CHAPTER ONE

In many of his works, debates, and lectures, William of Ockham confronted the issue of how to conceive universals and individuals, given his particular nominalistic tendency. How is he different from previous philosophers? As a nominalist, how does he articulate his understanding of universals and individuals? Specifically, how do his fictio and intellectio theories address universals and individuals? In fact, before any of these questions are answered in any depth, given his relative obscurity among other medievals, one must ask, "Who is William of Ockham?" In this first chapter, I shall try to answer the above questions in a way that will elucidate Ockham's place among medieval philosophers as an innovator with respect to universals and individuals.

William of Ockham is usually seen as an ambiguous background figure in the Middle Ages, as it were, skirting the dark edges of the spotlight in which Saints Thomas Aquinas, Anselm and Bonaventure shine. Hence, a brief biography is appropriate to locate this individual.

William of Ockham was born around 1285, placing him near the end of the Middle Ages. From the English village of Ockham in Surrey, he joined the Order of Friars Minor and studied under Duns Scotus, the Subtle Doctor at Oxford. He taught at Oxford, London, and Paris exploring his ideas in philosophy, theology and politics. Through his teaching, he became known as the Venerabilis Inceptor. While at Avignon responding to charges of heresy, and in the midst of controversy between his order and the Church, Ockham fled and was subsequently excommunicated from his order and the Church. Settling with Louis of Bavaria with whom he sided, he died impenitent although in the process of reconciliation with the Church on April 10, 1347 in Munich.

In a treatment of William of Ockham, one realizes that since Ockham is considered the "proper founder of Nominalism," he is indeed a pioneer of philosophy in the late Middle Ages. Before one examines his thinking and the manner in which Ockham breaks new ground, it is appropriate to first examine the main currents of thought that were prevalent at the time. Thus, one gets a fuller sense of how it is that William of Ockham is an innovator in philosophy.

The medieval period of philosophy is basically an exploration of Christianity using the philosophical tools that persisted from the ancient period. As such, this period inherits and expands upon two major philosophies of realism--those of Plato and Aristotle. Plato teaches that individual things of this world participate in corresponding universal forms or ideas found in a world or reality apart from this one. Consider the example of beauty as treated in the Phaedo:

This extreme realism is difficult for many, including Plato's most notable pupil, Aristotle.

Although some noteworthy Christian philosophers did use a Platonic approach, our focus is concerned with those who articulated the Christian perspective through different modes of Aristotelian realism. In brief, Aristotle's rejoinder to Platonism is that an individual thing's nature or universal form resides in the thing itself and not in some separate world. As explained below, this fundamental perspective will be the lens, so to speak, of the Christian realism in which Ockham finds himself.

Let us first take up an example of the extreme realism of the Middle Ages. The writings of Peter Abelard of the twelfth century produce for us, William of Champeaux, who demonstrates a severe and defensive realism. According to Stockl's summary, William of Champeaux believed

Such a strong presentation of the universal's relationship to individuals almost seems more untenable than Plato's. To be sure, problems arise when objections are raised about the total existence of a universal in a particular thing, i. e., How can the universal then exist in particular_y if it is totally present in particular_x? Such a theory as that of William of Champeaux is apparently contrived and deliberately exaggerated but for us, it serves well to demonstrate the limits, in a sense, of the medieval context which Ockham encounters.

Most manifestations of medieval realism are not as seemingly untenable as Champeaux's above. Instead, using the basic paradigm set forth by Aristotle, many medievals maintained a more plausible, moderate realism. Let us take Ockham's teacher, John Duns Scotus, the Franciscan, as our example here. Duns Scotus contributed much to the overall contribution of late medieval philosophy, including the matter of universals and individuals. In brief, the Subtle Doctor taught that universals are not borne out of thought but are objectively real, thereby excluding the possibility of a world exclusively containing individuals. An individual exists as a unity that is not communicable. The species or form to which an individual belongs however, has a unity that is communicable. Here, one notes his understanding of universality existing in reality. Also, a universal is potential since potency preserves a universal's inferior place in its relation to actualized individuals; this potency is able to be made real in individuals and can also be understood as actualized in the intellect. Duns Scotus' realism is indeed more nuanced or qualified but is also--understandably--more acceptable. Without compromise, Duns Scotus accommodates the notion of universals as objectively real--hence his status as a realist--and of universals in intellectual activity.

With the above presentation of how realism ranged from the implausible to the seemingly acceptable, a general framework is established with respect to the lineage of the dominant school in Ockham's day and also, the basic issue of universals and particulars. The depiction of such a setting is necessary for, in fact, William of Ockham's treatment of universals departs from the realist tradition in a way that is pivotal in the development of Western philosophy. As a result, a better sense of his impact is communicated when one sees him not in isolation, but in his context, with which his work forms a sharp contrast.

Two principal theories, among others, are born during his career, the fictum and intellectio theories. These theories are important here since they demonstrate how Ockham treated concepts in general and more importantly, how he treated the universal concept. In what follows, the former theory is first treated followed by the latter which, according to some chronologies, would accurately reflect the order in which Ockham developed these theories.

Ockham's first theory is referred to as the fictum theory. Ockham explains a concept, to use Leff's words, as "an image or representation (fictum) in the mind. . . ." As such, a concept has "merely conceptual status as an object of thought (esse obiectivum)." Ockham states in the first edition of the Ordinatio--his Commentary on the Sentences--, "something exists in the mind whose being is that of an object of thought only, without inhering in the mind as an independent subject." As an object of thought, a concept's mode of existence is, as Adams states, "non-real" or, to use Ockham's term, esse obiectivum. Here one notes that Ockham is concerned with denying concepts--and specifically, universals--"their extra-mental reality."

In spite of that aim, it is also true that, through the above nuancing about existence, Ockham does not intend to deprive thought concepts of their given degree of existence. This point may be taken for granted insofar as thoughts correspond to existing things but the issue may become contested when thoughts are of things which cannot and/ or do not exist (e. g., (i) "things . . . having contradictory properties", (ii) "things not . . . having contradictory properties . . . [but] are not the kind of thing that can really exist", "propositions, syllogisms, . . . and universals" (italics mine); and (iii) "things that can exist but in fact do not." As such, when there is no corresponding object in reality to one's mental concept, as Leff notes, "the fictum is that at which the act of knowing terminates as an object in the mind."

Although Ockham makes provisions for concepts which might be rooted in say, flights of fancy, e.g., round-squares and chimeras, it should be noted that the above-mentioned inclusion of fictitious possibilities--figmenta--does not in effect render the range of mental concepts all figmenta. That is to say, that in trying to secure a diminished degree of ontological status for universals--all concepts for that matter--the resulting theory of ficta or mental pictures should not be reduced to one of the completely fictitious, false or imaginary.

This may be better understood by recalling that although Ockham places primacy in individuals, he nonetheless suggests that universals are mental concepts, representations or pictures--ficta. Although, as noted above, some mental concepts are fictitious--figmenta--the understanding of these may be confused with the "unreal" tendency (or real in the limiting sense of objectively existing) that Ockham categorically accords all universals concepts. In fact, the unreality of universals is not connotatively the same as the falsity of fictions. Boehner, in his Collected Articles, criticizes at length a modern presentation of Ockham in which the above mistake is made. The importance of this clarifying distinction is that, although Ockham is known for his ennoblement of individuals, this thesis must be couched in a context which is inclusive of his distinctions regarding universals. This is, after all, why he tries with greatest subtlety and finesse to explore the nature and possibility of universals in relation to the all-important individuals instead of categorically excluding universals altogether.

One notes then, that according to William, universals, as concepts or thought-objects in the fictum sense, objectively exist in the mind. In the eighth question of his Ordinatio, Ockham asserts:

Ockham takes care to qualify carefully the degree of ontological status of universals in a way that is lesser than individuals which really exist or which have a real mode of existence. Hence, Ockham places priority in singulars or individuals--this will persist in the second theory and in his thought in general. In fact, "[f]or him, the central question was no longer to explain the individual by reference to the universal but rather to account for universals in a world of individuals." For, as Leff comments, when the concept is common to many individuals, "it can be called a universal, referring equally to all that from which it is abstracted." As such, a universal, as a thought-object, represents or, is the object of, particular individuals--the subject(s) which exist in reality, outside the mind.

Ockham concludes his treatment of the fictum theory in the Ordinatio stating quite clearly that "the concept thus mentally fashioned and abstracted from singular things previously known is universal by its nature. . . ." As a result, we get a sense of the nature of universals, so to speak, in reality, or, in this case, in the mind, as well as how universals are related to individuals.

Ockham's contemporary, Walter Chatton challenged Ockham by arguing that the fictum theory is in contradiction to Ockham's principle of parsimony, also known as Ockham's Razor: "'Plurality is not to be posited without necessity.'" William's concern for avoiding unnecessary propositions or needlessly "maintain[ing] that a certain thing exists," composes the context in which he critically re-evaluates his fictum theory.

Using his Chatton's argument, Ockham presents the fictive theory in question thirty-five of Quodlibeta IV with a reiteration of the razor:

In effect, Ockham asserts that a fictum is not needed in explaining the relationship between cognition--an act of understanding--and the thing being cognized; Armand Maurer emphasizes: "they [ficta] stand in the way of knowing reality itself." In spite of its attractiveness, Ockham is not satisfied with the theory and rejects it.

An alternative to the collapsed fictum theory, however, is actually built into Ockham's refutation: ". . . whatever is preserved by appeal to a fictive entity can be preserved by appeal to an act of understanding." Or, to put it more clearly, Maurer explains, "Everything that can be explained by them [ficta] can equally well be accounted for by real acts of knowing." William then pursues a fuller development of the already-mentioned intellectio theory to cover his eventual abandonment of the prior theory. That is to say--in Adams' words--by "abandoning the distinction between objective and real existence--[Ockham] identifies concepts with really existent acts of intellect."

Since the two theories differ in ontology, it is important to note that the transition in the thinking of Ockham is what Adams calls "a reasoned ontological conversion." In what follow, Adams' thesis will be more readily apparent as the second theory, the intellectio, is treated in a more isolated way.

Although the above criticism and rejection of the fictum theory is based on an illustration of the intellectio theory as a superior and more economic revision of the first, it is best to consider this second theory by itself in order to understand its attractive attributes. As may have been seen above, Ockham's thinking is written in a way that his complete treatment of a theory is rarely contained in one work; much of the commentary encountered for use in this chapter parallels Ockham's own thinking in that a good part of the articulation of Ockham's theory originates in the relationships--antagonistic or harmonious--with his thinking peers. As a result, there are three principal sources in Ockham's writing which explicitly expose us to the intellectio theory, each complementing the others' demonstrations: the Ordinatio, the Expositio, and the Quodlibeta.

As already mentioned above, William opts for an understanding of universal concepts in which they are indistinct from the cognitions or acts of understanding. Examining the first theory in the answer to question eight in the second distinction (d. 2, q. 8) of his Ordinatio, Ockham proposes "that a universal is a concept of the mind, and that the concept is really the act of intellection itself. . . ." His use of the term 'really' must be taken not only as an emphatic device but must also be considered as explaining a universal's ontology in the sense of its real existence in the mind.

That a universal has more than objective existence does not appear to be the claim of a nominalist, but before that matter is addressed more fully below, a consideration of what then is the ontological status of the simultaneous universal-concept/ intellectio is in order. These intellectiones or what Adams calls "really existent acts of the intellect" are the basis for what she terms Ockham's ontological conversion as treated above. This change is best understood in light of Ockham's own words:

Inasmuch as the soul or mind is understood as subject, and since a concept exists in the same mode as the soul, the inference that a concept exists subjectively is evident.

Also worthy of note is Ockham's categorical classification of a concept as a quality in the preceding quotation. Let us consider Ockham's presentation of Aristotle's view on what is a quality taken from Ockham's Summa Logicae:

Appropriating this category is another way in which the Singular Doctor bolsters the stronger ontology of an intellectio.

According to Ockham's interpretation of Aristotle, the two concepts themselves, namely intellectio and quality, are very much interrelated. This is evident in Ockham's closing statement in Quodlibet IV, question thirty-five in which the important points of his argument are synthesized as he links the real existence of intellectiones with their being qualities: ". . .[they] are truly real beings, since they are truly qualities that exist subjectively in the intellect." The same connection, moreover, is stated at the onset of Ockham's presentation of the mental-act theory in the Ordinatio: "One. . . can hold that a concept, and any universal, is a quality existing subjectively in the mind." One may conclude without doubt that, given the concise presentations of the intellectio theory above, Ockham sees the discernment of the universal concept as necessarily including how it is a quality.

Ockham, in his Expositio, explains how a cognition is related to that which it cognizes:

In effect, using the nature/convention distinction, a concept itself is portrayed as inclined, as it were, by nature to represent in the mind, the thing in reality which is cognized; concepts are referred to as the "natural signs of things" in the Ordinatio. Ockham explains further: "No universal--unless perhaps it is a universal through voluntary institution [convention]--is anything existing in any way outside the soul." Moreover, universal concepts, as natural, exist in superior relationship to words--even universal words--as Maurer explains: "Concepts. . . are the primary signs of things; words. . . are conventional signs, whose signification is subordinate to that of concepts." The insistence that the universal concept is natural illustrates in another way the importance of its subjective existence in the mind, unlike a universal that is posited by convention.

Before examining in depth the nature of an intellected concept as universal, one must recall that, according to Ockham's definition taken from the Expositio and cited above, ". . . the act of intellect. . . stands for the thing to which it refers." This definition is helpful in understanding how an intellectio represents one thing or a singular, but a universal is usually related, although not exclusively, to many things. Specifically then, how does an intellectio act as a universal? Ockham writes,

In other words, a universal is an intellectio referring indistinctly to several things which the intellectio signifies without priority to any one thing.

I believe that Ockham's thinking on the relationship of a universal to its individuals is quite clear although it may be important to mention that what he calls a "confused cognition" does not refer to a disordered state of the intellect as we moderns are prone to understand it; rather, it emphasizes in a different way how a universal cognition is common to many in that it melts them together, as it were, or confuses them.

Universals then are identical with acts of the intellect or intellectiones. As such, they are qualities that subjectively exist in the mind. They act, by their very nature, as signs of individual things in reality, outside of the mind. Being a sign, a universal represents similar individuals as a confused cognition, or by what is common to them and refers to them indistinctly. A universal can incontrovertibly refer to an imagined thing or things without renegotiating its ontological status since the thing itself may not have ever existed but the universal as a mental act, does exist subjectively.

As such, the intellectio theory, it must be admitted, is far from exhausted through this explanation. This treatment does, however, serve to acquaint the thinking reader with how it is that Ockham ultimately sought to understand those instances where we refer to individual or singular things not by their name but by a name which corresponds to an understanding of that singular in its similarity to many other things, even an infinity.

Ockham's writings reflect his struggle to find a satisfactory treatment of universals in a world of individuals. This chapter considers two of Ockham's theories--the fictum and intellectio theories. In his first theory, Ockham allocates a special existence for universals and concepts in general. Yet, striving for economy as postulated by Ockham's Razor, William ultimately rejects ficta for the latter. It is important to note, however, that Ockham's first theory is worthy of merit in spite of its deficiencies highlighted by the second. Consider Adam's comments:

Her comments lead to a more balanced appreciation of the whole of Ockham's theory as represented in this chapter.

By evaluating two of William of Ockham's principal theories of universals, one senses how Ockham's thoroughly precise handling of the problem of universals deals deftly with the challenges implicit in transitioning away from a realist point of view. Ockham's attention to individuals as purely individuals without any intrinsic or essential element of universal character addresses the difficulty that is intrinsic to the realist perspective. That is to say, moderate medieval realism accounts for universals primarily by making them part of the form of an individual. Seeing this as unsatisfactory and untenable, William focuses on what the realist treats as a secondary account, so to speak, of universals, namely, conceptual universals. Ockham's fresh outlook is indeed--as suggested by Boehner--". . . almost as epoch-making as the Copernican revolution in astronomy."

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