Books
- Game Theory for Applied Economists, Princeton University Press, 1992. (International version: A Primer in Game Theory, Harvester-Wheatsheaf.) translated into Chinese, Hungarian, Italian, Japanese, and Spanish.
- Organizational Economics, Princeton University Press, forthcoming 2008.
- Handbook of Organizational Economics (with J. Roberts, eds.), Princeton University Press, forthcoming 2008.
Papers
Applied Theory
- Disolving a Partnership Efficiently
(with P. Cramton and P. Klemperer). Econometrica, 55 (1987): 615-32.
Reprinted in The Economic Theory of Auctions, P. Klemperer (ed.), Edward Elgar Publishing Limited (Cheltenham, U.K.), 1999.
- Simultaneous Signaling to the Capital and Product Markets
(with R. Gertner and D. Scharfstein). Rand Journal of Economics, 19 (1988): 173-90.
- Cheap Talk Can Matter in Bargaining
(with J. Farrell). Journal of Economic Theory, 48 (1989): 221-37.
Reprinted in Bargaining with Incomplete Information, P. Linhart, R. Radner, and M. Satterthwaite (eds.), Academic Press, 1992.
- Cheap Talk with Two Audiences
(with J. Farrell). American Economic Review, 79 (1989): 1214-23.
- Cheap Talk about Specific Investments
(With J. Farrell). Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 11 (1995): 313-34.
- An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11 (1997): 127-49.
Reprinted in Readings in Applied Microeconomic Theory: Market Forces and Solutions, R. Kuenne (ed.), Blackwell Publishers, 2000.
Labor Economics
- Piece-Rate Incentive Schemes
Journal of Labor Economics, 5 (1987): 413-29.
- Learning in Equilibrium Models of Arbitration
American Economic Review, 78 (1988): 896-912.
- Layoffs and Lemons
(with L. Katz). Journal of Labor Economics, 9 (1991): 351-80.
- Does Unmeasured Ability Explain Inter-Industry Wage Differences?
(with L. Katz). Review of Economic Studies, 59 (1992): 515-35.
- Getting Together and Breaking Apart: The Decline of Centralized Collective Bargaining
(with R. Freeman). Chapter 10 in R. Freeman and L. Katz (eds.), Differences and Changes in Wage Structures, University of Chicago Press, 1995.
- Learning and Wage Dynamics
(with H. Farber). Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111 (1996): 1007-47.
- Incentives and Careers in Organizations
Chapter 1 in Volume II of D. Kreps and K. Wallis (eds.), Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Careers in Organizations: Theory and Evidence
(with M. Waldman). Chapter 36 in Volume 3B of O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, North Holland, 1999.
- A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics in Inside Firms
(with M. Waldman). Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114 (1999): 1321-58.
Reprinted in Personal Economics, E. Lazear and R. McNabb (eds.), Edward Elgar, 2003.
- Task-Specific Human Capital
(with M. Waldman). American Economic Review, 94 (2004): 203-07.
- Comparative Advantage, Learning, and Sectoral Wage Differences
(with L. Katz, T. Lemieux and D. Parent). Journal of Labor Economics, 23 (2005): 681-723.
- Enriching a Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms
(with M. Waldman). Journal of Labor Economics, 24 (2006): 59-107.
Behavioral Game Theory
- When and Why Do Negotiators Outperform Game Theory?
(with M. Bazerman, L. Thompson, and K. Valley). Chapter 4 in R. Stern and J. Halpern (eds.), Nonrational Elements of Organizational Decision Making, ILR Press (Ithaca, NY), 1998.
- Contingent Social Utility in the Prisoners' Dilemma
(with L. van Boven). Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 45 (2001): 1-17.
- How Communication Improves Efficiency in Bargaining Games
(with M. Bazerman, L. Thompson, and K. Valley). Games and Economic Behavior, 38 (2002): 127-55.
Reprinted in Negotiation, Decision Making and Conflict Management, M. Bazerman (ed.), Edward Elgar, 2004.
Political Economy
- Trust in Social Structures: Hobbes and Coase Meet Repeated Games
Chapter 11 in K. Cook (ed.), Trust in Society, Russell Sage Foundation, 2001.
- Hobbesean Horseraces
(with A. Rutten). Revised draft, August 2006.
Incentive Contracts
- Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers
(with K.J. Murphy). Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 43 (1990): 30S-51S.
Reprinted in Do Compensation Policies Matter?, R. Ehrenberg (ed.), ILR Press (Ithaca, NY), 1990.
Reprinted in The Economics of Executive Compensation, K. Hallack and K.J. Murphy (eds.), Edward Elgar, 1998.
Reprinted in Personnel Economics, E. Lazear and R. McNabb (eds.), Edward Elgar, 2003.
- Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence
(with K.J. Murphy). Journal of Political Economy, 100 (1992): 468-505.
Reprinted in The Economics of Executive Compensation, K. Hallock and K.J. Murphy (eds.), Edward Elgar, 1998.
- Does Executive Compensation Affect Investment?
(with K. Murphy). Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 5 (1992): 99-109.
- Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts
(with G. Baker and K.J. Murphy). Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109 (1994): 1125-56.
- Incentives in Organizations
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12 (1998): 115-32.
- Incentives Between Firms (and Within)
Management Science, 51 (2005): 2-17.
Organizational Economics
- Game Theory and Garbage Cans: An Introduction to the Economics of Internal Organization
Chapter 2 in J. Halpern and R. Stern (eds.), Debating Rationality: Nonrational Elements of Organizational Decision Making ILR Press (Ithaca, NY), 1998
- Taking Coase Seriously
Administrative Science Quarterly, 44 (1999): 145-57.
- Informal Authority in Organizations
(with G. Baker and K.J. Murphy). Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 15 (1999): 56-73.
- Bringing the Market Inside the Firm?
(with G. Baker and K.J. Murphy). American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 91 (2001): 212-18.
- Firms (and Other Relationships)
Chapter 7 in P. DiMaggio (ed.), The Twenty-First Century Firm: Changing Economic Organization in International Perspective, Princeton University Press, 2001.
- Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
(with G. Baker and K.J. Murphy). Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117 (2002): 39-83.
Reprinted in The International Library of the New Institutional Economics, C. Menard (ed.), Edward Elgar, 2004.
- Team Theory, Garbage Cans, and Real Organizations: Some History and Prospects of Economic Research on Decision-Making in Organizations
Industrial and Corporate Change, 12 (2003): 753-87.
- What Is Economic Sociology and Should Any Economists Care
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19 (2005): 3-7.
- Four Formal(izable) Theories of the Firm
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 58 (2005): 202-47.
- What the Folk Theorem Doesn't Tell Us
Industrial and Corporate Change, 15 (2006): 381-86.
- Why Organizations Are Such a Mess (and What an Economist Might Do About It)
Unpublished manuscript, March 2000.
- Strategic Alliances: Bridges Between 'Islands of Conscious Power'
(with G. Baker and K.J. Murphy). Revised draft, August 2004.
- Contracting for Control
(with G. Baker). Revised draft, July 2006.
- What Do Managers Do? Suggestive Evidence and Initial Theories about Building Relationships
(with R. Henderson, N. Repenning, and J. Sterman). Draft in progress. To appear in Handbook of Organizational Economics (R. Gibbons and J. Roberts, eds.), Princeton University Press.
- Incentives in Organizations
(with J. Roberts). Draft in progress. To appear in Handbook of Organizational Economics (R. Gibbons and J. Roberts, eds.), Princeton University Press.
|
