CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF WAR: THEORY AND METHOD

This course explores the causes of modern war with a focus on preventable causes. We cover theoretical, historical, and methodological topics. Major theories of war are surveyed and assessed in the first few weeks of the class, asking at each stage: Are these good theories? How could they be tested? How much can they explain? Also discussed: case study methodology; and the identification and use of natural experiments from history. The rest of the course explores the history of the outbreak of some major wars. We ask how these wars can best be explained. We also use these wars as raw material for case studies, asking "if these episodes were explored as case studies, how should those studies be performed, and what could be learned from them?" A related activity: we ask if these cases contain events that have attributes of controlled experiments, and if so, what can be learned from them.

Course requirements: Students will write several 1-page exercises early in the term, and two short papers (~6-9 typed doublespaced pages) later in the term. One of the ~6-9 page papers will be a case study--that is, a study that tests general hypotheses about war, or a study that explains the case--"why did this war happen?" The second paper can be another case study; or it can be an assessment of a theory or theories of the causes of war, to include your own theory, if you have one. These topics are negotiable with the instructors.

This is a graduate course open to undergraduates by permission of the instructors.

Recommended for purchase at the MIT Coop:

Also at the COOP, but only recommended:


None of Cashman is assigned but it is a useful synopsis of important hypotheses. Turabian is a style reference that you should own and obey.

All other readings will be available online through Stellar.

Readings in books available in the COOP bookstore are denoted below with a "B"; course notes readings available on Stellar are denoted below with a "S"; handouts are denoted with an "H".
I. INTRODUCTION: FRAMING, TESTING AND USING THEORIES (1 class)

Class 1 (9/15, 3:00 p.m.): Hypotheses, Laws, Theories, Case Studies, & Natural Experiments from History (1 class)

The course will be previewed. And a preview of Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, Van Evera, "Natural Experiments," Diamond and Robinson, and Smith and Pell (assigned for next week) will be offered. Read them for this class if you have a chance.

II. SPECIAL CLASSES ON WORLD WAR I AND THE PACIFIC WAR (2 classes)

Class 2 (9/15, 5:30-7:30 p.m.): Origins of World War I: Did Germany Want the War? Did Germany Cause the War? with guest Marc Trachtenberg, in E53-482

S 1. Imanuel Geiss, German Foreign Policy, 1871-1914 (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976), pp. vii-ix, 121-37, 139-50, 156-57, 163-72, 206-8. Geiss's book summarizes the views of the "Fischer School" of German historiography. Fischerites argue that Germany wanted a general war in 1914, and German aggression was a prime cause of the war. Geiss draws heavily on Fritz Fischer's 1969 book War of Illusions, which is the cornerstone work of the Fischer School. Pages 121-27 recount Germany's self-encirclement by belligerent policies. Pages 128-37 recount Germany's offensive against this "encirclement," including efforts to ensure British neutrality in a possible European war. Also recounted here (pp. 135-37): rising public belligerence in Germany. Pages 139-50 detail the occurrence and aftermath of the War Council of 8 December 1912, a centerpiece of the Fischer school case for German responsibility for the war. Pages 156-7 describe German anxiety over the decay of Austria Hungary. Page 163-72 describe the "blank checks" that the German government issued to Austria in July 1914, and subsequent German policy in the July crisis. Pages 206-207 reprint a diary entry by Admiral Müller, discovered only in the 1960s, that records the December 8 1912 "War Council." Fischerites claim this entry is a "smoking gun" for their case against Germany. Pages 207-8 recount a May or June 1914 conversation in which German army chief of staff Helmut von Moltke urges German foreign secretary Jagow to provoke war with Russia.

Please read with particular care pages 140-150, 206-8.

Despite evidence reported here many find Fisher and Geiss unpersuasive. How can this dispute be resolved?
S 2. Marc Trachtenberg, "New Light on 1914?" (Manuscript, July 29, 2015), 56 pp. A criticism of Fischer's Germany-blaming explanation for World War I. Trachtenberg argues that Fritz Fischer's War of Illusions offers a badly flawed recounting of key evidence. Trachtenberg also notes that Russian and French leaders were also in a belligerent frame of mind in 1914. Some Russian leaders expressed a desire for war, and Russian officers spoke of destroying Germany. Top French officers believed 1914 was a favorable moment for war. If so, Germany is hardly the only responsible party for the war.


Class 3 (9/16, 6:00-8:00 p.m.): Origins of The Pacific War, 1941-1945: Did FDR Want the War? Did FDR Cause the War? with guest Marc Trachtenberg, in E53-482


AND: Can political scientists be historians?

III. HYPOTHESES ON THE CAUSES OF WAR (4 classes)

Classes 4, 5 (9/22, 9/29): Framing and testing theories; and power and war. Subtopics on power and war: military-related causes of war, and aggregate power distributions and war.

A. Framing and testing theories


B 2. Ibid., pp. 89-96 ("What is a Political Science Dissertation?"). We define the range of acceptable topics too narrowly. All political science Ph.D. dissertations needn't test a theory. There are other important things to do.

S 3. Stephen Van Evera, "Natural Experiments" (manuscript, 2012). A primer on natural experiments from history. Controlled experiments offer strong tests of theories but are often infeasible for IR scholars. Some argue that "quasi-experiments," a.k.a, "natural experiments from history" can offer equally strong tests of theories. Maybe we should look for them.


S 5. Gordon C.S. Smith and Jill P. Pell, "Parachute Use to Prevent Death and Major Trauma Related to Gravitational Challenge: Systematic Review of Randomized Controls," BMJ 2003, 327: 1459, published December 18, 2003. You need only read the Abstract (1/2 page). Experiments (both controlled and natural-experiments-from-history) require comparing the attributes of a treated group to an untreated control group. What qualifies as a control group? Must the control group be randomized? Or can non-randomized control groups also be used? If so, when?

Smith and Pell find that no one has done a randomized controlled experiment to test whether parachutes ("parachute interventions") prevent harm to people falling/jumping from great heights. Oh dear--no
randomized control! Yet people widely agree that parachutes are helpful. Implication: people have drawn strong causal inferences from comparisons of treated groups (jumping/falling people with parachutes) to non-randomized control groups (e.g., past experiences of people jumping/falling from high places without parachutes). Was this inference legitimate? Why?

B. Hypotheses on military power-factors as causes of war (i.e. theories addressing the fine-grained structure of power):


Power-related theories of war are summarized here. Don't overlook the discussion of the phenomenon of preventive war on pp. 46-47.

Levy and Thompson provide a propositional inventory on the causes of war. Another good propositional inventory is Gregg Cashman, *What Causes War?* (Rowman and Littlefield, 2014). It is not assigned but worth a look. Many theories discussed in our class are covered.

For more color on preventive war, consult (not assigned):

Jack S. Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War," *World Politics*, Vol. 40, No. 1 (October, 1987): 82-107. The effect of "windows" of opportunity and vulnerability and the problem of preventive war are explicated here. "When states expect that the balance of power will shift against them, and they expect war down the road, they start "preventive" wars to avoid fighting wars later under worse conditions." Such "preventive" wars are common in history.

S 2. Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale, 1966), pp. 221-251 ("The Dynamics of Mutual Alarm.") The classic statement of "stability theory"--"war is more likely when the side moving first gains an advantage." States then mobilize or strike first from fear that otherwise their adversary will gain the advantage of moving first. Such "preemptive" wars are rare but have happened. Some people argue that World War I and the 1967 Israel-Arab war were preemptive.

the offense-defense balance? What is offense-defense theory? What evidence supports it? Argued here: war is more common when conquest is easy. Predatory states can then conquer more easily so they start more wars. All states are less secure so they aggress to gain better borders and to acquire other things that provide security. When conquest is easy it's a violent world. When conquest is hard things are peaceful.

For more color on offense-defense theory consult (posted on Stellar but not assigned):


S 4. Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214. This article was the first development of offense-defense theory, and remains a classic. The above-listed pieces by SVE on offense-defense theory subsume most of the ideas in here. You should pass your eyes across it nevertheless. Some important ideas (e.g., Jervis's ideas about the distinguishability of offense from defense) are found only here. Please skim pp. 167-185, focus on pp. 186-214.


S 6. David W. Ziegler, War, Peace and International Politics, 6th ed., (NY: HarperCollins, 1993), chapter 10 ("Disarmament"), pp. 183-204. A basic discussion of arms limitation as a peace program. Discussed here: total vs. partial disarmament; and quantitative vs. qualitative disarmament. Implicit in the idea of quantitative disarmament: when the destructive power of states is smaller, there is less warfare. True? Implicit in the idea of qualitative disarmament: some types of military forces are more dangerous than others; and governments can limit those that are more dangerous by mutual agreement. True? How could these hypotheses be tested?

S 7. Martin Rees, Our Final Hour: A Scientist's Warning: How Terror, Error, and Environmental Disaster Threaten Humankind's Future in this Century--On Earth and Beyond
The advance of science has a dangerous byproduct: we are discovering ever more powerful means of destruction. These destructive powers are being democratized, says Rees: the mayhem that only major states can do today may lie within the capacity of millions of individuals in the future unless we somehow change course. Deterrence works against states but will fail against crazed non-state organizations or individuals. Hence the pacifying effects that WMD have so far produced will be reversed as humans invent more potent means of mass destruction. What will result? A vast outbreak of preventive wars of counter-proliferation? What can be done to address this danger?

For a technology now causing concern, search online for information on crispr-cas9, a powerful tool for genetic engineering.

C. Hypotheses on systemic power factors (i.e. hypotheses on the effects of aggregate power distributions):

S 1. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 161-176 ("Structural Causes and Military Effects"). Pages 176-193 are also included in your coursenotes, but you can skim them quickly; we include them to give you the whole chapter for your files.

S 2. Review again Levy and Thompson, Causes of War: 44-46, on power transition theory. Compare/contrast with the theory of preventive war, discussed on pp. 46-47 and covered last week.

For more color on power transition theory consult (not assigned):

Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp. 156-185 ("Equilibrium and Decline") and 186-210 ("Hegemonic Change and War."). On pages 156-186 Gilpin argues that dominant states are often overtaken by challengers; on pages 186-210 he argues that these power-transitions cause war.

among states is safer than an unequal distribution of power. Mearsheimer also argues that nuclear weapons have pacifying effects.

For more color on Mearsheimer's ideas (not assigned):


Class 6 (10/6): Hypotheses on national misperception.

A. Hypotheses from psychology:

S 1. Levy and Thompson, Causes of War: 140-154. Theories of war drawing on psychology, including Jervis (listed next) are reviewed here.


S 3. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1976): 58-84. Jervis' famous piece outlines the "spiral model" vs. "deterrence." Spiral model believers argue that using carrots solves conflicts while using sticks provokes them. Deterrence believers oppositely say that sticks work better than carrots, and warn against appeasement. How can this dispute be resolved? Does Jervis say enough to resolve it? Note: pages 85-113 are also included in your coursenotes but you can skim them quickly, they are included for context.

Personality disorder: a lacuna? The literature on misperception (e.g., Jervis) draws heavily from cognitive psychology. It explores whether policy makers make the cognitive errors of ordinary people. Should we also investigate whether some political systems select elites in ways that over-represent certain psychological or personality disorders--e.g., narcissism, megalomania, paranoia, sadism, sociopathy--that have effects on state perceptions and foreign policy behavior? For example, some argue that narcissists tend to rise to the top in most political systems; and that violent sociopaths tend to rise to the top
of violent revolutionary political movements, such as Bolshevism and the Iraqi Ba`ath party. Work by Jerrold Post and Rose McDermott is a starting point.

A brain-starter on personality disorder and politics:

S 1. Elisabeth Bumiller, "Was a Tyrant Prefigured by Baby Saddam?" *New York Times*, May 15, 2004). Saddam Hussein was severely abused as a child and as a result suffered narcissism and other personality disorders. Does this help explain the 1991 and 2003 Iraq wars? Can the U.S. deter or coerce such people if it better understands their personal demons?

A second lacuna: the manifestations of ingroup-outgroup dynamics in politics? How many are these manifestations? How destructive are they? How much havoc and cruelty is explained by ingroup-outgroup reflexes? Much scholarship argues that humans have a reflexive tendency to sort themselves into competing groups, to then demonize the outgroup, and to show mindless loyalty to the ingroup. How much conflict does this reflex explain? How can it be tamed? Study that explores the impact of this reflex in the realm of human conflict might be useful.

A third lacuna: cults and politics? Some important political movements have cult-like aspects, e.g., Bolshevism, radical Islamic jihadism. Worth study?

A starter on ingroup-outgroup theory and research:


An overview of ingroup-outgroup theory is here (not assigned):


B. Hypotheses about society: militarism, nationalism, defects in academe and the press, other institutional pathologies.

B 1. Levy and Thompson, *Causes of War*: 91-93, 168-176. A
Synopsis of arguments that militaries live by war, so they cause war to create a market for themselves; that militaries favor war-causing offensive military doctrines and force postures; and that government intelligence is sometimes politicized in war-causing ways.

S 2. Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War," in Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace, expanded ed. (MIT Press: 1993): 204-211 (pages 193-203 are also in your course notes but only for context). Argued: professional militaries sometimes infuse society with self-serving bellicist myths. These myths persuade civilians that belligerent policies are wise or necessary. As a result civilians start unwise wars. Wilhelmine Germany and imperial Japan illustrate. Also argued: societies infuse themselves with self-glorifying, self-exculpating, and other-blackening myths. These cause war.

S 3. Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Purpose of Political Science," in James C. Charlesworth, ed., A Design for Political Science: Scope, Objectives, and Methods (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1966); 69-74. Does academe have a responsibility to help weed out national misperceptions? Does it fulfill this responsibility? Morgenthau was the dean of IR theory in the U.S. in the 1940s-60s. He argued in this 1966 polemic that academe is broadly dysfunctional and irresponsible toward its obligation to expose falsehoods that shape public policy and to otherwise "speak truth to power." Was he right then? Right now? Note: for context we include the whole piece in your coursene notes (pp. 63-79) but please read only pp. 69-74.

S 4. Levy and Thompson, Causes of War: 180-82. Irving Janis draws on the psychology of small-group dynamics to propose "groupthink" as a cause of war. "Group decisionmaking is defective because groupthink dynamics stifle free exchange of ideas."

For more color on non-evaluation (not assigned):


C. Systemic theories: "The system makes states fool each other," and "the international environment is opaque."

B 1. Levy and Thompson, Causes of War: 63-69. A synopsis of Jim Fearon's argument that the anarchic international environment gives states an incentive to misrepresent their capabilities and resolve to one another; and creates a "commitment problem" that impedes settlement of disputes when relative power is shifting. These incentive cause war.

S 2. James Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995): 379-414. Here is the original Fearon article. Pages 390-401 detail Fearon's arguments on "war due to private information and incentives to misrepresent"; pages 401-409 cover the "commitment problem."

Another important take on perceptions and misperceptions (not assigned):

Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425. Wendt inspired the "constructivist" school in the IR field. This article distilled the constructivist view of the causes of war and peace. It argues that states' perceptions of one another's intentions emerge from self-reinforcing action-perception-action cycles. A bad start triggers a bad cycle; a good start creates a good cycle. Somewhere in the past the international community got off to a bad start. This bad start is the root of international conflict.

Class 7 (10/20; no class on 10/13): Hypotheses on domestic political and social structure: democracy, gender, cultural learning, social equality and social justice, minority rights and human rights, prosperity, economic interdependence, capitalism, communism, imperial decline and collapse, religion,
and climate change and other threats to the environment as causes of war and peace. Also, a portrait of war today.

Democracy and war:


OR

Levy and Thompson, Causes of War: 104-117. Another synopsis of democratic peace theory. Read either Hegre or Levy/Thompson.

For color on the history of democratic peace theory, an early synopsis (not assigned):


The first modern statement of democratic peace theory, now a classic (not assigned):


Gender and war:


Cultural learning and war:

S 1. John Mueller, "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World," in Lynn-Jones, Cold War and After, pp. 45-69. War has been delegitimated, much as slavery and duelling were delegitimated before it. Even conventional war is now a fading institution.

The diversionary theory of war:

For more color on the diversionary theory of war see (not assigned):


Economic interdependence and war:


For more color on interdependence and war, and also prosperity and war, see (not assigned):


Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, chapter 2 ("Paradise is a Bazaar"): 18-32.

Culture and war:


Social stratification and revolution--and also democracy and capitalism--as causes of war and peace:


Marxist theories of war:

S 1. Levy and Thompson, Causes of War: 82-91.

For more color on Marxist explanations for war (not assigned):
Benjamin Cohen, *The Question of Imperialism* (NY: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 3-72, focus on 34-49, skim the rest. Marxist theories were once widely favored as explanations of international conflict. Cohen distills and assesses Marxist theories of imperialism, hence of war, since Marxists saw imperialism as the taproot of war.

For the opposite argument that mass revolution (e.g., communist revolutions, the French revolution) causes war see (not assigned):


Religion and war. Political science lacks a strong stock of theories on religion and war. Here are some brain-starters to move you toward filling this gap.

S 1. Harvey Cox, "A Challenge to People of All Faiths," in Forrest Church, ed., *Restoring Faith: America's Religious Leaders Answer Terror with Hope* (NY: Walker, 2001): 161-165. Cox argues that all religious traditions are tainted with violent teachings that can dominate the tradition unless they are managed. "They lie there like dry tinder, and any spark could set them ablaze" (p. 164). Cox urges that we work to identify the factors that tempt people to use their scripture to justify hatred and brutality. Do we need more work on this subject? Do we also need work on how people of good will can redirect the terms of debate within religious movements that have become morally unhinged?

S 2. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror* (NY: Simon and Schuster, 2002): 38-55, 62-68, 91-94, 419-446. Pages 38-55, 62-68, 91-94 describe the Islamist currents of thinking that spawned Osama Bin Laden's Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda's violence stems from a stream of Islamist thought going back to ibn Taymiyya, a bellicose Islamic thinker from the 13th century; to Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792), the harsh and rigid shaper of modern Saudi Arabian Islam; to Rashid Rida (1866-1935) and Hassan al-Banna (?-1949); and above all to Sayyid Qutb (?-1966), the shaper of modern Islamism. Taymiyya, al-Wahhab and Qutb are covered here. Covered also (pp. 91-94) is the frightening rise of apocalyptic thinking in the Islamic world. What causes the murderous thinking described here?
Pages 419-446 cover the phenomenon of millenarianism--apocalyptic thinking--in other religions--Judaism, Buddhism, and Christianity. This violent, even genocidal, form of religious thought has appeared widely in the last two decades. Why? How can it be tamed before it is used to justify great horrors?

S 3. Irshad Manji, "Is Islam to Blame? Despite Claims of Moderate Muslims, a Literal Reading of the Koran Offers Cover for Acts of Terrorism," Los Angeles Times, July 22, 2005. The Koran contains hateful passages and passages that incite to violence. What to do about them? Does it cut it for Muslims to continue to declare that the entire Koran is the sacred word of God? What about Manji's suggestion that Muslims follow the Christian writer John Shelby Spong and confess some "sins of Scripture"?


Emotions and war: the role of fear, vengeance, contempt, honor, contrition, apology, insult, pride, and hatred. Emotions are also at work in ingroup-outgroup relations, discussed above.

Relevant works (not assigned):

Roger D. Petersen, Understanding Ethnic Violence;
Climate change, the environment and war:

S 1. James R. Lee, "Global Warming is Just the Tip of the Iceberg," Washington Post, January 4, 2009, p. B03. Global warming will create vast flooding and desertification, which will create hordes of refugees, who will clash with those in their new host-countries. Warming will also open new conflicts between states, who will quarrel over newly-valuable mineral rights in the now-ice-free arctic. War will result.


Lead scholars on the environment-and-war issue include MIT political science PhD grads Thomas Homer-Dixon and David Victor. Look up their work.

War today: a portrait.

S 1. Therése Pettersson and Peter Wallensteen, "Armed Conflicts, 1946-2014," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 52, No. 4 (July 2015): 536-550. Forty armed conflicts were ongoing in 27 places worldwide in 2014, when the data reported here was collected. Of these 40 conflicts, 11 have seen at least 1000 battle deaths and thus rise to the level or "wars," using the common definition. Conflicts are fewer than the post-1945 peak year of 1991 (when 51 conflicts were ongoing), but more than the trough year of 2010, (31 ongoing) and far more than 1946 (17 ongoing). Annual battle deaths reached a post-Cold War peak in 2014 at 101,400, due largely to the great violence of the Syrian civil war. However, fatalities are still lower than during the second half of the last century, which saw great bloodletting in several episodes (the wars in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Angola, Iran-Iraq, Congo, and Ethiopia-Eritrea).
Nearly all conflicts today are civil conflicts—in fact only one "international" conflict was underway in 2014 (India-Pakistan). This is a huge change from the centuries before 1945, when most war was between states. But many civil wars today are "internationalized"—troops from foreign states are involved—so they are fueled by international conflict even though they occur within one state. Thirteen of the 39 internal conflicts ongoing in 2014 were "internationalized," an all time high. These thirteen include the conflicts in Ukraine, Yemen, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan, and Afghanistan. Yet interstate war has undeniable abated. Why has this happened? Could interstate war make a comeback?

Extra sidebar topic: ideas about the causes of international conflict applied to civil war (items are not assigned):

Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Spring 1993): 27-57. Like interstate wars, civil wars are fueled by insecurity. When competing groups in society feel their safety is threatened by one another they are more likely to wage civil war. An application of offense-defense theory to civil conflict.

Barbara F. Walter, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," *International Organization*, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 335-364. Civil wars are harder to settle than interstate wars. One reason: the belligerents won't settle unless they expect to be secure under the settlement, but this is hard to arrange. Walter therefore argues that steps to ensure the future security of both belligerents are important to ending civil wars. Another application of offense-defense theory to civil conflict.


Extra sidebar topic: inferring theories from large-n data sets; the Correlates of War project, other large-n projects (items are not assigned):

J. David Singer, "Correlates of War," in Lester Kurtz, ed., *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and*
Conflict, 3 vols. (San Diego: Academic Press, 1999), 1:463-471. Singer's summary of his Correlates of War project. Singer eschews cases studies and natural experiments from history. Rather, he looks for correlations in large-n data sets, and nominates phenomena that correlate with war as candidate causes of war. How fruitful is this approach? When should it be used?

Page Fortna, "What We Know from the Numbers: The Quantitative Literature on Civil and Interstate War" (Manuscript: 2003). A survey of quantitative literature.

IV. CASES (5 classes)

Classes 8, 9 (10/27, 11/3): Segue to cases: and World War I (continued): more on German responsibility for WWI; regime type, regime dysfunction and WWI; professional militaries and WWI; nationalism and WWI; what questions are answered, what questions remain unanswered, what research is needed on WWI origins.

A. Segue to cases: the case study method and natural experiments from history. How should case studies be performed? How can natural experiments from history be identified and used?


S 3. Review again Van Evera, "Natural Experiments" (manuscript, 2012), assigned for Week #2 (class #4). Should the identification and use of natural experiments from history be part of political science/IR methods training?


You can't believe everything you read in the archives, or anywhere else.


S 7. Skim through the syllabus used by the Institute for Qualitative and Multi-Method Research at Syracuse University's Maxwell School, posted on the IQMR website.

The IQMR student seminar is a valuable experience. The MIT political science department and MIT Center for International Studies usually fund several MIT political science graduate students to go, all expenses paid. Inquire about it. Maybe you can go.

Another valuable experience is the George Washington University Summer Institute for Conducting Archival Research (SICAR). Go there for a few days next summer and learn the secrets of working in the archives.

For more on case methods, the following are classics (not assigned):


On rational choice methods: 1999 saw a great debate between Stephen Walt and rational choice advocates (not assigned):


Also of interest are:
> Criticisms of this piece published in the Fall 1999 issue of International Security.


B. World War I

A review of recent books on WWI origins:


German responsibility, motives:

S 1. Annika Mombauer, ed., and trans., The Origins of the First World War: Diplomatic and Military Documents (New York: Manchester University Press, 2013): 87-88, document 46. Swiss Ambassador to Berlin Alfred de Claparède here records a December 10, 1914 conversation in which Wilhelm II frames his view on the key issue of Serbia-Austria. Serbia must be neutered sometime soon. Force should be used to achieve this goal if necessary.

S 2. John C.G. Röhl, "Goodbye to all that (again)? The Fischer Thesis, the New Revisionism, and the meaning of the First World War," International Affairs, Vol 91, No. 1 (Winter 2015): 153-166. A recent Fischerite take on the debate about WWI origins. Röhl claims that German responsibility has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. He describes a recently discovered speech given by Bethmann on November 28, 1912 that indicates an inclination for war.

Regime type, regime dysfunction: what was wrong with Germany?

He was crippled, abused, and unloved as a child. As an adult he was narcissistic, given to intense rages, unable to focus for long on anything, and easily manipulated by others. He ruled Germany during 1888-1918. What could possibly go wrong?

S 2. Dominic Lieven, Towards the Flame: Empire, War and the End of Tsarist Russia (Penguin, 2013): 91-93. Lieven notes that European elites widely created "hybrid regimes" in the late 19th and early 20th century, modelled on the regime Bismarck created for Germany. These hybrid regimes featured elected parliaments while reserving sovereignty and executive power to the monarch. Bismarck's goal had been to allow some pluralism while keeping keep democracy and/or the lower classes at bay. The German monarchy of Wilhelm II and the Russian monarchy of Nicholas II illustrate. Such regimes worked poorly. They gave immense power to monarchs who ascended to power through accidents of birth, and often governed without much institutional support. Can a "hybrid regimes" theory explain why the governments of Europe made poor decisions during the run-up to World War I? Specifically, does it explain Germany's many blunders?

More explanations for WWI: alliances, imperial rivalries, militaries, military strategies, public moods. And the history of the July crisis:


More on professional militaries and the outbreak of WWI:

S 1. Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914 3 Vols. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980 reprint of 1952-1957 edition), 3:1-24. Described here: German decisions on July 30, the fateful last moment when war could have been averted. Albertini records that German army Chief of Staff Helmut von Moltke swung into action on July 30, somehow persuading Bethmann in a 1:00 p.m. meeting that Germany should move to mobilization and war the next day, July 31, at noon. Moltke also incited Austria to mobilize in a 2:00 telegram to Vienna, and later engineered the cancellation of Order 200, Bethmann's last weak effort to rein in Austria. A busy fellow at an important moment!

Army and the Civilians."") In Germany the army purveyed the concept of preventive war, the notion that war was healthy and beneficial, and other exotic ideas; and within Germany it became a law unto itself—a "state within the state," in Gordon Craig's phrase.

S 3. Stephen Van Evera, "European Militaries and the Origins of World War I," in Richard N. Rosecrance and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Next Great War? The Roots of World War I and the Rise of U.S.-China Conflict (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2014), pp. 149-174. The militaries of Europe caused the war. They lobbied hard for war. Through propaganda they also purveyed bellicist ideas that persuaded European civilians to favor war. Most important among these bellicist ideas was the "cult of the offensive," a Europe-wide belief that conquest was easy and the offense was strong.

Ideas, lies, alarmist propaganda and the origins of WWI:

S 1. Kelly Greenhill, "Novel Fears: Invasion Panics and Spy Mania in Pre-World War I Britain," (manuscript, 2015). Greenhill argues that British elite and public opinion was stirred to panic by scary futuristic novels on several occasions before World War I. She argues that British policy was sometimes affected by these panics. Frightening futuristic novels of the genre Greenhill discusses, predicting national defeat unless military spending was increased, were widely published in France, Germany and other states as well.

Can natural experiments from history be found in Greenhill's account?

More on nationalism and the origins of WWI:


S 2. Louis L. Snyder, German Nationalism: Tragedy of a People (Port Washington NY: Kennikat, 1969), chapters 6 ("Historiography") and 10 ("Militarism"). Read pp. 123-24, mid-139-152, 227-243; you need only skim pp. 124-139, 243-254. German historians were more a problem than a solution; German popular thought was militarized.

For more on the role of German public opinion in causing the war, but not assigned:

Reviews of debates about World War I origins (not assigned):


More documents on World War I origins (not assigned):


An online documents collection is at www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1914.html.

Class 10 (11/10): The Second World War in Europe:


S 3. Wolfram Wette, "From Kellogg to Hitler (1928-1933). German Public Opinion Concerning the Rejection or Glorification of War," in Wilhelm Deist, ed., The German Military in the Age of Total War (Dover: Berg, 1985),
pp. 71-99. How Germans came to love war again so soon after the Marne and Verdun.


S 5. Kelly Greenhill, "The Big Lie that Will Not Die: The Enduring Myth of a Jewish World Conspiracy" (manuscript, 2015). The Protocols of the Elders of Zion purported to reveal a conspiracy by Jewish elites to take over the world. It was a forgery. The Nazi future leaders of Europe imbibed and believed it. By adding a threat element to traditional Christian anti-semitism it put anti-semitism on steroids.

A valuable contribution on Hitler's rise, by a distinguished political scientist (not assigned):

Sheri Berman, The Social Democratic Moment: Ideas and Politics in the Making of Interwar Europe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998): ix-x, 176-200. Why did the Great Depression of the 1930s bring benign Social Democrats to power in Sweden while bringing the vicious and expansionist Nazis to power in Germany? Clearly, the effects of depressions on modern industrial politics are not uniform; instead, a condition variable of some sort must decide these effects. Clearly, that condition variable must have had very different values in the Swedish and German cases. Berman's study tries to identify that condition variable. Does she do so persuasively?

More works on the ideas that gave rise to World War II (not assigned):


These works are by historians. Would more political science work on ideas be valuable? Is a methodology needed?
Class 11 (11/17): More wars: the Seven Years' War; the U.S.-China war in Korea; the Peloponnesian War.

A. Seven Years:


For more color on the 7 Years' war (not assigned):


B. Korea:


For more color on the U.S.-China conflict in Korea (not assigned):


C. The Peloponnesian War


For more color on the Peloponnesian war (not assigned):


Class 12 (11/24): The Vietnam War
The U.S. decision for war:


The case for the war:


Was the war premised on true or false ideas?

S 1. Sol W. Sanders & William Henderson, "The Consequences of 'Vietnam'", *Orbis*, vol. 21, no. 1 (Spring 1977), pp. 61-76. The ideas behind the war were largely true.


V: THE NUCLEAR REVOLUTION; THE END OF THE COLD WAR; THE CAUSES-OF-WAR FIELD AGENDA; PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (2 classes)

Class 13 (12/1): The nuclear revolution; other WMD; the future of WMD

The nuclear revolution:


For more color on the nuclear revolution (not assigned):


Other WMD, the future of WMD:

S 1. Henry C. Kelly, "Terrorism and the Biology Lab," New York Times, July 2, 2003. The biology profession must realize that its research, if left unregulated, could produce discoveries that gravely threaten our safety. Biologists must develop a strategy to keep biology from being used for destructive ends.

S 2. Carla Anne Robbins, "Thinking the Unthinkable: A World Without Nuclear Weapons," New York Times, June 30, 2008. Former Republican Secretaries of State George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, former Democratic Secretary of Defense William Perry, and former Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn--all former nuclear hawks--want to pursue global nuclear disarmament. Should we do this?

S 3. William J. Broad, "Laser Advances in Nuclear Fuel Stir Terror Fear," New York Times, August 21, 2011. General Electric and Hitachi are reportedly developing a new means to enrich uranium. Enriching uranium is the key step in making an atomic bomb. If it works, the GE/Hitachi Silex process could allow enrichment in a small, low-cost facility. Some fear this could put atomic bombs in close reach of crazy states and terrorists. What could possibly go wrong?

Class 14 (12/8): The End of the Cold War; the field agenda in causes of war studies; professional ethics.

End of Cold War:


Robert Zoellick, "An Architecture of U.S. Strategy After the Cold War," in Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey

For more color on the end of the Cold War (not assigned):

Joshua Shifrinson, "Creating Hegemony and Ending the Cold War" (manuscript, 2015), 82 pp.

Professional Ethics:

B 1. Van Evera, Guide to Methods, chapter 6 ("Professional Ethics"). What professional ethics should guide academic communities? E.g., do scholars have a responsibility to address questions that concern the wider society? To offer unpopular answers if evidence leads there?


S 3. Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Scholars on the Sidelines," Washington Post, April 13, 2009: A15. Political scientists increasingly focus on questions of little concern to the wider world. Is this ok? If Nye is right, why should the wider society pay our upkeep? Are we not parasites? What can be done about the situation Nye describes?

1
FURTHER READING

I. GENERAL, THEORETICAL

Journals:

International Security
Security Studies
Journal of Peace Research
Journal of Conflict Resolution
Peace Studies
Peace Research
Peace and Change
International Organization
Journal of Strategic Studies
International Studies Quarterly

Syllabi for courses on war and other international relations subjects:

Syllabi can be found online at:
www.apsanet.org/RESOURCES/For-Faculty

General and theoretical works:

Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959). This classic began as a propositional inventory.
Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, eds., The Use of Force, many editions.

Military policy and the causes of war:

Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale, 1966)
George H. Quester, Offense and Defense in the International
System (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1977)


Marion W. Boggs, Attempts to Define and Limit "Aggressive" Armament in Diplomacy and Strategy, University of Missouri Studies 16, No. 1 (Columbia: University of Missouri, 1941)


Bjørn Møller, Common Security and Nonoffensive Defense: A Neorealist Perspective (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992)


The nuclear revolution and the causes of war:


Systemic theory:


Realism vs. liberal institutionalism:

Michael Joseph Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986)

Formal theory:

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992)

Perceptions and ideas:

Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991)

Militarism:

Gordon Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army (NY: Oxford U.
See also representative writings on war and international affairs by military officers, e.g., Friedrich von Bernhardi, Ferdinand Foch, Giulio Douhet, Nathan Twining, Thomas Powers, and Curtis LeMay.

**Nationalist mythmaking:**


**Ingroup-Outgroup dynamics:**


**II. HISTORICAL**

**General surveys of international history:**


See Palmer and Colton's extensive bibliography for more sources. Also pertinent are the relevant books in four series of general histories:

1: The "Langer" series, published by Harper Torchbooks, 15-odd volumes covering western history since 1200, under the general editorship of William Langer (e.g. Raymond Sontag, *A Broken World, 1919-1939*.)
2: The Longman's "General History of Europe" series, covering western history since Roman times, published by Longman, under the general editorship of Denys Hays (e.g. J.M. Roberts, *Europe 1880-1945*).
3: The Fontana "History of Europe" series, published by Fontana/Collins, covering history since the middle ages, under the general editorship of J.H. Plumb (e.g. J.A.S. Grenville,
Europe Reshaped, 1848-78);
4: The "New Cambridge Modern History" and "Cambridge Ancient History" series, covering western history from the beginning.

World War I:

Histories include:

D.C.B. Lieven, Russia and the Origins of the First World War (New York: St. Martin's, 1983)
Zara S. Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War (NY: St. Martin's, 1977)

Surveys of debates about the war's origins are:


Other sources on the origins of the war include:


Contemporary descriptions of the political climate in Germany are:

Wallace Notestein, ed. Conquest and Kultur: Aims of Germans in Their Own Words (Washington: Committee on Public Information, 1917)
William Roscoe Thayer, ed., Out Of Their Own Mouths (NY:
Appleton, 1917)


Other works on themes pertinent to this course:


Louis L. Snyder, *From Bismarck to Hitler* (Williamsport: Bayard, 1935)


Antoine Guillard, *Germany and Her Historians* (NY: McBride, Nast, 1915)


Readable accounts of the war itself include:


World War II in Europe:

E.H. Carr, International Relations Between the Two World Wars (NY: Macmillan, 1947)
William L. Shirer, Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1960)
Max Weinreich, Hitler's Professors (NY: Yiddish Scientific Institute, 1946)
Keith Wilson, ed., Forging the Collective Memory: Government and International Historians through the Two World Wars (Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1996)
Omer Bartov, Hitler's Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and the War in the Third Reich (NY: Oxford University Press, 1991)
Richard J. Evans, In Hitler's Shadow: West German Historians and the Attempt to Escape from the Nazi Past (New York: Pantheon, 1989)
Denis Mack Smith, Mussolini's Roman Empire (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977)
Saul Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, 1933-1939: The Years of Persecution (New York: HarperCollins, 1997); and Saul


**The Pacific War:**


Michael A. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987)


**The origins of the Cold War:**


The Korean War:


The Indochina War:


David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest* (Greenwich: Fawcett, 1972)


The Peloponnesian War:


B.C."), pp. 14-79.

The Punic Wars


The Cuban Missile Crisis:

Max Frankel, *High Noon in the Cold War: Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Cuban Missile Crisis* (NY: Ballantine, 2004)