A Bibliography of Color and Philosophy

compiled by Alex Byrne and David Hilbert

first version published in Readings on Color, Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color (MIT Press, 1997)

Please send any corrections or additions to Alex Byrne (abyrne@mit.edu)


Books | Papers A-C, D-I, J-R, S-Z

MIT Philosophy Home Page

Contemporary Philosophy of Mind: an annotated bibliography, compiled by David Chalmers


Books

Philosophy
Recent philosophical books substantially concerned with color:

Broackes. J. The Nature of Colour. Routledge, forthcoming.

Clark, A. 1993. Sensory Qualities. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hacker, P. M. S. 1987. Appearance and Reality. Oxford: Blackwell.

Hardin, C. L. 1993. Color for Philosophers: Unweaving the Rainbow (expanded edition). Indianapolis: Hackett.

Harrison, B. 1973. Form and Content. Oxford: Blackwell.

Hilbert, D. R. 1987. Color and Color Perception: A Study in Anthropocentric Realism. Stanford: CSLI.

Jackson, F. 1977. Perception: A Representative Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Landesman, C. 1989. Color and Consciousness: An Essay in Metaphysics. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Landesman, C. 1993. The Eye and the Mind: Reflections on Perception and the Problem of Knowledge Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Maund, J. B. 1995. Colours: Their Nature and Representation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McGinn, C. 1983. The Subjective View: Secondary Qualities and Indexical Thoughts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mundle, C. W. K. 1971. Perception: Facts and Theories. London: Oxford University Press.

Thompson, E. 1995. Colour Vision. New York: Routledge.

Westphal, J. 1991. Colour: A Philosophical Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell. (First published as Colour: Some Philosophical Problems from Wittgenstein.)

Wittgenstein, L. 1977. Remarks on Colour, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. L. L. McAlister and M. Schättle. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Goethe
Goethe's Farbenlehre has influenced a number of philosophers, notably Schelling, Schopenhauer, Hegel, and Wittgenstein:

Goethe, J. W. von. 1840/1970. Theory of Colours, trans. C. L. Eastlake. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

For a useful historical account see:

Sepper, D. L. 1988. Goethe contra Newton: Polemics and the Project for a New Science of Color. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Color in Culture

The best survey of color in Western culture is:

Gage, J. 1993. Color and Culture: Practice and Meaning from Antiquity to Abstraction. Boston: Bulfinch Press.

And for fun:

Theroux, A. 1994. The Primary Colors. New York: Henry Holt.

Theroux, A. 1996. The Secondary Colors. New York: Henry Holt.

Papers

We have attempted to list every philosophical paper since 1950 in English whose main topic includes color. Aesthetics has been omitted, but selected historical material, book chapters, and book reviews have been included.

Aldrich, V. C. 1952. Colors as universals. Philosophical Review 61, 377-81.

Allaire, E. B. 1959. Tractatus 6.3751. Analysis 19, 100-5.

Anscombe, G. E. M. 1974. The subjectivity of sensation. Ajatus 36, 3-18.

Arbini, R. 1963. Frederick Ferré on colour incompatibility. Mind 72, 586-90.

Armstrong, D. M. 1961. Problems about the secondary qualities. Perception and the Physical World, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, chapter 14.

Armstrong, D. M. 1968a. The secondary qualities: an essay in the classification of theories. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 46, 225-41.

Armstrong, D. M. 1968b. The secondary qualities. A Materialist Theory of the Mind, London: Routledge, chapter 12.

Armstrong, D. M. 1969. Color realism and the argument from microscopes. In Contemporary Philosophy in Australia, ed. R. Brown and C. D. Rollins. London: Allen & Unwin.

Armstrong, D. M. 1987. Smart and the secondary qualities. In Metaphysics and Morality: Essays in Honour of J. J. C. Smart, ed. P. Pettit, R. Sylvan, and J. Norman. Oxford: Blackwell. Reprinted as chapter 3 of this volume.

Armstrong, D. M. 1993. Reply to Campbell. In Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays in Honour of D. M. Armstrong, ed. J. Bacon, K. Campbell, and L. Reinhardt. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Arthadeva. 1961. Naive realism and the problem of color-seeing in dim light. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 21, 467-78.

Austin, J. 1980. Wittgenstein's solutions to the color exclusion problem. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41, 142-9.

Averill, E. W. 1980. Why are colour terms primarily used as adjectives? Philosophical Quarterly 30, 19-33.

Averill, E. W. 1982. The primary-secondary quality distinction. Philosophical Review 91, 343-62.

Averill, E. W. 1985. Color and the anthropocentric problem. Journal of Philosophy 82, 281-303. Reprinted as chapter 2 of Readings on Color, vol. 1.

Averill, E. W. 1991. Review of C. L. Hardin's Color for Philosophers and D. R. Hilbert's Color and Color Perception. Philosophical Review 100, 459-63.

Averill, E. W. 1992. The relational nature of color. Philosophical Review 101, 551-88.

Baldes, R. W. 1978. Democritus on the nature and perception of `black' and `white'. Phronesis 23, 87-100.

Beard, R. W. 1967. Analyticity, informativeness, and the incompatibility of colors. Logique et Analyse 10, 211-7.

Benardete, J. A. 1958. The analytic a posteriori and the foundations of metaphysics. Journal of Philosophy 55, 503-14.

Bennett, J. 1965. Substance, reality, and primary qualities. American Philosophical Quarterly 2, 1-17.

Bennett, J. 1971. Primary and secondary qualities. Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Oxford: Oxford University Press, chapter 4.

Berchielli, L. 1995. Representing color: discussions and problems. In Bilder im Geiste: Zur kognitiven und erkenntnistheoretischen Funktion piktorialer Repräsentationen, ed. K. Sachs-Hombach. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Bigelow, J., J. Collins, and R. Pargetter. 1990. Colouring in the world. Mind 99, 279-88.

Block N. 1990. Inverted Earth. In Philosophical Perspectives 4, ed. J. Tomberlin. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview.

Boghossian, P. A., and J. D. Velleman. 1989. Colour as a secondary quality. Mind 98, 81-103. Reprinted as chapter 7 of Readings on Color, vol. 1.

Boghossian, P. A., and J. D. Velleman. 1991. Physicalist theories of color. Philosophical Review 100, 67-106. Reprinted as chapter 8 of this volume.

Boyne, C. 1972. Vagueness and colour predicates. Mind 81, 576-7.

Bradley, M. C. 1963. Sensations, brain-processes and colours. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41, 385-72.

Bradley, M. C. 1964. Critical notice of J. J. C. Smart's Philosophy and Scientific Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 42, 262-83.

Brenner, W. 1982. Wittgenstein's color grammar. Southern Journal of Philosophy 20, 289-98.

Brenner, W. 1987. `Brownish-Yellow' and `Reddish-Green'. Philosophical Investigations 10, 200-11.

Broackes, J. 1992. The autonomy of colour. In Reduction, Explanation and Realism, ed. D. Charles and K. Lennon. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted as chapter 11 of Readings on Color, vol. 1.

Broackes, J. 1993. Critical notice of J. Westphal's Colour: A Philosophical Introduction. Philosophical Quarterly 43, 233-8.

Buckner, D. K. 1986. Transparently false: reply to Hardin. Analysis 46, 86-7.

Byrne, A., and D. R. Hilbert. 1997. Colors and reflectances. In Readings on Color, vol. 1: The Philosophy of Color, ed. A. Byrne and D. R. Hilbert. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Campbell, J. 1993. A simple view of colour. In Reality, Representation, and Projection, ed. J. Haldane and C. Wright. New York: Oxford University Press. Reprinted as chapter 10 of Readings on Color, vol. 1.

Campbell, K. 1969. Colours. In Contemporary Philosophy in Australia, ed. R. Brown and C. D. Rollins. London: Allen & Unwin.

Campbell, K. 1979. The implications of Land's theory of colour vision. Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science 6, ed. L. Cohen. Amsterdam: North Holland.

Campbell, K. 1993. David Armstrong and realism about colour. In Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays in Honour of D. M. Armstrong, ed. J. Bacon, K. Campbell, and L. Reinhardt. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Casati, R. 1990. What is wrong in inverting spectra. Teoria 10, 183-6.

Clark, A. 1985a. Qualia and the psychophysiological explanation of color perception. Synthese 65, 377-405.

Clark, A. 1985b. Spectrum inversion and the color solid. Southern Journal of Philosophy 23, 431-43.

Clark, A. 1989. The particulate instantiation of homogeneous pink. Synthese 80, 277-304.

Clark, A. 1996. True theories, false colors. Philosophy of Science 63 (Proceedings), S143-50.

Clement, W. C. 1956. Quality orders. Mind 65, 184-99.

Cornman, J. 1969. Sellars, scientific realism, and sensa. Review of Metaphysics 23, 417-51.

Cornman, J. 1974. Can Eddington's `two tables' be identical? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52, 22-38.

Cornman, J. 1975. Naive realism. Perception, Common Sense, and Science, New Haven: Yale University Press, chapter 6.

Cottingham, J. 1989-90. Descartes on colour. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 90, 231-46.

Cummins, R. 1978. The missing shade of blue. Philosophical Review 87, 548-65.

Daniels, C. B. 1967. Colors and sensations, or how to define a pain ostensively. American Philosophical Quarterly 4, 231-7.

Dedrick, D. 1995. Objectivism and the evolutionary value of colour vision. Dialogue 34, 35-44.

Dedrick, D. 1996. Can color be reduced to anything? Philosophy of Science 63 (Proceedings), S134-42.

Dennett, D. C. 1981. Wondering where the yellow went. Monist 64, 102-8.

Deshpande, D. Y. 1982. An alleged case of factual a priori. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 9, 107-12.

Dolby, R. G. A. 1973. Philosophy and the incompatibility of colours. Analysis 34, 8-16.

Dummett, M. A. E. 1979. Common sense and physics. In Perception and Identity: Essays Presented to A. J. Ayer with his Replies, ed. G. F. MacDonald. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Edwards, J. 1992. Secondary qualities and the a priori. Mind 101, 263-72.

Erickson, G. W. 1991. Wittgenstein's Remarks on Colour. Dialogos 57, 113-36.

Evans, G. 1980. Things without the mind -- a commentary upon chapter two of Strawson's Individuals. In Philosophical Subjects: Essays Presented to P. F. Strawson, ed. Z. Van Straaten. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ferré, F. 1961. Colour incompatibility and language-games. Mind 70, 90-94.

Fales, E. 1982. Generic universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 60, 29-39.

Fogelin, R. J. 1984. Hume and the missing shade of blue. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45, 263-71.

Foti, V. 1990. The dimension of color. International Studies in Philosophy 22, 13-28.

Geach, P. T. 1957. Abstractionism and colour-concepts. Mental Acts, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, section 10.

Gibbard, A. 1996. Visible properties of human interest only. In Philosophical Issues 7, ed. E. Villanueva. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview.

Gilbert, P. 1987. Westphal and Wittgenstein on white. Mind 76, 399-403.

Gilbert, P. 1989. Reflections on white: a rejoinder to Westphal. Mind 98, 423-6.

Goldman, A. H. 1975. Criteriological arguments in perception. Mind 84, 102-5.

Goodman, N. 1957. Letter to the editor on W. C. Clement's `Quality and order.' Mind 66, 78.

Grandy, R. E. 1989. A modern inquiry into the physical reality of colors. In Mind, Value and Culture: Essays in Honour of E. M. Adams, ed. D. Weissbord. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview.

Guerlac, H. 1986. Can there be colors in the dark? Physical color theory before Newton. Journal of the History of Ideas 47, 3-20.

Hacker, P. M. S. 1976. Locke and the meaning of colour words. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 9, ed. G. Vesey. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Hacker, P. M. S. 1986. Are secondary qualities relative? Mind 95, 180-97.

Hahm, D. E. 1978. Early Hellenistic theories of vision and the perception of color. In Studies in Perception, ed. P. K. Machamer and R. G. Turnbull. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press.

Hall, R. J. 1996. The evolution of color vision without colors. Philosophy of Science 63 (Proceedings), S125-33.

Hardin, C. L. 1983. Colors, normal observers, and standard conditions. Journal of Philosophy 80, 806-12.

Hardin, C. L. 1984a. A new look at color. American Philosophical Quarterly 21, 125-34.

Hardin, C. L. 1984b. Are `scientific' objects coloured? Mind 93, 491-500.

Hardin, C. L. 1985a. A transparent case for subjectivism. Analysis 45, 117-9.

Hardin, C. L. 1985b. The resemblances of colors. Philosophical Studies 48, 35-48.

Hardin, C. L. 1985c. Frank talk about the colours of sense-data. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63, 485-93.

Hardin, C. L. 1988. Phenomenal colors and sorites. Noûs 22, 213-34.

Hardin, C. L. 1989a. Idle colours and busy spectra. Analysis 49, 47-8.

Hardin, C. L. 1989b. Could white be green? Mind 98, 285-8.

Hardin, C. L. 1989c. Review of J. Westphal's Colour: Some Philosophical Problems from Wittgenstein. Mind 98, 146-9.

Hardin, C. L. 1989d. Review of D. R. Hilbert's Color and Color Perception. Canadian Philosophical Reviews 9, 47-9.

Hardin, C. L. 1990a. Why color? In Perceiving, Measuring, and Using Color: 15-6 February 1990, Santa Clara, California, ed. M. Brill. Bellingham, WA: SPIE.

Hardin, C. L. 1990b. Color and illusion. In Mind and Cognition, ed. W. G. Lycan. Oxford: Blackwell.

Hardin, C. L. 1991a. Color for philosophers: a précis. Philosophical Psychology 4, 21-6.

Hardin, C. L. 1991b. Reply to Levine. Philosophical Psychology 4, 41-50.

Hardin, C. L. 1991c. Reply to Teller. Philosophical Psychology 4, 61-4.

Hardin, C. L. 1992a. The virtues of illusion. Philosophical Studies 68, 371-82.

Hardin, C. L. 1992b. Physiology, phenomenology, and Spinoza's true colors. In Emergence or Reduction? Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism, ed. A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, and J. Kim. New York: Walter de Gruyter.

Hardin, C. L. 1993. Van Brakel and the not-so-naked emperor. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44, 137-50.

Hardin, C. L. 1997. Reinverting the spectrum. In Readings on Color, vol. 1: The Philosophy of Color, ed. A. Byrne and D. R. Hilbert. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

Harding, G. 1991. Color and the mind-body problem. Review of Metaphysics 45, 289-307.

Harman, G. 1996a. Explaining objective color in terms of subjective reactions. In Philosophical Issues 7, ed. E. Villanueva. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview. Reprinted as chapter 13 of Readings on Color, vol. 1.

Harman, G. 1996b. Qualia and color concepts. In Philosophical Issues 7, ed. E. Villanueva. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview.

Harrison, B. 1967. On describing colours. Inquiry 10, 38-52.

Harrison, B. 1986. Identity, predication and color. American Philosophical Quarterly 23, 105-14.

Harvey, J. 1979. Systematic transposition of colours. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57, 211-9.

Harvey, J. 1992. Challenging the obvious: the logic of colour concepts. Philosophia 21, 277-94.

Hatfield, G. 1992. Color perception and neural encoding: does metameric matching entail a loss of information? Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 1, 492-504.

Hilbert, D. R. 1992. What is color vision? Philosophical Studies 68, 351-70.

Hilton, J. 1961. Red and green all over again. Analysis 22, 47-8.

Holman, E. L. 1979. Is the physical world colourless? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57, 295-304.

Holman, E. L. 1981. Intension, identity, and the colourless physical world: a revision and further discussion. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59, 203-5.

Illetterati, L. 1993. Hegel's exposition of Goethe's theory of colour. In Hegel and Newtonianism, ed. M. J. Petry. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Jackson, F. 1973. Do material things have non-physical properties? Personalist 54, 105-10.

Jackson, F. 1996. The primary quality view of color. In Philosophical Perspectives 10, ed. J. Tomberlin. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

Jackson, F., and R. Pargetter. 1987. An objectivist's guide to subjectivism about colour. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 41, 127-41. Reprinted as chapter 6 of Readings on Color, vol. 1.

Jacquette, D. 1990. Wittgenstein and the color incompatibility problem. History of Philosophy Quarterly 7, 353-65.

Jacquette, D. 1995. Color and Armstrong's color realism under the microscope. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 26, 389-406.

Jarvis, J. 1961. Definition by internal relation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 39, 125-42.

Johnson, D. M. 1984. Hume's missing shade of blue, interpreted as involving habitual spectra. Hume Studies 10, 109-24.

Johnston, M. 1992. How to speak of the colors. Philosophical Studies 68, 221-63. Reprinted as chapter 9 of Readings on Color, vol. 1.

Johnston, M. 1996a. Is the external world invisible? In Philosophical Issues 7, ed. E. Villanueva. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview.

Johnston, M. 1996b. A mind-body problem at the surface of objects. In Philosophical Issues 7, ed. E. Villanueva. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview.

Johnston, M. 1997. Postscript: visual experience. In Readings on Color, vol. 1: The Philosophy of Color, ed. A. Byrne and D. R. Hilbert. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Keating, L. 1993. Un-Locke-ing Boyle: Boyle on primary and secondary qualities. History of Philosophy Quarterly 10, 305-23.

Kenner, L. 1965. The triviality of the red-green problem. Analysis 25, 147-53.

Kraut, R. 1992. The objectivity of color and the color of objectivity. Philosophical Studies 68, 265-87.

Krishna, D. 1961/2. Colour incompatibility and language-games. Indian Journal of Philosophy 3, 55-60.

Landesman, C. 1993. Why nothing has color: color skepticism. In Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, ed. L. Pojman. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

Lauxtermann, P. F. H. 1987. Five decisive years: Schopenhauer's epistemology as reflected in his theory of colour. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 18, 271-91.

Lauxtermann, P. F. H. 1990. Hegel and Schopenhauer as partisans of Goethe's theory of color. Journal of the History of Ideas 51, 599-624.

Leeds, S. 1975. Two senses of `appears red'. Philosophical Studies 28, 199-205.

Levin, J. 1987. Physicalism and the subjectivity of secondary qualities. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65, 400-11.

Levine, J. 1991. Cool red. Philosophical Psychology 4, 27-40.

Lewis, D. K. 1966. Percepts and color mosaics in visual experience. Philosophical Review 75, 357-68.

Lewis, D. K. 1987. Naming the colours. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming.

Lycan, W. G. 1973. Inverted spectrum. Ratio 15, 315-9.

MacIntyre, A. 1992. Colors, cultures, and practices. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17, 1-23.

Mackie, J. L. 1976. Primary and secondary qualities. Problems from Locke , Oxford: Oxford University Press, chapter 1.

Matthen, M. 1988. Biological functions and perceptual content. Journal of Philosophy 85, 5-27.

Maund, J. B. 1981. Colour: a case for conceptual fission. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59, 308-22.

Maund, J. B. 1991. The nature of color. History of Philosophy Quarterly 8, 253-263.

McCulloch, G. 1987. Subjectivity and colour vision. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Suppl. 61, 265-81.

McDowell, J. 1985. Values and secondary qualities. In Morality and Objectivity,, ed. T. Honderich. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

McGilvray, J. A. 1983. To color. Synthese 54, 37-70.

McGilvray, J. A. 1991. Review of C. L. Hardin's Color for Philosophers. Philosophy of Science 58, 329-31.

McGilvray, J. A. 1994. Constant colors in the head. Synthese 100, 197-239.

McGinn, C. 1996. Another look at color. Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming.

McGinn, M. 1991a. On two recent accounts of colour. Philosophical Quarterly 41, 316-24.

McGinn, M. 1991b. Westphal on the physical basis of colour incompatibility. Analysis 51, 218-22.

McGinn, M. 1991c. Wittgenstein's Remarks on Colour. Philosophy 66, 435-53.

Melica, C. 1993. Hegel on shadows and the blue of the sky. In Hegel and Newtonianism, ed. M. J. Petry. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer.

Montgomery, R. 1990. Visual perception and the wages of indeterminacy. Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 1, 365-78.

Morreall, J. 1982. Hume's missing shade of blue. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42, 407-15.

Mulligan, K. 1991. Colours, corners and complexity. In Existence and Explanation: Essays Presented in Honor of Karel Lambert, ed. W. Spohn, B. C. Van Fraassen, and B. Skyrms. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Nathan, N. 1986. Simple colours. Philosophy 61, 345-53.

Nelkin, N. 1994. Phenomena and representation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45, 527-47.

Nelson, J. O. 1961. y-Propositions. Philosophical Studies 12, 65-72.

Nelson, J. O. 1989. Hume's missing shade of blue re-viewed. Hume Studies 15, 353-63.

Noren, S. J. 1975a. Cornman on the colour of micro-entities. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53, 65-7.

Noren, S. J. 1975b. The conflict between science and common sense and why it is inevitable. Southern Journal of Philosophy 13, 331-46.

O'Hair, S. G. 1969. Putnam on reds and greens. Philosophical Review 78, 504-6.

Pap, A. 1957. Once more: colors and the synthetic a priori. Philosophical Review 66, 94-9.

Pautz, A. 2006. Can the physicalist explain colour structure in terms of colour experience? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84, 535-64.

Peacocke, C. 1984. Colour concepts and colour experience. Synthese 58, 365-82. Reprinted as chapter 5 of Readings on Color, vol. 1.

Peacocke, C. 1986. Reply to Michael Smith. Synthese 68, 577-80.

Pears, D. F. 1953. Incompatibilities of colours. In Logic and Language (second series), ed. A Flew. Oxford: Blackwell.

Perkins, M. 1983. Vision. Sensing the World, Indianapolis: Hackett, chapter 6.

Pickering, F. R. 1975. Is light the proper object of vision? Mind 84, 119-21.

Pitcher, G. 1971. Colors: our perception of them and their ontological status. A Theory of Perception, Princeton: Princeton University Press, chapter 4.

Pluhar, E. B. 1986-7. The perceptual and physical worlds. Philosophical Studies (Ireland) 31, 228-40.

Putnam, H. 1956. Reds, greens, and logical analysis. Philosophical Review 65, 206-17.

Putnam, H. 1957. Red and green all over again: a rejoinder to Arthur Pap. Philosophical Review 66, 100-3.

Radford, C. 1963. The insolubility of the red-green problem. Analysis 23, 68-71.

Radford, C. 1965a. Reply to Mr. Kenner's `The triviality of the red-green problem.' Analysis 25, 207-8.

Radford, C. 1965b. Incompatibilities of colours. Philosophical Quarterly 15, 207-19.

Remnant, P. 1961. Red and green all over again. Analysis 21, 93-5.

Rhees, R. 1963. The Tractatus: seeds of some misunderstandings. Philosophical Review 72, 213-20.

Ribe, N. M. 1985. Goethe's critique of Newton: a reconsideration. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 16, 315-35.

Rosenberg, J. F. 1982. The place of color in the scheme of things: a roadmap to Sellar's Carus lectures. Monist 65, 315-35.

Rosenthal, D. 1990. The colors and shapes of visual experiences. Report No. 28, Research Group on Mind and Brain, Perspectives in Theoretical Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind (ZiF), University of Bielefeld, Germany.

Rozeboom, W. W. 1958. The logic of color words. Philosophical Review 67, 353-66.

Sahu, N. 1988. On `this is red and this is blue': Tractatus 6.3751. Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 6, 1-19.

Sanford, D. 1966. Red, green and absolute determinacy: a reply to C. Radford's `Incompatibilities of colours.' Philosophical Quarterly 16, 356-58.

Saunders, B. A. C., and J. van Brakel. 1989. Review article: On cross cultural colour semantics: Color for Philosophers by C. L. Hardin. International Journal of Moral and Social Studies 4, 173-80.

Sellars, W. 1971. Science, sense impressions, and sensa. Review of Metaphysics 24, 391-447.

Sellars, W. 1981a. The lever of archimedes. Monist 64, 3-36.

Sellars, W. 1981b. Is consciousness physical? Monist 64, 66-90.

Sepper, D. L. 1989. Review of C. L. Hardin's Color for Philosophers. Review of Metaphysics 42, 834-37.

Shiner, R. A. 1977. Goldman on the non-contingency thesis. Mind 86, 587-90.

Shiner, R. A. 1979. Sense-experience, colours and tastes. Mind 88, 161-78.

Shoemaker, S. 1982. The inverted spectrum. Journal of Philosophy 79, 357-81.

Shoemaker, S. 1986. Review of C. McGinn's The Subjective View. Journal of Philosophy 83, 407-13.

Shoemaker, S. 1990. Qualities and qualia: what's in the mind? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (Suppl.), 109-31.

Shoemaker, S. 1991. Qualia and consciousness. Mind 100, 507-24.

Shoemaker, S. 1994a. Self-knowledge and `inner sense.' Lecture III: the phenomenal character of experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54, 291-314.

Shoemaker, S. 1994b. Phenomenal character. Noûs 28, 21-38. Reprinted as chapter 12 of Readings on Color, vol. 1.

Shoemaker, S. 1996. Colors, subjective reactions, and qualia. In Philosophical Issues 7, ed. E. Villanueva. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview.

Sibley, F. N. 1968. Colours. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 68, 145-66.

Sievert, D. 1989. Another look at Wittgenstein on color exclusion. Synthese 78, 291-318.

Silverman, A. 1989. Color and color-perception in Aristotle's De Anima. Ancient Philosophy 9, 271-92.

Sloman, A. 1964. Colour incompatibilities and analyticity. Analysis 24, 104-19.

Smart, J. J. C. 1959. Incompatible colors. Philosophical Studies 10, 39-41.

Smart, J. J. C. 1961. Colours. Philosophy 36, 128-42.

Smart, J. J. C. 1963. The secondary qualities. Philosophy and Scientific Realism, London: Routledge, chapter 4.

Smart, J. J. C. 1971. Reports of immediate experiences. Synthese 22, 346-59.

Smart, J. J. C. 1975. On some criticisms of a physicalist theory of colors. In Philosophical Aspects of the MindBody Problem, ed. C. Cheng, Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii. Reprinted as chapter 1 of Readings on Color, vol. 1.

Smart, J. J. C. 1987. Reply to Armstrong. In Metaphysics and Morality: Essays in Honour of J. J. C. Smart, ed. P. Pettit, R. Sylvan, and J. Norman. Oxford: Blackwell. Reprinted as chapter 4 of Readings on Color, vol. 1.

Smart, J. J. C. 1995. `Looks red' and dangerous talk. Philosophy 70, 545-54.

Smith, A. D. 1990. Of primary and secondary qualities. Philosophical Review 99, 221-54.

Smith, M. A. 1986. Peacocke on red and red´. Synthese 68, 559-76.

Smith, M. A. 1993. Colour, transparency, mind-independence. In Reality, Representation, and Projection, ed. J. Haldane and C. Wright. New York: Oxford University Press.

Smith, P. 1987. Subjectivity and colour vision. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Suppl. 61, 245-64.

Sorabji, R. 1972. Aristotle, mathematics, and colour. Classical Quarterly 22, 293-308.

Sosa, E. 1990. Perception and reality. In Information, Semantics & Epistemology, ed. E. Villanueva. Oxford: Blackwell.

Sosa, E. 1996. Is color psychological or biological? Or both? In Philosophical Issues 7, ed. E. Villanueva. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview.

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