Analyzing the Interplay Between Regulatory Compliance and Cybersecurity

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Abstract
Today, regulatory compliance is a critical component of any cybersecurity program. However, although compliance is often the driver for developing or improving cybersecurity, it may be incomplete as a cybersecurity measure itself. The result is that even a compliant organization may have gaps in its security posture. Through an in-depth literature review, this paper investigates the complexity surrounding compliance and the factors that have an impact on the interplay between compliance and cybersecurity.

Introduction
Over the past decade, cyber threats have increased rapidly, accentuating the need to regulate cybersecurity practices and activities, and to impose penalties and sanctions for violating the regulations. However, relying solely on compliance to achieve security protection doesn't necessarily enable an organization to cover all cybersecurity needs. The extent to which compliance is sufficient to ensure the success of cybersecurity operations tends to vary depending on several factors. For example, it may depend on how readily an organization facilitates the implementation of regulatory requirements or the monitoring capabilities of an organization. Thus, compliance is not black and white but rather a matter of a series of components, which may either minimize or maximize the impact of compliance on cybersecurity. This study examines the interplay between compliance and cybersecurity through a multidisciplinary structured literature review of 77 publications. In particular, this research offers three contributions. Firstly, it provides an overview of compliance, which shapes the basis for moving from the general concept of compliance to the current notion of cybersecurity compliance. Secondly, it addresses the results of a comparison between worker safety compliance and cybersecurity compliance. Thirdly, it investigates cybersecurity compliance in different sectors.

Definition and Domains of Compliance
The concept of compliance is a broad topic, and it is often hard to define as its operational boundaries can be varied. The term follows a philosophical tradition involving the belief that people lack self-governance ability and, consequently, the need to establish a robust governing authority (Foorthuis & Bos, 2011). This logic, although profoundly transformed, influenced the perception of compliance and led to the need to refer to specific requirements that vary, depending mainly on the industry and type of business. Today, there is not a generally accepted definition, even though many scholars and professionals typically refer to compliance as a method for ensuring that specific norms and rules are met (Kharbili et al., 2008). For example, according to Wright (2008), “compliance in the true sense of the word entails a legal requirement or a standard for context.” Other authors pointed out that adhering to laws and regulations is a way of mitigating societal risk and encouraging ethical behavior (MacLean and Behnam, 2010; Abdullah, Sadiq & Indulska, 2010). However, only recently, compliance has been integrated into the organization’s day to day activities, which made it necessary to distinguish between regulatory and internal compliance. According to Nawar and Dagam (2015), regulatory compliance involves following the rules for a specific industry or field established by an outside authority. Thus, regulatory compliance should not be confused with internal compliance, which, conversely, refers to the procedure of following internal processes and best practices established by an organization (Foorthuis, 2012). However, arguing that regulatory compliance merely consists of meeting rules and regulations limits the notion to the legislative area, omitting a set of related values, such as commitment and integrity. The existing literature provides a comprehensive definition of regulatory compliance, although described in a fragmented manner and from different perspectives. The following categories represent some of the most common trends:
Compliance as an accountability-enabler
According to Breaux, Antón, and Spafford (2009), compliance is a defense tool to hold organizations accountable. These authors stated that compliance and accountability are intertwined because accountability involves the acceptance and assumption of responsibility for complying with regulations. However, being responsible in this context does not mean that compliance with the rules is also an act of accountability or that the rules themselves are an accountability mechanism. It means establishing enforcement procedures and ensuring that everyone is set to a standard expectation when it comes to regulations. From a broader perspective, other authors (Romzek & Dubnick, 1987; Romzek & Ingraham, 2000) extended this concept to all the participants involved in the regulatory chain, from the regulation originator to the regulated party. More specifically, they argue that, given the complexity and evolving nature of the regulatory environment, it is critically important to integrate the concept of accountability into every step of the regulatory process. For example, Scott (2000) suggested a devolved regulatory framework to ensure accountability. Lodge (2004) and Mashaw (2006) also discussed different methods to improve transparency and accountability in regulatory activities. More recently, May (2007) elaborated these concepts and classified regulatory accountability into four types: legal accountability, bureaucratic accountability, professional accountability, and political accountability. Each level differs in the unique challenges that they pose for ensuring regulatory accountability and contributes to the overall regulatory performance (May, 2007, p 8-26).

Compliance as an assurance function
According to Loshin (2010), compliance means “demonstrating that the organization is in accordance with defined guidelines.” Being “in accordance,” just like Loshin stated, means being in a state of conformity with some established guidelines, specifications, or legislation (Kingsbury, 1997; Mushkat, 2009). Other authors claimed that compliance is driven by needs to demonstrate adherence to regulation, and, therefore, auditing is fundamental in determining its assurance function (Panitz, Wiener & Amberg, 2011). In particular, establishing and maintaining assurance involves helping management, the board, and other stakeholders identify and consider the critical risks arising from technology. In this context, communication also plays a crucial role in strengthening the assurance function in compliance. Effective communication enables organizations to identify the causes of potential gaps and implement control mechanisms (Usnick & Usnick, 2013, p. 311).

Compliance as a point of transformation
Other authors seem to refer to regulatory compliance as a precise state in the organization. In examining compliance in the data security field, Kwon and Johnson (2013) defined it as “a snapshot of security about whether an organization exhibits controls.” Compliance is, therefore, seen as a piece of information or picture that provides a temporary understanding of an organizational situation in relation to certain regulations at a particular time. El Kharbili (2012) touched on this concept by defining compliance as “an interval between two states in the history of the evolution of the enterprise.” However, time is not the only element that scholars use to express the concept of transformation in compliance. Some also use the word “action” to explain how an organization, and more specifically, employees and teams can have the power to move from a state to another in terms of compliance. Compliance is, therefore, considered an action required by a supervisory authority that enterprises need to put into practice (Pererva et al., 2017).
Compliance as an ongoing process.

Conversely, some authors, such as Caldwell and Eid (2007) defined compliance as a progression and emphasized their definitions by describing compliance as an integral part of the organizational structure and process. VanLengen (2008) stated that regulatory compliance is “not a one-time event,” and business management and IT should make an active effort to maintain it over time. For example, Doganata and Curbera (2009) defined compliance as “an ongoing process that goes beyond testing and evaluating the internal controls of a sampled space.” This concept illustrates that an organization needs to work consistently to align organizational goals and regulatory requirements (Bailey, Haq & Gouldson, 2002; Wells, 2013). The compliance process involves periodic checks to ensure adherence to regulations and constant monitoring (Pupke, 2008). In particular, according to El Kharbili (2012), the process of managing compliance “deals with the modeling, checking, enforcement, and analysis of compliance requirements (CRs) extracted from regulations of various kinds, such as laws (i.e., legislations), contracts, internal policies, etc.” Additionally, according to Moeller (2011), “for enterprise management, compliance is the process of adhering to a set of guidelines or rules established by government agencies, standards groups, or internal corporate policies (Bailey et al., 2002, p. 245-256).”

Cybersecurity and Safety: Common basis and Lessons Learned

However, despite the differences among the definitions provided above, one of the most evident commonalities is that compliance is highly dependent on the relationship between regulators and the corresponding regulated industry, and the way organizations achieve the intended purpose of regulation. In the context of cybersecurity, regulations are part of a complex combination of state and federal regulations, including different regulatory approaches and degrees of scope (Thaw, 2013, p. 287). Cybersecurity regulations have not found yet a commonly accepted classification in the literature on compliance. However, one of the closest terms to define this regulatory category is “cybersecurity law.” While most authors refer to cybersecurity law as a set of cybersecurity standards, national frameworks, and relevant case law on cybersecurity, Kosseff (2017) provided a more purpose-oriented definition of cybersecurity law by defining it as a discipline that “requires an examination of the harms that the law seeks to prevent.” The type and severity of possible harms also play a critical role in the safety regulatory environment, which seems to share similar principles and dynamics with the one related to cybersecurity.

One similarity between safety and cybersecurity is the underestimation of their impact, respectively. For example, in the past, there was little attention to improving worker safety since it was cheaper to replace a dead or injured employer than to introduce safety measures. Later on, the combination of higher accident costs occurred during the years between the First and the Second World Wars, along with the growing safety concerns in large organizations, led to the implementation of safety-related legislation, such as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Mine Safety and Health Administration in 1970. Lawmakers designed the law to encourage safer workplace conditions and ensure that work environments were free from hazards (Bradbury, 2006). For many years now, working safely has been at the forefront of issues that regulators address. For example, the introduction of rules to encourage improvements in worker safety has sharply redefined and influenced the concept of compliance over the years, from reducing stress and risks of incidents and occupational injuries in the workplace to the development of more comprehensive insurance plans.

Similarly, the emergence of advanced cyber threats has been a catalyst for the enactment of rigorous security rules. Preserving the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the information systems in the cyberspace (also known as the CIA Triad) has been one of the motivating forces behind most of the regulatory efforts (Adams et al., 2015; Cojocaru, 2019; Deelman et al., 2019, p. 13-15). For example, the 2014 cyber-attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment compromised all three principles of the CIA Triad. According to Kosseff (2017), the attackers harmed the confidentiality of employees’ personal information and compromised the integrity and availability of Sony’s systems by altering their interface and limiting access to the network. After cyber events like the Sony attack, regulators began developing more regulatory initiatives to adapt to the current landscape. However, when regulators realized this phenomenon, they decided to look back on many of the lessons that safety has learned over the years. Thus, in some cases, safety represented a departure from which regulators defined rules on cybersecurity and cyber risk. For example, one of the achievements in safety regulations was recognizing that even minor vulnerabilities can
result in devastating damages, injuries, lost production, and significant fines. Regulators started considering organizations not simply as part of the solution to improve safety. Rather, they viewed them as the main actors in handling risk (Regens, Dietz & Rycroft, 1983). In the context of safety, the term “risk” is generally defined as the likelihood of hazard occurrence (Smith, 1992). Risk has always become the cornerstone of safety management, and therefore, is an important component of safety compliance. For example, safety regulations require risk assessments in areas, such as hazardous substances, lifting equipment, noise management, and so on. Today, cybersecurity regulations and standards integrated this concept into their regulatory principles and require risk management as a foundation. For instance, ISO 27001 considers risk as the basis for implementing appropriate information security controls; the GDPR requires a DPIA (Data Protection Impact Assessment), etc. Another fundamental lesson learned by cybersecurity regulators is the “implementation of safeguards or countermeasures against a hazard scenario.” (Hildenbrandt & Van Beurden, 2019, p. 625-630). Just like compliance obligations for safety require organizations to provide employees with training and proper protective equipment, cybersecurity regulations require the adoption of measures, such as firewalls, antivirus software, encryption measures, intrusion detection systems, etc. (Kosseff, 2019).

Despite being two inclusive, risk-driven fields, cybersecurity and safety have been generally addressed separately from a regulatory point of view. However, the rise of cybersecurity as a concern for sectors, such as Industrial Control System (ICS), has encouraged a conversation about the integration between cybersecurity and safety into the regulatory environment. For example, safety standards are now beginning to require cybersecurity controls. For example, the second edition of IEC 61511 (Functional Safety: Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process Industry Sector), includes clauses on security risk assessment and cybersecurity resilience (Paul & Rioux, 2015, p. 335-349). Additionally, now the majority of cybersecurity requirements apply to systems, which are already subject to well-established safety obligations. Regulators are beginning to understand that applying safety knowledge to the cybersecurity function, in turn, can have a positive effect on safety as well.

Consequently, to successfully achieve the desired regulatory goals in both fields, not only do cybersecurity regulations have to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability, but it also has to go beyond by addressing the concept of dependability. The term dependability is commonly used to indicate the measurement of a system’s attributes, such as availability, reliability, safety, integrity, and maintainability (Trivedi et al. 2009). Threats affecting a system subject to safety and cybersecurity requirements may affect its entire life cycle and, therefore, cause a drop in dependability (Laprie, 2005).

**Cybersecurity compliance differs in different industries**

On the one hand, cybersecurity regulations inherited positive principles from safety; on the other hand, safety also passed down some of its issues to cybersecurity compliance. For example, one issue is the misalignment between safety and compliance. In some situations, the line between the two can be blurred. For instance, in the construction industry, just because workers are required to wear protective equipment under a particular regulation, it doesn’t mean that they are safe. Although the bare minimum offered by safety rules can be acceptable to be compliant, it may not be the same in certain circumstances. Similar considerations are also part of the current discussion on cybersecurity compliance. For example, Kwon & Johnson (2011) investigated whether the level of compliance affects security performance. Surprisingly, they found that an organization’s level of compliance doesn’t significantly affect actual security performance, although “a combination of cybersecurity and compliance strategies is better than that of either alone (Kwon & Johnson, 2011).”

Conversely, Muckin, and Fitch (2014) argue that much of the mandatory controls required by regulations may negatively drive cybersecurity behaviors. Being the result of analyses and assessments conducted on a large scale, these controls may not be suitable for each unique organizational environment, and may, therefore, prevent organizations from implementing procedures that will address their particular needs. Similarly, Scully (2011) stated that “compliance standards should not rigidly mirror long-accepted security measures that have failed us; rather, compliance standards should be based on evidence of successful security practices.” Along with this line of thought, other studies (Oltisk, 2011; Donaldson et al., 2015, p. 27-44) examined the reasons why compliance is not a guarantee for security protection. Some of these argue that, regardless of whether good compliance coincides with good security, relying on compliance provides a false sense of security (De Guzman, 2007; Grossman, 2008, p. 24-27). Yimam & Fernandez (2016),
instead, provided a different perspective. They claim that, in some cases, compliance and security are only assessed either at the testing phase or at the last stage of application development. According to the authors, this practice may result in gaps in identifying potential threats.

However, given the high number of contexts in which cybersecurity regulations are applied, paths to compliance and security are in practice diverse. To appropriately comprehend the dynamics of the relationship between compliance and security, one key approach is focusing on the industry to which regulations refer to.

**Financial service**

Regulations within the financial sector vary greatly based on the financial service. According to Mohammed (1970), some of these regulations focus only on investment products, while others deal with credit and liquidity functions. However, since the financial industry is highly dependent on information technology, cybersecurity has now become one of the most significant components of financial regulatory compliance. In particular, protecting asset data, managing the use of sensitive information, monitoring electronic payments are just some of the main regulatory priorities in financial services. For example, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) imposes liability for data breaches and provides obligations on how organizations must collect and share information in the financial services sector (Mohammed, 1970, p. 1-11; Cuaresma, 2002, p. 497). The Act, originally introduced to “modernize” the financial service industry, requires financial institutions to adopt “administrative, technical, and physical safeguards” to “ensure the security and confidentiality of customer records and information” and “protect against unauthorized access to or use of such records” (Smith, 2002). Additionally, ensuring accountability is a constant requirement for financial service organizations. The Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002 places, for instance, emphasis on this concept as it requires organizations to be accountable for the security, accuracy, and reliability of all information systems that they use when reporting financial information. However, despite these regulatory initiatives, Arner, Barberis, and Buckley (2017) found that, following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the nature of financial markets, services, and institutions have changed dramatically. While information sharing concerns, users’ cyber protection, and secure digital transactions are still some of the principal goals of regulatory compliance in the financial sector, there is an increasing need for new or updated measures to address the latest cybersecurity threats. For example, Hornbuckle (n.d.) discussed how standards, like the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS), are not sufficient to protect companies from cybersecurity events, such as the Target store breach (Dissanayake, 2019). The increasing need to address these issues in financial service has led to the rise of the “FinTech” phenomenon, which is described in the literature as “the use of technology to deliver financial solutions (Douglas, 2016, p. 17; Jenik & Lauer, 2017).” As FinTech becomes more and more advanced, it is necessary to address more cybersecurity demands to ensure that companies continue to deliver secure services.

For this reason, the rapid evolution of FinTech is also influencing the regulatory environment in many financial sectors, such as banking and capital markets. Some authors argue that this phenomenon has caused the need for a new approach to addressing security through compliance, referred to as “RegTech.” This term, which is a contraction of “regulatory” and “technology,” describes the use of technology in the context of regulation and is used by regulators and supervisors to address the compliance issues raised by FinTech (Jenk & Lauer, 2017). Supporters of this new movement claim that the potential of RegTech is significant as it provides the basis for a more suitable and applicable regulatory framework that identifies and addresses regulatory risks while also facilitating more efficient regulatory compliance (Arner et al., 2016). Conversely, others (Packin, 2018, p. 193) believe that the adoption of RegTech is difficult. Examples of challenges include the difficulties of removing ethical issues resulting from organizational culture or the increase in regulatory requirements and their related costs.

**Healthcare**

Traditionally, healthcare regulations have always incorporated the need to maintain the confidentiality of medical information. However, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) has raised awareness of the importance of safeguarding personal medical information and has provided a more comprehensive regulatory framework to encourage compliance in the healthcare field. HIPAA defines a broad set of rules and procedures, many of which require proper technology that provides the security features suggested by HIPAA guidelines (Appari & Johnson, 2010, p. 279-314). The Act has also placed more attention on the concept of responsibility of those who transmit health data electronically. However, while the establishment of HIPAA and other health-related regulations, such as the Health Information
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH), was the catalyst for the development of improved medical information requirements, some scholars argue that there are several issues that prevented them from being a complete solution to effectively securing Personal Health Information (PHI). Mohammed (2017) stated that various factors might affect compliance in healthcare. For example, in the case of HIPAA, the regulation seems to focus more on the areas to protect rather than specific methods to implement security in those areas. Additionally, the author pointed out that guidance for some cybersecurity concepts is absent, and that some rules fail to keep up with the evolving cybersecurity threats. Other authors (Shen et al., 2006; Grandison & Bhatti, 2012, p. 108-124 ) also examined the comprehensibility of the regulation. They argued that, although privacy and security rules cover enough areas to enable healthcare organizations to define themselves compliant, the language of the procedures included in the regulation, such as those related to privacy and consent, doesn’t facilitate comprehension by health operators and patients. More broadly, Johnson and Kwon (2012) described how the overall regulatory environment for the healthcare sector requires modifications. They noted significant disparity both in security practices and in perceived compliance with federal and state regulations. According to the authors, low levels of perceived compliance may cause uncertainty towards medical practices and the required path to compliance. Compliance perception in healthcare is also a topic that other authors addressed (Bauer & Latzer, 2016 ). For instance, Miller and Tucker (2011) also studied this phenomenon in the healthcare sector. They indicated that the “safe harbor provisions in breach notification regulations” may cause a false sense of security because they encourage people to be “careless.” (Warkentin et al., 2006, p. 326) found that employees of public healthcare organizations reported higher levels of perceived compliance than those of private facilities. Their study also suggested that public healthcare administrative and medical staff members are likely to be more capable of protecting private health information.

**Automation**

Cybersecurity is becoming an increasingly important component of automation as well. The term automation identifies the technology that uses control systems for managing processes and reducing the need for human intervention. Not only is automation applied to execute repetitive or complex operations and boost productivity, but also to make specific procedures more secure. According to Joshi et al., (2019), “automation includes the combination of instrumentation, electrical, electronics, and computer systems to control the process.” It covers applications in a vast range of fields, such as ICSs, home automation (or domotics), robotics, Internet of Things (IoT), communication, automotive, etc. Traditionally, automation systems were not designed with specific cybersecurity characteristics in mind (Tuptuk & Hailes, 2018, p. 93-106). For this reason, these systems became extremely vulnerable to cyber-attacks over the years. In a detailed report on the status of IoT, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) staff addressed privacy and security concerns related to the use of IoT devices. Some of these involved collecting sensitive information (e.g., geolocation, financial data, health information). For example, the report identified significant vulnerabilities with home automation systems and smart appliances. Likewise, other scholars indicated that home automation, although being an interdisciplinary science aimed at improving the quality of life in domestic environments, creates unique risks to properties as well as even more critically risks for people (e.g., physical harm and even loss of life) (Kirtley & Memmel, 2018, p. 455; Croce, 2017; Millán et al., 2014, p. 239-254; Weber & Studer, 2016, p. 715-728).

Although much of the technological equipment used in automation is often the same as that employed in other information system environments (e.g., software, gateways, wireless access points, routers, computers, etc.), the cybersecurity goals and needs of automation are not the same as those for other fields. Protecting automation systems requires considerable experience and knowledge of automation technologies as well as their related operational functioning. General industry regulations and cybersecurity best practices don’t seem to secure automation systems accurately. Instead, standards have seen a constant evolution over the last few decades. There have been, for example, several initiatives from the International Society of Automation (ISA). Among these, IEC 62443, developed by both ISA99 and International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) committees, is one the most widely used set of standards at the international level. Its purpose is to protect components or systems used in industrial automation and control against cyber risks (Dayabhai, 2017). Standards like IEC 62443 provide a flexible framework to address current and future cybersecurity vulnerabilities in industrial automation and control systems (IACSSs) and are generally applicable to all industry fields and critical infrastructures. However, according to Leander, Čaušević, and Hansson (Leander et al., 2019, p. 101), there are several issues that organizations might face when trying to keep compliance with IEC62443, especially in the context of Industrial Internet.
of Things (IIoT). For example, they noticed a lack of guidance concerning the handling of cross-zone communication and software updates. Just like Leander et al., other authors (Frotzscher et al., 2014, p. 67-72; Mathavi, 2012, p. 1-8) agree that the majority of standards on automation need improvements and, in some cases, specific automation industries have no regulatory protection. Frotzscher et al. (2014) argue that companies operating in the industrial wireless automation sector have no regulatory coverage regarding some specific issues, such as wireless interferences, leaving them more vulnerable to cyberattacks.

Conclusions

Compliance and security have moved from being a general topic of interest to representing an increasing concern within specific industries. Looking at the literature, gaps emerge, which suggest that each sector reflects a combination of issues affecting the relationship between compliance and cybersecurity. These issues depend on the following compliance characteristics.

- **Clarity.** The clarity of the language or concepts introduced by regulations or standards and how it applies to the industry and the corresponding cybersecurity environment.
- **Implementation capability.** The ability to implement regulations or standards into action.
- **Consistency.** The consistency of regulations or standards between the industry and the related cybersecurity needs.

Table 1 summarizes the major issues by industry.

### Table 1: Compliance Characteristics for Industry Sectors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Compliance Characteristics</th>
<th>Financial service</th>
<th>Healthcare</th>
<th>Automation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Clarity</strong></td>
<td>The language and concepts of regulations are sometimes outdated</td>
<td>Regulatory language doesn’t facilitate comprehension by health operators and patients (e.g., privacy and consent concepts)</td>
<td>Lack of guidance about some industry concepts (e.g., cross-zone communication management and software updates)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implementation capability</strong></td>
<td>Ethical issues, the high number of regulatory requirements, and their related costs seem to be an obstacle to compliance implementation</td>
<td>Difficulties regarding the enforcement of privacy rules but good response from public healthcare administrative employees</td>
<td>Good applicability and flexibility in all sectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Consistency</strong></td>
<td>Discrepancy between current cybersecurity goals in the financial sector and actual FinTech needs</td>
<td>Disparity between security practices and perceived compliance due to a false sense of security</td>
<td>Regulatory gaps or no regulatory protection against specific issues (e.g., wireless interferences)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results of this analysis show that some industries are considered to need more attention than others in some compliance areas. In the financial sector, for example, the increasingly regulated environment and the lack of modernization in regulations are some of the problems that may significantly affect the effectiveness of cybersecurity procedures and may make compliance more problematic and costly. Because cybercriminals are persistent and use advanced techniques, the development of these regulations may not be sufficient to stop them. In the healthcare sector, instead, there seem to be inadequate compliance procedures to communicate understandable privacy practices or provide adequate security safeguards. Communication issues may, therefore, affect the employees’ ability to implement security controls accurately and create a false sense of cybersecurity awareness. As for the automation sector, there seems to be a lack of comprehensive regulatory coverage in some industries.
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