Gibbons Photo

MIT

Robert Gibbons

Sloan Distinguished Professor of Management, Sloan School of Management and Professor of Organizational Economics, Department of Economics

MIT Sloan School of Management
100 Main Street, E62-519
Cambridge, MA 02142-1347
(617) 253-0283 (phone)
(617) 258-6786 (fax)
rgibbons@mit.edu

 

Curriculum Vita

Bio

In Honor of David Kreps


Teaching

Summer Institute at CASBS on Organizations and Their Effectiveness

MBA Course (15.903: Organizational Economics and Corporate Strategy)

Ph.D. Courses

Thesis Supervision

 


 

Seminar and Conferences




 

Books

  • Game Theory for Applied Economists, Princeton University Press, 1992. (International version: A Primer in Game Theory, Harvester-Wheatsheaf.) translated into Chinese, Greek, Hungarian, Italian, Japanese, and Spanish.
  • Handbook of Organizational Economics (with J. Roberts, eds.), Princeton University Press, 2013.
  • Foundations of Organizational Economics, Princeton University Press, forthcoming 2017.

 

Papers

Applied Theory

Labor Economics

  • Piece-Rate Incentive Schemes
    Journal of Labor Economics, 5 (1987): 413-29.
  • Learning in Equilibrium Models of Arbitration
    American Economic Review, 78 (1988): 896-912.
  • Layoffs and Lemons
    (with L. Katz). Journal of Labor Economics, 9 (1991): 351-80.

    Reprinted in Learning in Labour Markets, M. Waldman (ed.), Edward Elgar Publishing Limited (Cheltenham, U.K.), 2017.

  • Does Unmeasured Ability Explain Inter-Industry Wage Differences?
    (with L. Katz). Review of Economic Studies, 59 (1992): 515-35.
  • Getting Together and Breaking Apart: The Decline of Centralized Collective Bargaining
    (with R. Freeman). Chapter 10 in R. Freeman and L. Katz (eds.), Differences and Changes in Wage Structures, University of Chicago Press, 1995.
  • Learning and Wage Dynamics
    (with H. Farber). Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111 (1996): 1007-47.

    Reprinted in Learning in Labour Markets, M. Waldman (ed.), Edward Elgar Publishing Limited (Cheltenham, U.K.), 2017.

  • Incentives and Careers in Organizations
    Chapter 1 in Volume II of D. Kreps and K. Wallis (eds.), Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Cambridge University Press, 1997.
  • Careers in Organizations: Theory and Evidence
    (with M. Waldman). Chapter 36 in Volume 3B of O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, North Holland, 1999.
  • A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics in Inside Firms
    (with M. Waldman). Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114 (1999): 1321-58.

    Reprinted in Personal Economics, E. Lazear and R. McNabb (eds.), Edward Elgar, 2003.

    Reprinted in Learning in Labour Markets, M. Waldman (ed.), Edward Elgar Publishing Limited (Cheltenham, U.K.), 2017.

  • Task-Specific Human Capital
    (with M. Waldman). American Economic Review, 94 (2004): 203-07.
  • Comparative Advantage, Learning, and Sectoral Wage Differences
    (with L. Katz, T. Lemieux and D. Parent). Journal of Labor Economics, 23 (2005): 681-723.
  • Enriching a Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms
    (with M. Waldman). Journal of Labor Economics, 24 (2006): 59-107.

 

Behavioral Game Theory

  • When and Why Do Negotiators Outperform Game Theory?
    (with M. Bazerman, L. Thompson, and K. Valley). Chapter 4 in R. Stern and J. Halpern (eds.), Nonrational Elements of Organizational Decision Making, ILR Press (Ithaca, NY), 1998.
  • Contingent Social Utility in the Prisoners' Dilemma
    (with L. van Boven). Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 45 (2001): 1-17.
  • How Communication Improves Efficiency in Bargaining Games
    (with M. Bazerman, L. Thompson, and K. Valley). Games and Economic Behavior, 38 (2002): 127-55.
  • Reprinted in Negotiation, Decision Making and Conflict Management, M. Bazerman (ed.), Edward Elgar, 2004.

 

Political Economy

  • Trust in Social Structures: Hobbes and Coase Meet Repeated Games
    Chapter 11 in K. Cook (ed.), Trust in Society, Russell Sage Foundation, 2001.
  • Hobbesean Horseraces
    (with A. Rutten). Revised draft, August 2006.

 

Incentive Contracts

 

Organizational Economics

  • Economic Theories of Incentives in Organizations
    (with J. Roberts). Chapter 2 in Handbook of Organizational Economics (R. Gibbons and J. Roberts, eds.), Princeton University Press, 2013.
  • Decisions in Organizations
    (with N. Matouschek and J. Roberts). Chapter 10 in Handbook of Organizational Economics (R. Gibbons and J. Roberts, eds.), Princeton University Press, 2013.
  • What Do Managers Do? Exploring Persistent Performance Differences Among Seemingly Similar Enterprises (with R. Henderson). Chapter 17 in Handbook of Organizational Economics (R. Gibbons and J. Roberts, eds.), Princeton University Press, 2013.
  • Organizational Economics
    (with J. Roberts) Forthcoming in R. Scott and S. Kosslyn (eds.), Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences, Wiley, 2015.
  • Relational Adaptation
    (with G. Baker and K.J. Murphy). Revised draft, November 2011. (Formerly "Contracting for Control." and "s Happens: Relational Adaptation in Contracts, Firms, and Other Governance Structures")
  • “Relational Adaptation under Reel Authority”
    (with D. Barron, R. Gil, and K.J. Murphy). Draft, July 2015.
  • “Culture from Cognition: How Categorizations Can Shape Interactions (and How Leaders Can Shape Categorizations)”
    (with M. LiCalzi and M. Warglien). Slides, November 2015.
  • “Intervening in Organizations: Musings about (1) What an Organization Is, (2) Why Organizational Change Therefore Might Be Hard, and (3) Whether Any of This Might Matter for Applied Microeconomics.”
    Slides, March 2016.

 

Health Care Delivery

  • “Changes in ICU Culture Associated with Changes in Bloodstream Infections”
    (with N. Beaulieu, J. Marsteller, E. Martinez, P. Pronovost, T. Wang, and S. Watson). Draft, September, 2015.


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Updated 4/7/2016