Spring 2012 Seminar Series

DATE: February 9th
LOCATION: E62-550
TIME: 4:15pm
Reception immediately following

SPEAKER:
Antonio Conejo

TITLE
Equilibria in an oligopolistic electricity pool with stepwise offer curves

ABSTRACT
This presentation analyzes the equilibria that can be reached by strategic producers in a pool-based network-constrained electricity market. The behavior of each producer is modeled by a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) whose objective is maximizing profit and whose complementarity constraints describe market clearing. The joint solution of all these MPECs constitutes an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC). The equilibria associated with the EPEC are analyzed by solving the strong stationarity conditions of all MPECs, which can be linearized without approximation by mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) techniques. The resulting mixed-integer linear conditions can be reformulated as an optimization problem that allows establishing diverse objectives to differentiate among alternative equilibria.