Reid Pauly


Reid Pauly is a PhD candidate in Political Science at MIT and a member of the Security Studies Program. He is currently a predoctoral fellow at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. His dissertation explains the causes of credible coercive assurance--why and how targets of coercion believe that they will not be punished after they comply with demands. His broader research interests include nuclear proliferation, nuclear strategy, deterrence and assurance theory, wargaming, and Arctic security. He was a Summer Associate at the RAND Corporation in 2016. Prior to graduate school, Reid was a research assistant at the Center for International Securityand Cooperation at Stanford University, and earned a BA in History and Government from Cornell University.


“Bedeviled by a Paradox: Nitze, Bundy, and an Incipient Nuclear Norm,” The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3-4 (2015): 441-455.

“The Pioneering Role of CIS in American War Gaming,” MIT Précis, Fall 2015.

“Should the United States or the international community aggressively pursue nuclear nonproliferation policies?” co-authored with Scott D. Sagan, in Peter M. Haas and John A. Hird (eds.), Controversies in Globalization: Contending Approaches to International Relations, 2nd Edition (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2013).

“The Conundrum of Close Calls,” co-authored with Scott D. Sagan, in Henry D. Sokolski and Bruno Tertrais (eds.), Nuclear Weapons Security Crises: What Does History Teach? (U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2013).

“History, Close Calls, and Nuclear Materials Security,” co-authored with Scott D. Sagan, commissioned by the Nuclear Threat Initiative for preparation of the Nuclear Materials Security Index 2.0, December 2012.