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Fall 2007 Seminar Series
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
OPERATIONS RESEARCH CENTER
FALL 2007 SEMINAR SERIES
DATE: October 4
LOCATION: E40-298
TIME: 4:15pm
Reception immediately following in the ORC ConferenceRoom, E40-106
TITLE
Game and Market Equilibria: Approximation and Smoothed Complexity
ABSTRACT
I will present some recent advances in Computational Game Theory
and particularly in computing and approximating Nash equilibria.
As you may have already known, the notion of Nash equilibria
has captured the imagination of much of the computer science
theory community, both for its many applications in the growing
domain of online interactions and for its deeps and fundamental
mathematical structures. As the complexity and scale of typical
internet applications increase, the problem of efficiently analyzing
their game-theoretic properties become more pointed. I will cover
the recent results in settling several open questions about Nash
equilibria. I will particularly focus on the complexity of approximation
in, as well as the smoothed complexity of, non-cooperative two-player
games. Those results link the computational complexity of Nash
equilibria to Brower's fixed point, Sperner's lemma, and to Papadimitriou's
complexity class, PPAD, characterized by the end-of-line problem.
If time permits, I will also cover the extensions of these results
to other equilibrium problems such as in trading and market economies.
-Joint work with Xi Chen (Tsinghua University), Xiaotie Deng
(The City University of Hong Kong). Also with Li-Sha Huang (Tsinghua
University) and Paul Valiant (MIT).
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