

**UNFICYP and a Cyprus Solution:
A Strategic Assessment¹**

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Introduction

This paper assesses what the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) can and cannot be expected to do to help promote a solution to the Cyprus problem and secure peace in the days that would follow.² This paper has three sections. First, I analyze the overall strategic situation on Cyprus. Second, I assess the effectiveness and limits of UNFICYP's peacekeeping activities. Third, I discuss UNFICYP's role in promoting bicomunal activities and the problem of ethno-nationalism more generally.

In the first section, I argue that Turkey will be the dominant power in the region for the foreseeable future and that there is little UNFICYP or any other organization or state can do to help Cyprus in case of war involving Turkey. This has obvious implications for a solution to the Cyprus problem: both sides had better get along after a solution or disaster and tragedy will result. The tape from 1960 to 1974 could well get re-played.

In the second section, I argue that without UNFICYP the chance of war on Cyprus would increase significantly. While UNFICYP has trouble coping with some of the larger incidents it confronts, UNFICYP is generally effective and helps buy time for the two sides to reach a solution. That said, the types of incidents that UNFICYP confronts -- lethal shootings and violent demonstrations in particular -- offer a modest sign that the two sides may be unprepared to get along after a solution. However, UNFICYP in some form could help implement whatever solution may be reached by verifying demilitarization, monitoring elections, and so forth.

² While it is not my purpose to go into detail on the specifics of a possible Cyprus solution, the basic elements of a solution have been pushed by the U.N. and the West for years: a bizonal, bicomunal federation. Under such a solution, Cyprus would be demilitarized, the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities would govern their respective zones, and sovereignty and some powers would rest with the central, federal government (including perhaps foreign affairs, a central bank, and the post office). Just how much power would be accorded to the federal government and how much freedom of movement and property/ownership would be allowed across the two zones are matters of debate and negotiation.

In the third section, I argue that bicomunal activities and other goodwill measures can help prepare the ground for a solution and can help maintain the peace after a solution is negotiated. UNFICYP plays a key role in sponsoring and helping coordinate bicomunal activities in part because it controls the buffer zone each side must cross to meet with the other and in part because it is one of the principal intermediaries between the parties

Unfortunately, despite increasing attendance at bicomunal activities, the problem that bicomunal activities address is getting worse, not better. The problem is ethno-nationalism. Rising ethno-nationalism, in a land already filled with propaganda and biased interpretations of history in everything from schools, the press, and politics, is a very bad sign about the prospects of the two sides being able to live together after an agreement.

The main argument of this paper is that a federal solution to the Cyprus problem is premature and would court a disaster similar to that of 1960-1974. Any solution that forces the two sides to live and govern together when they do not appear ready to get along is dangerous.

Part I: A Strategic Assessment

Turkey is and will be for the foreseeable future the dominant local power in the Eastern Mediterranean. There are at least two reasons to flesh out this argument.

First, it appears that many people on Cyprus either contest this view of the balance of power or believe that there are ways to reverse it. These people are wrong and may miscalculate their way into tragedy. People who believe that mobilizing Cyprus' reserves could give them a 3:1 ratio over the Turkish forces and thus enable a successful campaign to Kyrenia are mistaken. People who believe that the S-300 missiles from Russia will clear the skies of Turkish aircraft are equally wrong. New weapons and joint dogmas may help deterrence marginally, but they

will not change the balance of power on Cyprus or in the region. More importantly, these policies increase tensions and increased tensions make solutions harder to achieve. If a solution is nonetheless achieved, high levels of tensions will likely make the form of that solution closer to partition than federation. Increased tensions also delay E.U. accession, hurt tourism, and increase the chance of war.

Second, those who promote a federal solution (the canonical 'bizonal, bicomunal federation') are also in danger of miscalculation. If Cypriot ethno-nationalism is on the rise, then it would be premature to force the two sides to govern together. I hope the current round of international concern for the Cyprus problem will lead to more confidence-building measures, goodwill measures, and bicomunal activities. And I hope that these steps will lay the foundation for healing the division on Cyprus. But my primary goal is to prevent conflict and war on Cyprus. That is why I argue against a premature federal solution on Cyprus.

At best, a Cyprus solution will lead all sides to shake hands and embrace each other in peace. This rosy outcome is based on the assumption that a solution, in and of itself, will overcome decades of Cypriot ethno-nationalism and tension. The opposite appears to be true. Ethno-nationalism and tensions are rising on Cyprus (and the larger Greco-Turkish conflict is of course millennia old). A Cyprus solution *might* help reduce these problems. However, it is more likely that a federal solution attempted in the midst of moderate or high levels of ethno-nationalism and tension will instead exacerbate these problems and lead to wider conflict.

Given the current levels of ethno-nationalism and tension on Cyprus and given Turkey's clear regional dominance, it seems unwise for the Greek Cypriots (and the international community) to push so strongly for a Cyprus solution. This is especially so when many Greek Cypriot tactics for provoking international support for a solution also increase tensions and deepen ethno-nationalism on Cyprus (the S-300 purchase and violent demonstrations are

discussed below).³ A federal solution imposed on a tension-filled island will lead to conflict between the Greek Cypriot majority and the Turkish Cypriot minority when they find it difficult to live and govern together. In the end, Turkey will intervene to protect its near-nationals, and the Greek Cypriots will suffer. It happened from 1960-1974 and it could happen again.⁴

Map 1, Cyprus and Its Neighborhood, on the next page helps make the case that Turkey will be the dominant local power in the region for the foreseeable future. Turkey dwarfs Cyprus and is only 40 miles away. Mainland Greece is not on the map. Greece's nearest militarily useful islands, Rhodes and Crete, are 300+/- miles away. Turkey's relative proximity to Cyprus compared to Greece makes its lines of communication more secure, allows for more rapid reinforcement and resupply, and facilitates air operations.

³ This working paper started as conference paper which was prepared with a mostly Greek and Greek Cypriot audience in mind. It retains this focus. Had it been a largely Turkish and Turkish Cypriot audience, I would have argued that Turkey faces major choices in its domestic and foreign politics, many of which involve cementing its relations towards the West or facing increasing isolation (at least from the West). There are some easy things it could do should it opt for the former, and helping achieve a Cyprus solution is one of them. Turkey and the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" or "TRNC" are widely recognized and condemned as being the more stubborn partner in the Cyprus negotiations. They could gain a lot of credibility in the West by withdrawing to 29% (or less) of the land in Cyprus, apologizing for the illegal aspects of the 1974 invasion, apologizing for the lethal brutality along the buffer zone in 1996, stopping the slow ethnic cleansing of the Maronites and Greek Cypriots in the North, and so forth [of course, the Cyprus problem is not necessarily the first thing Western states think about when they assess Turkey's human rights record. Turkey kills several hundred Kurds (or more, depending on when one starts counting) for every Greek Cypriot killed. On the other hand, the Cyprus problem is more directly tied to issues of NATO/Western solidarity].

Indeed, it is Turkey's very strength (which in this paper I argue should sober both ethno-nationalists and those who would impose a solution on Cyprus when the two sides don't appear too ready to get along) which should permit it to make considerable concessions to solve the Cyprus problem and to gain favor in the West. While this paper argues primarily that Greece and Cyprus can't gain much (and can lose a lot) from belligerence and arms build-ups, a paper directed more towards the Turkish side would argue that the Turks can't lose much (and can gain a lot) from being more conciliatory.

⁴ In 1960, a constitution was imposed that made the Turkish and Greek Cypriots govern together. They couldn't because tension between the two made smooth power sharing impossible. Gridlock in the consociational government fueled intercommunal violence. Eventually, this violence (and a coup which threatened enosis) led Turkey to intervene in 1974. The month-long war resulted in several thousand dead and about a third of the island's populations being turned into refugees. This sequence of gridlock, strife, and tragedy highlights the dangers of a premature federal solution.

Map 1. Cyprus and Its Neighborhood⁵



Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean Area

On Cyprus, the Greek Cypriot National Guard (GCNG) has 10,000 soldiers on active duty, with 88,000 reserves. Of the 88,000, half are age 35-50; the rest are age 20-34. These

⁵ Franz Georg Maier, *Cyprus: From the Earliest Time to the Present Day*, Peter Gorge, trans. (London, Great Britain: Elek Books Limited, 1968), p. 4.

forces are supplemented by about 1,000 Green mainland troops and 1,3000 Greek mainland officers. These officers lead and control the Greek Cypriot National Guard.⁶

On the North side of Cyprus, there are some 4,000 Turkish Cypriot Security Forces (TCSF) with 26,000 reserves (also up to age 50). There are about 39,000 Turkish mainland soldiers in the North. The Turkish forces (TF) are better trained and better disciplined than the Greek Cypriot National Guard.⁷ The TF enjoy a two or three to one advantage in main battle tanks, after the GCNG buildup is taken into account. There are similar proportions in other types of weaponry.

Other forces on Cyprus include about 4,000 troops from the United Kingdom in the Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) as well as about 1,150 lightly armed troops serving with UNFICYP (mostly from Argentina, Austria, and the UK).

The bottom line on the local balance of forces is that the Turkish forces could defeat the South in about three days.⁸ All balance of forces assessments are rough and dependent on many variables: warning time, mobilization, weather, and so forth. However, assuming this estimate is correct, the Greek Cypriots could double the effectiveness of their forces and the war would be

⁶ Except where noted, most of the following data is from International Institute for Strategic Studies. *The Military Balance, 1996/97*, (London, Great Britain: Oxford University Press for the IISS, 1996). See also Aristo Aristotelous, *Greece, Turkey and Cyprus: The Military Balance, 1995-1996 – Arms, Doctrines and Disarmament* (Nicosia, Cyprus: Cyprus Centre for Strategic Studies, 1995).

⁷ This assessment is based on numerous conversations with those who have had direct contact with the forces on Cyprus, as well as with others who were in a position to offer authoritative judgements on this issue. If even front-line qualitative differences between the TFs and the NG are such that whatever reserves the NG can mobilize won't give them a three-to-one combat power ratio. The ratio is only meaningful if measured in terms of combat power, not simple manpower. People who make arguments about taking Krenia based on mobilization of reserves illustrate the potential for miscalculation on Cyprus.

⁸ The estimate of three days was given to me and confirmed by experts from different organizations. No one suggested that the Turkish forces/Turkey wanted to conquer Cyprus or that they would be wise to do so. Indeed, such an attack would set back many of Turkey's professed aims.

over in six days. If they tripled their effectiveness, the war would be over in nine days. If they tripled their effectiveness and this estimate was off by 100%, the war would be over in 18 days.

The Strategic Environment: Greece, Turkey, Russia, the U.S. and Europe

This section evaluates the strategic environment faced by Cyprus. In so doing, it discusses the Greek and Turkish mainland forces, the U.S., Russia, NATO and Europe. Table 1 sets the stage:

Table 1. Basic Components of Military Strength⁹

	Total Active Armed Forces	1995 Defense Expenditures	1995 GDP	1995 Population
Cyprus	10,000+2,300 Greek mainland soldiers and officers (with 30,000 TF and 4,000 TCSF on the North)	\$354 million (4.5% GDP)	\$7.9 billion	784 thousand (8% Turkish Cypriot) ¹⁰

⁹ From IISS, *Military Balance, 1996-1997*, pp. 59-61, 70-72 and 84-85.

¹⁰ Population figures on Cyprus, especially for northern Cyprus, are often contested. The Greek Cypriots claim that as many as 100,000 Turkish mainland civilians have settled in the north since 1974 (when they were 116,000 Turkish Cypriots out of 641,000 total Cypriots). The Turkish Cypriot authorities claim that only 15,000 Turkish mainlanders have settled on Cyprus. In their first census since 1974, the Turkish Cypriot authorities recently found that the “TRNC”’s population was 198,215. However, the birthplaces for this population have not been disclosed. In a final complication, it is widely recognized that many Turkish Cypriots have left Cyprus, but again nobody knows or will say how many. There are over 600,000 Greek Cypriots in the Republic of Cyprus. For information on this census, see Celestine Bohlen, “Fresh Tension for Cyprus: Counting the Newcomers,” *New York Times*, January 23, 1997, p. A10.

This issue is a major hurdle for any peace agreement (over and above those that are the focus of this paper) because it raises the following questions: Who is a Turkish Cypriot? Anybody born on Cyprus? What of those living there long enough to have children? What will happen if Turkish mainlanders come to outnumber Turkish Cypriots? If representation or federal contracts or federal social aid be based (if these are relevant features of the new constitution)? Will a settlement involve deportation of tens of thousands of Turkish settlers?

Turkey is close to Cyprus and has large armed forces. Some of its forces are tied down in suppressing the Kurds and it must deploy its forces on almost every border to confront threats ranging from Syria to Greece to Russia. However, of these possible threats, the Imia/Kardak crisis of early 1996 and rising tension on Cyprus suggest that the most immediate security concerns for Turkey are Greece and Cyprus.

Greece is quite distant from Cyprus and its armed forces are much smaller than those of Turkey (despite spending a larger fraction of GDP).

The geographical and force structure imbalances suggest that Greece will not be able to add much to Cyprus' defense in the event of war with Turkey. The importance of the Greek/Cyprus Joint Defense Doctrine (or dogma, as it is often referred to) of 1993 should not be overestimated. Indeed, many Greek and Cypriot observers indicate that the main purpose of the dogma is to increase deterrence, not to imply that victory is possible. One Greek analyst suggested to me that in the event of conflict on Cyprus, the dogma might lead the Greeks to attack Turkish forces in other areas and not on Cyprus. The dogma offers limited help to Cyprus in the forms of marginally increased deterrence or horizontal escalation if deterrence fails. These effects may be weaker than some Cypriots may be hoping for or counting on. Greece has a strong interest in not being dragged into war with Turkey via Cypriot miscalculation.

Greece might be wise not to send more than token forces to help Cyprus. Forces moving to Cyprus face fairly easy interdiction. If they attempt to take a circuitous route hoping to avoid attack, they will postpone their arrival to the time-urgent war. Moreover, any route to Cyprus ends up close to Turkey (of course). In addition, if Turkey feints or conducts attacks on Thrace or the various Greek islands on its border, it's not unreasonable to believe that Cyprus would begin to look pretty far away to Greece. Imagine that you are a Greek mainland commander and that you have a brigade to work with. If you send it to Cyprus, it will take time and many of

these forces could end up manning the lifeboats. If you keep it closer, more of these forces could end up taking on the Turkish army and defending Greece proper. What choice would you make?

Even if Cyprus were demilitarized -- an almost certain provision of any Cyprus solution -- Cyprus would still be at the mercy of the Turkish armed forces. I do not mean to imply that Turkey would want to attack more of Cyprus or that it would be wise to do. On the contrary, such an attack would set it back for decades to come.

More Distant Countries

Turning to more distant countries, Russia has recently warmed up its relations with the Government of Cyprus. Symptoms include increased investment and the sale of perhaps eight to twelve S-300 surface to air missile systems to Cyprus. How do the rapprochement and the arms sales affect the balance of power on Cyprus?

Russia's closer ties to Cyprus may help give Cyprus a friend on the U.N. Security Council, and arms purchases may add some increment to deterrence. Beyond this Cyprus should expect little other concrete help from Russia. As Chechnya and numerous stories of desertion and other problems show, Russia's armed forces have declined considerably. Russia's power projection capabilities were never its strong suit and they are even weaker now. While Russia and Turkey have been at odds for centuries, and Greece has often been the stage for this drama (for example, the Greek rebellion in the 1820s), it would be unwise for Russia to draw too close to Cyprus and risk direct involvement in an intra-NATO war or in a war with Turkey. Russia has more immediate and proximate problems to deal with and, like Turkey, would be unwise to alienate itself from the West.¹¹

¹¹ On the other hand, if Russia became alienated from the West, indirect involvement in a war on Cyprus may well come to suit Russia's perceived interests. For example, one can imagine a world in which NATO expands, this angers Russia, Russia's government becomes more nationalistic (which may happen independent of NATO

The S-300 missiles, like any surface to air missiles (SAMs), are mostly defensive in nature¹² and the Government of Cyprus clearly has a legal right to buy them. They will impede Turkish air operations over Cyprus and thus they may also help deter Turkey from attacking in the first place (at present though, these missiles have incited a Turkish threat to attack them if they are deployed). However, even these sophisticated SAMs cannot be expected to work or be operated perfectly, most Turkish planes carry ways to spoof SAMs (chaff and flares), and the Turkish Air Force has high-speed anti-radiation missiles (AGM_88 HARMs) as well as AGM_65 Maverick air-to-ground missiles.¹³ The HARMs are purpose-built to destroy SAMs and, if the Turkish forces can locate the S-300s, they would become vulnerable to a variety of other attacks. Thus, the S-300s, while very capable, cannot be expected to clear the skies of Turkish aircraft.

The S-300s impose costs as well as benefits. Turkey has two interests on Cyprus: preventing Cyprus from becoming a Greek base (thus completing Turkey's encirclement by Greek islands) and protecting the Turkish Cypriots (and now the Turkish settlers). The S-300s and the construction of the airbase at Paphos and the naval base at Larnaca¹⁴ are beginning to turn Cyprus into just the Greek outpost the Turks fear. While the Greeks and Greek Cypriots have ample and just reason to fear the Turks, the Turks increasingly have a strategic justification for maintaining forces on Cyprus. This is a classic security spiral.

expansion), and this government then seeks to undermine NATO. What better and easier way to do so than to try to provoke trouble on Cyprus? Turkey's reaction to the S-300 missiles shows how easy it may be for Russia to stir up tensions on Cyprus.

¹² Some would no doubt argue that even seemingly defensive weapons can provide a shield behind which one can better attack.

¹³ This information on Turkish missile capabilities is from Ken Petrie of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

¹⁴ Aristotelous, *Greece, Turkey and Cyprus: The Military Balance*, p. 73.

Even more acutely, Turkey has threatened to attack the S-300s if they are deployed. This threat may just be a bluff made in the hope of scaring the S-300s away. However, Turkey's credibility is now on the line. And if there is an attack, Greece's credibility (regarding the defense dogma) will also be on the line. Hence, if everyone can be taken at their word, the likelihood of conflict or war on Cyprus and between Greece and Turkey will be quite high when the missiles are deployed in the early summer of 1998.

In the end, the delivery of the missiles may not take place, or Turkey may not attack them. But the S-300 purchase has already raised tensions and raised tensions have several costs. First, any Europeans scared of importing a Cyprus problem into the E.U. will be more likely to postpone accession.¹⁵ The more tension there is, the more distant Cyprus' accession becomes. Second, tourism -- upon which Cyprus depends heavily -- is likely to drop. Third, if outside powers do muster enough leverage to propel Cyprus toward a solution, that solution is more likely to resemble partition than federation. The more tension there is, the less appealing a federal solution becomes and the more necessary partition appears. The S-300s may have helped focus the world's attention on Cyprus, but Cyprus may not like the result.

The S-300s are a gamble. The Greek Cypriots are hoping that the benefits of a marginal increase in deterrence and defensive capability, as well as increased world attention, are worth the costs of helping justify Turkey's presence on the island, a higher risk of a war they would lose, a reduced chance of E.U. membership, fewer tourists, and a less favorable solution -- if a solution is possible at all.

¹⁵ Some Greek Cypriots make the point that the E.U. has already imported several ongoing conflicts: Northern Ireland, and the Basque and Corsican problems. At first glance, there is some logic to this point. However, none of these conflicts are as likely to escalate into war between major powers as the conflict on Cyprus (which involves Greece and Turkey). Importing the Cyprus problem into the E.U. is qualitatively much different.

With respect to the U.S., America is unlikely to be of timely help in case of conflict on Cyprus. Even though the U.S. has a strong interest in preventing a war on Cyprus, and especially a war between Greece and Turkey, there are several reasons why the U.S. is likely to be slow to act. First, despite its overall interest in peace, many of the rest of the U.S.' interests in the region are conflicted and this is likely to lead to a degree of inaction. This will be especially true if it's not clear how and why the war started. Even if Turkey started the war, the U.S. may not be too willing to take actions it believes would isolate Turkey and move it more towards fundamentalism. Turkey is also closer to oil than Greece or Cyprus.

Second, the U.S. is becoming less activist in foreign affairs, especially when it comes to spending blood and treasure. This problem is compounded by the number of items already on the U.S.'s foreign policy agenda: China, Russia, and Middle East among them. The odds of a time and resource-intensive push on Cyprus seem low when other issues are more pressing. A counter to this argument is that the U.S. already has considerable latent influence on Turkey and Greece because of military and other assistance. Thus, the resources are already in place if the U.S. decides to use them in an attempt to coerce either of these countries in the event of a crisis (or perhaps as part of the Cyprus negotiations).

Third, history offers lessons about possible U.S. (and other states' and organizations') action. In the 1967 crisis, it was heavy weather, not Secretary of State Cyrus Vance that initially prevented Turkey from invading Cyprus. Vance's efforts then successfully defused the standoff that followed.¹⁶ In 1974, following the Cypriot coup and impending enosis,¹⁷ much of the world initially was equivocal about or even somewhat supportive of the initial Turkish invasion. The

¹⁶ Robert McDonald, "The Cyprus Problem," *Adelphi Paper 234* (London, Great Britain: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989), p. 15.

¹⁷ Enosis means the union of Cyprus with Greece. Enosis would turn the Turkish Cypriots into Greek citizens, or refugees.

internationally community more decisively singled out Turkey for condemnation only after it became apparent that the invasion would not restore the 1960 constitution, that the scope of the damage and loss of lives caused by the invasion was disproportionate to the potential threat, and that the percentage of land conquered (37%) was disproportionate compared to the percentage of Turkish Cypriots on Cyprus (18%).

Europe is also unlikely to intervene meaningfully in a timely way. Many people died in the former Yugoslavia and Albania before useful actions were taken. The parties involved and distances to Cyprus make U.S. leadership even more necessary in dealing with a crisis on Cyprus than it was with the Yugoslavia and Albanian crises nearer the heart of Europe. Finally, some in Europe may see benefits in a continued Cyprus problem. Those who don't want Turkey in the E.U. cite the Cyprus problem as one reason for keeping Turkey out.

Conclusion of Part 1: A Strategic Assessment

In the event of war on Cyprus, there is little any state or organization can do to prevent Turkey from winning that war. This is true whether Cyprus is demilitarized or not. Tragic consequences await those who think otherwise. If the Greek and Turkish Cypriots are forced to cooperate and live together under a federal government when they are not ready to do so, the resulting gridlock, tension, and strife could well lead to a replay of 1960-1974.

Part 2: UNFICYP, Its Effectiveness and Limits

In March of 1964, following a sharp increase in intercommunal violence on Cyprus,¹⁸ the U.N. Security Council authorized the establishment of a U.N. peacekeeping mission mandated to:

*"to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions."*¹⁹

In practical and current terms, this means that UNFICYP's chief responsibility on Cyprus is to supervise the cease-fire and thus foster conditions conducive to negotiating a peace settlement.²⁰ The principal way UNFICYP maintains the cease-fire is by preserving the military status quo within and along the buffer zone. A successfully maintained the status quo cuts off a prime source of spiraling tension. On a daily basis, UNFICYP endeavors to prevent military construction and improvements in positions in and along the buffer zone, to stop soldiers or unauthorized civilians from entering the buffer zone, to stop the sides from antagonizing each other across the buffer zone, and to investigate whatever incidents occur in and along the buffer zone. By seeking to minimize disputes and conflict along the buffer zone, UNFICYP seeks not

¹⁸ This violence was sparked when the President of Cyprus made a number of proposals to amend the 1960 constitution. These proposals would have ended several years of bickering and gridlock between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, but they would have done so by eliminating many of the constitutional protections for the Turkish Cypriot minority and concentrating power in the Greek Cypriot majority.

¹⁹ Karl Th. Birgisson, "United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus," in William J. Durch, ed., *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 222.

²⁰ The question of whether or not UNFICYP deprives Cyprus of the 'hurting stalemate' that might be propitious for negotiations is a subject of debate. My bottom line is that the chance of war would go up significantly without UNFICYP. Thus, I don't advocate removing UNFICYP to promote peace because that is tantamount to promoting war to promote peace.


The mandate also covers humanitarian activities, including the bicomunal efforts described in the next section.

only to maintain a cease-fire in the technical sense of no bullets flying, but also to keep tensions low and defuse threats to the cease-fire at the lowest possible level.

To maintain surveillance of the buffer zone, the U.N. staffs 22 permanent observations posts (OPs) along the buffer zone and uses another 120 OPs less frequently. Routine patrols within the buffer zone are conducted from 19 patrol bases. Patrols are also sent out to investigate whenever one of the sides complains about the other's construction, overmanning, or harassment - all frequent occurrences. The buffer zone is 180 kilometers long, comprises 3% of Cyprus' area, varies in width from 5 meters (in Nicosia) to seven kilometers, and contains some of Cyprus' most fertile agricultural land.²¹ The buffer zone separates the two sides and is the area that existed between the two opposing cease-fire lines at the end of the Turkish invasion in 1974. Map 2 shows how Cyprus looks from UNFICYP's perspective (similar maps are attached in each bi-yearly *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus*).

²¹ United Nations, S/1996/411, pp. 1-3, United Nations, *Blue Helmets*, 2 ed., pp. 306-307.

Map 2, Cyprus from UNFICYP's Perspective ²²



²² Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, S/1995/1020, December 10, 1995, p. 23.

UNFICYP confronts about 1000 recorded incidents a year, or about three per day. In addition, many more incidents don't make it into UNFICYP's record books.²³ What kinds of routine incidents does UNFICYP deal with?

- Military construction along or into the buffer zone (the two sides are only supposed to maintain but not improve their positions).²⁴
- Overmanning of positions along the buffer zone (many positions are only supposed to be manned by one or two soldiers).
- Moves forward and encroachments into the buffer zone by the two sides.
- Slingshotting and stone throwing between the two sides.
- Insults and obscene gestures traded between the two sides.
- The pointing and/or cocking of weapons between the two sides
- Harassment of the other side with spotlights.

In response to these sorts of incidents, UNFICYP:

- interposes itself between arguments, stone throwing, and so forth on the line.
- investigates incidents to find out what really happened.

²³ According to the *Report of the Secretariat Review Team on the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus*, S/21982, December 7, 1990, paragraph 13, UNFICYP recorded 820 incidents in the first 10 months of 1990, 25% of the incidents were shootings, another 20% were encroachments into the buffer zone, and another 20% were strengthening of positions near the cease-fire line. Based on my research, I believe these statistics under-report antagonism and harassment incidents (because UNFICYP soldiers on the line can often defuse them quickly and informally and thus often don't bother to report them).

In paragraph 14, the *Report* continues: "Tense situations often occur in places where the buffer zone is only a few metres wide and opposing forces confront each other across a narrow UNFICYP patrol track. Soldiers on both sides have been prone to deliberate acts of provocation, including shouting abuse, throwing stones and making obscene gestures. This invites retaliation in kind and can easily escalate if UNFICYP does not interpose itself quickly to calm tensions and maintain a physical presence until tempers have cooled. In past years, such incidents have resulted in a number of fatalities."

²⁴ The 1995 Roccas Bastion construction was perhaps the most notorious construction incident. The incident highlights UNFICYP's limits and effectiveness. Only the U.N. was capable of getting access to the Roccas Bastion on the Turkish side and conducting inspections to assure the Greek Cypriots that the construction was of little military utility. On the other hand, the U.N. had to expend almost every resource it had to obtain those inspections: involvement of the Secretary-General and of the U.N. Security Council, as well as coordination with various embassies.

- tells both sides to back down.
- mediates or acts as a liaison between the two sides.
- calls up the superior officers of misbehaving soldiers and gets them disciplined.
- issues written protests to the offending side(s).

These routine incidents usually do not pose a high risk of escalation, in part because UNFICYP does a very good job of stopping or putting a damper on them. However, the possibility of escalation is always present and these sorts of incidents both reflect and cause simmering tension between the two sides.

Shootings and demonstrations are two types of incidents which can become considerably more violent and which can pose higher risks of escalation. I will discuss these in turn.

Shootings.

The vast majority of shooting incidents are accidental and non-lethal (what UNFICYP terms negligent discharges). Even the vast majority of intentional shootings are non-lethal. They are usually intended to scare or harass the other side, often by trying to cause a strike mark on the other side's position.

Lethal shootings are the most serious type of shooting incident and, as the following two incidents show, these carry a high risk of escalation. Within hours after the April 8, 1993 shooting of National Guard private Athanasios Kleovoulou by the Turkish forces (he was in the buffer zone to trade brandy with the Turks), forty Greek Cypriots were demonstrating at the South Ledra Checkpoint. Tensions increased along both cease-fire lines, marked by shouting, stone throwing, and general ill discipline. Additional Greek Cypriot demonstrations occurred.

Finally, on April 11, a major gunfight occurred near Dherinia. Approximately 50 small arms rounds were exchanged and a Turkish Cypriot Security Forces position was hit three times.²⁵

Immediately following the June 3, 1996 shooting of National Guard private Stelios Panayi, up to 90 Turkish forces soldiers, armed with machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, assembled on their side of the buffer zone. This was matched by an equivalent National Guard show of strength. The Turkish forces fired warning shots (a total of three) each time the UNFICYP forces tried to recover the dying Panayi from the buffer zone. As with Kleovoulou, this killing by the Turkish forces was tragic, brutal, and unnecessary. To illustrate the possibility for escalation, imagine what would have happened if the Turkish forces had fired on the National Guard instead of UNFICYP as they moved forward to recover Panayi. After such a rapid build-up on both sides, the result could well have been a tragedy of immense proportion.

Demonstrations.

Demonstrations are the second type of incident that risk violence and serious escalation. Most demonstrations are usually held by Greek Cypriots to protest the Turkish invasion and occupation. Many demonstrations are peaceful. And many are not. Demonstrators frequently try to cross into the buffer zone and this can create havoc for UNFICYP. The demonstrators also may throw rocks, bottles, and occasional molotov cocktails across the buffer zone at Turkish Cypriots or other targets of opportunity, including UNFICYP personnel. According to the U.N. Secretary-General: "Civilian demonstrations near the cease-fire line on the Greek Cypriot side have often degenerated into individual or mass attempts to enter the buffer zone with the

²⁵ See *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus*, S/25912, June 9, 1993, paragraph 14.

declared purpose of crossing to the other side. Sometimes, such demonstrations have been accompanied by considerable violence on the part of the demonstrators."²⁶ Motorcycle demonstrators have proven to be particularly troublesome for UNFICYP.

UNFICYP's responsibility during the demonstrations is to protect the integrity of the buffer zone. The Cyprus police (CYPOL) are supposed to help control the demonstrators and help prevent entry into the buffer zone (and thus help UNFICYP), but CYPOL's level of cooperation is spotty. In ideal circumstances, CYPOL forms the first line of crowd control, U.N. civilian police (UNCIVPOL) personnel then talk to any demonstrators that get by, and unarmed UNFICYP troops and their barbed wire form the third line of restraint.

The Greek Cypriot demonstrators typically consist of school groups (children sometimes led and often encouraged by their teachers),²⁷ women's organizations such as "Women March Home," relatives of missing persons,²⁸ or motorcycle clubs. The number of

²⁶ *Report of the Secretary-General in Connection with the Security Council's Comprehensive Reassessment of the U.N. Operation in Cyprus, S/26777, November 22, 1993, paragraph 16.*

²⁷ Even schoolchildren can be aggressive. In October of 1993, 5000 schoolchildren left their schools to protest at the Ledra Palace, violated the buffer zone and injured five members of UNFICYP (*Report of the Secretary-General on in Connection with the Security Council's Comprehensive Reassessment of the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, November 22, 1993, S/26777, paragraph 68*). Two years later,

...for several successive days in second week of November 1995, Greek Cypriot schoolchildren, marshaled by adults, including teachers, violently protested the detention by Turkish Cypriot authorities of a member of the National Guard who had crossed the buffer zone. Fifteen members of UNFICYP sustained minor injuries during these demonstrations. The U.N., both in Nicosia and in New York, made strong representations to the Government of Cyprus; thereafter, in particular on 15 November 1995, the Cyprus Police took effective action to control the demonstrators and improved advance liaison with UNFICYP. (Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, December 10, 1995, S/1995/1020, paragraph 9.)

After these November demonstrations, the ambassadors of several troop contributing countries threatened to withdraw from UNFICYP, protesting that their soldiers were not in Cyprus to get hurt by schoolchildren. November 15 was also the opening of the Roccas Bastion playground on the Turkish side. During the 'celebration,' the Turkish authorities did little to prevent Turkish civilians from throwing stones from the bastion toward the Greek side.

²⁸ There are approximately 1500-1600 Greek Cypriots (1619 is the figure most often heard) and 500-800 Turkish Cypriots unaccounted for since the 1974 invasion. Since 1984, the U.N. has run an autonomous (ie. not a U.N. organ) Committee on Missing Persons (CMP) which is supposed to coordinate the activities of the two sides to

demonstrators can vary from several tens to several hundreds to the low thousands.

Authoritative sources, as well as conversations with Greek Cypriots, indicate that less than half (perhaps 30-40%, according to one source) of the demonstrators are primarily motivated by their feelings about the Cyprus problem. The remaining demonstrators (60-70%) are "professional demonstrators," or people going along more for excitement or because of social pressure than because of deep commitment to the cause.²⁹

The Turkish side organizes what are usually counter-demonstrations that occur during or following the Greek Cypriot demonstrations. The Turkish demonstrations tend to be more controlled and orchestrated, even though plenty of rocks be thrown from Turkish side.

According to authoritative sources, both sides' demonstrations are often triggered by politicians.

The large motorcycle demonstration of August 11, 1996 (and subsequent events) which led to two deaths and many injuries shows how dangerous protests can be. The U.N. Secretary-General described the lead-up to the demonstration:

First announced in January 1996, it was to take the form of a symbolic motorcycle ride, undertaken by Greek Cypriots and persons from other countries, originating in Berlin and ending in Kyrenia on 11 August. This meant that the demonstrators intended to cross the United Nations buffer zone as well as the Turkish forces cease-fire line, a course of action that was bound to cause the utmost provocation. During the period leading up to the demonstration, the media on both sides publicized a large number of increasingly acerbic statements by the demonstration's organizers and by Greek Cypriot political leaders, as well as counter statements by the Turkish Cypriot side.³⁰

ascertain the whereabouts of these persons. Of the missing, there are currently 1493 Greek Cypriot and 500 Turkish Cypriot cases officially before the CMP. The U.N. has signaled its displeasure with the CMP's lack of progress and has grumbled about ending the committee. See *Reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus*, December 10, 1995, S/1995/1020 and June 7, 1996, S/1996/411, paragraphs 32-33, and 31 respectively.

²⁹ Of course, most demonstrators feel some commitment to the cause and feel some hostility toward the Turkish invasion and occupation. Most observers, myself included, object to many aspects of the Turkish invasion and occupation.

³⁰ *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus*, S/1996/1016, December 10, 1996, paragraph 2.

UNFICYP warned President Clerides and the Government of Cyprus about the potential for danger on a weekly basis for three months before the demonstration. Various embassies began to chime in several weeks in advance. In addition, UNFICYP repeatedly urged CYPOL to help fulfill its obligations to prevent violations of the buffer zone. Given the problematic history of motorcycle demonstrations and the avowed purpose of this one in particular, there could have been no doubt that this one would lead to violence.

President Clerides did agree to call off the demonstration on the morning of the 11th, and this appeal was relayed to the demonstrators by the head of the Cyprus Motorcycle Federation as some 1500 motorcyclists and others met in Nicosia's Makarios stadium (out of 3500 people who had gathered throughout Cyprus for the demonstration). As could or may have been predicted, the message was too late to stop the demonstration and groups of demonstrators began to move out. In some areas, the subsequent demonstrations remained peaceful. Others did not.

In one case, about 350 demonstrators made it into the buffer zone (after CYPOL had lifted the NG cease-fire line barrier), went up to the TF cease-fire line and lit fires as they went along. After a few hours the situation had calmed down. In a second instance along the link road to the Dhekelia SBA [a British sovereign base area], about 150 Turkish Cypriot demonstrators met 200 Greek Cypriot motorcyclists (and several TV crews) and both sides began to throw stones. Some Greek Cypriots crossed onto the Turkish side and planted a Greek flag. The Turkish Cypriot demonstrators then fired shotguns at the Greek Cypriots who set fires as they retreated. Ten Greek Cypriot demonstrators were wounded, some by shotgun pellets.

The most serious incident occurred around Dherinia, a frequent hotspot. According to an UNFICYP press release on the demonstration:³¹

At 1430 hours, some 300 motorcyclists together with some 700 persons in vehicles escorted by Cypol arrived at the NG cease-fire line checkpoint in Dherinia [250 demonstrators were already in the area]. Cypol deployed along the NG cease-fire line but left the checkpoint unattended, thus enabling the demonstrators to enter the United Nations buffer zone unimpeded.

In the meantime, the Turkish forces had allowed some 1,000 persons in buses to pass through their 3 km deep military zone and to assemble along the TF cease-fire line, including persons carrying the flag of the Grey Wolves [ultra-nationalists] who had come from Turkey.

The situation soon became violent, after Greek Cypriot demonstrators entered the buffer zone and approached the TF cease-fire line to provoke the TF, the TCPE [Turkish Cypriot Police Element] and demonstrators assembled there with verbal abuse and throwing stones. Cypol was not effective in controlling the Greek Cypriot demonstrators.

At about 1600 hours, the Turkish forces allowed the Turkish Cypriot demonstrators to enter the United Nations buffer zone armed with bats and iron bars. The Turkish Cypriot demonstrators, joined by the Turkish Cypriot Police, then proceeded to pursue the Greek Cypriots and mercilessly beat all those who they were able to catch. At the same time, there was shooting, including by Turkish Cypriot police, from behind the Turkish forces cease-fire line towards the Greek Cypriot demonstrators.

During this period, a Greek Cypriot demonstrator, Anastasios Isaak, was beaten to death by a number of Turkish Cypriot demonstrators, including three Turkish Cypriot policemen. By 1800 hours the situation began to calm down. In addition to the one dead, it was reported that some 54 Greek Cypriots and 17 Turkish Cypriots were injured. 12 UNFICYP personnel suffered injuries.

Isaak's funeral followed three days after his brutal and avoidable death. The funeral led to another deadly demonstration. According to UNFICYP's press release, "The Demonstration of 14 August 1996":

On Wednesday 14 August, about 3,000 people and some 500 motorcyclists attended in Paralimni the funeral of Anastasios Isaak. After the funeral service, at about 1345 hrs, some 200 motorcyclists and a number of vehicles arrived at the northern outskirts of Dherinia where members of Cypol had been stationed. As during the events on Sunday, Cypol was not effective in preventing the demonstrators from entering the United Nations Buffer Zone (UNBZ). Some 150 Greek Cypriots passed the police line and outflanked the UNFICYP troops deployed inside the UNBZ.

As the Greek Cypriot demonstrators made their way into the UNBZ, Turkish forces and Turkish Cypriot military and police, which until then had remained out of sight, deployed in full

³¹ The press release, "The Demonstrations of 11 August 1996," also supplied most of the previous information on the day's events.

view and in added strength along the TF CFL. UNFICYP requested both Turkish forces and Turkish Cypriots military and police to exercise restraint and not to over-react. It also reminded them that UNFICYP has sole responsibility to deal with incursions into the buffer zone and that there must be no interference.

By 1420 hours, some 200 Greek Cypriots were inside the UNBZ, but UNFICYP was in control of the situation. The demonstrators were being rounded up and moved out of the UNBZ. The main group of Greek Cypriots were no closer than about 30 metres from the Turkish forces Cease-Fire Line (TF CFL).

At about that time, a Greek Cypriot male, later identified as Solomos Spyrou Solomou, broke free from the main group and ran towards the Turkish Cypriot check point. He was chased by two UNFICYP soldiers, who caught up with him at the guard post, but the demonstrator broke free and began to climb a flag pole which was flying the Turkish flag just inside the Turkish Cypriot check point. The UNFICYP soldiers were pursuing him a few feet behind.

Solomou was some 3 metres off the ground (less than a fourth of the way to the top of the flag pole), when he was shot by a Turkish or Turkish Cypriot soldier and fell to the ground with blood flowing profusely from his neck (the autopsy revealed that Solomou was hit by five bullets). Turkish or Turkish Cypriot soldiers then proceeded to fire some 25 to 50 rounds indiscriminately into the crowd inside the buffer zone. The whole incident was witnessed by the UNFICYP Force Commander and the Commanding Officer of the Austrian Battalion who were in the UNBZ some 35 metres from the TF CFL. They observed uniformed Turkish or Turkish Cypriot military personnel kneeling down and firing in the direction of the demonstrators inside the UNBZ.

As a result of the indiscriminate shooting by Turkish or Turkish Cypriot soldiers, two British UNFICYP soldiers were shot from behind and two Greek Cypriot civilians were also hit by gunfire. Three were inside the buffer zone and one of the civilians, who sustained a serious gun shot wound to the abdomen, was standing outside the UNBZ close to the National Guard checkpoint. During the demonstration, two Cypol officers and five Greek Cypriot civilians suffered non-gunshot related injuries.

The Force Commander of UNFICYP accompanied by the Chief of Staff met with the Commander of the Turkish forces in Cyprus late in the afternoon of 14 August to strongly protest the totally unwarranted use of force by Turkish or Turkish Cypriot military personnel.

These quotes describe in some detail the lethal and unnecessary brutality of the Turkish forces. Such excessive use of force does little to advance Turkey's interests, assuming that one of their main goals is closer ties to the West.³²

Violent demonstrations and other provocations are also counter-productive for the Greek Cypriot cause. This cause has most of the facts on its side and it is a cause which enjoys the

³² In the short term though, the Turks may be calculating that it is in their interests to aggravate the Cyprus problem. The reason for this line of thought is that the Turks may want to delay Cyprus' entry into the E.U., thinking if they can't get admitted, then Cyprus won't get in either. If this explanation is correct, an ironic situation becomes apparent: the Greek Cypriots stir up problems thinking it will help propel a Cyprus solution while the Turks stir up trouble thinking it will delay a Cyprus solution.

support of the world community (evidenced by non-recognition of the "TRNC," and so forth). It is in part because of my fond feelings for Cyprus that I hope Cypriots consider my arguments that rising ethno-nationalism and policies of provocation are likely to do more harm than good. They do not help promote a peaceful and desirable settlement for the island.

Peacekeeping on Cyprus: A Conclusion

Before discussing the potential roles of UNFICYP and the U.N. following a solution, I will offer some conclusions about UNFICYP and the current problems it faces. First, I'm not sure how well Cypriots understand what UNFICYP does for them on a daily and routine basis. UNFICYP successfully tames the vast majority of the 1000 or so incidents it confronts every year. The odds of conflict and war on Cyprus would increase significantly without UNFICYP. On the other hand, UNFICYP has trouble with some of the more serious and exceptional incidents. When UNFICYP has to confront demonstrations, it can only concentrate about 250 of its 1150 peacekeepers in one place, and these peacekeepers are unarmed. One or two peacekeepers can calm a slingshotting incident, but 250 peacekeepers can do little against hundreds of motorcyclists.

UNFICYP's effectiveness can be conceived of in what I call the Roulette Wheel analogy. Every time there is an incident, there is a risk of escalation, tragedy, and even war. Thus, every time there is an incident, the roulette wheel of tragedy and war gets spun. Of course, the chance of war is slim when insults or slingshots are involved. But the chance of tragedy or war goes up considerably when more serious incidents are involved.

UNFICYP can't eliminate the possibility of war on Cyprus, but it effectively shifts the odds on the roulette wheel away from war. With UNFICYP on Cyprus, there is less chance of the wheel coming up war whenever it is spun. UNFICYP's benefits are probabilistic, not cast in

stone. Moreover, UNFICYP can't prevent war if one side wants one or if an incident gets out of hand and escalates beyond UNFICYP's limited ability to control it.

If UNFICYP reduces the probability of war on Cyprus, then removing UNFICYP would increase the probability of war.³³

Second, UNFICYP's effectiveness helps create a better atmosphere for the Cypriots to make peace. Without UNFICYP, more incidents would escalate, tensions would be higher, and peace would be even more distant.

³³ Some argue that removing UNFICYP would make the two sides face more squarely the possibility of war, increasing their incentives to negotiate a peace while also leading to greater discipline along the buffer zone/border. There is some logic in this point. There is currently poor discipline along the buffer zone (compare to the Cold War inner-German border for contrast). Also, the Greek Cypriots in particular use the U.N. to communicate to the larger world and they rely on UNFICYP and the buffer zone to save them from their own provocations. The Turkish side grumbles about UNFICYP (half of which is paid for by the Greeks and Greek Cypriots), but they tolerate it. They aren't too worried about war and aren't lobbying heavily to change the status quo because they enjoy decisive military superiority and the benefits of de facto partition currently outweigh the costs (a central argument of this paper is that these benefits rise with increased tension).

Despite these points, removing UNFICYP would be very risky and the probability of disaster resulting from removal outweighs the possible benefits. First, who or what would manage the land-grabbing that would result when UNFICYP gave up control of the buffer zone (three percent of Cyprus' land)? This alone could lead to war. Second, if there are 1000 recorded shooting, antagonism, and other incidents a year when there is a buffer zone separating the two sides, why is there any reason to believe that there would be less rather than more of these incidents if the two forces became face to face over the 180 kilometer border? Deterrence theorists would argue that removing the buffer zone would make the costs of conflict more obvious, and thus enhance deterrence (note that the real costs of conflict remain unchanged, with or without the buffer zone). On the other hand, there are two reasons why deterrence theorists may be wrong. This is because there are two groups of Greek Cypriots who may not be swayed by a relatively small shift in the perceived costs of conflict (here I am speaking of Greek Cypriots because I assume that if the Turkish side wasn't happy with the status quo, they would either use their superior force or negotiate more seriously to change it). In the first group are those who don't recognize Turkey's overwhelming superiority. They are likely to be so blinded by ethno-nationalism that they can not be deterred from provocations under any conditions. They are also likely to be willing to pay high costs to make political points. The second group is more subtle. They already don't want war, especially because they know they would lose. Thus, they too would scarcely be affected by a relatively small shift in the perceived costs of conflict. But this group still harbors hostility and contempt toward Turks and Turkish Cypriots. Their persistent ethno-nationalism is likely to lead to continued incidents along any common border. There may be fewer incidents because of the subtle increase in deterrence or there may be more incidents because of closer proximity. Whether there would be fewer or more incidents is indeterminate, so the real question then becomes: is war more likely when hundreds of incidents a year occur in a land with UNFICYP and a buffer zone or when hundreds of incidents occur in a land without them? UNFICYP and the buffer zone are preferable because of UNFICYP's demonstrated daily success in taming incidents.

In the end, I think removing UNFICYP would clearly increase the odds of war, while doing little to increase the odds of peace. Removal of UNFICYP could easily backfire and lead to war.

Third, the sorts of incidents described above underscore the utility of confidence-building measures such as unmanning along the buffer zone, not carrying loaded weapons, and establishing a code of conduct for behavior in and along the buffer zone. Those sincere about reducing tension should push for these and other incident-reducing measures.

Fourth, both sides have to get along after a solution or it invites strife and tragedy. The incidents I have described cast some doubt on the ability of the two sides to get along. Slingshotting and insulting don't cast a favorable light on either side. The shootings of last summer show outright Turkish brutality. No one had to die last summer. Violent demonstrations involving manipulated schoolchildren and motorcycle hooliganism³⁴ are needlessly provocative and do little to gain respect for the Greek Cypriot cause.

Why do the Greek Cypriots resort to risky and sometimes deadly provocations when they have most of the facts and international sympathy on their side?³⁵ From what I have learned and can deduce, the main reason for these provocations is to keep the international community engaged in trying to solve the Cyprus problem. Politicians may also be trying to achieve a level

³⁴ I was criticized by some at the conference for using this term. One argument against the term was that the demonstrators had a legal right to cross the buffer zone and go wherever they wanted in the North (the Government of Cyprus, the only internationally recognized government on Cyprus, claims sovereignty over the whole island). Another argument was that the term cast aspersions on motorcycle-riding patriots who felt strongly about the Cyprus problem. One person likened the violent demonstrations to the intifada.

I regret that my remarks caused some to feel badly. I recognize that not all motorcyclists are hooligans. And I don't want to anger those I am trying to persuade. Yet on balance I can not come up with a better term. As an outsider brought to the conference to present views from the outside, I feel that relaying these views without sugarcoating may help the Greek Cypriot cause and a Cyprus solution more generally by helping the Greek Cypriots avoid miscalculation.

The evidence presented here (repeated violence by motorcycle demonstrators, lack of sincerity, etc.) supports the term hooligan or a synonym for many if not most of the motorcycle demonstrators. It is also worth considering that that which is legal is not necessarily that which is wise. The real question for Greek Cypriots is not what is legal with respect to where the demonstrators can go but: "what is the best and most effective way to achieve a solution in which a permanent peace is established and the three freedoms (movement, property ownership, and settlement) are restored?"

³⁵ The point here is not to blame the victims but to question the wisdom of a strategy of provocation. The Turks did not have to kill anyone to prevent people from crossing their cease-fire line (or to return those that did manage to

of domestic mobilization -- keeping schoolchildren indoctrinated and keeping passions from waning.

I believe that a strategy of provocation achieves both these goals.³⁶ But I also believe that a strategy of provocation is self-defeating in the short and long term. Here is why:

- Provocations detract from the sympathy for the Greek Cypriot cause.³⁷ They hurt the moral authority of Greek Cypriot case. The violent demonstrations in particular are not those of Mahatma Gandhi or Martin Luther King.
- If the provocations work and create enough international pressure to lead to a solution, the solution is likely to be premature and break down. This will be in part due to the feelings of hostility perpetuated and inflamed by the provocations. The danger of break down is most acute under a federal solution in which hostile parties are forced to live and govern together. So if the international community is pushed to impose or coerce a solution, it may be compelled to push for partition or near-partition.
- The provocations and massed charges at the Turkish cease-fire lines create fear on the Turkish side and help them justify the presence of Turkish forces on Cyprus.³⁸ The more

cross). The Greek Cypriots didn't *make* the killings happen, the Turks did. However, two Greek Cypriots would be alive today had the demonstrators not entered the buffer zone.

³⁶ It is widely recognized (as has been indicated by some Government of Cyprus officials) that a principal motivation for the purchase of the S-300s as well as for provocations along the buffer zone is to focus attention on the Cyprus problem. For example, Michael Theodoulou reports in "Divided island faces critical year of talks," *The European*, April 3-9, 1997, p. 24 that "President Glafcos Clerides, the Greek Cypriot leader, attributes heightened US interest to Washington's realisation that the densely militarized island is not an 'extinct volcano,' and that any eruption could suck in the feuding Nato allies, Greece and Turkey."

Even more specifically, the evidence above makes quite clear why there is a "strategy" of provocation. To focus on the August demonstrations, politicians encouraged the motorcycle demonstration and President Clerides didn't try to stop it until it was too late to effectively do so (despite ample warning -- warnings which should not have even been necessary given the predictable, near inevitability of violence). Further, CYPOL was not just lax in its duties to prevent violations of the buffer zone, but it left checkpoints abandoned and removed barriers for the demonstrators. If the Government of Cyprus had wanted to prevent violence, it could have. What happened was quite the opposite.

The same goes for continued ethno-nationalism in textbooks and elsewhere, demonstrations by schoolchildren and so forth. If the government wanted to stop these things, it would try harder to do so. Technically, the Government of Cyprus has apologized for the violence against the Turkish Cypriots in the 1960s. However, that apology would mean a lot more if it were accompanied by a toning down of ethno-nationalist historical interpretation and propaganda.

³⁷ Many of these points apply equally, if not more, to the Turkish side.

³⁸ Likewise, the Turk's lethal brutality creates fears in the Greek Cypriot community. The Turkish Cypriots feel very vulnerable on Cyprus. But when the Greek Cypriots look out at the region, they are the ones who feel vulnerable.

provocative the Greek Cypriots are, the more viable these justifications will appear.³⁹ Protection of nationals and near-nationals is one of the two principal justifications for keeping Turkish forces on Cyprus.⁴⁰

- Increased provocations and violence and rising ethno-nationalism are likely to delay E.U. accession.
- Increased provocations and violence are likely to scare away tourists.⁴¹
- Finally, the provocations and violent demonstrations stiffen ethno-nationalist identities and increase each side's fears. They reflect and create rising ethno-nationalism. These effects are antithetical to a solution. To quote (as closely as my notes allow) Professor Caesar Mavratsas, University of Cyprus, from his April 5 presentation at the conference: "Greek Cypriot nationalism is incompatible with federation and the Greek Cypriots are anything but prepared for a federation."

UNFICYP'S ROLE IN A FUTURE SOLUTION

If there is a solution to the Cyprus problem and a peace agreement is signed, UNFICYP and the U.N. can play a large role during the transition and after. The U.N.'s record is modest, but it has been successful in a variety of missions and has proven that it can accomplish many

³⁹ Of course, the more Greek Cypriots the Turks kill, the worse Turkey's human rights problems become. These are already frequently cited as a barrier to further integration with the West.

⁴⁰ The other interest is to prevent Cyprus from becoming the final Greek or near-Greek island to encircle Turkey in the Mediterranean.

⁴¹ I would like to add two personal observations here. First, tourism creates friends of Cyprus. Second, there is a book where people, especially tourists, can write their comments about the Cyprus problem. This book (or series of books as they fill up quickly) is located at the Greek Cypriot observation post at the end of Ledra Street which abuts the buffer zone. Here tourists are invited to peer into the buffer zone, see barbed wire, and can see many photos depicting the pain-filled Greek version of the 1974 invasion. By far the most prevalent reaction of the writers is sadness about the whole situation on Cyprus.

Most of these comment writers ignore the propaganda that surrounds them at the end of Ledra Street and cut straight to the human side of the Cyprus tragedy. To see any land cut in two by barbed wire and U.N. patrol tracks is fundamentally sad. Everyone with a heart wants to see a solution to the Cyprus problem. The question is: does the degree of ethno-nationalism (and other factors which affect how peacefully the communities on Cyprus could live together) require the necessary expedient of continued separation?

things. The U.N.'s experience in Cambodia, Namibia, Central America, and elsewhere show that the U.N. can effectively serve the following functions that might be of use on Cyprus:

- Monitor the withdrawal of mainland military forces on Cyprus and verify the demilitarization. Withdrawal and demilitarization are a necessary part of any Cyprus solution.
- Supervise or monitor elections and help make sure they are fair and honest.
- Assist with other aspects of civil administration, in particular monitoring aspects of the post-solution government which may depend on various proportions of people from each side to work. Proportional representation/proportional civil service problems posed big problems from 1960-1964.⁴²
- Continue to help with coordination between the two zones in such areas as electricity, sewers, and so forth (as it does today).

The key to success with these functions is consent of the parties. A solution cannot be imposed on parties who are hostile and who are not ready to live together.

With respect to the buffer zone and peacekeeping, these functions hopefully won't be necessary after a solution is reached. Realistically, there is likely to be lingering hostility even after a solution is agreed upon, so it might be worth considering an UNFICYP presence during the transition period. The transition period might involve a temporary new buffer zone between the bi-zonal communities. UNFICYP could also conduct 1960s type patrolling - moving freely wherever the two communities have come back closer together and thus providing a pre-emptive calming effect. To signal a fresh start, it might help to rename UNFICYP and bring additional peacekeeping contingents.

A new buffer zone could also help the negotiations for a solution in the first place. What if both sides cannot agree on what percent of the land each of the bi-zonal zones is supposed to

⁴² Here a loose federation as proposed by Dr. Theophanous might be of help. Ideally though, a loose federation is only a starting point and to prevent it from being a stopping point requires cooperation between the two

represent? Say the Turkish Cypriots want 31% and the Greek Cypriots want 71%. Maybe a new buffer zone that took up two percent of the island could help make each side happy with 29% and 69% (respectively). The might happen because the remaining two percent of each side's bargaining position would have been ceded to the buffer zone, not the other side. UNDOF's creation on the Golan Heights helped in just this way. Each side could make "concessions" to the U.N. zone that they wouldn't make to each other.

With luck, some of these ideas will not be necessary or will only be necessary for a temporary period. Either way, UNFICYP and the U.N. will likely play an important role in coming to a solution and during the transition afterward.⁴³

communities. These points are made in Andreas Theophanous, "The Economic Aspects and Consequences of a Federal Solution to the Cyprus Problem," *Cyprus Review*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Fall 1994).

⁴³ Oliver Richmond's symposium paper focused on the role of mediation and mediators on Cyprus and discussed the U.N.'s good offices mission.

Part 3: Bicomunal Activities

*"The Greeks don't remember what happened before 1974 and the Turks can't forget it."*⁴⁴

UNFICYP is very active in promoting bicomunal activities. Other organizations and embassies are also involved in bicomunal activities. However, as the monitor of the buffer zone and principal intermediary between the two sides, UNFICYP must necessarily help coordinate bicomunal activities.

Two pictures I displayed on the overhead together at the conference are photocopied on the next page.

⁴⁴ Interview, Brigadier General Ahti Vartiainen, May 7, 1996.

Turkish Cypriot Picture Board on display at the checkpoint on the way into the "TRNC":

Greek Cypriot picture board on display at the Ledra Street tourist observation post:

The first photograph is of a Turkish Cypriot picture board, one of three, that one sees at the checkpoint on the way into the "TRNC". It shows pictures of death, destruction, and refugees. The words say "No more Massacres, No more Mass Graves since 1974 . . . Thanks to Turkey, Thanks to the Turkish Army, Thanks to Our Fighters."

The second photograph is of one of several Greek Cypriot picture boards at the Ledra Street tourist observation post. It too depicts death, destruction, and refugees. The captions say things like: "Churches are no exception to destruction."

What is the problem here? As the picture boards make clear, the two sides have profoundly different and incompatible views of history, views in which the other side is responsible for all the intercommunal ills on Cyprus while one's own side is only a victim. As a

former Force Commander of UNFICYP said: "The Greeks don't remember what happened before 1974 and the Turks can't forget it."⁴⁵

How is this related to bicomunal activities? These pictures highlight a fundamental problem that hinders coming to a solution and which portends danger if a solution is imposed prematurely: ethno-nationalism. For years, both sides have engaged in nationalistic propaganda, one-sided bias, and chauvinism in everything from the schools to the media to politics. For peace to last and for tragedy to be averted, this vilification and devil-imaging has got to stop. This is what bicomunal activities are trying to achieve. As the U.N. Secretary-General notes:

*Both sides must work more effectively to promote tolerance and reconciliation. Both have been wanting in this respect...the two sides, despite their professed aim of forging an agreed settlement and creating a bicomunal and bizonal federation, carry out an endless propaganda campaign against each other that is incompatible with this objective. Even school textbooks are not exempt from that campaign.*⁴⁶

⁴⁵ General Vartiainen, May 7, 1996.

⁴⁶ *Report of the Secretary-General, S/26777*, November 22, 1993, paragraph 102.

Bicommunal activities are meant to bring people from the two sides together, build confidence, and show each community the human face of the other. Despite some obstacles from the Turkish side, the frequency and number of people participating in bicommunal activities over the years has increased.⁴⁷

It is hard to measure exactly what effect bicommunal activities have, but I strongly believe in their usefulness. Such person-to-person confidence-building measures should continue well after an initial solution is reached. One problem with many current bicommunal activities is that they are relatively informal and undirected (jazz concerts, cultural activities, and the like). Any bicommunal activities are better than the alternative of no bicommunal activities. Ideally though, bicommunal activities should involve people in as directed an activity as possible.⁴⁸ Directed and purposeful activities in which people must cooperate to achieve shared goals are more likely to create true common interests and bonds.

I propose an idea that might help address the one-sided history and excess nationalism issue more directly. I call it the common history project. This project is no panacea, but it might be a step in the right direction. It would have to be one of many such steps. Over the course of years, these steps may, with luck and determination from the leaders and people on both sides, prepare the Cypriots for a solution in which the two sides can live together and share governance of Cyprus.

If the two sides work together and can establish a common history, this would be a sign of considerable promise that the two sides were in fact prepared to live together.

⁴⁷ Of all the bicommunal activities proposed, about 75% take place. The Turkish side is responsible for blocking 99% of the 25% that do not take place.

The common history project is not a fault assigning exercise but it cannot avoid being in part 'a who did exactly what to whom described as factually as possible' exercise. No doubt this is extremely difficult, but so is living together.

The Common History Project

I propose two ideas for establishing a common history. The first is to set up a joint history commission of primarily Greek and Turkish Cypriot scholars and have them write what would become a definitive political history of Cyprus. They could be helped by a team of U.N. and outside experts. The commission might do well to include mainland Greek and Turkish, and perhaps British scholars as well, although the Cypriots would remain in charge. The U.N. and outside experts would be most useful at the start in setting up the agenda and figuring out exactly what topics should be covered in which order. The first goal would be to establish as detailed an outline as possible for the study. The next step would be for each side to go off and write its own history, hewing tightly to the outline.

Then, when the resulting tomes were compared, it would reveal the specific differences between the two sides' versions of history and where more research needed to be done. At this point, the hard work of ironing out the differences would really begin. Here again the U.N. and outside experts could be of assistance, but only up to a point. The project would lose some of its legitimacy and its purpose would be vitiated if the Cypriots were forced by outsiders to accept one interpretation over another. That said, the outside experts could help separate fact from assertion, help conduct more research,

⁴⁸ There are many other confidence-building measures that are possible along these lines and which could build what students of interdependence call cross-cutting linkages. Oliver Richmond's symposium paper

help establish what the facts really were, and reduce the extent to which interpretations were necessary.

The second idea would be to set up an outside history commission of primarily outside experts to write the history. This would have the advantage of overcoming what could well be gridlock if the project were left in the hands of Cypriots. However, if the conditions are there for gridlock between the Cypriots in the first place, then it is also likely that the results of the outside history commission's study would be disputed. Perhaps the joint history commission and the outside history commission could operate simultaneously. They could submit their works together and begin the ironing out process described above. My hunch is that the outside history commission is a distant second best idea.

Of course there are several possible objections to the common history project. Perhaps it would just crystallize differences. Perhaps the cooperation needed to resolve differences in interpretation is of such magnitude that the project (especially the joint history commission) could only be completed if the Cyprus problem was close to being resolved in the first place.

A senior U.N./UNFICYP official's objections to a truth commission concerning the missing persons are relevant. He said "what is truth anyway? ... 1500 Greek Cypriots and 500 Turkish Cypriots are dead, and most of the 1500 were soldiers ... Nothing can really be justified. How do you solve this thing? By dragging out the past? You shouldn't divide the fault 60:40 or 70:30. Instead, the two sides should cry together."⁴⁹

mentioned a number of these, as does Dr. Theophanous' previously cited *Cyprus Review* article.

⁴⁹ Interview, Gustave Feissel, UNFICYP Chief of Mission and U.N. Deputy Special Representative, May 8, 1996.

I agree that the two sides should cry together. They have caused each other much pain. However, how do you get each side to accept that fact? At present, both sides are too filled with one-sided, biased history to do so. The blame for the pain is divided 100:0 and 0:100. The prospect of joint crying seems further away than the prospect of ironing out differences in historical interpretation. Cyprus is a tragic island and there is a lot to cry about. I believe that establishing a common history would help exorcize the tragedy and promote peace.

The common history project may sound like the optimistic musings of a distant academic. But it is at least as realistic as achieving a peaceful solution. Two sides which vilify each other so much they can't even start this sort of project aren't likely to be ready for peace. On a more positive note, two sides which can complete this project are more likely to be ready for peace and the process of working on the project may in itself help bring the sides closer.

Conclusions

This paper has tried to highlight the dangers of military buildups and provocations that raise tensions and deepen ethno-nationalism on Cyprus. Rising tension and ethno-nationalism run counter to every goal that Cyprus is trying to achieve. In particular, they make a federal solution to the Cyprus problem dangerous because such a solution would force hostile parties to live and govern together. Instead of peace, a premature solution would cause gridlock in the federal government and exacerbate intercommunal strife. This strife could lead to wider conflict.

Greek Cypriot military buildups and joint defense dogmas only add marginally to deterrence. This benefit must be compared to the costs of increased tension, threats of military attack, and making it harder for strategic reasons for Turkey to give up its bases on Cyprus.

Greek Cypriot provocations and violent demonstrations also help cause rising ethno-nationalism and rising tension. High levels of ethno-nationalism and tension will delay Cyprus' E.U. accession, scare away tourists, help the Turkish side argue that their forces are necessary on the island to protect their nationals and the Turkish Cypriots, lessen sympathy for the Greek Cypriot cause, hurt the moral authority of Greek Cypriot case, and make it dangerous to arrive at a federal solution to the Cyprus problem.

Turkish lethal force and bellicosity also contribute rising ethno-nationalism and tensions. Such provocations are counter-productive for Turkey and Turkish Cypriots as well.

These arguments do not mean that Cyprus and the international community cannot benefit from the current focus on the Cyprus problem. On the contrary. The opportunity should be seized to undertake confidence-building and goodwill measures that might reduce ethno-nationalism and tensions. However, these underlying problems currently make a federal solution premature. The ground must be prepared before a solution is reached.

The future will test many of my arguments. During the summer of 1997, how will politicians and leaders commemorate those who died in the summer of 1996? Will the candidates in the February 1998 Greek Cypriot presidential election stir up divisive ethno-nationalist passions? Or will they be more constructive?

It will be a good sign if the candidates compete to try to create the conditions for a lasting peaceful settlement. Perhaps they will compete to offer more creative confidence-building and goodwill measures. Perhaps the candidates will courageously and frankly address the problem of ethno-nationalism. Perhaps they will propose ways to reduce propaganda in schoolbooks and elsewhere on Cyprus.

These ideas cannot hurt Greek Cypriot security, can either encourage the Turkish side or make their obstinacy obvious, can help with E.U. accession, and can help promote a peaceful settlement.