• Moral Reasoning
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  • Friday October 14, 2011

• Some Distinctions
  • Ambiguity in "reasoning" and "argument"
    • Something people do
    • Abstract structures
  • Theoretical and practical reasoning
  • Reasoning with others and reasoning by and for yourself
  • System 1 and System 2

• Reasoning as Change in View
  • A change in what one believes, feels, or intends
  • Normative or descriptive
  • Conservative and coherence seeking

• Ought and reasons
  • Explain what people ought to do in terms of how they ought to reason?
    • J J Thomson
    • An objective reason for something is a fact that is evidence for (makes more probable) a relevant belief
      • Objective reason for S to D is a fact that is evidence for the belief that S should D
      • P is a subjective reason for S to D iff S believes that P is a fact and is a reason to D.
    • Circular to explain what one ought to do in terms of what one has reasons to do

• Reasoning with Others and Reasoning by Oneself
  • Gibbard, and Mercier and Sperber: reasoning with others is more basic
    • Evolutionary speculation of why this should be so
    • Language evolved to make possible group discussion and argument
    • Conscious individual reasoning is modeled on group discussion
  • Chomsky speculation
    • Language evolved as an instrument of individual thought
      • Recursive structures of plans and other thoughts
    • Only later becoming used in communication

• Must We Distinguish Practical and Theoretical Reasoning?
  • Practical reasoning reduced to theoretical reasoning: Thomson, Nagel
  • Theoretical reasoning reduced to practical reasoning: Levi

• Significant Differences Between Theoretical and Practical Reasoning
  • Wanting something to occur is a reason to decide to make it occur but not to believe it has occurred.
  • Arbitrary choices are often required in practical reason but are forbidden in theoretical reasoning.

• Arguing, Argument, Reasoning, Inference
  • Arguing in disputes vs. reasoning in discussions
    • Come, let us reason together
    • Come, let us argue together
  • Reasoning by and for yourself vs. arguing with yourself
  • Practical inference vs. practical reasoning

• Arguments that are abstract structures
  • A structure of sentences or propositions
    • Premises, intermediate steps, conclusion
    • Not necessarily premises or conclusions of someone presenting the argument
  • Reasoning may involve accepting such a structure as a valid argument
    • Temporal order of reasoning may not reflect the order of items in the structure
    • The conclusion of the reasoning may not be the conclusion of the abstract argument (cf. inference to the best explanation)
  • Most reasoning or inference does not seem to involve an associated abstract argument
    • People are inept at constructing such arguments
    • College courses in logic for freshmen

• Logic, Inference, Reasoning
  • Logic as the theory of valid argument
    • Arguments as abstract structures of sentences or propositions
    • Rather than arguing
      • Described by specifying axioms and rules of implication
    • Misleading to call these rules, rules of inference
      • Not rules you can follow
- Not about inference
- Important not to confuse these
- Some nonstandard logics result from such confusion
- Do Deductive Arguments Justify Conclusions?
  - No
  - Deductive logic is not a theory about what justifies what
- How Important Is the Ability to Produce Reasons for One's View?
  - Hugo Mercier: People are motivated to produce reasons for their views if challenged: "This is important as, if the rationalizations are voiced out, others can then attack them. If they are found lacking, if we fail to defend our original judgment appropriately, then we must change our mind on pain of vein thought to be inconsistent and unreasonable."
  - Paxton and Greene: "People reject judgments based on their own intuitions when those judgments appear to be unprincipled …"
  - But reasons are typically invented on the spot and, if inadequate, people produce others
  - And people do not typically reject their judgments because they cannot justify them.
- Believing the Logical Consequences of Your Views?
  - There are infinitely many
  - Your beliefs are probably inconsistent
  - Discovering inconsistency does not require you to drop everything to resolve it
  - You may not care
  - Set theoretic and liar paradoxes
  - Kelvin vs. Darwin
- Reasoning as Constraint Satisfaction
  - Goodman
  - Rawls' "reflective equilibrium"
  - Thagard's computer models
  - Scientific reasoning, jurors
  - Unstable, sensitive to order in which evidence is considered
  - "Wide reflective equilibrium"
- Moral Bargaining
  - Actual social contract
  - Hume on implicit bargaining: rowers
  - Might explain why the duty not to injure is stronger than the duty to help
  - Existing moral conventions fit better with actual social contract theory than with hypothetical contract theories
- Possible Analogies between Moral Theory and Linguistics
  - Lewis on conventions of language
  - Rawls envisioned a moral grammar that would be analogous to generative grammar of a particular language
  - Many dialects, many moralities
  - Principles and parameters
  - I-Grammar and I-Morality
- Recursive Structure in Language and in Morality
  - A phrase of a given type can be embedded in a larger phrase of that type, which is embedded in a still larger phrase of that type.
  - Similarly in morality?
    - It is wrong to promise to do something that is wrong.
    - It is worse to cause harm than to fail to prevent it
    - The notion of cause can depend on moral obligations
  - Related cases: whether an act is cheating or lying, whether a consequence of an act is intended, whether an agent has killed another or merely let the other person die.
- Moral Relativism and Linguistic Relativism
  - Different mutually incomprehensible languages, different mutually incomprehensible moral frameworks.
  - No objective way to determine the single true morality
  - Nevertheless there may be moral universals in the same way in which there are linguistic universals
- Summary
  - Four Distinctions
  - Reasoning as change in view: beliefs, intentions, desires, emotions, and other feelings
  - "Ought" and reasons
  - Reasoning with others more basic than reasoning
  - Non-reducibility of practical reasoning to theoretical and vice versa.
  - Ambiguities in "argument," "reasoning," and "inference"
  - Misuse of "rules of inference"
  - Justification
  - Constrain satisfaction
  - Moral bargaining
  - Analogies with linguistics
- END