

Bibliography

1. Probability Theory and Decision Theory:

(a) Textbook Treatments

The classic on probability theory:

Feller, W. (1957). *An Introduction to Probability Theory and its Applications*. New York: Wiley.

A lighter introduction, covering subjective probability, decision theory, and long-run frequency approaches, full of philosophical insight and historical discussion, see the always delightful:

Hacking, I. (2001). *An Introduction to Probability and Inductive Logic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

(b) Book Length Treatments

The theory of personal probability and its connections to rational decision theory first got fully worked out in the still illuminating:

Savage, L.J. (1954). *The Foundations of Statistics*. New York: Wiley.

For a critique of the Savage approach, and a reformulation:

Jeffrey, R. (1983). *The Logic of Decision*, 2nd Ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

(c) Research Articles:

The background to the Savage approach to personal probability and decision theory was laid out in the following two papers:

Ramsey, F.P. (1926). Truth and Probability. In H.E. Kyburg and Howard E. Smokler (eds.), *Studies in Subjective Probability*, New York, Wiley, 1964.

de Finetti, B. (1937). Foresight: Its logical laws, its subjective sources. In Kyburg and Smokler (eds.), op.cit.

For papers connecting probability/decision theory to issues in semantics/pragmatics, see:

Merin, A. (1999). Information, Relevance, and Social Decision Making: Some Principles and Results of Decision-Theoretic Semantics. In L. Moss, J. Ginzburg, and M. de Rijke (eds.), *Logic, Language, and Information*, v.2, Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications.

Potts, C. (2006). Integrated Pragmatic Values. MS, UMass Amherst.

van Rooij, R. (2003). Questioning to Resolve Decision Problems. *Linguistics and Philosophy*, 26: 493-527.

(2) Multiagent Epistemic Logic and Information Dynamics:

The first treatment of the logics of knowledge and belief using modal logic was:

Hintikka, J. (1962). *Knowledge and Belief*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

A very good up to date textbook treatment is:

Fagin, R.J., J. Halpern, Y. Moses and M. Vardi. (1995). *Reasoning About Knowledge*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

On the problem of “logical omniscience,” see:

Stalnaker, R. (1991). The Problem of Logical Omniscience, I. *Synthese*, 89: 425-440.

For the classic paper on dynamic semantics, where meaning is identified with information update, see:

Heim, I. (1983). On the Projection Problem for Presuppositions. *WCCFL*, 2: 114-125.

3. Game Theory

(a) Textbooks

For a fairly accessible textbook, see:

Osborne, M. (2004). *An Introduction to Game Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

For an intermediate level treatment, with a nice mix of theoretical rigour and applications and examples, see:

Gibbons, R. (1992). *Game Theory for Applied Economists*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

For a more advanced treatment, see:

Osborne, M., and A. Rubinstein. (1994). *A Course in Game Theory*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

(b) Book Length Treatments

The classic on coordination games is:

Schelling, T. (1960). *The Strategy of Conflict*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

For coordination and linguistic communication, see:

Lewis, D.K. (1969). *Convention*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

This is also where we see the first appearance of the notion “common knowledge.”

For a fully game-theoretic approach to pragmatics, see:

Parikh, R. (2001). *The Use of Language*. Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications.

For an introduction to game theory and pragmatics, as part of a fuller collection of papers connecting game theory and pragmatics, see:

Benz, A., G. Jaeger, and R. van Rooij. (2005). An Introduction to Game Theory for Linguists. In A. Benz, G. Jaeger, and R. van Rooij (eds.), *Game Theory and Pragmatics*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

(c) Research Articles:

For published articles connecting semantics/pragmatics (and case marking, in the case of Jaeger’s paper) to game theory, see:

Clark, R. and P. Parikh. (in press). An Introduction to Equilibrium Semantics for Natural Language. In A-V Pieterinen (ed). *Game Theory and Linguistic Meaning*, Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Clark, R. and P. Parikh. (in press). Game Theory and Discourse Anaphora. In *Journal of Logic, Language, and Information*.

Jaeger, G. (to appear). Evolutionary Game Theory and Typology. *Language*.

van Rooij, R. (2004). Signalling Games Select Horn Strategies. *Linguistics and Philosophy*, 27: 493-527.

van Rooij, R. (2003). Quality and Quantity of Information Exchange. *Journal of Logic, Language, and Information*, 12: 423-451.

Stalnaker, R. (2005). Saying and Meaning, Cheap Talk and Credibility. In Benz et al. (eds). op.cit.

There is also an entry called “Optimality-Theoretic and Game-Theoretic Approaches to Implicature” up on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/implicature-optimality-games/>

For some of the relevant papers on signalling games, cheap talk games, truth, meaning and credibility, from the economics literature, see:

Crawford, V. and Sobel, J. (1982). Strategic Information Transmission. *Econometrica*, 50: 1431-1451.

Farrell, J. (1993). Meaning and Credibility in Cheap Talk Games. *Games and Economic Behaviour*, 4: 514-531.

Farrell, J. and M. Rabin. (1996). Cheap Talk. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 10: 103-118.

Rabin, M. (1990). Communication Between Rational Agents. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 51: 144-170.

For several manuscripts in the works, see:

Jaeger, G. (2006). Game Dynamics Connects Semantics to Pragmatics. MS, University of Bielefeld.

Jaeger, G. and C. Pawlowitsch. (2007). Evolutionary Game Theory: From Biology and Economics to Linguistics. MS, University of Bielefeld and University of Vienna.

Parikh, P. and R. Clark. The meaning of *THE*: A New Account of Definite Descriptions. MS, UPenn.