Gibbons Photo

MIT

Robert Gibbons

Sloan Distinguished Professor of Management, Sloan School of Management and Professor of Organizational Economics, Department of Economics

MIT Sloan School of Management
100 Main Street, E62-524
Cambridge, MA 02142-1347
(617) 253-0283 (phone)
(617) 258-6786 (fax)
rgibbons@mit.edu

 

Curriculum Vita


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Teaching

MBA Course (15.903: Organizational Economics and Corporate Strategy)

Ph.D. Courses

Thesis Supervision

 


 

Seminar


 

Books

  • Game Theory for Applied Economists, Princeton University Press, 1992. (International version: A Primer in Game Theory, Harvester-Wheatsheaf.) translated into Chinese, Greek, Hungarian, Italian, Japanese, and Spanish.
  • Handbook of Organizational Economics (with J. Roberts, eds.), Princeton University Press, 2013.
  • Organizational Economics, Princeton University Press, forthcoming 2015.

 

Papers

Applied Theory

Labor Economics

 

Behavioral Game Theory

  • When and Why Do Negotiators Outperform Game Theory?
    (with M. Bazerman, L. Thompson, and K. Valley). Chapter 4 in R. Stern and J. Halpern (eds.), Nonrational Elements of Organizational Decision Making, ILR Press (Ithaca, NY), 1998.
  • Contingent Social Utility in the Prisoners' Dilemma
    (with L. van Boven). Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 45 (2001): 1-17.
  • How Communication Improves Efficiency in Bargaining Games
    (with M. Bazerman, L. Thompson, and K. Valley). Games and Economic Behavior, 38 (2002): 127-55.
  • Reprinted in Negotiation, Decision Making and Conflict Management, M. Bazerman (ed.), Edward Elgar, 2004.

 

Political Economy

  • Trust in Social Structures: Hobbes and Coase Meet Repeated Games
    Chapter 11 in K. Cook (ed.), Trust in Society, Russell Sage Foundation, 2001.
  • Hobbesean Horseraces
    (with A. Rutten). Revised draft, August 2006.

 

Incentive Contracts

 

Organizational Economics

  • Economic Theories of Incentives in Organizations
    (with J. Roberts). Chapter 2 in Handbook of Organizational Economics (R. Gibbons and J. Roberts, eds.), Princeton University Press, 2013.
  • Decisions in Organizations
    (with N. Matouschek and J. Roberts). Chapter 10 in Handbook of Organizational Economics (R. Gibbons and J. Roberts, eds.), Princeton University Press, 2013.
  • What Do Managers Do? Exploring Persistent Performance Differences Among Seemingly Similar Enterprises (with R. Henderson). Chapter 17 in Handbook of Organizational Economics (R. Gibbons and J. Roberts, eds.), Princeton University Press, 2013.
  • Why Organizations Are Such a Mess (and What an Economist Might Do About It)
    Unpublished manuscript, March 2000.
  • Relational Adaptation
    (with G. Baker and K.J. Murphy). Revised draft, November 2011. (Formerly "Contracting for Control." and "sHappens: Relational Adaptation in Contracts, Firms, and Other Governance Structures")

 

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Updated 12/20/2012