the House leadership. Both sides were optimistic about their chances in the next Congress, and this resulted in neither side accepting compromise. Thus, even though either bill would likely have made the median voter of the House floor better off than Feist, both bills died. A more complete account can be found in Author (2002).

Figure 1: Scope of Jurisdiction




Figure 2: Preference Ordering

IP Protection (IPP)




TABLE 1: HOUSE COMMITTEE HEARINGS ON COPYRIGHT BILLS

Congress	Agriculture	Energy & Commerce	Foreign Affairs	Government Operations	Interior/ Insular Affairs	Judiciary	Science/ Space/ Technology	Small Business	Ways & Means	Total Number of Bills
80	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%	0%	9
81	0%	0%	0%	0%	8%	92%	0%	0%	0%	12
82	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%	0%	11
83	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%	0%	5
84	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%	0%	4
85	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%	0%	3
86	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	50%	50%	0%	0%	2
87	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	71%	29%	0%	0%	7
88	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%	0%	1
89	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%	0%	3
90	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%	0%	2
91	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0
92	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%	0%	3
93	0%	20%	0%	20%	0%	60%	0%	0%	0%	5
94	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	83%	17%	0%	0%	6
95	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%	0%	2
96	9%	0%	0%	18%	0%	45%	27%	0%	0%	11
97	0%	7%	0%	0%	0%	71%	7%	0%	14%	14
98	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	91%	9%	0%	0%	11
99	0%	0%	10%	0%	0%	70%	10%	0%	10%	10
100	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	92%	0%	8%	0%	13
101	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	88%	13%	0%	0%	16
102	0%	7%	0%	0%	0%	87%	7%	0%	0%	15
103	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%	0%	7
Total	1%	2%	1%	2%	1%	85%	8%	1%	2%	172

TABLE 2: ECONOMETRIC RESULTS FROM BILL COSPONSORSHIP

<u>Variable</u>	<u>H.R. 353</u> <u>Model 1</u>	<u>H.R. 353</u> <u>Model 2</u>	<u>H.R. 1858</u> <u>Model 3</u>	<u>H.R. 1858</u> <u>Model 4</u>
Educational Employment	-0.0083** (-2.11)	-0.0078** (-1.99)	0.0004 (0.19)	0.0008 (0.54)
Commerce Committee		-0.1014** (-1.96)		0.2344*** (5.88)
Science Committee		-0.0278 (-0.50)		0.0179 (0.71)
Judiciary Committee		0.3350*** (4.55)		-0.0112 (-.49)
ADA	-0.0003 (-0.58)	-0.0002 (-.44)	-0.00015 (-0.56)	-0.00003 (-0.21)
Median Home Value	0.0026 (0.07)	-0.0073 (-0.18)	0.0104 (0.48)	0.0018 (0.09)
Median Income	0.0003 (0.78)	0.0036 (0.94)	-0.0016 (-0.72)	-0.0012 (-0.85)
Educational Attainment	.0016 (1.08)	0.0017 (1.17)	-0.0001 (-0.17)	-0.0002 (-0.29)
n	435	435	435	435
LL	11.50	37.39	1.45	38.70

Two-sided t-statistics below coefficient estimates

** 95% significance

*** 99% significance

TABLE 3: COMMERCE COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP COSPONSORS

<u>Variable</u>	<u>H.R. 1858 Model 5</u>
Educational Employment	-0.0026 (-0.26)
ADA	-0.0003 (-0.01)
Median Home Value	-0.0109 (-0.02)
Median Income	-0.0031 (-0.50)
Educational Attainment	0.0006 (0.22)
Committee Rank	-0.0441** (-2.57)
Election Margin	-0.0019 (-0.89)
Committee Rank * Election Margin	0.0004** (2.06)
n	53
LL	-18.76

Two-sided t-statistics below coefficient estimates

** 95% significance

FOR REVIEWER ONLY
 REVIEWER APPENDIX R: CORRELATION MATRIX

(obs=435)

	Educational Employment	Judiciary Committee	Science Committee	Commerce Committee	ADA	Median Income	Median Home Value	Educational Attainment
Educational Employment	1							
Judiciary Committee	-0.0263	1						
Science Committee	0.1083	-0.0595	1					
Commerce Committee	-0.0366	-0.038	0.0559	1				
ADA	0.0448	-0.0233	-0.0232	-0.0159	1			
Median Income	0.0534	0.0517	0.0374	0.045	0.2512	1		
Median Home Value	0.1536	0.014	0.1044	0.0052	0.0403	0.7095	1	
Educational Attainment	0.2966	0.0117	0.0753	0.0026	0.0552	0.6225	0.7643	1