This course explores the causes and consequences of American foreign policy since 1898. Course readings cover both substantive and methods topics. Four substantive topics are covered: (1) major theories of American foreign policy; (2) major episodes in the history of American foreign policy and historical/interpretive controversies about them; (3) the evaluation of major past American foreign policies—were their results good or bad?; and (4) current policy controversies, including means of evaluating proposed policies. Three methods topics are covered: (1) basic social scientific inference—what are theories? what are good theories? how should theories be framed and tested? (2) historical investigative methodology, including archival research, and, most importantly, (3) case study methodology. Historical episodes covered in the course are used as raw material for case studies, asking "if these episodes were the subject of case studies, how should those studies be performed, and what could be learned from them?"

Course requirements: students will be asked to write 2 short papers (6-10 page typed double spaced pages) and four 1-page exercises. One of the 6-10 page papers will be a case study; the other can be a case study or a policy evaluation. The 1-page exercises are due Feb. 18, Feb. 25, March 4, and March 11. The papers are due Friday April 22 and Monday May 16.

This is a graduate course. It is focused on considering how to write Ph.D. dissertations in the field of international relations and/or U.S. foreign policy. It is open to undergraduates by permission of the instructor only. Most undergraduates should instead take 17.40, American Foreign Policy (to be given in Fall 2011).

Recommended for purchase:

- Justus D. Doenecke and John E. Wilz, From Isolation to War, 1931-1941, 3rd ed. (Wheeling, Ill.: Harlan Davidson, 2003).

All will be at the MIT COOP. You should also be able to get them through Amazon.com or BarnesandNoble.com.

Also at the COOP, and recommended:


Some 50 pages of Paterson et al. are assigned. The rest is recommended for those in need of remedial history. So you might consider buying it as well. Turabian is a style reference book you should own and obey.

These books are also on reserve at Dewey library (building E-53, on Wadsworth Street). Most other assigned readings will be will be available online through Stellar, the MIT online syllabus service. A few assigned readings may be handed out in class.

Readings in the books for purchase listed above are denoted below with an "B"; readings on Stellar are denoted below with an "S"; readings that are handed out in class are denoted below with an "H".

I. THEORIES OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

Feb. 4: Hypotheses, Laws, Theories and Case Studies

The course will be previewed. And a preview of Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science and Diamond and Robinson, *Natural Experiments in History* (assigned for next week) will be offered.

Feb. 11, 18, 25: Theories of American Foreign Policy

A. Framing and testing theories
   B 2. Ibid., pp. 89-96 ("What is a Political Science Dissertation?"). We define the range of acceptable topics too narrowly. All political science Ph.D. dissertations needn't invent or test a theory. There are other important--and sometimes easier--things to do.
   S 3. Jared Diamond and James A. Robinson, "Afterword," in Jared Diamond and James A. Robinson, eds., *Natural Experiments of History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010): 257-75. Controlled experiments offer strong tests of theories but are often infeasible for political scientists. Some argue that "natural experiments" and "quasi-experiments" can offer equally strong tests of theories. Maybe we should keep a sharp eye out for them.

Note: a glance at the section introductions in Ikenberry, AFP, will ease the following reading. (6th ed. pages are 53-4, 127-8, 219, 301-2, 401, 479, 551; 4th ed. pages are pp. 59-60, 137-138, 203-204, 297-298, 395-395, 465-466, 573-574; .)

B. Systemic explanations: "the environment governs conduct."
tendency of states to threaten others' security by their efforts to secure themselves. Can explanations for American conduct be inferred from this famous piece? If so, how much American conduct can Jervis' theory explain?


S 4. Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances, chapter 2 ("Explaining Alliance Formation"), pp. 17-49. More on how states respond to their environment, with some domestic hypotheses thrown in. Relevant to U.S. conduct?

C. Economic explanations.


D. National Values and Domestic Institutions as causes.


S 5. Review again here Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances, chapter 2 ("Explaining Alliance Formation"), pp. 33-40 (assigned above). Common ideology as an explanation for alliance behavior. Is common ideology a glue or a solvent of alliance ties? Do we need research that measures the power of ideology as glue vs. nationalism as a solvent of alliances?
E. Bureaucratic behavior and pathology as explanation.


S 2. James C. Thompson, Jr., "How Could Vietnam Happen? An Autopsy," in Ikenberry, AFP, 4th ed (sadly omitted from later editions), pp. 454-463. A famous analysis that points to pathologies in how the government thinks. Experts are purged, analysts are silenced by fear of punishment for speaking politically incorrect truths, etc.


F. Misperception as explanation.


wield influence through such machinations?


S 11. Jeffrey Birnbaum, "The Influence Merchants," Fortune, December 7, 1998, pp. 134-152 but read only pp. 134-135 and the chart on 137. A “delphi method” survey reveals that Washington insiders rank the Israel lobby the second most powerful lobby in Washington—behind only the AARP and ahead of the NRA, the AMA, the AFL-CIO, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the VFW, and others. Can we believe the results of a delphi study like this?


More writings on the Israel lobby are found online at www.americantaskforce.org/Israellobby.htm.


painting themselves in rose-colored hues.


S 18. Irving Janis, "Escalation of the Vietnam War: How Could it Happen?" in Ikenberry, AFP, 4th ed (sadly omitted from later editions), pp. 544-572. "Groupthink" as the cause of national misperception. Janis points to pathologies much like those identified by Thompson ("How Could Vietnam Happen", above), but Janis' theory is wholly different (Janis points to psychological causes, Thompson to bureaucratic causes). Could these two theories of national misperception be tested against each other?

S 19. Aaron Wildavsky, "The Self-Evaluating Organization," Public Administration Review, Vol. 32, No. 5 (September/October 1972): 509-520. Wildavsky argues that organizations (including government organizations) cannot evaluate their own performance. Sub-units that are created to evaluate will be coopted, deterred, or destroyed by the larger organization. Does this help explain the sluggish learning and frequent stupidity of governments?

G. Public opinion dynamics as explanation.


S 2. Patricia Cohen, "Great Caesar's Ghost! Are Traditional History Courses Vanishing?", New York Times, June 11, 2009. The study of political, diplomatic and military history is being marginalized or destroyed in American universities. Some find this dangerous. Will an increasingly ignorant American public will choose unwisely on fateful security matters? As Santayana warned: "Those who forget the past are condemned to repeat it."

H. Theories of the consequences of U.S. foreign policy: the domino theory, the credibility theory, theories and factual assumptions about nationalism.

II. AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGIES; OTHER POLICY DEBATES

March 4: Contending grand strategies past and present

Cold War era U.S. strategy (1947-1989):
S 1. World map scaled to national gross domestic products, from The New York Times Magazine, November 7, 1976, p. 35, designed by Edwin O. Reischauer; and tables from Paul Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, and Kenneth Oye, ed., Eagle in a New World. Please focus on the map and tables 6, 17, 18, 31, 35, 41, and chart 2 on pages 3, 6, 7, 15, 16, 19, and 20 (handwritten numeration). Data on the relative GDPs of the states and regions of the world is summarized in these tables, and depicted in the world map. Many 20th century realists believed that this data defined the global distribution of power, and should define U.S. grand strategy. This data was the starting point for those who shaped the policies of the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration, and those who framed early U.S. Cold War strategy, including George F. Kennan and public commentators like Walter Lippmann. Were they right to find large meaning in this data? Should we continue to focus on this data today? (Does GDP still define national power?)


Post-Cold War era strategy, pre-9/11 (1989-2001):


Post-Cold War era strategy, post-9/11 (2001-present):

S 1. Stephen Van Evera, "A Farewell to Geopolitics," in Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro, eds., To Lead the World: American Strategy after the Bush Doctrine (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, July 2008): 11-35. Other major powers no longer pose much threat to U.S. national security. But WMD terror and climate change are growing dangers. Thus the world again resembles 1815, when the greatest threat to the European powers was from below (specifically, from revolution), not from each
other. As in 1815 the right response is a concert strategy—a broad cooperation of all powers against WMD spread, WMD terror, and climate change.

S 2. Barry R. Posen, "The Case for Restraint," in Ikenberry, AFP, 6th ed., pp. 552-580. Posen argues that the U.S. creates more trouble than it solves by its global activism. A far more restrained U.S. grand strategy would be better. Critics responses, and Posen's response to the responses, are also found here. See also comments on Posen's article by distinguished scholars.


S 4. David E. Sanger, "Bush to Formalize A Defense Policy of Hitting First," New York Times, June 17, 2002. The Bush Administration embraced a general doctrine of preventive war against rogue states that aspire to develop weapons of mass destruction. Iraq was one of several rogue states that some in the Bush administration hoped to attack. Good idea?


For more discussion of the 2002 U.S. strategy statement see the "Defense Strategy Review Page" of the Project on Defense Alternatives, at www.comw.org/qdr/.

B 6. G. John Ikenberry, "America's Imperial Ambition," in Ikenberry, AFP, 5th ed., pp. 564-575 (omitted from the 6th ed). Reprinted From Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 5 (September/October 2002). An article from early in the George W. Bush Administration, arguing that the Bush team has embarked on a fateful imperial rampage. It will end badly. Others will eventually coalesce to check the U.S.


Lind argues that the Bush 43 coalition includes dangerous elements, including millennialist Christians who want to take U.S. Mideast policy in dangerous directions.


March 11: The War on Terror; other national security policy issues.

S 1. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror 2nd ed. (NY: Random House, 2003): 38-55, 61-68, 91-94, 419-489. Pages 38-55, 62-68, 91-94 describe the Islamist currents of thinking that spawned Osama Bin Laden's Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda's violence stems from a stream of Islamist thought going back to ibn Taymiyya, a bellicose Islamic thinker from the 13th century; to Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792), the harsh and rigid shaper of modern Saudi Arabian Islam; to Rashid Rida (1866-1935) and Hassan al-Banna (?-1949); and above all to Sayyid Qutb (?-1966), the shaper of modern Islamism. Taymiyya, al-Wahhab and Qutb are covered here. Covered also (pp. 91-94) is the frightening rise of apocalyptic thinking in the Islamic world. What causes the murderous thinking described here?

Pages 419-446 is a terrifying survey of the rise of nihilistic madness in a number of the world's great religions. Isn't the millennialist thinking described here likely at some point to lead believers in these views to use weapons of mass destruction on cities? What should the U.S. do about this threat??

Pages 447-489 surveys and evaluates Bush 43 administration counter-terror strategies.

Not assigned but also valuable are pp. 219-393, a survey of Clinton administration counter-terror strategies and policies. They are recommended.


S 4. Graham Allison, "How to Stop Nuclear Terror," Foreign Affairs,
Vol. 83, No. 1 (January/February 2004): 64-74. A plan for action to prevent a disaster that we better prevent! (We will return to this subject in the last class period.)

S 5. Graham Allison, "A Failure to Imagine the Worst," Foreign Policy, January 25, 2010. Many Americans underestimate the risk and consequences of a terrorist nuclear attack on the U.S. Will facts be enough to wake them from their torpor or will a bright flash be necessary?


S 10. National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 2005): 6-9. This summarizes Bush administration thinking on how to defeat Al Qaeda. Note the list on page 8 of eight major terrorist vulnerabilities to be targeted. Behind this strategy is the view that terrorist networks are like organisms whose care and feeding can be disrupted if their needs are understood.

S 11. Martin Rees, Our Final Hour: A Scientist's Warning: How Terror, Error, and Environmental Disaster Threaten Humankind's Future in this Century—On Earth and Beyond (NY: Basic Books, 2003): 41-60, 73-88. The advance of science has a fearsome byproduct: we are discovering ever more powerful means of destruction. These destructive powers are being democratized: the mayhem that only major states can do today may lie within the capacity of millions of individuals in the future unless we somehow change course. Deterrence works against states but will fail against crazed non-state organizations or individuals. How can the spread of destructive powers be controlled?

We will return to this subject in the last class period.

For more on controlling the long term bioweapons danger see www.cissm.umd.edu/documents/pathogensmonograph.pdf

For more on Al Qaeda and the war on terror see www.lib.edu/govdoc/911.html, where Al Qaeda statements and other information are found.
March 18: Other policy issues and debates

A. Policy debates

On ethics and human rights:

S 1. Leslie H. Gelb and Justine A. Rosenthal, "The Rise of Ethics in Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 3 (May/June 2003): 2-7. Ethical concerns once played little role in U.S. foreign policy; now they have an important place at the table.

On supporting national self-determination:


On saving failed states:


On "preventive diplomacy" (action to forestall all wars and human rights horrors):

S 1. Chaim Kaufmann, "See No Evil," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 4 (July/August 2002): 142-149. The U.S. could have stopped genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and elsewhere but chose not to. Good choice? Should the U.S. intervene to prevent such horrors?

Does this subject need more study?

On intervention to promote democracy:


S 3. Sylvia Nasar, "It's Never Fair to Just Blame the Weather," New York Times, January 17, 1993, p. E1. Third world democracy is good: it serves publics far better than authoritarian regimes. For example, democracies are far better at saving their citizens from starvation during famine. Dramatic evidence! (But compare with Noble, below.)

in this instance. Dramatic evidence! (But compare with Nasar, above.)

S 5. Benjamin Valentino, "Still Standing By: Why America and the International Community Fail to Prevent Genocide and Mass Killing," Perspectives on Politics 1:3 (September 2003): 565-578. Humanitarian intervention often fails to produce good results. The most effective way to intervene can be to help victims of mass killing escape their killers, not to oust killers from power. Ouster is nice but hard and messy.

On occupations, occupationology:


On U.S. defense policy:


For detail on current budget issues (but not assigned) see Cindy Williams, "The U.S. Defense Budget," Testimony before the Committee on the Budget, United State Senate (February 23, 2010), online at the MIT SSP website.

An excellent history syllabus on late Cold War U.S. security policy by Prof. Frank Gavin of the University of Texas is at http://uts.cc.utexas.edu/~gavinprp/. See it for specific advice on historical research and security research topics.

On protecting the global commons--e.g., the global environment and global public health:

S 1. Andrew C. Revkin, "Scientists Say a Quest for Clean Energy Must Begin Now," New York Times, November 1, 2002. A 2002 study warns that we must start looking for clean energy sources now or we may destroy the planet. Later may be too late. This will require broad international cooperation. Sadly we're not very good at international cooperation. In fact, we've done nothing since this article was published. Oh dear.

S 2. Keith Bradsher, "Bird Flu is Back, Raising Fear of Spread Among Humans," New York Times, August 30, 2004. The 1918 flu killed 675,000 Americans--more than the two World Wars combined. Bummer. Could it happen again? Maybe! The particular flu virus discussed here, the highly lethal H5N1, has not become contagious between humans, but another lethal virus might. An answer may lie in worldwide preventive action. Again, everyone must cooperate. Hence this is a foreign policy problem.

On foreign aid, does it work, why we do it:
On women's rights and welfare:

S 1. Isobel Coleman, "The Better Half," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 1 (January/February, 2010): 126-130. Nicholas Kristof and Sheryl WuDunn's book, reviewed here, argues that when women are empowered, many evils abate and many good things ensue, including economic development, better governance, reduced population growth, and preservation of the environment. Should the empowerment of women be a prime goal of US foreign policy? If so, how can it be achieved?

B. Segue to Cases: the Case Study Method. How Should Case Studies Be Performed?


- Criticisms of this piece published in the Fall 1999 issue of *International Security*.


11. Skim through syllabi for courses on qualitative methods taught in political science departments around the United States on the web at http://www1.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/cqrm/Syllabus_Database/. And see also the syllabus used by the Institute on Qualitative and Multi-Method Research at Syracuse University, online at http://www1.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/cqrm/Schedule_and_Reading_List_for_2010_Institute/.

In the past the "methods" field in political science was often assumed to consist solely of large-n (statistical) methods. While statistics courses were required at most schools, case study methods often were untaught. Case methods now get more attention, as these syllabi illustrate.

The IQRM student seminar is a valuable experience. The MIT political science department and MIT Center for International Studies usually fund several MIT political science graduate students to go, all expenses paid (but do remember to thank Dick Samuels and Rick Locke, they deserve it). Inquire about it. Maybe you can go.

Another valuable experience that will develop your methods skills is the George Washington University Summer Institute for Conducting Archival Research (SICAR). Go there for a few days next summer and learn the secrets of plumbing the archives.

III. CASE HISTORIES: AMERICAN WARS, CRISES AND INTERVENTIONS

April 1, 8 (THERE IS NO CLASS on March 25--spring break): The Filipino-Spanish-American War; World War I; World War II; Historical methods


- Chapters 2, 3, and first part of chapter 6 (pp. 34-67, 110-113). Healy says that the U.S. had a large imperialist
movement in the 1890s, but that its eyes were not on the Philippines.

Page 12: note evidence of a European intent to carve up China, emerging in late 1897 and early 1898.


S 10. Marc Trachtenberg, The Craft of International History: A Guide to Method (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), chapters 3-5 ("The Critical Analysis of Historical Texts"; "Developing an Interpretation through Textual Analysis"; and "Working With Documents"), pp. 51-169, and appendixes 1 and 2, pp. 199-256 (just look the appendices over quickly to get an idea what you can learn from them, don't try to memorize them). Also worth a gander but not assigned is chapter 2, "Diplomatic History and International Relations Theory." Read chapter 4
first, on the outbreak of the Pacific War. This chapter develops Trachtenberg’s remarkable argument that FDR deliberately provoked war with Japan to bring the U.S. into war with Germany.

April 15: The Cold War, Korea, the 1950s; the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis

A. The Cold War and Korea.


S 3. John Lewis Gaddis, "The Tragedy of Cold War History," Diplomatic History, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Winter 1993), pp. 1-17. Cold War hawks were right. The U.S. could not have avoided the Cold War. Stalin was dangerously crazed.

S 4. Melvyn P. Leffler, "Inside Enemy Archives," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 4 (July/August 1996), pp. 120-135. Cold War hawks were wrong on some important points. Stalin hoped to cooperate with the United States after World War II. The Cold War was essentially inadvertent. The Soviets didn't cook up the Korean or Angolan wars.

S 5. James I. Matray, "Civil is a Dumb Name for a War," Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Newsletter, Vol. 26, No. 4 (December 1995), pp. 1-15. A historian frames the unresolved debates over the Korean war. What research would push these debates toward resolution? How should a case study that addressed them be framed?

S 6. Jerald A. Combs, American Diplomatic History: Two Centuries of Changing Interpretations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 197-198, 258-281. The present changes our understanding of the past. Should history work this way? Students interested in the writing of history and in the creation of political ideas should explore further in this excellent book, now sadly out of print. (More of it is assigned below.)

B. Cuban Missile Crisis 1962


For more on the Cuban Missile Crisis, visit an excellent website on the crisis put together by the [National Security Archive](www.nsarchive.org/nsa/cuba_mis_cri). Documents can be seen, tapes can be listened to, and intelligence photos can be viewed at this site. And for more sources on the crisis see a website from Harvard's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, [www.cubanmissilecrisis.org](http://www.cubanmissilecrisis.org).

**ST 4.** Jean Edward Smith, "The Peace Presidents," *New York Times*, May 9, 2007. Is history written to emphasize the uses of force by Presidents, and to downplay their horsetrading and compromise? The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis was settled by concessions from both sides, although Kennedy hid the U.S. concessions from public view and painted the outcome as a pure Soviet backdown. Smith notes that other war-hero presidents, including Grant and Eisenhower, eschewed force and cut deals at important moments, and more often than popular history remembers. Grant was quite a peacenick! George Washington also stood against strong hawkish criticism to reach Jay's treaty, which avoided war with Britain; and John Adams resisted strong demands for war with France, losing office as a result. But their policies look good in retrospect.

**C. An Adventure in the Archives.** Also assigned for this week: a document treasure hunt in the Harvard Government Documents library declassified documents collection; and/or in the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, which holds most of the Kennedy Administration's archives.

More on this later.

A relevant snippet is:

**S 1.** Tim Weiner, "Keeping the Secrets that Everyone Knows," *New York Times*, October 30, 1994, p. 16E. The JFK library is hiding the record from us.

As preparation for the Adventure please also consult the appendices to Marc Trachtenberg's book *Craft of International History*. Also very useful are the online versions of these appendices, replete with links to the sources he mentions in that book, at [www.polisci.ucla.edu/faculty/trachtenberg/methbk/Appendix1.html](http://www.polisci.ucla.edu/faculty/trachtenberg/methbk/Appendix1.html) and [www.polisci.ucla.edu/faculty/trachtenberg/methbk/Appendix1(links).htm](http://www.polisci.ucla.edu/faculty/trachtenberg/methbk/Appendix1(links).htm).

**April 22: The Indochina War, 1945-1975; The Iraq war of 1991**

**B 1.** Herring, *America's Longest War*, chapters 4 and 7 (pp. 131-169, 271-320 in the 4th edition). The standard account, from a middle-of-the-road perspective, of the key decisions to escalate and de-escalate the war.

**S 2.** Sol W. Sanders & William Henderson, "The Consequences of 'Vietnam'", *Orbis*, vol. 21, no. 1 (Spring 1977), pp. 61-76. The authors re-evaluate the propositions at issue in the debate over the war, concluding that postwar events show that the hawks were right, and the doves wrong.

**S 3.** Clark Clifford with Richard Holbrooke, *Counsel to the President*
A short counterpoint to Sanders and Henderson.


S 5. Jerald A. Combs, American Diplomatic History: Two Centuries of Changing Interpretations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 299-300, 367-383. More on the impact of the present on the past. Indochina transformed the academic study of American diplomatic history; pre-Vietnam episodes were now reinterpreted more critically. (Should history work this way?)


May 29: Other U.S. Third World interventions; the second Iraq War, 2003-


S 5. Peter J. Schraeder, "Paramilitary Intervention," in Peter J. Schraeder, ed., Intervention Into the 1990s, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992), chapter 8, pp. 131-151; focus on pp. 137-149 ("The Reagan Doctrine and Paramilitary Intervention"), skim the rest. (The version posted on STELLAR may be from the 1990 edition, in which case these pages are wrong. But the
older edition works fine: find the "Reagan Doctrine and Paramilitary Intervention" section and read it.) What policies flowed from the Reagan Doctrine? The four wars waged under its rubric are described here.


IV. CONCLUSION

May 6: Current crises; the future of American foreign policy


S 2. Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, "The Coming Conflict with America," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 18-32. America's China doves (e.g., Robert Ross) are wrong wrong wrong. The U.S. and China are on a collision course, and the U.S. should stay on it. (This article is from 1997 but the view it frames has influential adherents in the U.S. today.)

S 3. Aaron L. Friedberg and Robert Ross, "Here Be Dragons: Is China a Military Threat?" The National Interest, No. 103 (September/October 2009): 19-34. Is China 10 feet tall or 2 feet tall? What research could narrow the disagreement between the two authors?

S 4. "Robert H. Frank, "A Small Price for a Large Benefit," New York Times, February 21, 2010. Climate change is real and dangerous. We face a 10 percent chance of a catastrophic 12-degree climb in temperatures by 2100. And: we can prevent catastrophic climate change at modest cost. Maybe we should do it!

S 5. Ruth Greenspan Bell, "What to Do About Climate Change," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 3 (May/June 2006): 105-114. Bell outlines a program for action to address the grave and growing danger of climate change.

from the government. This is a recipe for immense calamity. Isn't it obvious that unless we take prompt action terrorists will get hold of nuclear materials, make nuclear weapons, and nuke us until we glow?

S 7. Review again Allison, "How to Stop Nuclear Terror," and Rees, Our Final Hour, assigned above. What policy toward the spread of weapons of mass destruction should the U.S. pursue?


S 9. David D. Newsom, "Foreign Policy and Academia," Foreign Policy, No. 101 (Winter 1995-96), pp. 52-67. Read only pp. 62-66 ("Communication Problems"), lightly skim the rest. Academics are obfuscatory, amphibolous, obscurantist, and recondite. Also, they are hard to understand. Should they address their work to real people once in a while?

S 10. Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Scholars on the Sidelines," Washington Post, April 13, 2009: A15. Political scientists increasingly focus on questions of little concern to the wider world. Is this ok? If Nye is right, why should the wider society pay our upkeep? Are we not parasites? What can be done about the situation Nye describes?

B 11. Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, pp. 117-121 ("Professional Ethics"). Does political science need professional ethics? If so, what should they be?

S 12. Oliver Staley, "Goldman Harvard Recruit Pledges to Do No Harm, Fights For Oath," Bloomberg.com, May 20, 2010. A code of ethics is proposed for Harvard Business School graduates. Should political scientists have such an oath? Would they better serve the world if they did?


S 14. Stephen Van Evera, "Trends in Political Science and the Future of Security Studies," Security Studies Program Annual Report 2009-2010 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Security Studies Program, November 2010). Two issues are considered: (1) What skills does the political science field need in order to be a strong science? Is causal inference the only skill, or are other skills also important? (2) How to choose between quantitative and qualitative methods?

B 15. Review again Van Evera, "What is a Political Science Ph.D. Dissertation?", Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, pp. 67-72 (discussed in first class). What should be the field agenda?