

This article was downloaded by: [DeVore, Marc Ronald]

On: 13 February 2011

Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 933403944]

Publisher Routledge

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK



Cold War History

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713634851>

The United Kingdom's last hot war of the Cold War: Oman, 1963-75

Marc DeVore^a

^a University of St. Gallen,

First published on: 12 February 2011

To cite this Article DeVore, Marc(2011) 'The United Kingdom's last hot war of the Cold War: Oman, 1963-75', Cold War History,, First published on: 12 February 2011 (iFirst)

To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/14682745.2010.498823

URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2010.498823>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: <http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf>

This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

The United Kingdom's last hot war of the Cold War: Oman, 1963–75

Marc DeVore
University of St. Gallen

Between 1963 and 1975, the United Kingdom fought its last 'hot war' that can be classified as part of the Cold War. Attracting little media attention at the time, the war the United Kingdom waged in Oman's Dhofar province halted the spread of communism in the Persian Gulf at a period of acute vulnerability. Contrary to existing studies, which treat the conflict as a textbook British counter-insurgency conducted in a remote province of Oman, the purpose of this article is to highlight the complex regional and international dynamics that arguably proved more critical to the conflict's resolution. Within this context, the key elements contributing to the Anglo-Omani victory were the ability of British policymakers to forge an alliance of the Middle East's conservative monarchies, their successful mobilization of conservative Islam against secular Marxism and their persistent efforts to destabilize the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen

I. Introduction

Between 1963 and 1975, the United Kingdom fought its last 'hot war' that can be classified as part of the ideological competition known as the Cold War. Although it attracted little media attention at the time, the hot war that the United Kingdom waged in Oman's Dhofar province halted the spread of communism and Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf at a period of acute vulnerability. Contrary to existing studies of the Dhofar War, which treat the conflict as a textbook British counterinsurgency conducted in a remote province of Oman, the purpose of this article is to highlight the complex regional and international dynamics that arguably proved more critical to the conflict's resolution.¹

Despite the Dhofar War's modest origins in 1963 as a tribal revolt, its formative years coincided with the victory of the communist National Liberation Front (NLF) in neighbouring South Yemen, the Soviet Union's growing presence in the Indian Ocean

Marc DeVore, PhD (MIT) is a Lecturer and Senior Research Fellow at the University of St. Gallen.
Correspondence to: Email: marc.devore@unisg.ch

and the United Kingdom's decision to withdraw from its commitments East of Suez. These factors internationalised the Dhofar War and raised the likelihood that a communist victory in Dhofar would lead to a domino effect in the neighbouring, newly independent, sheikhdoms and emirates. Thus, from the perspective of the Dhofari insurgents, their allies in South Yemen and their British opponents, the war for Dhofar constituted part of a larger struggle for control of Southern Arabia. The regional stakes of the Dhofar War manifested themselves in numerous efforts to expand the war. South Yemen (as well as Iraq) promoted efforts to subvert other provinces in Oman and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), while the United Kingdom and Oman supported tribal insurgents in South Yemen.

When the Dhofar insurgency reached its apogee in 1970, many British policymakers feared that the war there was being lost and that Oman had become 'a kind of micro-Vietnam in the Arabian peninsula.'² The fact that this worst-case scenario did not transpire has frequently been attributed to the United Kingdom having conducted a model counterinsurgency in Dhofar. In the United Kingdom, where Oman literally displaced Malaya as the textbook counterinsurgency studied at the army's Junior Command and Staff Course, the view has taken root that the Dhofar insurgency was vanquished by proven tactics, organisational tools and procedures elaborated during prior counterinsurgencies in Malaya, Kenya and Borneo.³

Although British military leaders attempted to implement such a model counterinsurgency programme, I argue that their efforts were thwarted by local political, geographic and human factors. Beginning in 1970, British commanders sought to enact an orthodox counterinsurgency plan employing conventional forces to interdict enemy supply lines, irregular forces to hunt enemy guerrillas and a political/economic 'hearts and minds campaign' to woo Dhofar's rural population away from the insurgency. However, every aspect of this campaign faltered. Oman's British-officered armed forces proved too small and immobile to hinder rebel communications with their sanctuaries in South Yemen, irregular forces suffered from chronic ill-discipline, and Oman's Sultan refused to implement political reforms or fund development programmes.

Unable to implement a traditional counterinsurgency campaign, the United Kingdom achieved a political victory in Oman through its ability to shape the Omani and broader regional political context. Once it had become frustrated with Sultan Said bin Taimur's unwillingness to implement the civil development measures, the British government in 1970 orchestrated a coup d'état that installed the former Sultan's Sandhurst-educated son as head of state. Under the rule of the new Sultan, Qaboos, the Omani state embraced the development projects, military build-up and diplomatic initiatives recommended by the United Kingdom. Although potentially ruinous, the expenditures necessitated by these policies were ultimately facilitated by Oman's greater revenues after the advent of the 1973 oil crisis.

One of the most strategically significant Anglo-Omani successes achieved under the Qaboos regime was Oman's cultivation of regional allies in the Middle East. Diplomatically isolated and burdened by numerous boundary disputes with its neighbours at the time of Qaboos' succession, Oman soon obtained an array of allies.

Within this context, the Anglo-Omani victory in Dhofar was ultimately won in 1975 with the assistance of sizeable Iranian and Jordanian military forces, and thanks to the arms donated by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the United States.

II. From tribal revolt to Cold War insurgency

Far from beginning as a Marxist revolution, the Dhofar Rebellion started in the early 1960s as a non-ideological tribal revolt against a distant and neglectful government. However, the transformation of South Yemen, on the western border of Dhofar, into a Marxist state in 1967 changed the rebellion. Following this date, training and weaponry supplied by communist states permitted Dhofar rebels to seize control of much of Dhofar and encouraged them to adopt a left-wing political platform.

While communism was attracting adherents in neighbouring South Yemen, Oman remained poor and its government launched few development programmes at a time when oil revenues were generating increasing affluence elsewhere in the Persian Gulf.⁴ The combination of Oman's lack of development and Sultan Said's authoritarian rule proved particularly vexatious in the province of Dhofar. Separated culturally and physically from the rest of Oman by 500 miles of desert, Dhofar was sparsely populated by only 30,000 villagers and pastoralists.⁵ Many sought employment in the oilfields and armies of wealthier Gulf monarchies. There they were first exposed to political currents opposed to Oman's monarchic regime, including the pan-Arab Movement of Arab Nationalists (MAN) and the Saudi-backed proponents of Oman's exiled Imam.⁶

Discontent amongst Dhofaris came to a head in 1963 when a member of the Bait Kathir bribe, Musallim bin Nuffl, and members of his clan ambushed an oil exportation vehicle and began sniping at the Sultan's Armed Forces (SAF). Although Oman's armed forces reacted swiftly, Musallim and his followers escaped to Saudi Arabia and Iraq, where they made contact with Dhofar émigré communities.⁷ Between 1963 and 1964, Musallim's Dhofari exiles joined émigré members of MAN and the expatriate Dhofari soldiers of the Organization of Dhofari Soldiers to form the Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF). With limited support from Iraq and Saudi Arabia, in 1964 the DLF began guerrilla operations in Dhofar.⁸

Although disconcerting Sultan Said, especially after attempting to assassinate him in 1966, the rebellion lacked the resources to go beyond annoying Oman's armed forces. Iraq was training comparatively few guerrillas, while arms could be smuggled to Dhofar only with great difficulty.⁹ Moreover, the pre-eminent figure at the onset of the rebellion, Musallim, was grievously wounded in 1966.¹⁰ When Sultan Said decided the next year to increase the size of his armed forces from two to three battalions, the United Kingdom's Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) concluded: 'The strong Security Forces which he [Said] has built up can probably deal effectively with any internal trouble.'¹¹ Writing after the fact, Brigadier Tony Lewis agreed that with a few more resources, 'I am sure that we could have brought the Dhofar trouble to an end there and then [1966].'¹² Without greater external support, the rebellion in Dhofar would slowly asphyxiate for lack of resources and leadership.

At the same time as its expectations of a rapid victory over the insurgency in Dhofar was proving illusory, the United Kingdom found itself drawn into a larger struggle over the future of Southern Arabia, a struggle that began with the United Kingdom's withdrawal from South Yemen and its failure to transmit power to a friendly regime. Challenged by urban and rural guerrillas from 1964, the United Kingdom attempted to empower a conservative confederation of rural sheikhs and urban merchants. However, the Marxist National Liberation Front was able to defeat all rivals and seize power as the British withdrew in 1967.¹³ After further infighting, the new government in South Yemen emerged as the Arab world's first (and only) avowedly communist regime and renamed the country the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY).

This development had immediate repercussions in Dhofar because the PDRY's Marxist leadership (NLF) and radical elements of Oman's guerrilla liberation group (DLF) shared common origins within the Movement of Arab Nationalists.¹⁴ Once in power, the NLF quickly moved to support the DLF. Although the Soviet Union initially attempted to restrain the PDRY from becoming involved with the Dhofari guerrilla group, the People's Republic of China provided an alternative source of aid.¹⁵ Initiating support in 1967, the Chinese trained large numbers of guerrilla leaders in camps in China and permitted Chinese advisors to fight alongside Dhofari rebels in Oman. North Korea soon joined China in training DLF guerrillas.¹⁶

Not to be outdone by their Chinese rival in the communist world, the Soviets trained selected DLF guerrillas in the Soviet Union and undertook to strengthen the PDRY's conventional military forces. Within the context of the late 1960s and early 1970s, the emergence of a communist regime in South Yemen provided opportunities for the Soviet Union to enhance its ability to project force globally.¹⁷ The Soviet Navy, which had been preparing for a worldwide role under the leadership of Admiral Sergei Gorchkov since the 1950s, first deployed ships to the Indian Ocean in 1965.¹⁸ Although also using limited facilities provided by Somalia, the Soviet Navy benefited from the PDRY's oil refinery and port, which allowed it to begin regularly dispatching ships to Aden in 1968.¹⁹

The Soviet Union's alliance with the PDRY deepened in subsequent years as its relations with Egypt declined. After Egypt expelled its Soviet advisors in 1972, the Soviet leaders increasingly viewed the PDRY's Marxist credentials as a guarantee of friendship.²⁰ As the only true Marxist-Leninist regime in the Middle East, the PDRY instilled in many Soviet officials a desire 'to prove that a small underdeveloped Arab country, a former British colony, would advance with seven-league strides towards the bright future provided it was armed with the slogans of scientific socialism'.²¹

From 1968, the Soviet Union transferred increasingly sophisticated weapons to the PDRY. These arms, combined with the assistance of Soviet military advisors, Cuban pilots and East German internal security experts, endowed the PDRY with military capabilities out of proportion to the state's size and resources.²² Although the PDRY had been supplying the Dhofari rebels with some of its Soviet arms from 1968, the Soviet Union and Cuba gradually became the rebellion's principal purveyor of weaponry and guerrilla training from 1971.²³

Weak and faltering in 1967, the fresh infusions of arms and expertise that now came to the DLF reinvigorated the rebellion. Kalashnikov assault rifles, mortars, recoilless rifles, anti-tank mines and heavy machine guns now gave Dhofar's rebels equal, if not greater, firepower than the Omani government.²⁴ Soon, well-trained guerrillas put the new equipment to good use in a series of ambushes and raids, wresting the initiative in Dhofar away from government forces. The overall intensity of the war increased as the number of skirmishes between government and rebel forces climbed from one to two a week in 1967, to two to three a day in 1969.²⁵ Worse, Dhofar's civilian population kept the rebels informed of the government forces' every move, while government forces operated blindly in an intelligence vacuum.²⁶

The mounting skill and ferocity of rebel attacks soon drove the Omani armed forces out of much of Dhofar. In August 1968, the rebels used their new mortars to attack Salalah, the administrative capital of Dhofar and the armed forces' logistic base.²⁷ In 1969, the rebels took Rakhyut, the largest settlement in Western Dhofar, and executed the governor and loyal inhabitants in public.²⁸ In March 1970, rebels achieved a further success when they seized the village of Sudh.²⁹ By this time, Oman's armed forces needed to launch large operations to merely keep their lines of supply open and had effectively ceded control over 80% of Dhofar.³⁰ Meanwhile, the rebellion had grown to encompass 2000 full-time guerrillas and 4000 part-time militiamen, effectively outnumbering the one battalion of government forces permanently deployed in Dhofar.³¹

British assessments of the war in Dhofar highlighted the worsening strategic outlook. In February 1970, it was judged that, 'Time is not on the side of the SAF [Sultan's Armed Forces]. Guerrilla pressure has been increasing and with it the pressure to RAF [Royal Air Force] Salalah.'³² Three weeks later, the Chiefs of Staff of the United Kingdom's armed forces doubted that the Sultan would retain control of Dhofar for another year.³³ Thus, having recovered from being virtually moribund in early 1967, the Dhofar rebellion controlled much of the province and its inhabitants by early 1970.

III. The international war

On 16 January 1968, even as the strategic situation in Dhofar and Southern Arabia shifted imperceptibly against the Sultan of Oman, Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced the United Kingdom's intention to withdraw its military forces from the Persian Gulf by the end of 1971.³⁴ This decision meant that 7300 British servicemen along with their supporting squadrons of fighter-bombers and transport aircraft would be redeployed to the United Kingdom.³⁵ It also meant that the United Kingdom would relinquish its traditional role as guardian of the small monarchies lying along the Western Persian Gulf, leaving these states vulnerable to the same sorts of subversive activities that had already transformed Dhofar into a battlefield.

The British faced a daunting challenge in establishing a stable and durable political order prior to withdrawing from the region. All of the entities being promised independence were small, and five of the sheikhdoms (Ajman, Fujayrah, Ra's al

Khaymah, Sharjah and Umm al Qawain) were too weak to become viable independent states. The governments of these states were also traditional and authoritarian, as had been the case in South Yemen and was at this time in Oman. As a 1968 CIA report stated, 'The states in the area are conservative – some medievally so – and are vulnerable to agitation for change . . . Whether indigenous security services are capable of coping with such problems, with or without British assistance – is far from certain.'³⁶

Moreover, the United Kingdom's presence had calmed the dynastic rivalries, which now threatened to come to the fore. To make matters worse, the regional powers of the Gulf – Iran and Iraq – also nourished territorial claims against the United Kingdom's protectorates, including Oman.³⁷ Although the British Foreign Office encouraged its Gulf protectorates to strengthen themselves by federating into a larger political ensemble, the failure of the United Kingdom's recent attempt to forge a South Arabian Federation in South Yemen out of 17 tribal states highlighted the difficulties of implementing such a strategy.³⁸ Initially, the political union of seven sheikhdoms into the United Arab Emirates appeared no more solid.³⁹

While the United Kingdom sought to successfully implement a version of the strategy that had failed them in South Yemen, revolutionaries throughout the Gulf hoped to replicate the NLF's victory over the conservative South Arabian Federation. A host of subversive movements already existed in the British protectorates and many of these shared a common origin with both the NLF and DLF in the Movement of Arab Nationalists.⁴⁰ Upon learning of the British withdrawal, Marxist MAN members from the British protectorates (Dubai, Qatar, Kuwait and Oman) formed the People's Revolutionary Movement (PRM) to replace the Gulf's conservative monarchies with Marxist regimes. Other revolutionary movements, such as the Bahrain-based Gulf Liberation Front and Ras al Kaima-based Arab Action Party, shared ideological affinities with the NLF, DLF as well as with the PRM.⁴¹

The activities of this network combined with the upcoming British withdrawal to raise the spectre of Marxists seizing power along much of the Western Gulf. Within this context, a rebel Marxist victory in Dhofar came to be viewed as a potential catalyst for similar successes in spreading Marxism elsewhere. The Dhofari rebels embraced this vanguard role in September 1968 when the organisation voted to change its name from the DLF to the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf (PFLOAG).⁴² To demonstrate its expanded vision, PFLOAG trained Northern Omani insurgents and facilitated their acquisition of weapons beginning in 1969.⁴³

In 1970 PFLOAG published a communiqué in a Gulf newspaper elaborating its strategy for fostering revolution throughout the Persian Gulf. According to this document, PFLOAG intended for Dhofar to continue to absorb the majority of Oman's armed forces and defence expenditures. Under these circumstances, the Sultanate would be ripe for insurgents to open a second front in Inner Oman. PFLOAG leaders assumed that this development would lay the basis for regime change in Oman. Thereafter, revolutionary cadres elsewhere in the Gulf would carry forward the struggle, replacing the region's sheikhs with 'republican regimes'.⁴⁴ British authorities, for their part, concurred with

PFLOAG's analysis, concluding that, 'If the Sultan were to lose control in Dhofar ... the trouble might spread, for example to Inner Oman.'⁴⁵

Would-be revolutionaries throughout the Gulf derived additional satisfaction from an international environment that seemed to favour their projects. The Soviet Union responded to the British announcement of its withdrawal by ostentatiously sending a large naval squadron to the Persian Gulf. This exercise was interpreted in the United States as showing that 'a diplomatic game highly reminiscent of the ones played by both the Russians and the Western European powers during the last century' had begun. Despite being alarmed by the Soviet Union's actions, the United States' engagement in Vietnam prevented it from immediately filling the vacuum left by the British.⁴⁶ More concretely, the PDRY and Iraq offered training and weapons to left-wing revolutionaries.

By late 1969, some of PFLOAG's sister organisations felt prepared to launch insurgencies of their own. PFLOAG's affiliate in Northern Oman, the National Democratic Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf (NDFLOAG) attempted to infiltrate 30 Iraqi-trained insurgents into Oman in 1969. However, Omani security forces received accurate intelligence about the route they intended to follow and staged an ambush that annihilated most of the insurgents.⁴⁷

This first failure was followed by a second NDFLOAG effort to initiate a guerrilla war in Northern Oman. By June 1970, 30 new insurgents had successfully returned to Oman after receiving training from Iraq, the PDRY and PFLOAG. NDFLOAG had also smuggled arms into Oman and dispersed them in caches. Following these preparations, the NDFLOAG leadership chose to initiate their long awaited guerrilla struggle. Rebel leaders planned to begin their campaign with two highly visible attacks on army bases at Izki and Nizwa. Once these attacks had demonstrated to ordinary Omanis that a guerrilla struggle had begun, the rebels planned to withdraw to the hills and wait for recruits to join them. Unfortunately for NDFLOAG, this strategy miscarried when the initial attacks provoked a vigorous government pursuit, which ultimately captured or killed most of the insurgents.⁴⁸

While NDFLOAG attempted to ignite a guerrilla war in Northern Oman, another revolutionary group, the Arab Action Party (AAP), struggled to develop its own insurgency against the Trucial States (future United Arab Emirates). Thirty (Iraqi, Omani and Bahraini) AAP insurgents landed on the Musandam Peninsula in late 1970. Musandam's status as an un-administered territory claimed by both Oman and Ras al Khaymah, yet lacking a contiguous border with the rest of Oman, rendered counterinsurgency operations exceptionally difficult, while raising the possibility that insurgents in Musandam could use the peninsula as a base for destabilising the weak, but neighbouring Emirate of Sharjah.⁴⁹ Conceptually, the AAP's strategy appeared sound. The dominant local tribe, the Shihuh, was notoriously anti-authority and would provide fertile ground for insurgent propaganda. Moreover, the rebellion could conveniently be supported by clandestine political organisations in Ra's al Khaymah and Dubai.⁵⁰

However, British forces fortuitously discovered the AAP's presence in Musandam before the insurgents were ready to act. As a consequence, the British succeeded in pre-empting the insurgents in December 1970 with a large military operation aimed at

capturing them and re-establishing Omani governmental authority over Musandam. Caught by surprise, the insurgents skilfully used Musandam's rough terrain to evade the British. Nevertheless, they were obliged to abandon equipment and documents, and the British succeeded at establishing friendly relations with the Shihub.⁵¹

Despite the United Kingdom's 1969 and 1970 successes in thwarting subversive uprisings outside of Dhofar, the threat of the Dhofar rebellion metastasising into a larger regional conflict remained acute. Both NDFLOAG and the AAP regrouped from their initial setbacks and plotted to renew their efforts to ignite guerrilla wars, and PFLOAG's affiliate in Bahrain contributed to labour unrest in that country once the United Kingdom had withdrawn from the Gulf in 1971.⁵² Foreign assistance reinforced their hopes as North Korea undertook to provide sophisticated training for 20 NDFLOAG operatives in sabotage and assassination, and the PDRY provided the organisation with an office.⁵³ Considering the fragility of the Gulf's newly independent states (especially the UAE), the prospect remained very real that a British defeat in Dhofar would initiate a domino effect amongst the United Kingdom's former protectorates. As one British officer put it, 'defeat [in Dhofar] would almost certainly have condemned the Gulf to years of instability and anarchy, and would probably have drawn other countries ... into a greater and more destructive conflict'.⁵⁴

IV. A textbook counterinsurgency?

Confronting a worsening military situation, the British officers commanding the Sultan of Oman's Armed Forces sought to develop a counterinsurgency strategy rooted in the lessons drawn from past British campaigns. However, Sultan Said repeatedly refused to approve the deficit spending or political reforms needed to successfully enact the plans proposed by his British advisors. As the situation declined further, British officers in Oman and policymakers in London concluded that they had to overthrow Said and replace him with his British-educated son, Qaboos bin Said. Nevertheless, despite their success at mounting a coup d'état and Qaboos' willingness to follow British advice, the United Kingdom's initial efforts to implement a 'textbook' counterinsurgency faltered in Dhofar's human and physical environments.

It was only natural that the British officers commanding Oman's armed forces turned to past precedents once the situation in Dhofar began to degenerate from 1964 onwards. British armed forces had fought against insurgents in Palestine, Greece, Malaya, Egypt, Kenya, Cyprus, Aden and Borneo in the years preceding the Dhofar War. Although the enemies and terrain differed from one theatre to the next, these campaigns provided British soldiers with unparalleled experience in fighting irregular opponents. Drawing on the lessons learned in these conflicts, the British armed forces developed a series of counterinsurgency 'best practices'.⁵⁵ Senior British officers seconded to the Omani armed forces had invariably absorbed these practices during their service in one or more campaigns, and now sought to apply proven formulas (particularly that of Malaya) in Dhofar.⁵⁶

The basic operational concept systematically announced by British counter-insurgency theory is clear, hold and then 'win' the countryside back from insurgents. Clearing involves the use of overwhelming military force to evict organised guerrilla bands from a region. Holding consists of preventing insurgents from re-entering an area by establishing a firm security framework. In past campaigns, this was achieved through the creation of loyalist home guards to protect population centres and the use of government forces to block guerrilla infiltration routes. Finally, the population would gradually be 'won' back to the government by a 'hearts and minds' campaign combining economic development and political reforms.⁵⁷

Viewed in this context, the British armed forces conceptualised the 'hearts and minds' of the population as the key objective of any counterinsurgency.⁵⁸ As one British authority noted, 'The aim of the government must be to regain if necessary and then retain the allegiance of the population.'⁵⁹ On the positive side, economic development, the provision of social services and political reforms are tools whereby a government can earn the loyalty of the population. On the negative side, government forces must employ minimal force in fighting insurgents and conduct themselves in a legally acceptable fashion so as not to alienate supporters.

Past British counterinsurgencies highlighted the value of special and irregular forces to keep guerrillas off-balance and defeat them in their rural milieu. Units formed from surrendered insurgents played a critical role in hunting guerrilla bands in both Malaya and Kenya thanks to their knowledge of the enemy and skill at operating in the local environment.⁶⁰ Indigenous trackers, such as the Ibans and Dyaks of Southeast Asia or North Kenyan tribesmen, also proved invaluable at locating enemy forces and providing reconnaissance on their activities.⁶¹ Special forces, such as the Special Air Service (SAS), trained, led and interacted with both categories of irregular forces.

In order to apply British counterinsurgency practices in Dhofar, British officers argued that Oman's armed forces had to simultaneously block rebel supply lines from the PDRY, defend the administrative capital of Salalah and mount an offensive operation to clear enemy forces from part of Dhofar's mountainous interior. Once a region had been cleared of guerrillas, establishing development projects, medical clinics and schools would win the population's allegiance back to the Oman's government. Irregular forces could then be formed to harass guerrilla forces and prevent them from returning to recently cleared areas.⁶²

However, enacting a counterinsurgency programme along these lines demanded resources greater than had hitherto been dedicated to the Dhofar War. More infantry would be needed to defend government-controlled territory, interdict enemy communications and conduct offensive operations. However, the additional infantry would only be able to function efficiently if it were equipped with more modern weapons than the bolt-action rifles and antiquated artillery originally provided to the armed forces. If this infantry and equipment were available, then helicopters and more transport aircraft would be necessary to transport them and support their operations across Dhofar's sparsely inhabited interior. Significant expenditures on development and specialised personnel, such as the SAS, were required for the 'hearts and minds' campaign.⁶³

Sultan Said did not oppose these requests in principle, but he was unwilling to run a budget deficit in order to meet them.⁶⁴ As a consequence, the armed forces' ability to wage the war in Dhofar was directly tied to Oman's meagre oil revenues. Thus, although Said accepted some of the requests put to him by his British advisors, the support he provided was perceived as inadequate.⁶⁵ London equally refused to deploy the SAS to the region before 1970, despite repeated requests from Oman and lobbying by the SAS leadership.⁶⁶

Without resources to conduct a proper 'hearts and minds' campaign, Oman's armed forces resorted to collective punishments, such as capping wells and burning villages, to deter Dhofari civilians from supporting the rebellion. Unfortunately, these practices only succeeded in driving more Dhofaris to join the rebels.⁶⁷ By late 1969, British officers serving in Oman were reporting to London that 'the situation in Dhofar was very bad and if allowed to go unchecked, control of the country might not be maintained for another year.'⁶⁸

Faced with what they perceived to be a cycle of increased repression feeding a growing insurgency, certain British officers began to argue that the only way of containing the rebellion in Dhofar was to change Oman's regime. One particularly influential voice was that of Tim Landon, who had been educated at the (British) Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, alongside the Sultan Said's son, Qaboos bin Taimur. Landon argued that Qaboos would be an ideal replacement for Said because of his British education, progressive views and service with the British Army.⁶⁹ However, prior to 1970, the British leaders of the Omani armed forces felt a personal sense of loyalty to Said and suppressed discussion of a coup d'état.⁷⁰

At the beginning of 1970, changes amongst the British personnel in Dhofar resulted in a high command more favourably disposed to overthrowing Said.⁷¹ Their arguments fell on favourable ears in London, where Said's unwillingness to fund development programmes had long frustrated the government. One British assessment from 1968 concluded that, 'Stability in Muscat and Oman depends largely upon the wisdom and perhaps the speed with which the Sultan apportions his oil revenues.'⁷² Another assessment, from 1970, concluded: 'If peace is to be won, it will require winning over the hostile tribes ... this would require economic development and eventually a political accommodation.'⁷³ If Said did not invest heavily in development programmes, then the United Kingdom could install a ruler who would.

Rather than precipitously backing a coup d'état, the British government decided to first confront Said with a series of demands that it viewed necessary for stabilising the deteriorating situation in Dhofar. In exchange for increased assistance, the Sultan would have to agree to expand Oman's armed forces, increase soldiers' pay, and implement a development programme in Dhofar. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) referred to this effort as the 'Grand Remonstrance'.⁷⁴ Unbeknownst to Said, his refusal to agree to British demands would result in Britain pursuing his overthrow.

The British Political Resident for the Persian Gulf and the FCO's Director of Middle Eastern Affairs presented the remonstrance to Said in May 1970. Although the Sultan agreed to many of the military policies, he refused to approve the political and economic measures.⁷⁵ This lost him what support he retained in London. In July 1970,

the Commander of British Military Forces in the Gulf, Major-General Roly Gibbs, declared: 'The Sultan must go, because if he did not, the Dhofar was liable to be lost to the rebels.'⁷⁶ Anthony Acland of the FCO echoed this appreciation, writing: 'Under the present Sultan's continuing rule we should still be faced with a steadily worsening situation in the Sultanate ... Qabus is likely to be a much better bet than the current Sultan, especially as he may well rely ... on HMG's support, encouragement and advice.'⁷⁷

Britain's new Conservative government approved of organising a coup d'état against Said in June or July 1970. Although the Cabinet hoped to keep British involvement deniable by prohibiting British loan (but not contract) officers from participating in the coup itself, they ordered the British commanders of Oman's armed forces to intervene directly should the initial coup attempt falter.⁷⁸ With London's approval, British officers Ray Kane and Tim Landon, and Oman's Sheikh Braik bin Hamud led a group of six Omani soldiers into the Sultan's palace in Salalah on 23 July 1970. After a short firefight that produced four casualties, including Said and Kane, Said agreed to abdicate in favour of Qaboos.⁷⁹

Qaboos lived up to the expectations of his British advisors by approving their policy suggestions and requests for more resources. London, likewise, proved forthcoming with additional resources and approved the dispatch of instructors from regular British units to Northern Oman and two SAS squadrons to Dhofar (under the pseudonym British Army Training Teams or BATT).⁸⁰ Once the new weapons were delivered, the SAS deployed and additional troops recruited, British officers felt confident that they could finally conduct the model counterinsurgency they had long envisioned. March 1971 was originally envisioned as the date when the offensive would begin, but delays pushed this deadline to October.

The Anglo-Omani strategic plan for 1971 drew on operational concepts long debated amongst British commanders and advice provided by the SAS leadership.⁸¹ For all intents and purposes, the offensive would consist of two distinct operations. In one, code-named Jaguar, a mixed force of SAS soldiers, tribal warriors and regular Omani units would establish a base in the highlands of Eastern Dhofar and begin clearing territory of PFLOAG guerrillas. Once an area was cleared of enemy personnel, local irregulars would hold it and the population would be won over to the government's side by a hearts and minds campaign combining medical assistance and economic development.

Parallel to this effort, another operation, code-named Leopard, relied on regular units of the Omani armed forces to establish three bases in the highlands westwards of the zone being cleared in Eastern Dhofar. Infantry operating from these bases would exploit the improved mobility provided by helicopters and the firepower of tactical aircraft to prevent PFLOAG reinforcements or supplies from infiltrating eastwards.

Newly created irregular forces, called 'firqas', were critical to Anglo-Omani offensive plans. Originally the brainchild of SAS Lieutenant-Colonel John Watts, the firqas would combine surrendered guerrillas and loyalist tribesmen in small units.⁸² The SAS experience working with the aboriginal inhabitants of Malaya and Borneo made its personnel particularly suited to training and leading such unorthodox formations. It

was hoped that these units would play a key role in pacification by seeking and destroying enemy guerrillas in Dhofar's highlands, while also forming 'home guard' units to prevent enemy units from re-infiltrating zones that had already been cleared.⁸³

The long-awaited 'textbook' Anglo-Omani offensive began on 2 October 1971. The raw military power available was greater than ever before and assumed to be decisive. The army could deploy two battalions to Dhofar, compared to half that number in the past, the air force was capable of flying 1900 missions per month, compared to 400 one year ago, and these forces would be supported by 300 irregular warriors (firqatmen) and 100 SAS men.⁸⁴ Reflecting on the forces under his command, the Commander of the Sultan's Armed Forces, John Graham, stated: 'What varied warriors the Sultan's forces contain now: SAF, clean, shaved and calm; BATT (SAS) tough, bearded and heavily laden with bergens [backpacks], weapons and ammo belts; and the Firqats, multi-dressed and high spirited at being on the top of their jebel [highlands].'⁸⁵ British commanders were confident that they could win the Dhofar War in nine months and thought that such a quick victory was necessary given the heavy financial burden of the war on Oman.⁸⁶

Unfortunately, the Anglo-Omani offensive rapidly proved a disappointment.⁸⁷ The sociological and cultural background of Dhofari tribesmen made them less receptive to SAS direction and more prone to pursuing clannish agendas than the irregular forces that had proven so valuable in Southeast Asia and Kenya. Thus, when the firqat-led pacification campaign began (Operation Jaguar), SAS personnel were left dumbfounded as their protégées refused to operate outside of their tribal areas, or during Ramadan or whenever they felt that their desires were not sufficiently taken into consideration. They also indulged in cattle rustling and warned their relatives amongst PFLOAG's guerrillas whenever an operation was planned in their neighbourhood.⁸⁸ Within a week, three (of five) firqas had ceased operations to celebrate Ramadan and soon all five were indisposed.⁸⁹ Brigadier Graham remarked caustically, 'They operate not as ordered, but as their own interests dictate. Thus, no firm military plan can be made to which their participation is indispensable.'⁹⁰

The attempt to block PFLOAG's movement into Eastern Dhofar by installing regular forces at three fortified bases (Operation Leopard) was no more successful than the firqat campaign. Although helicopters permitted the men to be moved and bases built without difficulty, the topography of Dhofar's highlands made it difficult to interdict enemy supplies from static bases. Innumerable deep valleys provided PFLOAG guerrillas with numerous opportunities to evade army patrols. As a consequence, the Leopard positions were moderately successful to begin with, but lost their utility once rebels learned how to sneak caravans through the intervals at night.⁹¹ Graham concluded: 'We simply have not got the kit or the expertise yet to construct an effective barrier across the jebel [highlands], nor the infantry to man one.'⁹²

Thus, after years of studying the question, the British commanders of Oman's armed forces finally in late 1971 possessed the resources they felt necessary to implement a textbook counterinsurgency. To obtain these resources, the United Kingdom overthrew Sultan Said and British commanders obtained reinforcements, including the SAS. But even after such preparations, the offensive collapsed when it

confronted the social and geographical realities of Dhofar. The failure of what was supposed to be a model counterinsurgency dispirited British policymakers and soon the United States' losing struggle in Vietnam, rather than the United Kingdom's victory in Malaya, became the analogy of choice.⁹³

Graham became increasingly gloomy about Oman's long-term prospects and Watts, who had led the pacification effort, 'handed over to his successor and returned to Britain an angry and disenchanted man'.⁹⁴ The fact was that the lessons of the United Kingdom's past counterinsurgencies were imperfectly applicable to Dhofar. A section of the manual (1972) on 'Anti-Guerrilla Operations in Dhofar' addressed precisely this point by enumerating the 'misconceptions' that British officers brought to Dhofar from their earlier experiences.⁹⁵

V. Mohammed versus Marx

The failure of Oman's British-led armed forces to win the Dhofar War via a textbook counterinsurgency strategy placed increased emphasis on the less orthodox domains of psychological warfare and subversion. British psychological warfare specialists and their Omani allies sought to undermine popular support for rebellion by mobilising the Dhofari population's attachment to tribalism and Islam against PFLOAG's vision of an atheistic post-tribal society. PFLOAG responded to this ideological challenge with increased violence and coercion against wavering Dhofaris. This struggle for the allegiance of Dhofaris was mirrored in both parties' efforts to spread subversion to their opponent's bases. British and Omani policymakers successfully fostered a tribal, anti-communist revolt in the PDRY, while PFLOAG and its allies failed in their strategy to spread urban terrorism to Northern Oman.

Psychological warfare played a greater role in Anglo-Omani operations after Qaboos' accession in 1970. Landon, who had played a pre-eminent role in the coup d'état, was a proponent of psychological warfare and promoted it thanks to his influence over the Sultan. The SAS also promoted psychological operations by constituting a small intelligence cell, with 20 personnel, containing propaganda specialists.⁹⁶ To diffuse the government's message to Dhofar's population, the British established a radio station in Salalah and began dropping propaganda leaflets over Dhofar's highlands. Modest in themselves, these measures finally provided Oman's government with a means of communicating with Dhofaris, whose information had hitherto come from PFLOAG broadcasts from Aden.⁹⁷

As Britain's psychological warfare personnel prepared to begin operations, dissensions within PFLOAG provided them with what would become the hallmark of the government's propaganda campaign – the mobilisation of Islamic and traditional Arab symbols against those of Marxist-Leninism. Ever since 1968, PFLOAG was rent by internal divisions by increasingly radical Marxists trained abroad in PDRY, China and the Soviet Union, and by Dhofari nationalists who merely sought to recover Dhofar's traditional autonomy vis-à-vis Oman.⁹⁸ In September 1970, matters came to a head when communists surrounded and attempted to disarm nationalist insurgents

in Eastern Dhofar. Rather than acquiesce, the nationalists fought and, when overpowered, fled to the safety of Omani army bases.⁹⁹ As Watts later observed, the rebellion's division between traditionalists and Marxists provided British psychological warfare specialists with an opportunity to exploit a rebellion within the Dhofari insurgency.¹⁰⁰

The British sought to gain the loyalty of non-Marxist insurgents and exploit the resentment of ordinary Dhofaris against the Marxists. To achieve the former objective, Qaboos proclaimed an amnesty shortly after his accession. Although resulting in a comparatively small number of rebel capitulations, the amnesty encouraged several of the rebellion's early leaders to rally to the government, including the DLF's founder, Musallim bin Nuffl, and the former deputy commander of the Eastern Area, Salim Mubarak.¹⁰¹ Immediately following their defections, Musallim and Mubarak contributed to the government's psychological warfare campaign.

Soon the intelligence cell in Salalah, PFLOAG defectors and Sheikh Braik (a coup participant) were collaborating to develop psychological ploys appealing to the piety of Dhofaris. As SAS Lieutenant Colonel (later Major General) Tony Jeapes explained, they reasoned, 'even in the minds of the hardest hardcore Communist there must remain the seeds of Islam from his childhood. We would try to remove the soft-core first and then drive the wedge into the hard-core itself.'¹⁰²

One of the first accomplishments of this informal group was the development of an official slogan to galvanise Dhofaris in the struggle against PFLOAG. The slogan, 'Islam is Our Way, Freedom is Our Aim', was calculated to tie the counterinsurgency in Dhofar with the ideals of freedom and Islam in the minds of Dhofaris, and was cleverly used to conclude Radio Dhofar's daily broadcasts and adorn propaganda pamphlets.¹⁰³ In 1971 the British also persuaded the senior Qadi, or religious leader, of Dhofar to declare the counterinsurgency to be a holy war and absolve government forces of the need to observe Ramadan.¹⁰⁴

A stream of propaganda leaflets followed. Some announced rewards for surrendering and put prices on the heads of PFLOAG leaders.¹⁰⁵ One featured a message from Musallim announcing that Qaboos acceded to all of the DLF's original (1964) demands and therefore that guerrillas should surrender.¹⁰⁶ However, the vast majority of leaflets portrayed the struggle between the government and PFLOAG as one between Islam and communist unbelievers.¹⁰⁷ One example, the propaganda leaflet cited below, encapsulates the government's effort to employ psychological warfare strategy:

Now is your time to claim your freedom. Throw off the yoke of the communist oppressors.

We, who are your brothers in *freedom and in Islam*, we who are from the jebel, we understand your hardships, for the communists destroyed our flocks and murdered our families.

Now we have returned!

We return in strength to take our revenge. Our brothers from all the tribes upon the jebel, now is your chance for revenge. Join us in the *Holy fight against the ungodly communists*.

Come to us in friendship, carry your rifle openly in your hand, join us in the fight as a *fellow warrior of Islam to defeat communism*.¹⁰⁸

To heighten the contrast between governmental Islam and rebel communism, Mubarak proposed naming the firqas after traditional Arab heroes, to symbolically set them apart from PFLOAG's units named for Marxist revolutionaries. Thus, loyalist firqas named after Salahadin, Gamel Abdul Nasr and Khalid bin Waalid were soon fighting against PFLOAG units named after Ho Chi Minh, Stalin and Che Guevara.¹⁰⁹

Recognising that Marxism had limited appeal to most Dhofaris, PFLOAG's leadership, worried by the Anglo-Omani psychological warfare campaign, employed violence and coercion to intimidate Dhofaris into supporting the rebellion. For the longer term, PFLOAG wanted to ensure that the next generation of Dhofaris would be Marxists and free from the piety and tribalism that inhibited Dhofar's development. Families were even forced to send their children to the Lenin boarding school in South Yemen's PDRY. As Graham reflected:

Those individuals who toyed with the idea of coming across to the government's side were so apprehensive of adoo [PFLOAG] reprisals against their families and cattle that they stayed put . . . Tribal leaders whose loyalty to the rebel cause was suspect were put to death, conscription into the Militia was imposed on young men, camels were confiscated for enemy resupply convoys and, shortly afterwards, children started to be removed from their families for an alien education in Hauf [PDRY].¹¹⁰

PFLOAG's efforts to coerce Dhofaris into supporting the rebellion succeeded in the short term, but at the price of losing among the rebels whatever sympathy they still retained.

While they struggled for the allegiance of Dhofaris, Oman and PFLOAG clandestinely struggled to subvert one another's rear areas. As early as 1969, Britain's intelligence service, MI6, coaxed the nomadic Mahra tribes inhabiting the deserts bordering the South Yemen territory of PDRY, Oman and Saudi Arabia to launch an anti-communist insurgency against the PDRY.¹¹¹ The Mahra eagerly embraced this mission due to a deep-seated enmity towards South Yemen's NLF government, which they had fought against until 1967 when their hereditary Sultan was overthrown and their territories occupied.¹¹² With its supplies dependent on a series of antiquated forts in Mahra territory, PFLOAG was exceptionally vulnerable to Mahra raiding and would probably have collapsed if these forts could have been destroyed or a Mahra 'buffer state' established.¹¹³

With British backing and sanctuaries in Saudi Arabia, the Mahra combined modern weaponry and Land Rovers with the raiding skills of a nomadic people.¹¹⁴ By 1971 a force of 130 warriors, under the leadership of Sheikh Karama, was causing considerable damage in the PDRY of South Yemen, thus earning the admiration of British officers who referred to them as 'militarily an impressive group'.¹¹⁵ In June 1971

this raiding force entered Dhofar, received supplies from Oman and then assaulted the PDRY fortress at Habrut. However, Omani fears of provoking retaliation from the PDRY were such that Qaboos deported the Mahra back to Saudi Arabia rather than permit them to base future operations outside Oman.¹¹⁶

Nevertheless, Oman's failure to cripple PFLOAG in 1971 soon convinced its leaders to embrace the Mahra insurrection, creating their own Mahra firqat for guerrilla operations in the PDRY.¹¹⁷ Ex-SAS personnel led this unit, ultimately in a daring raid destroying the fort at Sinau, 80 miles deep inside PDRY territory.¹¹⁸

Successes such as this convinced Sultan Qaboos and many British officers that the Mahra had great potential and, if directed by the (regular) SAS, 'would relieve the pressure on the SAF and would embroil PDRY/PFLOAG resources in counter-insurgency operations'.¹¹⁹ After the British cabinet approved the measure to support them in November 1972, the Mahra's strength and effectiveness increased, resulting in the rebellion beginning to pay 'military dividends' by endangering PFLOAG base areas and diverting the PDRY's forces away from Dhofar's border.¹²⁰

In sharp contrast to the effective British-sponsored Mahra insurgency, the PDRY and PFLOAG failed in their more ambitious effort to destabilise Northern Oman. After the abortive attempts to start a guerrilla struggle in 1969 and 1970, Northern Oman's NDFLOAG's survivors amalgamated with PFLOAG and patiently laid the basis for a fresh uprising in Northern Oman. To avoid the amateurism that had brought failure in the past, PDRY arranged for the uprisings' cadres to receive a first-rate education in the techniques of guerrilla warfare, sabotage and terrorism. To this end, the North Koreans trained 20 operatives in sabotage and assassination methods and a similar number of Northern Omanis received combat experience fighting alongside the rebels in Dhofar.¹²¹ Seven agents even received training from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).¹²²

The leader of the Northern Oman front, Zahir Ali Zaher, planned to avoid committing the same error as his predecessors of prematurely attacking military facilities. Instead, he devoted more than a year to recruiting and training personnel, and smuggling weapons into Northern Oman. When the time was ripe, he planned to imitate the Marxist NLF's victorious strategy in Aden (in 1964–67) of first assassinating the state's key intelligence personnel before engaging in guerrilla warfare.¹²³ Zahir Ali was confident in his ability to anticipate and thwart the government's response because he had succeeded in penetrating the security forces. Once satisfied with the preparations, he set 1 January 1973 as the day for the new insurrection.¹²⁴

Unfortunately for PFLOAG, Oman's intelligence service had progressed greatly since the earlier attempts to foment revolution. Shortly after the first reports of insurgents infiltrating Northern Oman were collected in February 1972, a triple agent and several defectors soon brought additional intelligence. By 23 December 1972, Omani intelligence knew enough about the subversive Zahir Ali's organisation to pre-empt its offensive by arresting 60 of its members. After interrogations and follow-on arrests, the government extirpated PFLOAG's clandestine network in

Northern Oman by arresting 80 of its members and seizing 165 rifles, 363 grenades and four mortars.¹²⁵ This attempt to spread revolution to Northern Oman proved the last.

Thus, although Anglo-Omani forces did not triumph on the battlefield during the first two years of Qaboos' reign, they achieved important objectives in the psychological and clandestine fields. By mobilising Islam and traditional values against Marxism, British psychological warfare specialists exploited a theme capable of eroding popular support for the rebellion. With the Mahra, British and later Omani leaders discovered a means of destabilising the PDRY and endangering PFLOAG's bases. PDRY/PFLOAG responses to these Anglo-Omani initiatives failed and, most probably, proved counterproductive. PFLOAG's increased coercion of Dhofaris undermined the rebellion's popularity and the failure of the rebellion in Northern Oman led to the exposure and arrest of the few PFLOAG cadres still operational outside Dhofar.

VI. An international victory

From a military point of view, the years 1970 to 1972 were characterised by a frustrating stalemate. Although Oman's government conducted a textbook counter-insurgency, developed a sound psychological warfare strategy and fostered revolt in the PDRY, PFLOAG retained an iron grip over most of Dhofar and Oman's armed forces appeared incapable to dislodging them. Between 1973 and 1975, Oman surprised many experts by expeditiously liquidating PFLOAG and re-establishing the government's authority throughout Dhofar. What made this turn of events possible was the extraordinary assistance provided by the Middle East's conservative monarchies. Iranian combat units spearheaded many of the critical offensives, Jordanian engineers and special forces fortified and defended critical locales, and infantry from the Emirates assisted Oman with internal security duties. Thus, Oman's triumph in Dhofar was actually an international victory.

Viewed from the perspective of 1970, the prospects of an international coalition fighting alongside Oman must have appeared preposterous. Oman was one of the world's most isolated states when Qaboos assumed power. Sultan Said had eschewed the expenses necessary to create a modern foreign ministry and preferred to conduct his diplomatic relations through London. Oman, therefore, had no foreign embassies or consulates, and only two states, the United Kingdom and India, maintained consulates in Oman.¹²⁶ Several of Oman's neighbours, including Saudi Arabia and Ra's al Khaymah (one of the Trucial States), bore historic grudges and attempted to regain disputed territories from Oman.¹²⁷

To make matters worse, many states viewed Oman as a repressive British puppet that lacked true sovereignty. Between 1955 and 1959, British support for Sultan Said against the traditional ruler of Northern Oman's hinterland, Imam Ghalib bin Ali, antagonised Arab states that had either supported Ghalib or resented Britain's role in the Middle East. In 1957, 10 Arab states called on the United Nations to sanction Oman's British-led

'invasion' of the Imamate. In 1965, 10 years of UN debate on the 'Oman Question' culminated in a General Assembly resolution declaring Oman to be a non-independent state and calling for the United Kingdom to relinquish its 'domination' of Oman, stop 'repressing' the Omani people and, finally, withdraw from Oman.¹²⁸

Breaking Oman's isolation and developing constructive relations with its neighbours became one of the first objectives for both Qaboos and his British advisors. Qaboos' strategy sought to compensate for Oman's limited diplomatic apparatus by concentrating on gaining admission to international organisations. To this end, he decided to apply for membership in the Arab League first, before attempting to gain admission to the United Nations.

However, against British advice Qaboos precipitated matters, on 9 March 1971, by submitting Oman's application to the Arab League before having bilaterally convinced individual Arab states to support Oman.¹²⁹ Qaboos' hasty act led to a humiliating rejection as a result of opposition from Saudi Arabia and the PDRY.¹³⁰ Oman's failure to gain admission to the Arab League in March 1971 emboldened the PDRY and PFLOAG to argue that 'Oman was not an independent country', but a colony that needed to be liberated from British domination.¹³¹ In effect, PFLOAG exploited Oman's failed bid to the Arab League by seeking legitimacy as an anti-colonial resistance movement on par with the Algerian Front de Liberation National (FLN) or the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).

Following the failure of Oman's March bid for Arab League membership, British diplomats probed for ways to enhance Oman's diplomatic standing.¹³² Egypt's Foreign Ministry proved particularly helpful in helping the British and Omanis develop and enact a diplomatic strategy for gaining admission to the Arab League. According to the Egyptians, Saudi Arabian support would be crucial to a future Omani application to the Arab League, but the key to gaining Saudi support was for Qaboos to negotiate a reconciliation with Imam Ghalib.¹³³ The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office therefore pressured Qaboos to appoint an emissary to negotiate with Ghalib.¹³⁴

With British advice, Qaboos offered Ghalib and his followers a general amnesty to return to Oman. He also extended to Ghalib the title of Mufti, or spiritual leader, of Oman, and promised a financial subsidy. In return, Ghalib would be forced to renounce his claim to the title of Imam, with its claim to temporal authority.¹³⁵ Ghalib initially rejected these conditions, but thereby alienated supportive regimes. The Saudis therefore lifted their objections and the Arab League admitted Oman on 29 September 1971, despite the PDRY's hostility.¹³⁶ After Saudi Arabia's *volte face*, Ghalib accepted the Sultan's concessions, but negotiated for the added benefits of a commercial monopoly on the import of Ford automobiles and Coca-Cola.¹³⁷ After obtaining entry into the Arab League, the United Nations admitted Oman.

Oman's admission to the Arab League and the United Nations as a sovereign state ultimately deprived PFLOAG of the legitimacy it sought as an anti-colonial resistance movement. However, Oman would need more than recognition if it were to win the war in Dhofar. Between 1970 and 1972, Qaboos had expanded Oman's armed forces from under 4000 personnel to over 10,000, and also bought a high-quality air force of 50 aircraft.¹³⁸

Raising and equipping a force of this size stretched Oman's financial resources to their limits, yet Oman still lacked enough military force to win the war in Dhofar.¹³⁹

With the United Kingdom increasingly bogged down in Northern Ireland, additional foreign assistance would most likely come from the Middle East's other monarchies, which had a vested interest in halting the spread of revolutionary Marxism. If there were any ambiguity as to the threat, PFLOAG's declared aim of liberating the 'Occupied Arabian Gulf' clearly signalled its hostility towards all conservative Arab regimes. However, it remained to be seen whether the Middle East's feuding monarchies could unite against a common foe. As Graham observed, 'The future of the Sultanate largely depends on getting outside aid: money, talent, political support and mil[itary] aid. The quick getting of these from a wide range of ARAB allies is fundamental.'¹⁴⁰

Qaboos began seeking such assistance by cultivating the Shah of Iran in October 1971, while participating in Iran's celebration of the 2500th anniversary of the Persian Empire. However, despite agreeing that the PDRY and Soviet Union posed a threat to both countries, the Shah offered no immediate aid.¹⁴¹ Surprisingly, though, Qaboos' presence in Iran resulted in Oman receiving Jordanian assistance. While Jordan's King Hussein was also attending the festivities in Iran, Qaboos was able to convince him to send four military advisors to help train Oman's growing armed forces.¹⁴² Along with Abu Dhabi's loan of rockets to Oman, these Jordanian officers represented the first help Oman received from other Middle Eastern states.¹⁴³ In 1972, Jordan and Saudi Arabia built on this base by providing Oman with greater assistance in training Oman's expanding army.¹⁴⁴

Despite its symbolic value, Middle Eastern states provided only limited support to Oman until 1973. Nevertheless, negotiations with Iran had been ongoing and by late 1972 the Shah was contemplating airlifting Iranian special forces and large amounts of weaponry to Oman.¹⁴⁵ Ironically a potentially disastrous miscalculation on the part of Oman's armed forces precipitated Iran's large-scale involvement in the Dhofar War in 1973.

After the failure of Operation Leopard to sever rebel communications with the PDRY in 1971, the Anglo-Omani high command contemplated seizing the locale named Sarfait. Sarfait occupied a natural chokepoint between the Persian Gulf and the desert, and was thought to dominate the only viable trail for rebel camel caravans to travel between the PDRY and Dhofar's interior. Graham reasoned that his forces could 'carry out a major, permanent and, it is hoped, decisive blocking operation on all enemy supply routes in the West' by seizing Sarfait.¹⁴⁶ To achieve this objective, Omani soldiers riding in helicopters descended on Sarfait in the extreme west of Dhofar in April 1972. Because of its isolation from the government's other positions, Sarfait had to be resupplied by air via a small airfield that was constructed for this purpose.

Unfortunately, Sarfait soon proved to be more of a trap to government forces than to the rebellion. Because Sarfait was perched at an altitude of 3000 feet and the rebel trails were at sea level, artillery in Sarfait could not target the supply caravans and patrols would have to descend a cliff to reach them.¹⁴⁷ To make matters worse, Sarfait's

airfield was vulnerable to recoilless rifle fire from heights overlooking it. PFLOAG therefore calculated that it could inflict a decisive defeat on the Omani forces by closing Sarfait's airfield to resupply flights and then by starving its 600-man garrison until they surrendered. Thus, after careful preparation, PFLOAG opened fire on Sarfait's airfield on 3 February 1973, destroying one aircraft and halting any further supplies being sent.¹⁴⁸

In these circumstances, only helicopters could resupply Sarfait and Oman did not have enough of them. If outside help were not forthcoming, Sarfait's garrison would either be starved into surrendering or, if lucky, evacuated.¹⁴⁹ However, the Shah of Iran, who was increasingly concerned by events in Oman, intervened to save Sarfait. On 15 and 16 February 1973, six Iranian helicopters flew to Salalah, from whence they provisioned Sarfait.¹⁵⁰

In dispatching these helicopters to Dhofar, Iran's Shah both saved Sarfait and overcame any residual opposition to his intervening in Oman. Henceforth, Iran intervened with increasingly significant military forces to crush PFLOAG and deter the PDRY from directly intervening in Oman. By late 1973, Iran had committed a battalion supported by artillery (1500 men) and a special forces (150 men) unit to Dhofar.¹⁵¹ In 1974, the Shah reinforced this force to an aggregate size of 3000 personnel, including an Iranian brigade battle group and 16 sophisticated fighter aircraft.¹⁵² Besides its combat units, Iran's transport aircraft and helicopters contributed immeasurably to the war effort by making it possible to move and resupply Omani forces over long distances.

Iran's example galvanised other monarchs in the region. Beginning in 1973, Abu Dhabi's Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan sent infantry to conduct internal security duties in Northern Oman, liberating Omani soldiers and gendarmes for use in Dhofar. In 1974, Jordan's King Hussein went further by deploying a squadron of combat engineers (200 men) and then, in 1975 a special forces battalion (600 men). Iran, Jordan, Abu Dhabi, Qatar and Saudi Arabia also all contributed money and/or weaponry to help in the war effort.¹⁵³

Thanks to all of these contributions, Oman and its allies progressively amassed overwhelming forces in Dhofar. Ultimately, in 1975, 11,000 troops had been assembled in Dhofar, including roughly 5000 Omani personnel, 3000 Iranians, 1200 Dhofari firquatmen, 1000 British and 800 Jordanians.¹⁵⁴ Operating according to a common plan, Oman and its allies initiated, in October 1973, a series of virtually uninterrupted offensives that destroyed the PFLOAG as an insurgent organisation.

Beginning in October 1973, the Imperial Iranian Battle Group opened the road from Salalah to Midway, linking Dhofar with Northern Oman, which had been closed since 1970. Despite their inexperience, the Iranians used overwhelming firepower to open and defend the road by building a plethora of static positions and bombarding 'free-fire zones' on either side of the road.¹⁵⁵ Meanwhile, assisted by Iranian special forces and Jordanian engineers, the Omani armed forces built a continuous barrier across the middle of Dhofar, finally isolating Eastern Dhofar from PFLOAG bases in the PDRY.¹⁵⁶ Following the success of these operations, the Iranians built another

fortified line further to the west, isolating the guerrillas from an increasing proportion of Dhofar's population.

Recognising their growing inferiority vis-à-vis an international coalition comprised of the conservative Middle Eastern regimes, PFLOAG and the PDRY attempted to adapt as best they could. In an effort to appease some of their opponents and thereby divide the hostile coalition, Dhofar's rebels renounced their pretensions to 'liberating' states other than Oman. To this end, in 1974, they changed their name to the Peoples' Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO).¹⁵⁷ In a vain attempt to redress the situation militarily, the PDRY's armed forces began to intervene directly in the Dhofar War. However, the efforts of several hundred PDRY soldiers were unable to stem the onslaught of thousands of Omani and allied forces.

In January 1975, Iranian and Omani forces launched simultaneous offensives that overwhelmed the PDRY and PFLOAG forces facing them. In late 1975, Sarfait was relieved, the PDRY's artillery positions at Hauf were destroyed by British pilots (flying Omani aircraft, donated by Jordan) and a large two-battalion helicopter-borne assault carried British forces to the PDRY border. In late November 1975, Sultan Qaboos officially proclaimed the rebellion in Dhofar to be at an end. Considering the scale of the effort made by Oman's Middle Eastern allies, which contributed nearly half of the regular soldiers and spearheaded many of the offensives, the victory in Dhofar is best seen as a regional-level triumph of conservative monarchies over Marxist revolutionaries.

VII. Conclusion

Traditionally, the Dhofar War has been analysed as a tribal insurgency that was defeated in a model counterinsurgency conducted by British and Omani forces. In contrast to the localised and Anglo-centric vision of the Dhofar War, this article contends that the conflict is best understood within the broader context of the Cold War and the United Kingdom's withdrawal from empire. The security vacuum created by the United Kingdom's 1968 decision to withdraw from the Persian Gulf created an unprecedented opportunity for revolutionary and Marxist groups originating in the Movement of Arab Nationalists to supplant the sultans and sheikhs ruling over much of Arabia. The NLF's victory in South Yemen had demonstrated that such successes were possible and provided an opening for communist states to support the efforts of the network of organisations originating in MAN.

The organisation that came closest to achieving its objectives was PFLOAG, which dominated 80% of Dhofar's territory by 1970 and worried British policymakers that the situation was becoming a quagmire akin to Vietnam. Frequently overshadowed by PFLOAG's more dramatic accomplishments, affiliated organisations attempted to subvert the Trucial States (future United Arab Emirates), Bahrain and Northern Oman.

All of this was possible thanks to the weaponry and training provided by communist countries, including China, the Soviet Union, North Korea, Cuba and East Germany. Less materially important, but indicative of the affinities connecting these organisations, was their efforts to aid one another. The more successful organisations

descended from MAN, such as the NLF government in South Yemen, PFLOAG and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), provided what training and assistance they could to their ideological allies.

At first, the conservative monarchies of the Persian Gulf had trouble adapting to this novel threat. Their own feuds and boundary disputes made it difficult for them to unite in a common front against the new Marxist challenge to their authority. The spectacle of fundamentalist Saudi Arabia and the Marxist PDRY joining forces to reject Oman's application to the Arab League in March 1971 was symptomatic of this phenomenon. No less so, the armed incursion of a Trucial State, Ras al Khaymah, into the Musandem Peninsula in November 1971 generated a crisis between it and Oman whose objective interests should have united them in opposition to PFLOAG and its affiliates.¹⁵⁸

The United Kingdom played a vital role in supporting the Omani armed forces until patient diplomacy could forge an alliance amongst the Middle East's monarchies. Faced with a deteriorating situation between 1968 and 1970, they drew on their past experiences to generate a plan for conducting a textbook counterinsurgency in Dhofar. However, Sultan Said's aversion to budget deficits prevented their plans from being implemented until a frustrated British government replaced Said with his more tractable son in July 1970. However, even Sultan Qaboos' endorsement of British plans failed to produce decisive results because British military leaders had miscalculated. Oman's limited resources, the rugged geography of Dhofar's highlands and the cantankerous mentality of converted enemy combatants thwarted Anglo-Omani offensive operations in 1971 and 1972.

Anglo-Omani efforts to weaken PFLOAG and the PDRY through psychological warfare and subversion proved more successful. The mobilisation of the symbols and rhetoric of Islam in opposition to the Marxist modernity preached by PFLOAG gradually paid dividends and prefigured the United States' later efforts, in Afghanistan, to use Islam as an instrument to fight against Soviet communism. Compared to the psychological campaign, British efforts to foster a revolt amongst the Mahra tribesmen of the PDRY were more covert but no less effective. By British estimates, four PDRY battalions and militia were eventually occupied in defending against these elusive raiders.¹⁵⁹

Despite these successes, Britain's limited aid and Oman's meagre oil revenues were incapable of winning a war that appeared to be a stalemate. Thus, between 1968 and 1973, British assistance did not win the war in Dhofar, but certainly prevented it from being lost. Victory was only possible once British and Omani diplomacy had managed to construct an informal alliance amongst the Middle East's monarchies. Within this context, the 1974 and 1975 battles in Dhofar witnessed the forces of this alliance overpower those of Arab Marxism. Omani, Iranian and Jordanian soldiers equipped with weapons provided by Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi triumphed over the Marxist guerrillas and soldiers of PFLOAG and the PDRY. Just as the threat of Marxist revolution was regional in its nature, so was the victory of conservative monarchism.

Notes

- [1] At present, the Dhofar War has yet to be the principal subject of a scholarly monograph. However, a number of excellent military memoirs examine the campaign, including Akehurst, *We Won a War*; Arkless, *The Secret War*; de la Billière, *Looking for Trouble*; Fiennes, *Where Soldiers Fear to Tread*; Gardiner, *In the Service of the Sultan*; Jeapes, *SAS Operation Oman*; Perkins, *A Fortunate Soldier*; Purdon, *List the Bugle*; Ray, *Dangerous Frontiers* and Thwaites, *Muscat Command*. A contemporary journalistic account of the war is Halliday, *Arabia without Sultans*. Secondary works treating the Dhofar War include: Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency in the Post-Imperial Era*; Geraghty, *Who Dares Wins*; and Hughes, 'A "Model Campaign" Reappraised'. To enhance the vision offered by these sources, this article relies heavily on documents and personal papers from The National Archives (TNA) of the United Kingdom, the Middle Eastern Centre (MEC) at St. Anthony's College, Oxford, and the Liddell Hart Archive (LHA) of Private Military Papers, located at King's College London.
- [2] Ministry of Defence: Chiefs of Staff Committee, 17 March 1970, FCO 46/609, and AD Parsons to Mr. Renwick, 17 January 1972, FCO 8/1856.
- [3] Jeapes set the stage by referring to the Dhofar campaign as a 'model counterinsurgency.' Most subsequent writers have followed in this vein. Mockaitis referred to it as a 'textbook counterinsurgency'. See Jeapes, *SAS Operation Oman*, 1; Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency in the Post-Imperial Era*, 72–95; and Hughes, 'A "Model Campaign" Reappraised'.
- [4] Owtram, *A Modern History of Oman*, 116–21; and Allen and Rigsbee, *Oman Under Qaboos*, 23–6.
- [5] Owtram, *A Modern History of Oman*, 108–9.
- [6] After being militarily defeated in 1958, the Imam continued to be considered the main subversive threat to the Sultan until the late 1960s. Allen and Rigsbee, *Oman Under Qaboos*, 26–27; and See 'Research Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk', Washington, 25 January 1968, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. XXI, 262.
- [7] TNA FCO 51/41 Memorandum on the Dhofar Liberation Front, 30 January 1968.
- [8] Allen and Rigsbee, *Oman Under Qaboos*, 27; Fiennes, *Where Soldiers Fear to Tread*, 10; and Thwaites, *Muscat Command*, 19–20.
- [9] According to some reports, the DLF did not receive any new supplies between early 1966 and mid-1967. TNA FCO 51/41 Memorandum on the Dhofar Liberation Front, 30 January 1968; TNA FO 1016/782 Arms Smuggling in the Persian Gulf, 4 February 1965; and MEC John Graham Collection 1/2, Lecture by Tony Lewis, n.d.
- [10] Fiennes, *Where Soldiers Fear to Tread*, 69.
- [11] TNA CAB 158/70 JIC (68) 35.
- [12] MEC John Graham Collection 1/2, Lecture by Tony Lewis, 'The Story of the Sultans Armed Forces 1964/67', n.d..
- [13] Naumkin, *Red Wolves of Yemen*; and Trevelyan, *The Middle East in Revolution*, 209–66.
- [14] Halliday, *Revolution and Foreign Policy*, 142–3.
- [15] TNA DEFE 11/658 'Record of a Conversation between the Sultan of Oman and the Prime Minister at 12:30 PM on Friday 1 Nov at 10 Downing Street', 1 November 1974; Jeapes, *SAS Operation Oman*, 26; and TNA CAB 158/70 JIC (68) 35.
- [16] Akehurst reports that Chinese operations inside Oman ceased after an advisor was killed in January 1968. Within China, Dhofari rebels were trained in a six-month course at Beijing's Anti-Imperialist School See Akehurst, *We Won a War*, 26; Fiennes, *Where Soldiers Fear to Tread*, 30–5; and MEC John Graham Collection 2/2, Anti-Guerrilla Operations in Dhofar, c.1972.
- [17] For an analysis of Soviet needs of naval bases and their shift from the Mediterranean emphasis (1960s) to one on the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf (1970s), see Golan, *Soviet Policies in the Middle East*, 12–16.

- [18] TNA CAB 130/495 'Interdepartmental Study on Defence in the Indian Ocean', 11 December 1970; Huan, *la Marine soviétique*, 23–68; and Golan, *Soviet Policies in the Middle East*, 7.
- [19] Halliday, *Revolution and Foreign Policy*, 182; and Woodward, *The Horn of Africa*, 136–8.
- [20] Golan, *Soviet Policies in the Middle East*, 229.
- [21] Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The World Was Going Our Way*, 214–5.
- [22] Halliday, *Revolution and Foreign Policy*, 182; and TNA DEFE 25/312 Confidential Annex to COS 25th Meeting/73, 27 November 1973.
- [23] Halliday, *Revolution and Foreign Policy*, 184; and TNA DEFE 25/312 Annex A to DP 20/73 Future UK Defence Activity in Oman.
- [24] In terms of infantry firepower, the DLF received large numbers of modern AK-47 assault rifles at a time when government forces still employed the World War II vintage Mk.4 Lee-Enfield rifle. Purdon, *List the Bugle*, 199; and Fiennes, *Where Soldiers Fear to Tread*, 186.
- [25] McKeown, *Britain and Oman*, 42–3.
- [26] Thwaites, *Muscat Command*, 157.
- [27] TNA DEFE 11/656 Annex A to COS 1329/797, GSM: Award of Clasp for Service in Dhofar, n.d.
- [28] Akehurst, *We Won a War*, 15; Thwaites, *Muscat Command*, 157.
- [29] Thwaites, *Muscat Command*, 158.
- [30] MEC John Graham Collection 2/2, Anti-Guerrilla Operations in Dhofar, c.1972.
- [31] Akehurst, *We Won a War*, 30; and TNA FCO 46/609 The Employment of an SAS Squadron in Dhofar, 26 February 1970.
- [32] *Ibid.*
- [33] TNA FCO 46/609 'Ministry of Defence: Chiefs of Staff Committee, 8/70', 17 March 1970.
- [34] Withdrawal from the Gulf, like previous retreats from empire it, was a response to economic difficulties. TNA PREM 13/2688 Burke Trend to Prime Minister, 13 March 1967.
- [35] TNA DEFE 25/186 Presentation to Sir William Luce on the Gulf by the D of DOP, 4 August 1970.
- [36] 'Intelligence Report: Security and Subversion in the Persian Gulf', Washington, 1 March 1968, in *FRUS, 1964–1968*, Vol. XXI, 284 (139).
- [37] Macris, *The Politics and Security of the Gulf*, 156–9.
- [38] *Ibid.*, 159–71; and Walker, *Aden Insurgency*, 21–40.
- [39] Macris, *The Politics and Security of the Gulf*, 183–4.
- [40] MAN was founded in Lebanon after the Arab defeat of 1948. By 1967, its right- and left-wing factions could no longer coexist in a single movement, and MAN dissolved, giving rise to distinct Marxist organisations operating in different states. See Naumkin, *Red Wolves of Yemen*, 65–74; and Abu Khalil, 'George Habash and the Movement of Arab Nationalists'.
- [41] MEC John Graham Collection 3/8, The National Democratic Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf, A Branch of the People's Revolutionary Movement, 3 March 1971.
- [42] Halliday, *Arabia without Sultans*, 320–1.
- [43] MEC John Graham Collection 3/8, The National Democratic Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf, A Branch of the People's Revolutionary Movement, 3 March 1971.
- [44] The actual communiqué cited in the British intelligence document took place in 1970. MEC John Graham Collection 3/8, Notes on Current State of Subversive Organisations in Northern Oman, 31 October 1971.
- [45] The JIC analysis (1968) pre-dates PFLOAG's exposition of its aims (1970). TNA CAB 158/70 JIC (68) 35.
- [46] 'Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to Secretary of Defense McNamara', Washington, 12 June 1968, in *FRUS, 1964–1968*, Vol. XXI, 297 (146); and Macris, *The Politics and Security of the Gulf*, 171–80.
- [47] Purdon, *List the Bugle*, 265–6; and MEC John Graham Collection 5/2, John Graham, Thirty Months, n.d.

- [48] MEC John Graham Collection 3/8, The National Democratic Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf, A Branch of the People's Revolutionary Movement, 3 March 1971; and MEC John Graham Collection 5/2, John Graham, Thirty Months, n.d.
- [49] TNA DEFE 24/575, Report on Operation INTRADON, 16 April 1971; and MEC John Graham Collection 5/2, John Graham, Thirty Months, n.d.
- [50] TNA DEFE 25/186 Chief of the Defence Staff to Secretary of State for Defence, 27 November 1970; and MEC John Graham Collection 5/2, John Graham, Thirty Months, n.d.
- [51] TNA DEFE 25/186 Major-General R.C. Gibbs to Chief of Defence Staff, Operation Intradon, 2 February 1971; and de la Billière, 263.
- [52] Khalaf, 'Labor Movements in Bahrain'.
- [53] MEC John Graham Collection 3/8, Notes on Current State of Subversive Organisations in Northern Oman, 31 October 1971.
- [54] Gardiner, *In the Service of the Sultan*, 1.
- [55] On the development of post-war British counterinsurgency practices, see Jones, *Postwar Counterinsurgency and the SAS*. British post-war counterinsurgency practices were first set forth in manuals such as, TNA WO 279/241 The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya, 3rd Edition, 1958; and TNA WO 276/545 A Handbook on Anti-Mau Mau Operations, n.d. In the mid-1960s, a series of books by British counterinsurgency experts set forth the theoretical reasoning behind British practices. See Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*; Kitson, *Gangs and Counter-gangs*; Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations*; and Paget, *Counter-Insurgency Campaigning*. Mockaitis provides a useful analysis on how British counterinsurgency doctrine was formulated and transmitted, see Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency in the Post-Imperial Era*, 133–41.
- [56] Corran Purdon, who commanded the Sultan's Armed Forces (1967–69), previously served in Palestine, Malaya, Cyprus and Borneo. His successor, John Graham (1969–72), served in Palestine and Cyprus. John Akehurst, commander of Dhofar Brigade (1974–76), served in Malaya. Peter Thwaites, who commanded Muscat Regiment (1967–70), served in Malaya. Bryan Ray, commander of a regiment (1972–74), served in British Somaliland, Cyprus and Northern Ireland. Malaya is the allusion mentioned most frequently in the writings of British commanders in Oman. See Purdon, *List the Bugle*; MEC John Graham Collection 5/6–7; Akehurst, *Generally Speaking*; Thwaites, *Muscat Command*, v–vi; Ray, *Dangerous Frontiers*, 38–40.
- [57] Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, 111–20.
- [58] Paget, *Counter-Insurgency Campaigning*, 176–9; and Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, 50–62.
- [59] Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations*, 49.
- [60] Kitson, *Gangs and Counter-gangs*; and Paget, *Counter-Insurgency Campaigning*, 69, 102.
- [61] Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations*, 136, 193.
- [62] Most studies of the Dhofar War argue that in 1970 SAS Lieutenant-Colonel Johnny Watts developed the counterinsurgency strategy that was implemented thereafter. However, all of the constitutive elements of this strategy had already been evoked by British commanders. During the years 1967–69, the leadership of Oman's armed forces (Purdon, Thwaites, and Harvey) developed a similar operational concept and requested the resources from the Sultan (development aid and military equipment), and London (the SAS) needed to implement it. See MEC John Graham Collection 2/1, Peter Thwaites, Lecture: Dhofar 1967–70, n.d.; and Purdon, *List the Bugle*, 207, 243.
- [63] LHC Peter Thwaites Collection, 1/2 Teddy (CO the Desert Regiment) to Peter Thwaites, January 18, 1970; and LHC Peter Thwaites Collection, 1/2 The Sultan's Armed Forces Association Newsletter, No. 4, December 1969.

- [64] Prior to 1931, Omani finances were managed by British officials, who were perceived as serving British, rather than Omani, interests. After he took over the finances of the kingdom in 1931, Said maintained a balanced budget so as not to provide the British with a pretext for (re-)assuming more authority. Allen and Rigsbee, *Oman Under Qaboos*, 2–4.
- [65] Contrary to certain accounts, Said was neither opposed to development nor disconnected from the realities of Oman's military situation. As soon as oil revenues became available in 1966, Said sponsored some development projects and nurtured plans for many more. He also satisfied as many military requests as his budget allowed. In response to the Dhofar War, Said expanded the armed forces from two to three battalions (1965), and purchased FN FAL rifles to replace old Lee-Enfields (1965), Skyvan aircraft (1969), and, finally, modern field artillery, helicopters and a fourth battalion. Allen and Rigsbee, *Oman Under Qaboos*, 23–6; Purdon, *List the Bugle*, 199, 242–3; 292–3; and MEC John Graham Collection 1/2, Outline notes for lecture, History of SAF, August 1970.
- [66] The British commander of the Omani armed forces requested the SAS in 1967. The commanders of 22 SAS, Lieutenant-Colonel John Slim, travelled to Dhofar in 1969 and lobbied for deploying the SAS. See Thwaites, *Muscat Command*, 77–8; and Purdon, *List the Bugle*, 207, 220–21.
- [67] MEC John Graham Collection 1/2, Lecture by Tony Lewis, The Story of the Sultans Armed Forces 1964/67, n.d.; Thwaites, *Muscat Command*, 76–7; and Fiennes, *Where Soldiers Fear to Tread*, 63.
- [68] TNA FCO 46/609 'Ministry of Defence: Chiefs of Staff Committee, Confidential Annex to COS 8th Meeting/70', 17 March 1970.
- [69] Fiennes altered Landon's name to Tom Greening. Fiennes, *Where Soldiers Fear to Tread*, 25, 86–7, 240–41; and Connor and Hebditch, *How to Stage a Military Coup*, 164.
- [70] Thwaites, *Muscat Command*, 151–2; and Purdon, *List the Bugle*, 243–4.
- [71] At the post of Military Secretary to the Sultan (i.e. Minister of Defense), Hugh Oldman replaced Pat Waterton at the post of Commander of the Sultan's Armed Forces, John Graham succeeded Corran Purdon in 1970. See MEC John Graham Collection 3/5, The Coup d'Etat in Oman, n.d. (the document is written by UK civil servant, but includes Graham's handwritten annotations).
- [72] TNA CAB 158/70 JIC (68) 35 Likely Developments in the Persian Gulf and their Probable Effects for British Interests, 7 June 1968.
- [73] TNA FCO 46/609 The Employment of an SAS Squadron in Dhofar, 26 February 1970.
- [74] TNA FCO 46/609 Ministry of Defence: Chiefs of Staff Committee, Confidential Annex to COS 8th Meeting/70, 17 March 1970.
- [75] TNA FCO 46/609 P.J. Bayne, Commodore, Chiefs of Staff Committee, to CDS, 4 June 1970; TNA Chiefs of Staff Committee, Defence Operational Planning Staff, The Situation in Muscat and Oman, 7 July 1970; and TNA FCO 46/609 A.A. Acland to P. Hayman, Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, Possibility of a Coup, n.d. (between 8 and 22 July).
- [76] TNA FCO 46/609 Major-General Gibbs, Ministry of Defence: Chiefs of Staff Committee, Confidential Annex to COS 21st Meeting/70, 15 July 1970.
- [77] TNA FCO 46/609 A.A. Acland to P. Hayman, Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, Possibility of a Coup, n.d. (between 13 and 22 July).
- [78] TNA FCO 46/609 Bahrain Residency to FCO, Telegram 340, 13 July 1970; TNA FCO 46/609 A.A. Acland to P. Hayman, Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, Possibility of a Coup, n.d.; and TNA FCO 46/609 FCO to Bahrain Residency and Muscat, n.d.
- [79] Sheikh Braik bin Hamud was the son of the Wali of Dhofar. Immediately after the coup, he took over from his father. Ray Kane's story originally appeared in the *Mail on Sunday* published on 7 July 2002. See Gardiner, *In the Service of the Sultan*, 23–4; and Connor and Hebditch, *How to Stage a Military Coup*, 164.

- [80] In 1970, SAS Brigadier Fergie Semple sent an intelligence cell of 20 personnel, bodyguards for the Sultan and an SAS squadron that could be used to train the new Omani battalion being formed in Northern Oman. The decision was later taken to send squadrons to fight in Dhofar. TNA DEFE 25/186 Department of Military Operations to Vice-Chairman of the General Staff, Assistance to SAF, 13 August 1970.
- [81] TNA FCO 46/609 Chiefs of Staff Committee, Defence Operational Planning Staff, the Situation in Muscat and Oman, 30 July 1970; and TNA DEFE 25/186 Department of Military Operations to Vice-Chairman of the General Staff, Assistance to SAF, 13 August 1970.
- [82] SAS officers have attributed the idea of the firqas to John Watts. On the other hand, General Graham stated that the plan to create firqas was 'conceived in Muscat [Oman] and courageously supported in London and Hereford [SAS Headquarters]'. De la Billière, 267; Jeapes, *SAS Operation Oman*, 32–41; and MEC John Graham Collection 5/2, John Graham, Thirty Months, n.d.
- [83] MEC John Graham Collection 2/3, CSAF (Graham) to Colonel M.G. Harvey, Directive to Commander, Dhofar for 1971, 12 February 1971.
- [84] TNA DEFE 25/186 Visit of the Military Secretary to the Sultan of Muscat and Oman – Colonel H.R.D. Oldman, 14 October 1970; MEC John Graham Collection 4/1, J.D.C. Graham, Oman Diary (23 November 1971); and Jeapes, *SAS Operation Oman*, 85, 101, 111, 133–5.
- [85] MEC John Graham Collection 4/1, J.D.C. Graham, Oman Diary (4 October 1971).
- [86] MEC John Graham Collection 2/3, CSAF (Graham) to Colonel M.G. Harvey, Directive to Commander, Dhofar for 1971, 12 February 1971.
- [87] TNA FCO 8/1856 Commander of the Sultan's Armed Forces' Assessment, 1972.
- [88] MEC John Graham Collection 2/2, Anti-Guerrilla Operations in Dhofar, 1972.
- [89] Jeapes, *SAS Operation Oman*, 135–44.
- [90] MEC John Graham Collection 2/1, CSAF's assessment of the situation in Dhofar as at 14 February 1972.
- [91] TNA FCO 8/1856 Commander of the Sultan's Armed Forces' Assessment, 1972.
- [92] MEC John Graham Collection 4/1, J.D.C. Graham, Oman Diary (6 February 1971).
- [93] In January 1972, a foreign office official referred to Dhofar as 'a kind of micro-Vietnam in the Arabian peninsula'. In November 1972, a member of the British Central Policy Staff pessimistically warned that 'Small beginnings [in Dhofar] can be deceptive, as Vietnam shows. And British public opinion might not take kindly to another Aden in a year or two's time.' TNA FCO 8/1856 From A.D. Parsons to Mr. Renwick, Private Secretary, 17 January 1972; and TNA CAB 148/122/49, 21 November 1972.
- [94] TNA FCO 8/1856 Defence Department (FCO) to Arab Department, 21 December 1971; and Jeapes, *SAS Operation Oman*, 144.
- [95] MEC John Graham Collection 2/2, Anti-Guerrilla Operations in Dhofar, 1972.
- [96] MEC John Graham Collection 5/2, John Graham, Thirty Months, n.d.; and TNA DEFE 25/186 SAS Assistance to the Sultanate of Oman, Annex to D/DS, 17 August 1970.
- [97] MEC John Graham Collection 2/2, Anti-Guerrilla Operations in Dhofar, 1972; and MEC John Graham Collection 5/2, John Graham, Thirty Months, n.d.
- [98] Thwaites, *Muscat Command*, 76; and Fiennes, *Where Soldiers Fear to Tread*, 167/75.
- [99] Jeapes, *SAS Operation Oman*, 29/30.
- [100] McKeown, *Britain and Oman*, 46.
- [101] Musallim had feelers out attempting to negotiate a truce with the government since at least 1968. TNA FO 51/41 FO/CO Joint Research Department Memorandum, The Dhofar Liberation Front, 30 January 1968; and Jeapes, *SAS Operation Oman*, 29–57.
- [102] Jeapes, *SAS Operation Oman*, 39.
- [103] *Ibid.*, 60.
- [104] *Ibid.*, 135.

- [105] MEC John Graham Collection 3/1, Translation Leaflet S13, n.d. and Translation of Mk. 10 Leaflet, December 1970.
- [106] MEC John Graham Collection 3/1, Translation of Message from Mussalim bin Nufl to the Dhofari Rebels (note: drop anytime after 10 January 1971).
- [107] MEC John Graham Collection 3/1, Leaflets S1, A3, MS1, S15, S18 and S22.
- [108] TNA DEFE 25/186 unnamed leaflet (*italics added*).
- [109] MEC John Graham Collection 5/2, John Graham, Thirty Months, n.d.; MEC John Graham Collection 2/3, Annex B to Op. Instr 1, Dhofar Int Sum, 20 November 1970; and Jeapes, *SAS Operation Oman*, 40–41.
- [110] MEC John Graham Collection 5/2, John Graham, Thirty Months, n.d.
- [111] LHC Peter Thwaites Collection, 1/2 H.H. (handwritten notes from meeting), n.d. (1969).
- [112] The Sultan of Mahra was the last of South Yemen's traditional rulers overthrown. Naumkin, *Red Wolves of Yemen*, 231, 256.
- [113] Thwaites' handwritten notes concerning the initiation of the Mahra uprising state that the ultimate goal was to evict the PDRY and PFLOAG from all of the forts, but especially Ghada. The ultimate objective was a Mahra buffer state. Writing in 1972, the SAF's intelligence chief, Major Hezeldine, still states that a Mahra buffer state is the objective, but recognises that it is probably politically infeasible. LHC Peter Thwaites Collection, 1/2 H.H. (handwritten notes from meeting), n.d. (1969); and MEC John Graham Collection 2/1, Major Awa Hazeldine, *The Future of Dhofar*, 27 June 1972.
- [114] MEC Edward Ashley Collection 2/1, Edward Ashley, Notes for Captain Insall, n.d. (1972).
- [115] MEC John Graham Collection 4/1, J.D.C. Graham, *Oman Diary* (6 June 1971); and MEC John Graham Collection 2/3, Intelligence Summary 441, Sultanate of Oman, 20 May to 3 June 1971.
- [116] Before this raid, the MI6 agent in Saudi Arabia told Karama that he could obtain supplies from the British-officered Omani armed forces. Karama offered his services to Oman once he entered Dhofar, but was instead resupplied and encouraged to depart. However, instead of leaving Dhofar immediately, he attacked Habrut, re-entered Dhofar and was then evacuated by sea back to Saudi Arabia. MEC John Graham Collection 4/1, J.D.C. Graham, *Oman Diary* (entries from 22 May to 21 June).
- [117] Not surprisingly this unit, Firqat Al Badiya, is not mentioned in Jeapes' history of the SAS in Oman. MEC John Graham Collection 2/3, Intelligence Summary 452, Sultanate of Oman, 13 November to 1 December 1971; and MEC John Graham Collection 2/1, Major Awa Hazeldine, 'The Future of Dhofar', 27 June 1972.
- [118] The use of ex-SAS personnel to officer the Mahra firqat is explained by Geraghty and indirectly confirmed by Arkless (who mentions a firqat being led by ex-SAS). Geraghty, *Who Dares Wins*, 135; and Arkless, *The Secret War*, 92.
- [119] TNA DEFE 11/736 D.W. Napper, Commodore, Dir Def Op Plans to CGS, 12 October 1972; and TNA DEFE 11/736 Ambassador Hawley, Muscat, to FCO, 10 October 1972.
- [120] TNA DEFE 11/762 CSAF to H.M., The Direction of the War, 19 June 1973; and TNA DEFE 11/762 COS Committee, DOPS, The Progress of Operations in Oman, 26 June 1973.
- [121] MEC John Graham Collection 3/8, Notes on Current State of Subversive Organisations in Northern Oman, 31 October 1971.
- [122] MEC John Graham Collection 3/7, Report on the Development and Activities of PFLOAG in Northern Oman, 20 July 1973.
- [123] In Aden, the NLF crippled the British counterinsurgency by liquidating most of Aden's Police Special Branch. Naumkin, *Red Wolves of Yemen*, 110–11.
- [124] MEC John Graham Collection 3/7, Report on the Development and Activities of PFLOAG in Northern Oman, 20 July 1973.
- [125] TNA DEFE 11/759 CGS to Minister of State, January 10, 1973; TNA DEFE 11/759 Directive from Major R.D. Willingale R. Sigs for Operation Jason, 17 January 1973; and MEC John

- Graham Collection 3/7, Report on the Development and Activities of PFLOAG in Northern Oman, 20 July 1973.
- [126] Kechichian, *Oman and the World*, 47–8.
- [127] The Buraimi Oasis produced conflict with Saudi Arabia in the mid-1950s while clashes occurred with Ras al Khaymah in 1971. See TNA CAB 158/70 JIC (68) 35 Likely Developments in the Persian Gulf and their Probable Effects for British Interests, June 7, 1968; MEC John Graham Collection 1/2, Lecture by Tony Lewis, n.d.; and MEC John Graham Collection 4/1, J.D.C. Graham, Oman Diary (23 November 1971).
- [128] Kechichian, *Oman and the World*, 44–6.
- [129] The first Omani delegation did not visit Saudi Arabia until January 1971 and only Abu Dhabi's Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan had visited Oman. Kechichian, *Oman and the World*, 70–78. On Britain's opposition to Qaboos' act, see: TNA FCO 8/1676 From Bahrain Residency to Cairo Embassy, 9 March 1971.
- [130] TNA FCO 8/1676 FCO Cairo Embassy to FCO, Telegram 367, 23 March 1971.
- [131] TNA FCO 8/1676 Cairo Embassy to Muscat Embassy, 16 March 1971; and TNA FCO 8/1676 Extract from '14 October' Issue No. 992, 31 March 1971.
- [132] TNA FCO 8/1676 From D.G. Allen, Arabian Department to D.F. Hawley, United Kingdom Ambassador, Muscat, 8 July 1971.
- [133] FCO 8/1676 FCO Cairo Embassy to FCO, Telegram 367, 23 March 1971.
- [134] Khalifa sought advice from the British Residency and freely communicated his frustrations with Qaboos' negotiating position. TNA FCO 8/1676 D.G. Allen to British Embassy Muscat, 8 July 1971; and TNA FCO 8/1676 Doha to British Permanent Residency for the Persian Gulf, 27 September 1971.
- [135] The suggestion that the title of Mufti could be accorded Ghalib seems to have originated with a Saudi ambassador. The Lebanese Foreign Ministry also backed the idea. TNA FCO 8/1676 D.G. Allen to British Embassy Muscat, 8 July 1971; and TNA FCO 8/1676 Beirut Embassy to FCO, Telegram 263, 6 July 1971.
- [136] The Saudi decision came as a surprise to some because of the lack of a breakthrough with Ghalib. TNA FCO 8/1676 From Cairo; FCO Telegraph No. 1255, 30 September 1971; TNA FCO 8/1676 Cairo Embassy to D.G. Allen, 13 October 1971; and MEC John Graham Collection 4/1, J.D.C. Graham, Oman Diary (8 October 1971).
- [137] TNA FCO 8/1676 *Sunday Telegraph*, 31 October 1971. A note written in the margin of the *Telegraph* article remarked laconically, 'Odd this has taken so long to reach Sunday Telegraph from Beirut!'
- [138] MEC John Graham Collection 5/2, John Graham, Thirty Months, n.d.
- [139] MEC John Graham Collection 4/1, J.D.C. Graham, Oman Diary (17 February and 10 September 1972).
- [140] MEC John Graham Collection 4/1, J.D.C. Graham, Oman Diary (17 May 1972).
- [141] Kechichian, *Oman and the World*, 99–100.
- [142] MEC John Graham Collection 4/1, J.D.C. Graham, Oman Diary (31 October 1971).
- [143] MEC John Graham Collection 4/1, J.D.C. Graham, Oman Diary (22 August 1971).
- [144] MEC John Graham Collection 4/1, J.D.C. Graham, Oman Diary (2 October 1972); and Kechichian, *Oman and the World*, 72.
- [145] MEC John Graham Collection 4/1, J.D.C. Graham, Oman Diary (3 August 1972).
- [146] TNA DEFE 24/575 Commander Sultan's Armed Forces Assessment, 14 February 1972.
- [147] Gardiner, *In the Service of the Sultan*, 63–4.
- [148] TNA DEFE 11/759 FM BRITDEFAT MUSCAT TO MODUK, 3 February 1973.
- [149] TNA DEFE 11/759 FM BRITDEFAT MUSCAT TO MODUK, 9 February 1973.

- [150] TNA DEFE 11/759 BRITDEFAT MUSCAT to MODUK, 15 February 1973; TNA DEFE 11/759 Brief for Meeting of Ministers, Gilmour/Balnel, Oman, 15 February 1973; and TNA DEFE 11/762 Review of the Military Situation, June 1973.
- [151] TNA DEFE 25/312 Military Operations in Oman, June–October 1973.
- [152] TNA DEFE 25/312 Record of Talks, 28 April 1974; and TNA DEFE 11/658 FCO Note, 2 December 1974.
- [153] TNA DEFE 25/312 Review of the Situation by Major General Tim Creasy, Commander of the Sultan's Armed Forces, December 1973–May 1974; TNA DEFE 11/658 Review of the Situation by Major General Tim Creasy, Commander of the Sultan's Armed Forces, June–December 1974; and TNA DEFE 11/658 Report on CSAF's visit to Jordan, 4 December 1974.
- [154] TNA DEFE 25/315 HQ SAF D-OPS/5, Operational Review, 11 April 1974; TNA DEFE 11/658 Review of the Situation by Major General Tim Creasy, Commander of the Sultan's Armed Forces, June–December 1974; and TNA DEFE 11/656 COS Committee, Defence Operational Planning Staff, Report on the Provision of British Service Assistance to Oman, 7 August 1974.
- [155] Akehurst, *Generally Speaking*, 154; and TNA DEFE 11/656 Major-General Tim Creasy to Sultan Qaboos, 25 August 1974.
- [156] Gardiner, *In the Service of the Sultan*, 75–94; and Ray, *Dangerous Frontiers*, 102–91.
- [157] TNA DEFE 11/658 Review of the Situation by Major General Tim Creasy, Commander of the Sultan's Armed Forces, June–December 1974.
- [158] MEC John Graham Collection 4/1, J.D.C. Graham, Oman Diary (23 November 1971).
- [159] TNA DEFE 11/658 Review of the Situation by Major General Tim Creasy, Commander of the Sultan's Armed Forces, June–December 1974.

References

- Abu Khalil, As'ad. 'George Habash and the Movement of Arab Nationalists: Neither Unity nor Liberation'. *Journal of Palestine Studies* 28, no. 4 (Summer 1988): 91–103.
- Akehurst, John. *Generally Speaking*. Wilby: Michael Russell, 1999.
- . *We Won a War: The Campaign in Oman, 1965–1975*. Guildford, Surrey: Michael Russell, 1982.
- Allen, Calvin, and W. Lynn Rigsbee. *Oman Under Qaboos: From Coup to Constitution, 1970–1996*. London: Frank Cass, 2000.
- Andrew, Christopher, and Vasil Mitrokhin. *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World*. New York: Basic Books, 2005.
- Arkless, David. *The Secret War: Dhofar 1971/1972*. London: William Kimber, 1988.
- Connor, Ken, and David Hebditch. *How to Stage a Military Coup: From Planning to Execution*. London: Greenhill, 2005.
- de la Billière, Peter. *Looking for Trouble: SAS to Gulf Command*. London: HarperCollins, 1995.
- Fiennes, Ranulph. *Where Soldiers Fear to Tread*. London: The Travel Book Club, 1975.
- Gardiner, Ian. *In the Service of the Sultan: A First Hand Account of the Dhofar Insurgency*. Barnsley, UK: Pen and Sword, 2006.
- Geraghty, Tony. *Who Dares Wins: The Story of the Special Air Service, 1950–1980*. London: Arms and Armour, 1980.
- Golan, Galia. *Soviet Policies in the Middle East: From World War II to Gorbachev*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Halliday, Fred. *Arabia without Sultans*. Middlesex: Penguin, 1974.
- . *Revolution and Foreign Policy: The Case of South Yemen, 1967–1987*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

- Huan, Claude. *La Marine soviétique*. Nantes: Marines éditions, 2002.
- Hughes, Geraint. 'A "Model Campaign" Reappraised: The Counter-Insurgency War in Dhofar, Oman, 1965–1975'. *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 32, no. 2 (April 2009): 271–305.
- Jeapes, Tony. *SAS Operation Oman*. London: HarperCollins, 1980.
- Jones, Tim. *Postwar Counterinsurgency and the SAS, 1945–1952: A Special Type of Warfare*. London: Routledge, 2001.
- Kechichian, Joseph. *Oman and the World: The Emergence of an Independent Foreign Policy*. RAND: Santa Monica, 1995.
- Khalaf, 'Abd ul-Hadi. 'Labor Movements in Bahrain'. *MERIP Reports*, no. 132 (March 1985): 24–9.
- Kitson, Frank. *Gangs and Counter-gangs*. London: Barrie & Rockliff, 1960.
- . *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping*. London: Faber & Faber, 1971.
- Macris, Jeffrey. *The Politics and Security of the Gulf: Anglo-American Hegemony and the Shaping of a Region*. London: Routledge, 2010.
- McKeown, John. 'Britain and Oman: The Dhofar War and Its Significance'. M.Phil. thesis, Cambridge University 1981.
- Mockaitis, Thomas. *British Counterinsurgency in the Post-imperial Era*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995.
- Naumkin, Vitaly. *Red Wolves of Yemen: The Struggle for Independence*. Cambridge: Oleander, 2004.
- Owtram, Francis. *A Modern History of Oman: Formation of the State since 1920*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2008.
- Paget, Julian. *Counter-Insurgency Campaigning*. London: Faber & Faber, 1967.
- Perkins, Ken. *A Fortunate Soldier*. London: Brassey's, 1988.
- Purdon, Corran. *List the Bugle: Reminiscences of an Irish Soldier*. Antrim: Greystone, 1993.
- Ray, Bryan. *Dangerous Frontiers: Campaigning in Somaliland and Oman*. Barnsley, UK: Pen and Sword, 2008.
- Thompson, Robert. *Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam*. New York: Praeger, 1966.
- Thwaites, Peter. *Muscat Command*. London: Leo Cooper, 1995.
- Trevelyan, Humphrey. *The Middle East in Revolution*. London: Macmillan, 1970.
- Walker, Jonathan. *Aden Insurgency: The Savage War in South Arabia, 1962–67*. Staplehurst: Spellmont, 2005.
- Woodward, Peter. *The Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations*. London: Tauris Academic, 1996.