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Readings in Organizational Economics

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### 3.6 Leadership

Rogers, Gregory and Michael Beer. 1995. “Human Resources at Hewlett-Packard (A) and (B).” Harvard Business School Cases #9-495-051 and 9-495-052.


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### 4.2 Job Assignment and Job Design

#### Job Assignment

Brüderl, Josef, Andreas Diekmann, and Peter Preisendörfer. 1991. “Patterns of Intraorganizational Mobility: Tournament Models, Path Dependency, and Early Promotion Effects.” *Social Science Research* 20:197-216.


**Job Design**


**Skill Development**


4.4 *Networks and Demography*

Networks and Employment


Organizational Demography


4.5 Employment Systems


4.6 Careers in Organizations


5. STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES IN ORGANIZATIONS

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5.1 Five Models of Hierarchy

Hierarchical Information Processing


Hierarchical Resource Allocation


Hierarchical Monitoring


Readings in Organizational Economics


Qian, Yingyi, Gérard Roland, and Chenggang Xu: Coordination and Experimentation in M-Form and U-Form Organizations.” *Journal of Political Economy* 114: 366-402.


Hierarchical Problem Solving


Hierarchical Decision Rights


5.2 Delegation


5.3 Organizational Design


**Partnerships**


**Contingency and Complementarities**


5.4 *Routines, Production, and Capabilities*

Sonnenfeld, Jeffrey, and Meredith Lazo. 1992. “United Parcel Service (A) and (B).” Harvard Business School Case #9-488-016 and -017.


5.5 Knowledge Management and Product Development


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