Evidently, a dilemma

Aikhenvald (2004) defines evidentiality as the linguistic category whose primary function is to relay the type of evidence a speaker has for a proposition. Recent formal probabilistic approaches (Davis et al., 2007; McCready and Ogata, 2007) adhere to this narrow definition of evidentials: that in using an evidential, the speaker commits to having the evidence source for a proposition that is associated with the evidential. Theories that assume a strict one-to-one mapping of evidence source type and evidentials (Davis et al, 2007; McCready and Ogata, 2007; Aikhenvald, 2004) do not allow for the cases in which the speaker may use an evidential for which they do not have the requisite evidence source type, where the speaker uses a more direct evidential than the evidence source type she possesses. I refer to this phenomenon as EVIDENCE PROMOTION.

One example of the promotion of hearsay evidence is taken from Central Alaskan Yup'ik (CAY). In CAY there are two evidential morphemes: the inferential evidential *llini* 'evidently' and the hearsay evidential *gguq* 'it is said/they say'. Jacobson (1995) states that a speaker uses *llini* to indicate that she has some type of (usually visual) evidence that allows her to infer that some event has taken place that she did not witness it herself. I have shown previously that *gguq* can be considered a weaker evidential, as it can be used when the speaker does not commit herself to belief in the proposition embedded under the evidential (Krawczyk, to appear). There are situations in which a speaker with hearsay evidence for the proposition *she left*, may felicitously use either the inferential evidential in (1a) or the hearsay evidential in (1b).

(1)

a. Aya-llru-**llini**-uq
leave-past-INF-3rdsg
'Evidently, she left.'

b. Aya-llru-uq-**gguq**
leave-past-3rdsg-H
'It is said she left.'

Promotion of hearsay evidence is not limited to Central Alaskan Yup'ik. In Cuzco Quechua (Faller, 2002), hearsay evidence can be promoted to direct. Cuzco Quechua has a direct evidential *mi* and a hearsay evidential *si*. In certain cases, the direct evidential *mi* can be used with hearsay evidence.

(2) Paqarin Inés-qa Qusqu-ta-**n/s** ri-nqa DIRECT/HEARSAY
Tomorrow Inés -TOP Cuzco-ACC-**mi/si** go-3FUT
'Inés will go to Cuzco tomorrow.' (Faller, 2002, p. 96: 71)

Faller notes that the speaker of (2) may use *mi* if Inés has told him, and she often does what she says she'll do. The speaker of (2) would use *si* if Inés were flaky, or often does not do what she says she'll do.

In addition to the promotion of hearsay evidence to direct (Cuzco Quechua) and hearsay evidence to inference (CAY) we also see an example of promotion of inferential evidence to direct in Cochabamba Quechua. Cochabamba Quechua has the direct *–min,* the inferential *–chá*, and the reportative/inferential *sina*. For example, if the speaker is a member of a club that meets every week, and tomorrow is the day in which the meeting normally takes place, the speaker will use *–min* to relay that she has a meeting tomorrow (and is not available to attend something else).

(3) naq'anchej tinku-sunchej-**min** q'aya
we-(inclus.) meet-FUT-DIR tomorrow
'We are meeting tomorrow.'

Examples (1)-(3) show that a speaker may use the more direct evidential without committing to having [more] direct evidence, thus misrepresenting the evidence type she has for a proposition.

Given the data above, I argue that evidence promotion is a response to two competing pragmatic pressures of conversation: Quantity, to make a contribution to the conversation as informative as necessary, and Quality, to not say what is believed to be false or that for which there is inadequate evidence (Grice, 1975). I argue that in terms of evidentials, these pressures are (i) to accurately express the *type* of evidence source she has for a proposition *p*, as well as (ii) to express the probability of the proposition, given the evidence. I discuss how these conflicting pressures give rise to, and at the same time constrain, evidence promotion.

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