Fall 2009 Seminar Series

DATE: October 22nd
LOCATION: E51-325
TIME: 4:15pm
Reception immediately following in the ORC ConferenceRoom, E40-106

SPEAKER:
Susan Athey

TITLE
An Empirical Model of Search Advertising Auctions

ABSTRACT
Equilibrium and Uncertainty in Search Advertising Auctions Search advertising is a large and growing business. This talk reviews recent research about designing search advertising markets. We look at the benchmark model of sponsored search advertising markets, and how it contrasts to more realistic auction environments that incorporate uncertainty faced by the bidders. We provide characterizations of existence, uniqueness, and properties of equilibrium bids. We then estimate the model using data from search advertising auctions, and use our estimates of bidder valuations to evaluate whether efficiency and welfare would be increased by switching to a Vickrey auction.