Fr. Léopold Braun has at long last received his due, some forty-two years after his death, with the publication of the memoirs of his long service to the American Embassy Community of Moscow and especially to his beloved Russian Catholic Community during the most trying of times and in the most dire of circumstances. His memoirs have been meticulously edited by Professor Gary Hamburg. It took the preparation for the centennial celebration of the Assumptionists’ presence in Russia to bring about even the possibility of their publication, after Fr. Braun’s long and unsuccessful battle with his ecclesiastical superiors to win permission. Over the years, the memoirs had fallen into the oblivion of the Assumptionist archives, until Professor Hamburg was commissioned by the then provincial superior, Fr. John Franck, A.A., to prepare a study of the Russian Mission from the American Assumptionists’ point of view, for a presentation to the Centennial Symposium held in Rome in November 2003. Gary Hamburg was a felicitous choice. He quickly recognized the importance of Fr. Braun’s memoirs and has produced this excellent and extraordinary edition.

The eighty-two-page preface and introduction expertly and accurately portray the greater historical context of the Assumptionist Mission in Russia, and later in the Soviet Union, with all the ups and downs the mission would have over the years. Hamburg also gives a finely tuned analysis of the strengths and flaws of the various versions of Fr. Braun’s manuscripts. Section V of the introduction analyzes with flair Fr. Braun’s efforts to publish his memoirs, and the long, laborious, and often stormy negotiations with the superiors of this religious congregation and also the Vatican; it also illustrates well the politics, both secular and ecclesiastical, that Fr. Braun had to face, unsuccessfully. The saga of the writing and rewriting of the memoirs and the struggle to have them published make for fascinating reading.

The memoirs themselves, however, make for even more fascinating reading, because in Fr. Braun we have an eyewitness to twelve years of persecution of a people on the religious front, as one might expect from a priest caught in the turmoil of the Stalinist attempt to purge the country of religious belief and of all religion in the name of godless communism, despite the so called “constitutional guarantees,” but also of any political opposition, including the people who adhered to any of the democratic ideals so dear to the American culture. Because Fr. Braun lived and worked among the Russian people even if most of the time his residence was in the French embassy, he was able to seize the facts in reports from various parishioners and acquaintances, and their implications, better than anyone.

In Lubianka’s Shadow is an honest, generally very accurate, though not completely unbiased, and true historical account of life and politics in Moscow and the Soviet Union during twelve years of grim government-sponsored terror and turmoil, and World War II. A lesser man than Léopold Braun would not have been able to endure the extremely high level of stress for so long a time. Even if at the end of his stay in Moscow he had become somewhat paranoid, he was misunderstood and mishandled by his ecclesiastical superiors. I agree with Professor Hamburg that, “happily, the memoirs of Fr. Léopold Braun can now take their rightful place among the primary sources of the Stalin epoch” (p. x).

Eugene V. LaPlante, A.A.
ideological and administrative constraints on creative thought. Others interpreted this as a conventional struggle for funding and prestige in the scientific community, in which both sides appealed to the authorities and denounced each other in the ideological language of the time. Some found here a triumph of dogma over true science; others saw a ritualistic game, whose outcome depended on the political adroitness of the players. Stalin was usually cast as an ideological zealot or a cynical political manipulator. Ethan Pollock’s remarkable book offers a radical and intriguing reevaluation of postwar science debates by suggesting to take seriously Stalin’s public call for scientific objectivity and free and open exchange of opinion.

Drawing on a wealth of recently declassified archival documents, including internal party memos and Stalin’s personal notes, Pollock traces a surprising evolution of the leader’s thought about the relationship between ideology and science. In late 1946, Stalin called for greater party-mindedness of philosophical discourse. But rather than explicitly dictate a definitive party line, he chose to hold an open debate and to publish a wide range of opinions expressed by discussion participants. Without an officially declared dogma, however, philosophers had a hard time arriving at a consensus. By the time of the 1948 controversy in biology, Stalin decided that more direct involvement, though behind the scenes, was needed, and he intervened on the side of Lysenko. His editing of Lysenko’s speech revealed that Stalin believed that Lysenko’s views were scientifically sound, not simply ideologically correct or politically expedient. The Soviet leader toned down militant ideological rhetoric and emphasized the scientific criteria for choosing between competing theories. The party bureaucracy’s attempts to organize in 1949 a public debate over ideological issues in physics came to naught, Pollock argues, because academy physicists decidedly refused to compromise with their opponents among “patriotic” physicists and militant philosophers. The academy physicists’ participation in the atomic bomb program may or may not have played a direct role in deciding the controversy, but it definitely emboldened them to take an uncompromising stand.

A decisive turn in Stalin’s thinking came around 1950, when he launched a debate in linguistics. According to Pollock, Stalin arrived at the conclusion that scientific truth could emerge only from open and free debate, and he spoke against the monopoly of a single scientist or approach and for scientific objectivity and freedom of criticism. The literal reading of Stalin’s liberal-minded remarks is somewhat qualified, however, by Pollock’s analysis of archival evidence of the 1950 physiology debate, when Stalin eagerly tutored a junior apparatchik in the art of backstage manipulation of public meetings. Faithful to his newly found commitment to open debate, in 1951 Stalin authorized an unprecedented five-week-long discussion on political economy with 116 speeches total. Despite his best hopes, the participants were unable to resolve politically controversial issues without clear guidance from above. Stalin had to step in again, fearlessly overturning ideological dogmas and insisting that economic laws were objective and not dictated by ideology. His example, however, inspired few to take risks and show creative thinking. Those who did try immediately earned a rebuke from Stalin, whose tolerance for dissent was clearly limited. Wiser scholars continued to ask for his advice on all major issues, as well as minor ones, such as the use of hyphenation and quotation marks.

Thoroughly researched, provocatively argued, and occasionally entertaining, Pollock’s book reveals a much greater degree of Stalin’s personal involvement in both the administrative and the intellectual sides of the postwar debates than previously thought. Pollock appreciates the complexity and specificity of each campaign by taking into account a wide range of factors—bureaucratic politics, patronage, Cold War, and disagreements among scientists themselves. Yet his focus is on the evolution of Stalin’s own thinking. Pollock argues that Stalin chose to hold open academic discussions instead of simply declaring the truth from above because the Soviet leader came to believe in the value of academic debate, wanted to stimulate creative thought, and was genuinely interested in the intellectual issues involved. A more cynical reader might add that the carefully controlled discussions served to teach the scientific community how to resolve disputes and police itself without daily supervision by party bureaucrats.

With the constant evolution of ideological dogmas and Stalin’s own unpredictable interventions, it was hardly surprising that both party officials and scientists often miscalculated the ideological
fortunes of various scientific theories. But it seems that Stalin himself made the worst miscalculation. His attempts to engage in a genuine scholarly debate produced what Pollock has called a “fundamental paradox”: instead of encouraging further free exchange of opinion, Stalin’s interventions established a new dogma, limited discussion, and suppressed all dissent. If Pollock’s analysis is correct, we are left with an even greater paradox: Stalin did not fully understand the workings of Stalinism.

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This anthology is based on papers presented at a German-Russian conference at the Munich Institut für Zeitgeschichte in 2003 called “Stalin—An Interim Balance Sheet.” The content stretches over mainly two fields of research: on the one hand Soviet-German relations comprising Soviet foreign policy toward Germany basically from 1933 to 1953, relations between German and Soviet Communist parties, and the treatment of German prisoners of war in the Soviet Union; and on the other hand systems of power, styles of dictatorships, use of ideology by the two leaders, and ways of bringing about mass crimes in Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, all seen from a comparative perspective. The politics and behavior of the Soviet top political echelon, often Stalin himself, constitutes the focal point, while Hitler and Nazi German politics and ideology represent more of an independent variable.

The reader is presented a wealth of information and at times very thoughtful analyses of previously known facts as well as new ones, based on archival sources that have recently been made accessible to researchers. The space allotted for this review does not allow for highlighting of more than a few contributions. Several articles connect to one another through their themes and methods of posing questions, which creates a sense of vivid dialogue. Some of the topics have been discussed and disputed among historians for a long time, such as Stalin’s March 1952 note to the Western powers proposing united, free political elections in Germany. What were the real intentions behind this unexpected political and rhetorical turn, which seemingly softened the Soviet attitude toward Western interests? Once again the content of the note is scrutinized (Aleksey Filitov), this time against a backdrop of newly found documents on a meeting between the Soviet foreign minister and the East German ambassador in September 1951. The latter complains about the lack of independent rights for Berlin vis-à-vis foreign countries, pointing out that Bonn already had achieved these rights (to issue visas) from the Western powers. Consequently, the intent behind Stalin’s note was to compromise with the Western powers on the German question; instead, it was meant as a disciplinary move toward the Soviet allies, specifically the East German leadership, who now showed sign of discontent with various aspects of Soviet politics. By demonstrating a willingness to approach the Western powers, a move that contained a potential threat to the position of the East German leaders, the satellite state was to be checked. The author points out that the Cold War was not so much about a clash resulting from the tensions between the blocs as it was an outgrowth of the need for both major powers to maintain tensions in order to keep their own allies—the junior partners—together and under their control. Several other authors also bring up the Stalin note, for example, the German and Russian scholars Bernd Bonwetsch and Sergey Kudriashov, who publish previously secret protocols of Stalin’s conversations with the East German leadership in Moscow in September 1951. These are documents conveying a picture of a strong Soviet hold on its satellites allies—contrary to what is stated in Filitov’s article.

Another topic, on the agenda ever since the 1950s, is the usefulness of the concept of totalitarianism to understand the two dictatorships. In a careful analysis German historian Zarusky reconsiders Hanna Arendt’s classical theses on the totalitarian power of Stalin and Hitler, which he contrasts to Ian Kershaw’s basically functionalist analysis. A renewed comparison leads Zarusky to conclude that factors such as ideology and the creation of artificial (“objective”) enemies, as well as