Week 7: Dualism and Behaviorism  
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1 Dualism
What motivates dualism?
The vividness of our conscious experience. The seemingly direct access we have to our mental states.

1.1 Substance Dualism
• Cartesian Dualism. The mind and body are two different substances.
• The ghost in the machine.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Essence</th>
<th>Mind</th>
<th>Body</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thinking</td>
<td>Thinking (consciousness)</td>
<td>Extension (having spatial dimensions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Properties</td>
<td>Known directly</td>
<td>Known indirectly</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>Determined</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Indivisible</td>
<td>Infinitely divisible</td>
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<td>Indestructible</td>
<td>Destructible</td>
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“According to substance dualism our brains and bodies are not really conscious. Your body is just an unconscious machine like your car or your television set. Your body is alive in the way that plants are alive, but there is no consciousness to your body. Rather your conscious soul is somehow attached to your body and remains attached to it until your body dies, at which time your soul departs. You are identical with your soul and only incidentally and temporarily inhabit this body” (Searle, Mind p. 30).

1.2 Property Dualism
• Property dualism is a weaker form of dualism, although it still inherits many of the problems of substance dualism.
• Instead of there being two separate substances, we say there are two different properties that things can have: physical and mental.
• Human beings are composed of both physical and mental properties.

2 Two Main Problems for Dualism
There are a number of problems that a dualist must face. Searle discusses several more problems in chapter 1 of his book Mind. But in class we focused on two: the metaphysical mind/body problem, and the epistemological problem of other minds.

2.1 Metaphysical: The Mind/Body Problem
• Metaphysics is the philosophical study of what there is.
• Are there actually medium sized dry goods, or are there only our perceptions of those goods? Are there abstract objects? (Nominalists say no.)
• Metaphysical problem for dualists is that of mental causation.
• Issue is metaphysical because it is about how the kinds of things there are are related to one another.
Our mental states cause things to happen in the world. Also, events in the world cause mental states. I will deliberate over what to make myself for dinner; I will make a decision and because of that decision certain things in the world will occur. On the other hand, if I am holding a delicious ice cream cone and then someone snatches it from me, I will become very sad. Something that happened in the world caused my sadness.

If there are two kinds of substances that are metaphysically distinct from one another, then it doesn't seem possible for them to interact in any way.

- There are intricate discussions in contemporary philosophy of mind discussing the problem of mental causation for the property dualist. For more info about this check out the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on Mental Causation.

2.2 Epistemological: The Problem of Other Minds

- Epistemology is the philosophical study of how we know things, and about knowledge and belief generally.
- If the mind is known directly then how can we be sure that other people have minds? How can we possibly know this?
- Argument from analogy: this doesn’t work because we can never verify the inference.

2.3 Smullyan’s Unfortunate Dualist

- Do you believe the drug is impossible in principle?
- Is it immoral?
- Does the story suggest that something is wrong with dualism?

3 Arguments for Dualism

3.1 Argument A and the Masked Man Fallacy

1. I cannot doubt that I exist.
2. I can doubt that my body exists.
C. I am not my body.

- Or, formalized:
1. F(a)
2. ¬F(b)
C. a ≠ b

- This argument isn’t valid. The masked man fallacy:
1. I cannot doubt that the masked man is before me.
2. I can doubt that my father is before me.
C. The masked man is not my father.

- What goes wrong?

  - Intensional contexts: An intensional context is a sentence S containing a referring expression N such that replacing N with a co-referring expression M does not necessarily yield a sentence that has the same truth value as S.
– “I cannot doubt that…” creates an intensional context, and thus the truth value of F(a) and F(b) can differ. Thus, the argument cannot be valid.
– One key is that intensional contexts are formed by mental states based on our beliefs, which can be mistaken. If the argument was based on facts and now belief states, then it would be valid. An example of how this could go:
  1. I exist.
  2. My body doesn’t exist.
  C. I am not my body.

3.2 Argument C

  1. I cannot truly think, “I am not thinking”.

C1. I cannot exist without thinking; i.e., the property of thinking is one of my essential properties.

  2. The property of thinking is not an essential property of any physical thing.

C2. I am not a physical thing.

• What’s wrong here?

  – The move from 1. to C1. is questionable: I cannot truly write ‘I am not writing’, but I continue to exist when I stop writing.

3.3 Argument D

  1. If I can clearly and distinctly conceive a proposition p to be true, then p is possible.

  2. I can clearly and distinctly conceive that the proposition that ‘I am not identical to my body’ is true.

C1. It is possible that I am not my body (there is a ‘possible world’ in which I am not my body).

C2. I am not my body.

• What’s wrong with this?

4 Behaviorism

What motivates behaviorism?

All this weird mental stuff that dualism is talking about is, well, too weird. Let’s simplify. If entities behave exactly like they have minds, then that’s it: they have minds. The mental is nothing over and above our behavior. From Putnam’s essay “Brains and Behavior”:

Numbers are treated as logical constructions out of sets. . . . What was novel about this was the idea of getting rid of certain philosophically unwanted or embarrassing entities (numbers) without failing to do justice to the appropriate body of discourse (number theory) by treating the entities in question as logical constructions. . . . Just as numbers are (allegedly) logical constructions out of sets, so mental events are logical constructions out of actual and possible behavior events. (Putnam, 326)

• First pass/Extreme Behaviorist Thesis: S is in mental state M iff S behaves in such-and-such ways.

  – Brain doesn’t have anything to do with mental states.
Pain → Pain behavior and Pain behavior → Pain
What’s wrong here?
* Can be in pain but not show it.
* Can pretend to be in pain when not really in pain.

**Second pass:** S is in mental state M iff S is disposed to behave in such-and-such ways

- Dispositions are special properties that things possess but aren’t always manifested. These properties are hidden until the right situation comes about.
- A wine glass is fragile (has the property of fragility) even when it isn’t manifesting the kind of behavior (breaking) distinctive of fragility.
- Thinking of mental states as dispositions to behave allows the behaviorist to cover a lot of the problem cases.

### 4.1 Problems with Behaviorism

1. Problem with mental causation: We seem to think that our behavior is somehow caused by our mental states.

2. Whereas the dualist had the problem of other minds, the behaviorist has the problem of our own minds. The behaviorist can’t explain the special access we have to our own mental states. If it’s all just behavior then should I be able to access your mental states by observing your behavior just as I access my own mental states by my own behavior?

   - Searle’s typical behaviorist joke: A behavior couple just after making love, he says to her “It was good for you. How was it for me?”

3. What you do depends on all the other mental states you are in too; i.e., a mental state doesn’t have a fund of behavioral consequences to call its own.

   - This is what is wrong with: S believes that its raining iff S is disposed to open an umbrella, wear a raincoat, take shelter, etc.
   - It doesn’t matter what you put on the right side of the biconditional. It could be anything, and what it is depends on a whole bunch of mental states.
   - I might love the rain and when I believe that it’s raining I am disposed to do the opposite of all of those things.