Fall 2015 Seminar Series

DATE: 12/3/15
LOCATION: E51-315
TIME: 4:15pm
Reception immediately following

SPEAKER:
Rene Caldentey

TITLE
Insider Trading with Incomplete Information

ABSTRACT
In this talk we will discuss a continuous-time model of strategic trading with asymmetric information. The formulation builds upon the insider trading model introduced by Kyle (1985) with three important differences: (a) the fundamental value of the asset has a Bernoulli distribution, (b) this value is publicly revealed at a random (unpredictable) time and (c) the market maker is not certain that there is an insider. Assuming the market maker can shut down the market when the potential losses of liquidity traders are unbounded, we are able to explicitly construct a Markov equilibrium. In equilibrium, the market maker continuously update his beliefs about the value of the asset, but his beliefs about the presence of the insider remain constant.

Joint work with Ennio Stacchetti (NYU).