The Determinants of Ethnic Voting

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[1] ***Note to BWGAPE*** This paper is a chapter from a larger book project that examines the conditions under which elections strengthen or undermine accountability in emerging democracies. Specifically, the project focuses on the determinants of voting behavior, the dynamics and consequences of electoral fraud, and the causes of electoral violence; employing cross-national evidence from Africa as well as an in-depth case study of Kenya's 2007 election. In this version of the chapter on the sources of ethnic voting, I have excluded an extensive background discussion of the election which appears in earlier chapters. Lacking this detail, I hope what remains in this chapter is clear enough. See also footnote 2 for background. I look forward to any and all comments.

In the previous chapter, I presented evidence that demonstrates the importance of incumbent performance and policy positions towards understanding individual motivations for voting in Kenya. However, ethnicity still forms an important consideration for many people. Some voters use co-ethnicity heavily in their voting calculus and will only choose co-ethnic leaders. Still others employ ethnic cues even when choosing a candidate from another group. In this chapter, I examine the determinants of choice for these sub-sets of ethnic voters. In so far as ethnicity matters, *how* does it matter?

In Kenya, ethnicity correlates strongly with vote choice for voters who have a co-ethnic candidate in the race. Table 1 shows the distribution of support for the three leading candidates that came from their co-ethnics in a pre-election survey (described below). Incumbent President Mwai Kibaki garnered 94 percent of his Kikuyu vote, Raila Odinga received 99 percent of Luo support, and Kalonzo Musyoka enjoyed 82 percent support from his fellow Kambas. All told, 92 percent of voters with a co-ethnic candidate (Kikuyus, Luos, and Kambas) chose their co-ethnic. However, this proportion of voters only makes up 47 percent of the total proportion of voters in Kenya. How do the remaining 53 percent decide? Does a lack of a co-ethnic candidate preclude ethnic motivations? Even for voters who choose a co-ethnic, are they necessarily driven by ethnic considerations? And for all voters, what motivations drive ethnic choices?

Table 1 here

Prior approaches to ethnic voting suggest four channels through which ethnicity could motivate the selection of a co-ethnic or responsiveness to ethnic cues. These include (i) affective ties of group membership, (ii) fear or (iii) prejudice towards ethnic outsiders, and (iv) expectations about the distribution of patronage and goods from politicians. Although these prior ethnic theories produce a set of similar observable implication—including co-ethnic voting and headcount elections—they rely upon a variety of distinct logics.

Extant studies suffer important limitations. First, they do not always discriminate between predictions for how ethnicity structures choices for those with co-ethnics candidates and those without them. Second, they frequently do not address or adjudicate between alternative ethnic logics. As a result, we only have a cursory glimpse into the reason(s) voters might respond positively to a candidate's ethnicity. While ethnic theories dominate general explanations for

politics in Africa, scholars have presented little evidence for the micro-foundations of the channels that drive ethnic outcomes.

I seek to build on prior work by delineating the logics of the prevailing theories and testing them with data drawn from a nationally representative household pre-election survey I conducted in the run-up to Kenya's 2007 election. My design includes two core components. First, I developed a set of survey questions that reflects the four main channels that structure ethnic voting, including strong affective ties to group members, fear and prejudice towards outsiders, and beliefs about favoritism in the distribution of government services. I measure these against the reported vote choice for co-ethnics of the candidates: the Kikuyu (co-ethnics of incumbent President Mwai Kibaki), Luos (co-ethnics of Raila Odinga), and Kambas (co-ethnics of Kalonzo Musyoka).[2] Second, I examine the impact of these ethnic factors on the full sample of voters, both co-ethnics and non co-ethnics of the candidates. Reported vote choice for voters who select across ethnic lines does not necessarily preclude ethnic motivations, particularly if groups coordinate to put themselves into winning ethnic coalitions. But a test of ethnic voting in this instance requires a different dependent variable than simply matching ethnicity between voters and candidates. To achieve this, I embedded an experiment that randomized ethnic and performance cues in describing a fictional candidate before asking respondents whether they would support that candidate.[3] I term "ethnic voters" those respondents who proved responsive to ethnic cues over performance cues. The combination of these two techniques provides a unique view into why some voters make ethnic choices. Similar to Ferree (2006, 2011), this chapter represents a systematic explorations of ethnic voting channels using individual level data.

I preview two sets of core findings. First, my data show that for the subset of voters with co-ethnic candidates as well as the full sample, the prime motivation for ethnic voting arises

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[2] ***** Note to BWGAPE***** Lacking background from previous chapters, let me briefly set the scene: 2007 was Kenya's fourth round elections since the reintroduction of multi-party politics in 1991. Mwai Kibaki, first elected in 2002, incumbent running for re-election running for the Party of National Unity (PNU). Raila Odinga his main challenger, ran on the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) ticket. A non-viable third place challenger, Kalonzo Musyoka, ran for a splinter party ODM-Kenya, but only garnered about 10 percent of the final vote (Kibaki and Odinga split the remaining 90 percent, Kibaki rigging himself into a second term and preventing a legitimate Odinga victory-- based on evidence from my exit poll discussed in previous chapters and other forensic and journalistic accounts). Kibaki, Odinga, and Musyoka were all members of the same coalition that brought Kibaki to power in 2002. An electoral winner in Kenya must win a plurality of the nation-wide vote, as well as at least 25 percent of the vote in any five of the country's eight provinces.

[3] This experiment had the same design as that described in Chapter 2.

from fear. Specifically, this means the perceived loss of individual security that respondents thought would arise from the election for president of ethnic outsiders. This result foreshadows the protest and violence that engulfed Kenya's 2007 election, a subject that I return to in Chapter 5. Second, comparing the responsiveness of voters to ethnic cues from the experiment for co-ethnics and non co-ethnics, I find that positive evaluations of group membership drove co-ethnics of candidates towards support, while it drove non co-ethnics away. Affective ties of membership therefore have both positive and negative effects, conditional on whether one's group fields a candidate.

Exploring the determinants of ethnic voting in Kenya may provide important lessons for understanding voting behavior in other emerging democracies. On the one hand, Kenya is similar to a majority of countries in Africa who do not feature ethnic groups that form permanent majorities. Notice from Table 1 that only 47 percent of Kenyans featured a co-ethnic in the race, leaving 53 percent without a clear choice. The need for politicians to appeal to voters outside of their group suggests the limited use of simply relying upon co-ethnic support to win office. In the last chapter, we saw that voters mostly respond to performance and campaign issues and politicians build broader support beyond their ethnic groups by recognizing this. We also saw a lack of consistent coordination for groups without candidates in forming ethnic coalitions with bloc-support. But that does not preclude a role for ethnicity for some voters, whether or not they happen to field a co-ethnic candidate or coordinate with other members of their group. On the other hand, the particular state of insecurity in Kenya felt by many citizens may place a larger emphasis on the role of fear in driving ethnic voting. While many new democracies in divided societies that have transitioned over the past twenty years in Africa and Asia have also emerged from conflict or a history of communal violence, countries that lack a violent history or present like Kenya probably probably do not have as fearful an electorate..

I organize the rest of this chapter as follows. In the next section, I outline the theoretical foundations of the ethnic drivers of the vote and deduce testable hypotheses. Section II discusses the method and data used to test them. Section III provides results, and Section IVconcludes.

I. Theoretical Foundations

In this section, I discuss the four main ethnic channels that motivate electoral choices. When voters receive information about the ethnic identity of candidates, what logic(s) drive support towards or away from alternative candidates? These channels include positive evaluations of association members that contribute to a sense of shared identity and belonging. Animosity towards out-groups may produce negative evaluations of ethnic strangers based on fear or prejudice. Leaders may also use lines of ethnicity to determine patterns of redistribution and patronage that favor co-ethnics at the expense of policies that would benefit others.

These four channels require that a voter receives an ethnic cue, or information about the ethnicity of the candidate on offer. As we saw in the last chapter, the identity of candidates in Kenya can provide a strong set of priors for voters on that individual's past and future likely behavior. We know that some of the support that Mwai Kibaki, Raila Odinga, and Kalonzo Musyoka drew from their co-ethnics and non co-ethnics occurred because of their ethnic identity. What motivates voters to make these choices?

Psycho-social gratification and strong feelings of in-group attachments

Ethnic ties can produce strong psychological feelings of affection towards in-group members. In turn, groups may carry on traits of "pathology" where they privilege their own members and exclude others. The experimental studies of Tajfel (1970, 1974), Tajfel and Billig (1973), and Billig (1973) demonstrate that humans remain predisposed towards dividing themselves into groups. In so doing, they also discriminate against others. These studies find that discrimination does not occur because of the actual similarities between group members, but rather strong ties of group membership and loyalty. Over their range of research, Tajfel and Billig argue that groups are naturally driven to comparison and competition. Individuals feel a positive social membership from other members of their group.

Horowitz (1985) provides a foundational study that applies these insights to the study of political behavior. He argues that because "Group allegiances and comparisons are a fundamental aspect of social life" (143), we should treat the psychoses of self-worth, anxiety, aggression of groups as we would individuals. For Horowitz, positive evaluations of in-group members strengthen group attachments. These attachments may also fuel feelings of animosity, fear, and resentment towards outsiders. Cooperation across groups proves difficult if not impossible. Members of minorities are particularly defensive and worried about survival.

Horowitz's main observable implication from this view is that in divided societies, group competition should produce ethnic parties. In turn, voters select co-ethnics because they feel a strong psycho-social gratification and strong assertion of group identity in doing so.

A set of related theories suggest that groups defined along boundaries of class or religion (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Lijphart 1977) and ethnicity (Geertz 1963, 1973; Horowitz 1985) hold internally homogenous preferences over a set of policies around which in-group members cohere but exclude out-group members. For example, an ethno-linguistic group may wish to enact a policy making their language a state's official language for education instruction and commerce. As groups differ over policies in this way, democratic competition produces extremism. Candidates try to "outbid" moderate competitors by promulgating maximalist promises that appeal to voters' sense of group belonging (Horowitz 1985; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972). Electoral races should produce ethnic headcounts.

There are reasons to suspect that strong in-group attachments may motivate Kenyan voters. Outside of metropolitan areas, most Kenyans grow up in ethnically homogenous areas and form close relationships with their co-ethnics. Few Kenyans marry across ethnic lines, and many Kenyans live, go to school, and work with co-ethnics. Most Kenyans can distinguish whether a stranger is a co-ethnic based on their appearance, tribal language spoken, and/or name. Although Kenya does not have ethnic parties a la Horowitz, most Kenyans typically vote for a co-ethnic when one appears on the ballot, as Table 1 demonstrates.

Fear and Prejudice

A close corollary to the positive feelings that co-ethnics feel towards each other are the negative evaluations that they may form of ethnic strangers. A wide scholarship suggests that fear and prejudice play important roles motivating political behavior. Pivotal events, including violent periods of colonization and insurgency, or battles over civil rights, create times when politicians strategically use fear of "out groups" to garner support.

In the US, whites are believed to hold deep social aversion to black political inclusion, potentially as a response to learned racist behavior in the divided and unequal South. Many studies of white voting behavior in the US argue that prejudice plays a motivating role in this aversion (Kinder and Sears 1981; Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989; Reeves 1997). Despite political and social developments since the civil rights era, racism could in fact prove stable and long-

lasting (Bell 1992). Minorities may feel fear of discrimination and subordination and hold prejudicial views of more dominant groups. Thus, fear and prejudice may have differential effects across groups, depending on their relative size and position in society. A lack of self-esteem produced from remaining on the bottom of the political, economic, and/or social ladders results from hostility to out-groups (Berkowitz 1962), and may drive prejudice against powerful groups (Bettelheim and Janowitzh 1964).[4]

Individuals within certain groups may perceive their socio-economic status threatened by members of other groups. In the US, Key (1949) formulates the "power-threat" hypothesis where "…whites engage in racial violence, resist desegregation, vote for racist candidates, and switch political parties partly in response to the threat that living among many blacks poses to their political and economic privilege" (Oliver and Mendelberg 2000, 574). Specifically, individuals who hold prejudicial views are not likely to support policies that redistribute income towards other groups (Sniderman et *al.* 1991). They may label members of other groups as "lazy" and otherwise want to protect their economic position relative to others (*ibid*).

With reference to Africa, Bates (1974) argues that fear, prejudice, and resentment exist between groups because of differential capabilities and social standing. He argues that ethnic groups that "are more wealthy, better educated, and more urbanized tend to be envied, resented, and sometimes feared by others; and the basis for these sentiments is the recognition of their superior position in the new system of stratification" (462).

In sum, feelings of fear or prejudice against out-group members may reflect deep psycho-social aversion to others, or could be based on real evidence of prior discrimination, violence, or immoderation. Taken together, fear and prejudice may result from a deeper and even more biological predisposition towards in-group members, while also combining experiences that people have had with one another. In either case, the implications for political behavior include co-ethnic voting and headcount elections.

Given its history, fear and prejudice could play important roles in shaping political behavior in Kenya. A violent history of colonization and decolonization, as well as a history of violent elections and ongoing crime, has made Kenya a dangerous society (Anderson 2005; Mueller 2008). The state frequently fails to adequately secure the population, and communal

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[4] In contrast to older theories, Hajnal (2005) shows that white voters are open to learning and will moderate their views towards blacks when black leaders (in his case, mayors) perform well.

violence is not uncommon. In so far as Kenyans believe the protection or abrogation of their security correlates with what group they belong to, they may form strong opinions about fear of ethnic strangers. Moreover, the privileged position of the Kikuyu relative to other tribes suggests the potential for ethnic prejudices. Kikuyus may blame non-Kikuyus for their lack of relative wealth and engage in negative ethnic stereotyping, and conversely other groups may demonstrate aversion to Kikuyu dominance. More locally, feelings of prejudice could exist across a host of intra-ethnic relations given limited employment and economic resources throughout Kenya.

Favoritism

Another channel in which ethnicity may drive voting derives from the perceived biases in the distribution of patronage and services on the part of the government towards certain groups. Many scholars recognize the importance of clientelism and patronage to Africa politics (Cruise O'Brien 1971, 2003; Bayart 1993; Chabal and Daloz 1999). Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) assert that "clientelistic accountability represents a transaction, the direct exchange of a citizen's vote in return for direct payments or continuing access to employment, goods, and services" (2). These include highly personal and individualized goods. Politicians generally use clientelism to favor their group and motivate co-ethnics to vote (Posner 2005; Wantchekon 2003), and reward them with targeted benefits such as public service jobs if successful (Chandra 2004). In new democracies, Keefer (2007) argues the inability of non-viable opposition parties to credibly promise to enact policies drives clientelism. This results in the under-provision of public goods and targeted goods towards a small sub-set of voters.

In Africa, the widespread assumption is that leaders distribute patronage along ethnic lines, favoring co-ethnics. Scholars have tried to explain why ethnicity provides a superior method of mobilization for politicians to target voters. Institutional theories examine the preferences and strategies created by electoral rules for determining distribution (Bates 1983). In his expansive study of Zambia, Posner (2005) describes the support given to co-ethnic politicians and the concomitant distribution of private goods to voters as a problem of coordination. Ethnicity is a source of information that helps both voters and politicians build expectations about each others' behavior. For voters, the fundamental feature of the political system includes the ability to access favoritism from group members. For politicians, the ethnicity of voters helps provide them with information about who will support them. Chandra (2004) argues that

patronage is necessarily ethnic in patronage-democracies because voters generally lack reliable information as to the past performance and policy differentials of candidates. In an information scarce environment, ethnicity provides an important, available, and reliable cue as to how politicians will behave once in office. With reference to ethnic groups, she comments that "…a favour given to one member sends a signal to others that they too can count on him in the future" (56). In India, ethnicity provides the cheapest and easiest signal from politicians to voters as ethnic identification can easily be determined by name.

Why do patterns of distribution favor certain ethnic groups at the exclusion of others? Observers argue that ethnic distribution results from African party systems that lack divergent platforms or ideologies found in industrialized democracies (Baudais and Sborgi 2006; Rakner, Svasand and Khembo 2007; van de Walle 2003). Parties also do not appear to produce meaningful policy differentials, and instead suffer from what van de Walle (2003) terms "programmatic homogeneity" (Burnell 2001; Di Lorenzo and Sborgi 2001; Nugent 2001). Further, parties seem to agree on most "valence" issues, such as reducing crime or increasing development (Ferree 2006, 2011). In a political context where candidates do not offer voters choices between competing platforms or ideologies, the flow of goods becomes more relevant to the individual voter.

Shared ethnic identity provides a superior method of coordination and therefore mobilization (Bates 1974). Given similarities of language and culture, as well as denser social networks, communication and coordination are easier within groups than between them (Hardin 1995; Fearon and Laitin 1996; Habyarimana et *al.* 2009). Co-ethnicity may also produce "norms of reciprocity" (Taylor 1988) that allow for easier sanctioning of in-group members (Miguel and Gugerty 2005) based on greater information regarding reputation (Platteau 1994).

The belief that the central government favors the ethnic group of the president imbues much of the literature on politics in Kenya (Branch 2011; Throup and Hornsby 1997). Observers believe that the founding President Jomo Kenyatta heavily favored his co-ethnic Kikuyus, and that his successor, Daniel arap Moi, did so with the Kalenjin. Kramon and Posner (2012) find evidence that the re-introduction of democratic elections did not eliminate ethnic favoritism, and in fact, one of Raila Odinga and ODM's central claims against President Kibaki and PNU was that he directed government services towards the Kikuyu and related groups, but in so doing ignored much of the country's population. If Kenyans believe that politicians bias the

distribution of patronage and services to their favored groups, voters are likely to select the candidate who will provide those benefits.

Understanding the Logic of Ethnic Voting

Studies of ethnic politics in emerging democracies provide a number of logics for why citizens make ethnic decisions at the ballot box. As we have seen already in the Kenyan case, some voters choose candidates based on ethnicity. This may occur between voters who are co-ethnics of the candidates, or voters who rely upon information about ethnicity to help them decide, regardless of whether their group fields a candidate. The specific motivations for both types of voters remain unclear, however, given the number of distinct channels that could undergird these choices.

As a result, a number of puzzles about the sources of ethnic voting remain. Prior work rarely investigates different channels at the individual level, typically only studying electoral outcomes at more aggregated units of analysis. Showing that electoral outcomes correlate highly with the ethnic census does not demonstrate either that ethnicity motivated voting, or if it did, which ethnic logic played a role. Most constituencies in Kenya are ethnically homogeneous and therefore this approach may only find a spurious correlation between candidate support and ethnicity deriving from unobservable factors, such as government performance. Studies that use individual level data (e.g. Bratton and Kimenyi 2008; Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005) do not isolate ethnic voters from the general population and/or distinguish the various ethnic channels that may drive choice. Therefore, we lack a micro-foundational logic of ethnic voting.

An important exception is Ferree's (2006, 2011) study of voting in South Africa, where electoral returns reflect an ethnic census—black South Africans nearly uniformly support the ANC and whites supporting predominately white parties. Ferree uses survey data to investigate whether these electoral patterns result from strong feelings of ethnic attachment, but instead finds that voters use party cues to assess the racial credentials of the ANC and white parties to help distinguish credible from non-credible promises. The attraction of black voters to the ANC does not result simply from identity voting, but rather the selection of a party that blacks view as more inclusive, trustworthy, and likely to deliver.

Previous studies also have a difficult time distinguishing whether ethnic voting is more likely driven by positive evaluations of one's group, or negative evaluations of ethnic strangers.

This is problematic for two reasons. The observable implication of the first of these logics is that voters will select co-ethnics when they are on offer—but it does not provide a clear prediction for what voters do when they lack a co-ethnic, even if groups coordinate and form multi-ethnic coalitions (which does not consistently occur in Kenya). The observable implication of the second is that voters will *not* select candidates of groups who they perceive negatively—but does not clearly predict who they will support.

To investigate the determinants of ethnic voting, I take a similar approach to Chapter 2 by relying on the importance of the information. In this chapter, this involves information about ethnicity and relayed through ethnic cues. Given their long involvement in Kenyan history, voters knew the ethnic identities of the main candidates contesting the presidency. Kikuyu, Luo, and Kamba voters had a clear ethnic choice. The remaining voters did not lack ethnic information about the candidates simply because they lacked a co-ethnic. Many of these voters still received ethnic cues and may have used information about candidates' ethnicities to help them decide. For both sets of voters, what drives ethnic voting?

Hypotheses

From the ethnic literature, I deduce four hypotheses regarding ethnic channels.

Hypotheses on Ethnic Channels:

H_1: *The greater affective ties voters feel towards their ethnic group, the more likely they are to vote for a co-ethnic or rely on ethnic cues* [in-group attachments].

H_2: *As voters' fears of opposing ethnic groups increase, so does their likelihood of choosing co-ethnics or rely on ethnic cues* [fear].

H_3: *As voters' prejudice of opposing ethnic groups increase, so does their   likelihood   of choosing co-ethnics or rely on ethnic cues* [prejudice].

H_4: *As voters' perceptions of favoritism from the central government increase, so   does their likelihood of choosing co-ethnics or rely on ethnic cues* [favoritism].

II. Method and Data

To study the determinants of ethnic voting, I designed, conducted, and implemented a nation-wide household survey in Kenya in the first week of December 2007, approximately three weeks before the election. The survey is nationally-representative and uses the final registry of voters provided by the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) as the sampling frame for a total sample of 2,700 respondents. I included all districts in the survey, with random selection of constituencies and enumeration areas proportionate to the voting population. After selection of enumeration areas, interviewers instituted a random walk and skip pattern for household selection. Within households, interviewers conducted random selection of respondents via Kish Grid. This scientific sampling procedure means that every Kenyan voter had equal probability of selection. Enumerators conducted the survey in English and Swahili.

While the exit poll discussed in Chapter 2 provides an improved method to assess voting behavior generally, the ability to enumerate it in a relatively short amount of time does not make it suitable for certain in-depth explorations, especially regarding the ethnic drivers of the vote. To overcome this, I conducted a household survey that could generally take longer to complete and within the comfort of a respondent's household. I did so close to the election, when voters knew the identity of the candidates contesting office, had been exposed to campaign issues and themes, and likely formed decisions about voting. Although some of these voters no doubt changed their minds between this survey and election day, my purpose here is not to project a winner but rather explore the drivers of the voter for people who express a proclivity for making ethnic choices. Eifert, Miguel, and Posner (2010) use data from the multi-country Afrobarometer survey to show that survey respondents are more likely to identify in ethnic terms closer to an election. Therefore, enumerating in the context of an actual race should form a critical time towards measuring the sources of ethnic voting.

I explore the potential underlying motivations for ethnic voting in two ways. First, I examine the motivations for voters who featured a co-ethnic in the race—the Kikuyu, Luo, and Kamba—and whether or not they reported that they would vote for their co-ethnic candidate (Kibaki, Odinga, and Musyoka, respectively). Table 1 shows candidate support by these ethnic groups. Echoing findings in Chapter 2 on levels of co-ethnic voting, ethnicity correlates strongly with candidate support for voters who feature a co-ethnic candidate: 94 percent of all Kikuyus

expressed their intention to vote for the Kikuyu candidate Mwai Kibaki, while 94 percent of Luos felt similarly about the Luo Raila Odinga, and 82 percent of Kambas about the Kamba Kalonzo Musyoka.

Second, because ethnicity can still motivate individuals who are not co-ethnics of the candidates, I also analyze the full sample of voters. Although many voters will not have a co-ethnic in the race, they may still hold positive or negative evaluations of candidates based on ethnicity. Lacking a co-ethnic candidate does not mean ethnic channels do not play a role in forming choices. If individuals do not field a co-ethnic candidate but still think that their group will be benefit or lose relative to others, voters with strong in-group attachments, fear, prejudice, or beliefs about favoritism may support candidates from other groups. They are technically voting across ethnic lines, but ethnicity still motivates their decisions.

However, I require a different dependent variable than matching votes for co-ethnic candidates since a majority of voters could not select a co-ethnic. To isolate these voters, I utilize an experiment embedded within a survey question that randomized performance and ethnic cues.[5] This experiment exactly mirrors that from Chapter 2. The question came at the beginning of the survey. The ethnic treatment was either a Kikuyu or Luo name reflecting the two main ethnicities vying for the presidency (but not the names of actual candidates).[6] The performance treatment was whether the candidate had performed well or not in office on issues of poverty reduction, service delivery, and job creation. This created four versions of the survey where a single respondent was given one of four scenarios and asked whether or not they would support a well-performing Kikuyu, well-performing Luo, poorly-performing Kikuyu, or poorly-performing Luo.

Table 2 shows the schema for the experiment. Versions 1 and 3 of the survey cue the same Kikuyu ethnic name ("Kamau"), and Versions 2 and 4 cued the same Luo name

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[5] The use of experimental methods to test the effect of ethnicity on voting and public goods provision has grown in recent years. Dunning and Harrison (2010) and Dunning (2010), for example, randomize various cues in campaign videos to test their effect on candidate support in Mali and South Africa. Habyarimana et *al.* (2009) perform field experiments in Kampala, Uganda to explore the effect of co-ethnicity on public service provision. Survey experiments in particular are increasingly used in political science (e.g., Adida 2011; Fair, Malhotra, and Shapiro 2011; Frye 2005, 2006; Pepinsky, Liddle, and Mujani 2009). No experiment, however, has been incorporated into an exit poll in Africa.

[6] I exclude a Kamba name since Musyoka was a non-viable and distant third place candidate. The introduction of an additional Kamba treatment would have also reduced power.

("Onyango").[7] Versions 1 and 2 cue poor performance, while Versions 3 and 4 cue good performance.

Table 2 here

The precise wording of the question from Versions 3 and 4 (see Appendix 1 for all four versions of the question):

Imagine that the following person is running for president. First, I am going to describe this candidate, and then ask you how likely you would be to support him for re-election. Since becoming elected, let's suppose President **Kamau/Onyango** reduced poverty, delivered more services, and created more jobs in Kenya. In your opinion, how likely would you be to support him: very likely, somewhat likely, somewhat unlikely, or not likely?

The answer options for respondents included: "Very likely / somewhat likely / somewhat unlikely / not likely" as well as "don't know" and "refused to answer." I collapse the evaluations into positive and negative (combine "very" and "somewhat" likely and "somewhat" and "not likely") and drop undecideds and refusals from analysis (which make up a very small proportion of all answers and do not affect the results).

Table 3 shows results across these four scenarios, matching closely the results from the exit poll replication, shown in Chapter 2, Table 13. Both a well-performing Kikuyu and Luo candidate receive 80 percent support. A poorly performing Kikuyu achieves 24 percent support, and a poorly performing Luo gets 23 percent.

Table 3 here

With this experimental set-up, I term "ethnic voters" those that lent more weight to ethnic cues over performance cues – that is, those voters that expressed support for a candidate in the

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[7] Kamau and Onyango are recognizable and common Kikuyu and Luo names, respectively, as confirmed in pre-election focus groups, piloting, and survey manipulation checks.

face of bad performance, but knowing their ethnic identity, or those who did not express support for a candidate in the face of good performance, but knowing their ethnic identity. I argue that all else equal and knowing nothing else about a candidate, a voter would never prefer a poorly performing candidate or reject a well-performing candidate. Changes in levels of support after the introduction of the ethnic cue therefore help to measure voters who are more likely to lend weight to ethnic, over performance, cues. Similar to patterns in Chapter 2 when I replicated the experiment on the exit poll, about 22 percent of the total sample in the pre-election survey responded positively to ethnic cues in this way (Table 3). I randomly distributed the four versions of the survey nation-wide so results are derived from the two information treatments, ethnic and performance cues, and not other confounding variables, such as the ethnicity of the respondent. Table 4 presents a balance test to demonstrate efficacy of randomization. The only significant variable predicting treatment is male, which I control for in subsequent tests.

Table 4 here

There are two potential problems to the way I have defined ethnic voters in this scenario. First, a positive or negative evaluation of a candidate knowing only their performance record and ethnicity does not necessarily tell us whether a single voter is driven by performance or ethnicity. However, identifying changes across the cells in Table 3 helps to determine whether voters are more likely to shift support when switching ethnic treatments or performance treatments. Voters are more sensitive to changes in performance than ethnicity, but some individuals remain positively disposed to ethnic cues regardless of performance. Therefore, I argue that while the measure I describe here does not perfectly identify ethnic voters, it does identify those voters who lend more relative weight to ethnic cues than performance cues.

Second, positive responses in favor of poor performers could indicate that Kenyan voters like to provide positive responses in general (perhaps to sound socially acceptable), but not necessarily with respect to the ethnic cue on offer. I suspect this is not the case since Kenyans are not afraid to lend critical opinions of poor performers—in fact, critical opinions are common as Table 3 shows. Moreover, differences across cells demonstrate important effects of varying treatments. If Kenyans uniformly provide positive responses, the treatments should have no effect. As Table 3 demonstrates, this is not the case.

To sum up the construction of my dependent variable, I test the determinants of ethnic voting in two specifications. In the first, I examine the sub-sample of voters who had co-ethnics in the race and whether or not they choose to vote for their co-ethnic. In the second, I look at the entire sample of voters, those with and without co-ethnics, and whether or not ethnic cues likely determined their support for candidates.

The independent variables for these specifications are the same and reflect the four ethnic channels through a battery of questions with respect to affective ties of ethnic belonging, fear or prejudice of ethnic others, and views of favoritism. I now describe how I measure these four ethnic channels.

The first question to test hypothesis 1 examines whether Kenyans hold strong in-group attachments from affective ties of membership. Building on work by Ferree (2006, 2011), Bratton and Kimenyi (2008), Ferree and Horowitz (2010), and Horowitz and Long (2012), I proxy in-group affection using a question about identification to measure the degree to which the electorate self-identifies in ethnic terms rather than other terms. Specifically, I ask: "*We have spoken to many Kenyans and they have all described themselves in different ways. Some people describe themselves in terms of their language, ethnic group, race, religion, or gender and others describe themselves in economic terms such as working class, middle class, or a farmer. Besides being Kenyan, which specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost?*" If people answer a tribal or language answer, they are coded as ethnic identifiers with strong in-group attachments.

Figure 1 here

Figure 1 presents results on ethnic identification. Aggregating responses that mentioned language, tribe, or ethnic group, about 16 percent of the sample identified in ethnic terms.[8] Kenyans were much more likely to answer their identity in terms of class (27 percent) or occupation (21 percent). Thus, overt levels of ethnic identification and strong in-group attachments are low in Kenya.

Table 5 shows results on fear of ethnic others with respect to individual security to test hypothesis 2. The survey asks respondents: "*I want you to think about your safety. In your*

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[8] These results echo findings from Afrobarometer surveys in Kenya (see Bratton and Kimenyi, 2008).

opinion, if a member of another tribe from your own were elected to the presidency, would you feel safer, less safe, or would it not make a difference?" Overall, 26 percent of respondents said that they would feel less safe if a member of another tribe were elected president, demonstrating anxiety about rule by ethnic others at the presidential level. Nearly half (49 percent) said it would make no difference, and 18 percent said they would feel safer if a non co-ethnic were president.

Table 5 here

Given a history of electoral violence in Kenya, I designed this question to reflect the security situation and the likelihood of post-election violence. To demonstrate the construct validity of this question, the groups with co-ethnic presidential candidates— the Kikuyu, Luo, and Kamba—proved on average more likely to fear for their safety if one of the other group's candidate won the election, perhaps viewing themselves as the ones with the most to lose or the potential targets of election violence. Given that these groups are the most likely to be polarized, in particular the Kikuyu and Luo, it makes sense that they express the most anxiety about their safety. I return to this important finding, and its implication for election violence, in Chapter 5.

Next, I turn to feelings of prejudice to test hypothesis 3. Survey design makes it difficult to ask respondents directly whether or not they hold prejudicial views of other ethnic groups since they may be unwilling to answer something they perceive to be socially undesirable. Even in a country with prior levels of social polarization like Kenya, respondents probably do not want to express overt dislike of other groups. To elicit more honest responses, I form a proxy question that measures support for out-group welfare following the format designed by Sniderman and his colleagues (Sniderman et *al*. 1991). The question asks: "*In thinking about other tribes in Kenya, which of the following statements is closest to your opinion? A. The government should help poor tribes raise their income. B. People in poorer tribes need to work harder if they want to catch up*." This question does not directly probe feelings of prejudice. Most directly, it asks respondents whether they would be likely to support redistribution to other ethnic groups. But recall the role that beliefs about redistribution play in relation to prejudice above – the two correlate strongly. One aspect of prejudice involves preferences for redistribution based on potential negative ethnic stereotypes, such as the belief that some groups are "lazy." I term those respondents who answer that poor tribes are not hard workers to have feelings of ethnic

resentment and prejudice. This question presents one kind of prejudicial stereotype, there are certainly others. While it therefore does not capture the universe of potential prejudicial behavior, it does test one regarding economic position. Conversely, beliefs that the government should do more to help groups demonstrate moderation, and the idea that a group's poverty does not result from negative ethnic stereotyping.

Table 6 shows the total responses plus broken down by ethnicity. Overall, 20 percent of Kenyans demonstrated prejudice against other tribes, while 75 percent remained non-prejudicial. There are small variations between the main ethnic groups, but overall, Kenyans remain fairly tolerant. To demonstrate construct validity of this question, Kikuyus hold the most resentment against other tribes, with 29 percent saying people need to work harder. Similar to Sniderman's findings about the position of ethnic majorities, this accords with our expectations for Kenya given that the Kikuyu are numerically a dominant tribe and on average have enjoyed higher levels of income than other groups. Therefore, they more than any other group should not desire to redistribute and will likely blame other groups for their position. Moreover, the tribes that are considered the poorest and the most economically marginalized, including the Maasai, Somali, and Kalenjin report the lowest levels of prejudice, which makes sense as they would benefit the most from greater income.

Table 6 here

To test hypothesis four on whether Kenyans perceive the distribution of goods and services from the state as biased, I first asked respondents to rate the performance of the central government in delivering services. I then asked a follow-up question: "*In your opinion, which of the following is the most important reason you do not get more services from the central government: misuse of funds, favoritism, or not enough money?*" "Misuse of funds" proxies as a measure for corruption and wastage, and "not enough money" suggests a lack of funds, rather than any misbehavior on the part of political leaders. "Favoritism" as a measure of targeted delivery. Politicians who "favor" their own bias the distribution of services and target them to their areas of core support at the exclusion of others. Moreover, the word "favoritism" in Kenya has ethnic overtones given the view that favoritism is determined by politicians delivering to

their areas of ethnic support. If respondents think there is ethnic bias, they should favor their own co-ethnic or the ethnic group they think will likely deliver.

Table 7 here

The total response from Table 7 shows that "favoritism" was the plurality response for all Kenyans, with 33 percent replying that they thought that was the most important reason they did not receive more services from the central government. However, the other two main responses were nearly equally important, with 31 percent blaming misuse of funds (corruption) and 27 percent blaming a lack of money. To demonstrate construct validity of this question, we again see differences that we expect across groups given that the incumbent president at this time was a Kikuyu. The Kikuyu remain the least concerned about favoritism, perhaps since they have a co-ethnic president in office running the central government, whereas the Kalenjin and Luo remain the most sensitive to favoritism.

III. Results

Table 8 here

To see which of the ethnic channels drives ethnic voting, I perform logit analyses in Tables 9-12 in a variety of specifications, based on the variables listed with their summary statistics in Table 8. In Table 9, the dependent variable is the selection of a co-ethnic for those ethnic groups that fielded a presidential candidate (Kikuyus, Luos, and Kamba). The independent variables in Table 8 derive from positive (=1) (i.e., ethnic) responses on survey questions with respect to the four channels discussed above. These variables are labeled In-Group Attachments, Fear, Prejudice, and Favoritism. Marginal effects and robust standard errors are shown (clustered by constituency), along with a host of demographic controls, including whether the respondent is Kikuyu (the ethnic group in power), age, income, gender, urban/rural, and education. Given that many ethnic sentiments arise from local competition between groups and the rule that presidential candidates must win at least 25 percent of the vote in five of eight provinces, I

include provincial fixed effects to soak up variation in the dependent variable driven by provincial level factors.

Table 9 here

The results from Table 9 for respondents with co-ethnic candidates show that the only ethnic channel consistently driving co-ethnic voting is fear. The sign on the coefficient for fear is positive, suggesting that *as a person's perceived loss of security from having a non co-ethnic in power increases, so does their likelihood of choosing a co-ethnic*, lending support to Hypothesis 2. A fearful voter is about five percent more likely to vote for a co-ethnic than a non-fearful voter. In-group attachments, prejudice, and perceptions of favoritism are insignificant and therefore fail to explain ethnic voting, disconfirming Hypotheses 1, 3, and 4. Urban voters are also less likely to choose based on ethnicity, and voters with higher incomes are more likely. Given small variation in the dependent variable (about 92 percent of voters with a co-ethnic choose one), I also run rare events logits for all models (not shown) and the coefficients and significance remain stable.

Table 10 here

Table 10 introduces the second specification of the dependent variable since a majority of voters, those who are not Kikuyus, Luos, or Kambas, did not feature a co-ethnic candidate. This variable derives from the survey experiment, where I term "ethnic voters" those respondents who lent more relative weight to ethnic cues instead of performance cues. This specification uses all respondents. These results echo those in Table 9: the only consistent predictor of ethnic voting is fear. The substantive impact increases from Table 9 for the full sample, with about an eight percent increase in the likelihood of a positive response to an ethnic cue for fearful voters.

To further explore the importance of co-ethnicity in shaping ethnic voting, I break the sample from the experiment into those with co-ethnics (Table 11) and those without (Table 12). The dependent variable in both tables remains the same: the preference of an ethnic cue from the experiment. The results in Table 10 show that only examining co-ethnics, fear still remains a positive prediction of vote choice. In-group attachments also drives selection. Male respondents

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and those who are older are more likely to be ethnic voters. In Table 12, fear again drives non co-ethnics to respond positively to ethnic cues, but the negative and significant coefficients on in-group attachments suggest that when voters *without* a candidate in the race have positive assessments of their own group membership, they are less likely to respond positively to the ethnic cues on offer that reflect other groups (in this case, Kikuyu and Luo candidates). Among those without co-ethnics, voters with higher levels of education are also less likely to respond to ethnic cues. The introduction of an interaction term between In-Group Attachments and Fear does not gain significance for either co-ethnics or non co-ethnics.

Table 11 here

Table 12 here

Taken together, these tests find that co-ethnics and non co-ethnics of the candidates on offer are likely to respond positively to ethnic cues when they are fearful of ethnic outsiders. Moreover, strong feelings of in-group attachments make voters positively predisposed to ethnic cues when they have a co-ethnic running, while positive group assessments make those without co-ethnics less likely to respond to ethnic cues.

IV. Conclusion

Chapter 2 demonstrated evidence that incumbent performance helps explain voting behavior in Kenya. But it is also clear that many voters in Kenya and elsewhere use ethnicity in their voting calculus and will only choose co-ethnic leaders. Others employ ethnic cues even when choosing a candidate from another group. This chapter examines the determinants of choice for these sub-sets of voters. Specifically, it examines four main channels that scholars believe drive ethnic voting, including affective ties of group membership, fear or prejudice towards ethnic outsiders, and expectations about the distribution of patronage and goods from politicians.

I present two sets of findings. First, my data from a pre-election household survey show that for the sub-set of voters with co-ethnics on offer, as well as the full sample, the prime motivation for ethnic voting arises from fear. Specifically, this means the perceived loss of individual security that results from the election of ethnic outsiders. This result foreshadows the protest and violence that engulfed Kenya's 2007 election, a subject that I return to in Chapter 5. Second, comparing the responsiveness of voters to ethnic cues from the experiment for co-ethnics and non co-ethnics, I find that positive evaluations of group membership helps drive co-ethnics of candidates towards support, while apparently pushing non co-ethnics away. Affective ties of membership therefore have both positive and negative effects, depending on whether one's group fields a candidate.

This chapter provides two contributions to current work on the importance of ethnicity to politics in divided societies. First, it explores and tests, with individual level data, the logic behind competing theories of ethnic voting behavior. Of course, these channels may gain or lose significance in different elections or settings—my tests do not demonstrate the universality of the role of fear of ethnic outsiders. Given a history of communal violence in Kenya, fear may prove a more potent force there than elsewhere. The relationships I found between fear and ethnic politics in my pre election survey foreshadow the arguments that I make to explain the trajectory of post election violence that followed the 2007 elections.

Second, my tests explicitly take into account the reality that ethnic drivers of voting may retain varying levels of significance conditional on whether a voter assesses a co-ethnic or not. Interestingly, in-group attachments matter for both sets of voters, but in different ways. Positive evaluations of group membership for co-ethnics drives those voters to respond positively to ethnic cues, while it drives non co-ethnics away from ethnic cues.

Table 1: Presidential Vote by Ethnic Group for Groups with a Co-ethnic Candidate

Ethnic Group	Presidential Vote			All Voters
	Kibaki	Odinga	Musyoka	
Kikuyu (Kibaki)	94	4	1	23
Luo (Odinga)	1	99	0	13
Kamba (Musyoka)	13	4	82	11
Total Vote	42	46	10	

Source: Pre-election survey, row percentages

Figure 1: Ethnic Attachment

Source: Pre-election survey

Table 2: Structure of survey experiment

		Performance Treatment	
		Good Performer	Bad Performer
Ethnic Treatment	Kikuyu name	Version 3	Version 1
	Luo name	Version 4	Version 2

Table 3: Survey Experiment (percent answering "very" or "somewhat" likely to support hypothetical candidate, N=2,700)

	Good Performer	Poor Performer	*Difference*
Kikuyu	80%	24%	*56%*
Luo	80%	23%	*57%*
Difference	*<1%*	*1%*	

Table 4: Balance Test of Experiment Randomization

	Treatment Assignment	p-value
Kikuyu	0.011	0.840
	(0.05)	
Luo	0.017	0.802
	(0.07)	
Age	0.095*	0.045
	(0.05)	
Income	0.049	0.414
	(0.06)	
Urban	0.008	0.864
	(0.05)	
Education	0.057	0.279
	(0.05)	
Male	0.007	0.880
	(0.04)	
Constant	2.405***	0.000
	(0.05)	
N	2700	
R2	0.002	

Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) shown

Table 5: Ethnic Fear

	Safer	Less Safe	Not make a difference	DK/RTA
Groups with candidates				
Kikuyu (Kibaki)	*15*	*36*	*43*	*6*
Luo (Odinga)	*17*	*28*	*49*	*5*
Kamba (Musyoka)	*11*	*36*	*47*	*6*
Groups without candidates				
Kisii	31	15	52	2
Luhya	28	15	50	6
Somali	17	9	55	18
Meru	7	36	48	9
Kalenjin	24	18	52	6
Mijikenda	13	9	67	11
Maasai	12	19	65	4
Other	13	32	42	13
Total	*18*	*26*	*49*	*7*

Source: Pre-election survey, row percentages

Table 6: Ethnic Prejudice

	Non-Prejudice	Prejudice	DK/RTA
Groups with candidates			
Kikuyu	*67*	*29*	*4*
Luo	*79*	*17*	*3*
Kamba	*79*	*16*	*5*
Groups without candidates			
Kisii	69	28	2
Luhya	80	17	3
Somali	78	8	14
Meru	71	22	6
Kalenjin	81	15	4
Mijikenda	76	23	1
Maasai	90	6	4
Other	81	12	6
Total	*75*	*20*	*5*

Source: Pre-election survey, row percentages

Table 7: Ethnic Favoritism

	Misuse of Funds	Favoritism	Not Enough Money	DK/RTA/ Other
Groups with candidates				
Kikuyu	*28*	*13*	*46*	*14*
Luo	*29*	*56*	*11*	*3*
Kamba	*28*	*30*	*34*	*7*
Groups without candidates				
Kisii	28	40	26	6
Luhya	38	42	13	7
Somali	46	22	26	6
Meru	31	20	41	8
Kalenjin	27	50	18	6
Mijikenda	53	25	16	5
Maasai	33	52	12	4
Other	31	25	30	14
Total	*31*	*33*	*27*	*8*

Source: Pre-election survey, row percentages

Table 8: Summary Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Co-Ethnic Vote	1248	0.92	0.27	0	1
Ethnic Cue (Experiment)	2700	0.22	0.41	0	1
In-Group Attachments	2700	0.16	0.37	0	1
Fear	2700	0.26	0.44	0	1
Prejudice	2700	0.20	0.40	0	1
Favoritism	2700	0.33	0.47	0	1
Kikuyu	2700	0.23	0.42	0	1
Age	2700	0.37	0.48	0	1
Income	2700	0.18	0.38	0	1
Male	2700	0.54	0.50	0	1
Urban	2700	0.36	0.48	0	1
Education	2700	0.72	0.45	0	1

Table 9: Logit Regression Predicting Ethnic Voting for Voters with a Co-ethnic (DV=1 co-ethnic vote)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
I. Ethnic Channels						
In-Group Attachments	0.012				0.007	0.008
	(0.02)				(0.02)	(0.02)
Fear		0.049*			0.051*	0.049*
		(0.02)			(0.02)	(0.02)
Prejudice			-0.012		-0.015	-0.015
			(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.02)
Favoritism				0.020	0.015	0.016
				(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
II. Controls						
Kikuyu	-0.006	-0.010	-0.005	-0.000		-0.004
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)		(0.03)
Age	0.024	0.024	0.024	0.024		0.025
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.01)
Income	0.036*	0.037*	0.035*	0.036*		0.038*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)
Male	-0.016	-0.015	-0.016	-0.016		-0.015
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)		(0.01)
Urban	-0.049 +	-0.047 +	-0.050 +	-0.049 +		-0.046
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.02)
Education	-0.013	-0.013	-0.014	-0.014		-0.013
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)
Constant	0.949***	0.934***	0.954***	0.943***	0.904***	0.929***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Province FE?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1248	1248	1248	1248	1248	1248
Pseudo-R2	0.014	0.021	0.014	0.014	0.010	0.023

Source: Pre-election household survey

+p<.1 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Marginal effects and robust standard errors clustered at the constituency level

Table 10: Logit Regression Predicting Ethnic Voting for All Voters (DV=1 co-ethnic cue chosen in experiment)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
I. Ethnic Channels						
In-Group Attachments	-0.005				-0.005	-0.009
	(0.02)				(0.02)	(0.02)
Fear		0.075**			0.077**	0.075*
		(0.02)			(0.02)	(0.02)
Prejudice			-0.010		-0.011	-0.010
			(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.02)
Favoritism				0.026	0.022	0.022
				(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
II. Controls						
Co-Ethnic	-0.006	-0.015	-0.005	-0.004		-0.013
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.02)
Age	-0.017	-0.017	-0.017	-0.016		-0.016
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.02)
Income	-0.021	-0.019	-0.020	-0.020		-0.019
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.02)
Male	-0.008	-0.007	-0.008	-0.009		-0.007
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)
Urban	-0.028	-0.025	-0.028	-0.027		-0.024
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.02)
Education	-0.046	-0.043	-0.046	-0.047		-0.045
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)
Constant	0.279***	0.258***	0.280***	0.270***	0.194***	0.255***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Province FE?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	2700	2700	2700	2700	2700	2700
Pseudo-R2	0.005	0.011	0.005	0.006	0.007	0.012

Source: Pre-election household survey

+p<.1 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Marginal effects and robust standard errors clustered at the constituency level

Table 11: Experimental Results from Co-ethnics (N=1,248) (DV=1 for Positive Response to Ethnic Cue)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
I. Ethnic Channels							
In-Group Attachments	0.047 +				0.048*	0.042*	0.073 +
	(0.02)				(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Fear		0.071			0.072	0.068	0.084 +
		(0.04)			(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Attachments*Fear							-0.078
							(0.05)
Prejudice			0.023		0.018	0.017	0.016
			(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Favoritism				-0.004	-0.007	-0.008	-0.007
				(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
II. Controls							
Kikuyu	0.023	0.016	0.020	0.021		0.013	0.012
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Age	-0.042 +	-0.043 +	-0.044 +	-0.044 +		-0.042 +	-0.043 +
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.02)
Income	-0.048	-0.048	-0.051	-0.051		-0.046	-0.046
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)
Male	-0.022*	-0.022 +	-0.023*	-0.022*		-0.022*	-0.021 +
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)
Urban	-0.016	-0.015	-0.019	-0.018		-0.013	-0.016
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Education	-0.027	-0.026	-0.027	-0.027		-0.025	-0.023
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	0.258***	0.245***	0.265***	0.271***	0.178***	0.236***	0.230***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Province FE?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1248	1248	1248	1248	1248	1248	1248
Pseudo-R2	0.010	0.015	0.009	0.008	0.010	0.016	0.018

Source: Pre-election household survey

+p<.1 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Marginal effects and robust standard errors clustered at the constituency level

Table 12: Experimental Results from Non Co-ethnics (N=1,452) (DV=1 for Positive Response to Ethnic Cue)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
I. Ethnic Channels							
In-Group Attachments	-0.078*				-0.071*	-0.081*	-0.085*
	(0.03)				(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Fear		0.066*			0.072*	0.065*	0.062 +
		(0.02)			(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Attachments*Fear							0.019
							(0.08)
Prejudice			-0.035 +		-0.035 +	-0.033 +	-0.033 +
			(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Favoritism				0.039	0.032	0.036	0.036
				(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
II. Controls							
Age	0.010	0.008	0.006	0.009		0.010	0.010
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.02)
Income	0.011	0.011	0.013	0.012		0.013	0.013
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.02)
Male	0.007	0.008	0.007	0.005		0.009	0.008
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.02)
Urban	-0.047	-0.042	-0.046	-0.044		-0.042	-0.042
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Education	-0.072 +	-0.065	-0.068	-0.070		-0.072 +	-0.072 +
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	0.288***	0.258***	0.280***	0.261***	0.215***	0.266***	0.267***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Province FE?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1452	1452	1452	1452	1452	1452	1452
Pseudo-R2	0.014	0.013	0.010	0.011	0.011	0.021	0.021

Source: Pre-election household survey

+$p<.1$ * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

Marginal effects and robust standard errors clustered at the constituency level

Appendix 1: Survey Experiment (Four Versions of the Survey)

Version 1 [Poorly performing Kikuyu]: Imagine that the following person is running for president. First, I am going to describe this candidate, and then ask you how likely you would be to support him for re-election. Since becoming elected, let's suppose **President Kamau did not** reduce poverty, **did not** deliver more services, and **did not** create more jobs in Kenya. In your opinion how likely would you be to support him: very likely, somewhat likely, somewhat unlikely, or not likely?

Version 2 [Poorly performing Luo]: Imagine that the following person is running for president. First, I am going to describe this candidate, and then ask you how likely you would be to support him for re-election. Since becoming elected, let's suppose **President Onyango did not** reduce poverty, **did not** deliver more services, and **did not** create more jobs in Kenya. In your opinion how likely would you be to support him: very likely, somewhat likely, somewhat unlikely, or not likely?

Version 3 [Well performing Kikuyu]: Imagine that the following person is running for president. First, I am going to describe this candidate, and then ask you how likely you would be to support him for re-election. Since becoming elected, let's suppose **President Kamau reduced** poverty, delivered **more** services, and created **more** jobs in Kenya. In your opinion how likely would you be to support him: very likely, somewhat likely, somewhat unlikely, or not likely?

Version 4 [Well performing Luo]: Imagine that the following person is running for president. First, I am going to describe this candidate, and then ask you how likely you would be to support him for re-election. Since becoming elected, let's suppose **President Onyango reduced** poverty, delivered **more** services, and created **more** jobs in Kenya. In your opinion how likely would you be to support him: very likely, somewhat likely, somewhat unlikely, or not likely?