

# Strategic Supply Chain Design



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
May 2001

charley@mit.edu


<http://www.clockspeed.com>

Tel: 1-617-253-3632, Fax: 1-617-258-7579

*Excerpts from*




# Cisco's End-to-End Integration for its Fulfillment Value Chain



# Cisco's Strategy for Technology Value Chain Design

1. Integrate technology around the router to be a communications network provider.
2. Leverage acquired technology with
  - sales muscle and reach
  - end-to-end IT
  - outsourced manufacturing
  - market growth
3. Leverage venture capital to supply R&D

# Volatility Amplification in the Supply Chain: "The Bullwhip Effect"




Information lags  
Delivery lags  
Over- and underordering  
Misperceptions of feedback  
Lumpiness in ordering  
Chain accumulations

**SOLUTIONS:**  
Countercyclical Markets  
Countercyclical Technologies  
Collaborative channel mgmt.  
(Cincinnati Milacron & Boeing)

# Supply Chain Volatility Amplification: Machine Tools at the tip of the Bullwhip

— % Chg. GDP    — % Chg. Vehicle Production Index    - - - % Chg. Net New Orders Machine Tool Industry


**“We are experiencing a 100-year flood.” J. Chambers, 4/16/01**



"Upstream Volatility in the Supply Chain: The Machine Tool Industry as a Case Study"  
E. Anderson, C. Fine & G. Parker *Production and Operations Management*  
Vol. 9, No. 3, Fall 2000, pp. 239-261.


# Clockspeed drives *Business Strategy Cadence*

Dynamics between **New Projects** and **Core Capability Development**: **PROJECTS MUST MAKE MONEY AND BUILD CAPABILITIES**



Leonard-Barton, *Wellsprings of Knowledge*

# THE DYNAMICS OF PRODUCT ARCHITECTURE AND VALUE CHAIN STRUCTURE: **THE DOUBLE HELIX**




Fine & Whitney, "Is the Make/Buy Decision Process a Core Competence?"

# Controlling the Chain Through Distribution: **The End of P&G Inside ?**

- *Controlling the Channel Through Closeness to Customers:*
- *consumer research, pricing, promotion, product development*


Customers





# Controlling the Chain Through Distribution: **Beware of *Walmart Outside***

*Controlling the Channel Through Closeness to Customers:  
Chain Proximity*



# ALL COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE IS TEMPORARY



## *Autos:*

**Ford** in 1920, **GM** in 1955, **Toyota** in 1990

## *Computing:*

**IBM** in 1970, **DEC** in 1980, **Wintel** in 1990

## *World Dominion:*

**Greece** in 500 BC, **Rome** in 100AD, **G.B.** in 1800

## *Sports:*

**Bruins** in 1971, **Celtics** in 1986, **Yankees** no end

*The faster the clockspeed, the shorter the reign*

# ***VALUE CHAIN ARCHITECTURE***



## **Integral value-chain architecture**

**features close proximity among its elements**

- **Proximity metrics: Geographic, Organizational  
Cultural, Electronic**
- **Example: Toyota city**
- **Example: Ma Bell (AT&T in New Jersey)**
- **Example: IBM mainframes & Hudson River Valley**

**Modular value-chain architecture features multiple,  
interchangeable supplier and standard interfaces**

- **Example: Garment industry**
- **Example: PC industry**
- **Example: General Motors' global sourcing**
- **Example: Telephones and telephone service**

# DESIGNING ARCHITECTURES FOR PRODUCTS & VALUE CHAINS: THE NEED FOR ALIGNMENT

## VALUE CHAIN ARCHITECTURE

(Geog., Organ., Cultural, Elec.)


		INTEGRAL	MODULAR
		INTEGRAL	MODULAR
PRODUCT ARCHITECTURE	INTEGRAL	<b>Jet engines</b> <b>Microprocessors</b> <b>Mercedes vehicles</b>	<b>Polaroid</b> <b>Nortel</b>
	MODULAR	<b>Automotive Supplier Parks</b>	<b>Personal Computers</b> <b>Bicycles</b> <b>Chrysler Vehicles</b> <b>Cisco</b>

# DESIGNING ARCHITECTURES FOR PRODUCTS & VALUE CHAINS: MODULARITY VS. OPENNESS


		ARCHITECTURAL PROPRIETARINESS	
		CLOSED	OPEN
ARCHITECTURAL STRUCTURE	INTEGRAL	<b>Pentium Chip</b> <b>Mercedes Vehicles</b> <b>SAP ERP</b>	<b>Linux</b>
	MODULAR	<b>IBM Mainframes</b> <b>Microsoft <i>Windows</i></b> <b>Chrysler Vehicles</b>	<b>Palm Pilot</b> <b>software &amp; accessories</b> <b>Phones &amp; service</b> <b>Web-based ERP</b>

**INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE MUST REFLECT BUSINESS MODEL**

# Technology Dynamics in the Aircraft Industry: LEARNING FROM THE DINOSAURS



# SOURCEABLE ELEMENTS



# Strategic Make/Buy Decisions: Assess Critical Knowledge & Product Architecture

	<b>DEPENDENT FOR KNOWLEDGE &amp; CAPACITY</b>	<b>INDEPENDENT FOR KNOWLEDGE &amp; DEPENDENT FOR CAPACITY</b>	<b>INDEPENDENT FOR KNOWLEDGE &amp; CAPACITY</b>
<b>ITEM IS INTEGRAL</b>	<b>A POTENTIAL OUTSOURCING TRAP</b>	<b>BEST OUTSOURCING OPPORTUNITY</b>	<b>OVERKILL IN VERTICAL INTEGRATION</b>
	<b>WORST OUTSOURCING SITUATION</b>	<b>CAN LIVE WITH OUTSOURCING</b>	<b>BEST INSOURCING SITUATION</b>
<b>ITEM IS MODULAR</b>			

Adapted from Fine & Whitney, "Is the Make/Buy Decision Process a Core Competence?"




# Strategic Make/Buy Decisions: Also consider Clockspeed & Supply Base Capability


		DEPENDENT FOR KNOWLEDGE & CAPACITY	DEPENDENT FOR CAPACITY ONLY	INDEPENDENT FOR KNOWLEDGE & CAPACITY												
DECOMPOSABLE (Modular)	Suppliers Few Many	<p><i>Trap</i> Clockspeed Fast Slow</p> <table border="1"> <tr> <td></td> <td>OK</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Watch it!</td> <td></td> </tr> </table>		OK	Watch it!		<p><i>Best Out</i> Clockspeed Fast Slow</p> <table border="1"> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table>					<p><i>Over-kill</i> Clockspeed Fast Slow</p> <table border="1"> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table>				
		OK														
Watch it!																
INTEGRAL	Suppliers Few Many	<p><i>Worst</i> Clockspeed Fast Slow</p> <table border="1"> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table>					<p><i>OK</i> Clockspeed Fast Slow</p> <table border="1"> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table>					<p><i>Best In</i> Clockspeed Fast Slow</p> <table border="1"> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table>				

Adapted from C. Fine, *Clockspeed*, Chap. 9


# Qualitative analysis of strategic importance uses five key criteria



# Sourcing Strategy Decision Tree - High Customer Importance Path




# Sourcing Strategy Decision Tree - Low Customer Importance Path




# Actual knowledge work compared to outcome of Decision Framework

Percentage of Knowledge Work Currently Done




# Every decision requires qualitative and quantitative analysis to reach a conclusion




# Value Chain Mapping

## *Organizational Value Chain*



## *Technology Value Chain*



## *Capability Chain*




**Underlying Assumption: You have to draw the maps before you can assess their dynamics.**

# **VALUE CHAIN DESIGN IS** **THE ULTIMATE CORE COMPETENCY**

**Since *all advantages are temporary*,  
*the only lasting competency is to continuously build and  
assemble capabilities chains.***

## **KEY SUB-COMPETENCIES:**

- 1. Forecasting the dynamic evolution of market power and market opportunities**
- 2. Anticipating Windows of Opportunity**
- 3. 3-D Concurrent Engineering:  
Product, Process, Value Chain**





***Fortune Favors the Prepared Firm***



# PROCESS FOR VALUE CHAIN DESIGN

1. Benchmark the **Fruit Flies**
2. Map your Supply Chain
  - Organizational Value Chain
  - Technology Value Chain
  - Competence Chain
3. Dynamic Chain Analysis at each node of each chain map
4. Identify **Windows of Opportunity**
5. Exploit **Competency Development Dynamics** with **3-D Concurrent Engineering**



# **Strategic Supply Chain Design**

- 1. Fruit Flies & Temporary Advantage**
- 2. Value Chain Design & 3-DCE**
- 3. eBusiness Phenomena:  
Business Model Innovation**
- 4. Telecom Value Chains:  
A fruit fly example**

# Internet Era Phenomena: eCompetition in Business Model Innovation

## *Benchmarking the eFlies*

### **E-tailing:**

#### **Attack:**

**Amazon, Webvan** Market disruption in hopes of making a place

#### **Defend:**

**Walmart.com, Ford.com** Defense can require costly SC revamping

### **B2B:**

#### **E2E integration:**

**Cisco, Dell** Integration pays off with modular products

#### **Marketplace Creation:**

**Freemarkets** Reverse auctions reduce short term costs

**Covisint** Common standards reduced supplier investment cost

### **Free & Open Digital Content:**


#### **Peer-toPeer Sharing/Theft:**

**Napster** Industry-shaking disruptions require value chain SWAT team

# DOT.COM COMPETITION: FOCUS ON THE SUPPLY CHAIN


**CASE#1:**

**WALMART.COM GOT NO TRACTION**



# DOT.COM COMPETITION: FOCUS ON THE SUPPLY CHAIN

## Napster's New Supply Chain Strategy (go to the end and steal everything!)




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
# Wireless Value Chain

## & *clockspeeds*



# Wireless Marketplace

## Value of Exchanges Between Supply Chain Links




Jeff Gower & Scott Constance, MIT & Siemens



# Wireless Marketplace

## Links Are Consummated on Exchanges



*Jeff Gower & Scott Constance, MIT & Siemens*

# Wireless Marketplace

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## Wireless Industry Structure: 5 Forces

### Market Entry

- *Proprietary learning curve*
- *Economies of scale*
- *Capital requirements*
- *Brand identity*
- *Switching costs*
- *Expected retaliation*
- *Proprietary products*

### Supplier Power

- *Supplier concentration*
- *Importance of volume to supplier*
- *Differentiation of inputs*
- *Switching costs of firms*
- *Threat of forward integration*

### Firm Rivalry

- *Industry concentration ratio*
- *Fixed costs/Value added*
- *Industry growth*
- *Intermittent overcapacity*
- *Product differences*
- *Switching costs*
- *Brand identity*

### Buyer Power

- *Bargaining leverage*
- *Buyer volume*
- *Buyer information*
- *Brand identity*
- *Price sensitivity*
- *Product differentiation*
- *Substitutes available*

### Substitutes


- *Switching costs of adopters*
- *Buyer propensity to substitute*
- *Relative price performance of substitutes*

**Jeff Gower &  
Scott Constance,  
MIT & Siemens**

# Wireless Marketplace


Jeff Gower &  
Scott Constance,  
MIT & Siemens

## Industry Structure: 5 Force Analysis




# Wireless Marketplace

## Wireless Device Supply Chain (Horizontal/Modular?)



# Wireless Marketplace

## Wireless Network Supply Chain (Vertical/Integral?)



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# Wireless Marketplace


Jeff Gower & Scott  
Constance, MIT & Siemens

## Wireless Devices Becoming Horizontal & Modular

- Massive adoption of handsets capacity strained as outsourcing coordination becomes apparent
- International demand & competition
- Consumer Expectations Increase
- Avg. # of Components 550 to 900


Device	Manufacturers
Cell Phone	Nokia, Motorola, Siemens, Ericsson, Samsung
PDA	Handspring, Palm, Compaq, Casio, Sony
SIM Pads	Sony, Siemens, Nokia
Smart Phones	Kyocera, Ericsson

**US** -Motorola-Devices  
**Abroad** Ericsson/Nokia/NTT Devices



# WIRELESS VALUE CHAIN: **MINI CASE EXAMPLE**

Wireless Handsets comprise numerous subsystems



Wireless handsets tend to exhibit integral architectures and rapid obsolescence, but require a large number of design decisions.

This results in slow and costly development processes.

Increased modularity with standardized subsystems might speed dramatically the rates of innovation.

# Wireless Marketplace

Jeff Gower & Scott  
Constance, MIT & Siemens

## Wireless Infrastructure Still Vertical & Integral

**US** -Motorola, Nortel

**Abroad** Ericsson,Nokia,Siemens

-Network costs focus attention on Spectral Efficiency and Network Optimization

-Pressure from Consumer for data services and from device manufacturers to provide faster data rates

1980-90

2001-2005E

AMPRS AT&T & Baby Bells  
BT, FT, Vodaphone, NTT

2007E-2010E

Convergence of  
Wireline to Wireless  
IP & 3G

1990-1995

-US 1996 Telecom Act

-American Tower, ArrayComm

1995-2001

-US 1996 Telecom Act  
-Spectrum Auctions \$\$\$\$\$  
-Vender Financing


2006E

-2.5-3 G Costs, ROI cycle shrinks  
-IP Standardizing PSTN/Packet Interface  
-Demand for data service increases complexity



# WIRELESS VALUE CHAIN: **MINI CASE EXAMPLE**

Wireless Base Stations (WSB'S) comprise 4 key subsystems:





WSB architectures are  
-integral & proprietary  
Suppliers include: Nortel, Moto,  
Ericsson, Siemens, Nokia  
Disruptive Modem advances  
(e.g., MUD) can double  
Base Station Capacity

## Modular WSB's might

- (1) Stimulate new WSB entrants (ala Dell)
- (2) Stimulate standard subsystem suppliers
- (3) lower prices to the network operators
- (4) Speed base station performance imp.
- (5) Increase demand for basestations due to improved price-performance ratios.

# Value Chain of Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO)



## MVNO:

- Does not have Spectrum & Radio Infrastructure
- Needs a host network
- Has at least Billing, Customer Service, Sales and Marketing

# MVNO Example 1: Virgin Mobile

Eelco de Jong, MIT

-Launched in Nov. 1999 in UK,  
wants to become a global player,  
leveraging its worldwide brand



-Host network: One 2 One (Deutsche Telekom)  
Virgin purchases wholesale minutes from One 2 One

-Virgin does not require customers to buy a new handset -  
only a Virgin SIM card (for US\$ 20).

Little handset subsidization. Simple pricing structure

-Extensive content offering, targeting the mass-market

-Low ARPU, but also low customer acquisition costs

# MVNO Example 2: Financial Times & Carphone Warehouse



Announced in March 2001,  
joint venture between FT, Carphone and BT Cellnet

Targeting business consumers, who will receive  
a WAP-enabled FT-branded phone

- Financial Times will provide content
- The retailer Carphone will provide billing, customer service, leveraging existing services in this area
- Cellnet will provide the host network

**Eelco de Jong, MIT**

# "Killer Technologies" of the Information Age: Semiconductors, Magnetic Memory, Optoelectronics



“We define a *killer technology* as one that delivers enhanced systems performance of a factor of at least a hundred-fold per decade.”


C.H.Fine & L.K. Kimerling, "Biography of a Killer Technology: Optoelectronics Drives Industrial Growth with the Speed of Light," published in 1997 by the Optoelectronics Industry Development Association, 2010 Mass Ave, NW, Suite 200, Wash. DC 20036-1023.

## Killer Question:

Will *Integrated Optics* evolve linearly like Semiconductors with Moore's Law or like Disk Drives with repeated industry disruptions?

# Roadmap for Electronic Devices

Number of chip components



Horst D. Simon


LAWRENCE BERKELEY NATIONAL LABORATORY

# International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors '99

Year	2005	2008	2011	2014
Technology (nm)	100	70	50	35
DRAM chip area (mm <sup>2</sup> )	526	603	691	792
DRAM capacity (Gb)	8		64	
MPU chip area (mm <sup>2</sup> )	622	713	817	937
MPU transistors (x10 <sup>9</sup> )	0.9	2.5	7.0	20.0
MPU Clock Rate (GHz)	3.5	6.0	10.0	13.5

# Moore's Law

Transistors per chip



Source: Joel Birnbaum, HP, Lecture at APS Centennial, Atlanta, 1999




# Disk Drive Development 1978-1991





Disk Drive Generation	Dominant Producer	Dominant Usage	Approx cost per Megabyte
14"	IBM	mainframe	\$750
8"	Quantum	Mini-computer	\$100
5.25"	Seagate	Desktop PC	\$30
3.5"	Conner	Portable PC	\$7
2.5"	Conner	Notebook PC	\$2

From 1991-98, Disk Drive storage density increased by 60%/year while semiconductor density grew ~50%/year. Disk Drive cost per megabyte in 1997 was ~ \$ .10

# Optical Networking is Keeping Up!



# Optical Technology Evolution: Navigating the Generations with an Immature Technology

	1	2	3	4	5
Timeline	Now	Starting	Starting	3-5 years	5-15 years
Stage	Discrete Components	Hybrid Integration	Low-level monolithic integration	Medium Monolithic integration	High-level monolithic integration
Examples	MUX/ DEMUX	TX/RX module OADM	TX/RX module OADM	OADM, Transponder Switch Matrix	Transponder
Core Technologies	FBGs, Thin-film, fused fiber, mirrors	Silicon Bench, Ceramic substrates	Silica Silicon InP	InP, ??	InP, ??
How many Functions?	1	2-5	2-5	5-10	10-XXX
Industry Structure	Integrated	Integrated/ Horizontal	Integrated /Horizontal	 DOUBLE HELIX	 DOUBLE HELIX

Dr. Yanming Liu, MIT & Corning

# OPTICAL VALUE CHAIN: MINI CASE EXAMPLE



NORTEL NETWORKS plays at at least three levels of the Optical Network Telecom value chain:

1. Network design & installation
2. Modules (OC-192 network elements)
3. Components (lasers, amplifiers)

**QUIZ:** Should Nortel sell their components business?

Hint: How likely are the scenarios of:

- An *Intel Inside* effect in components?
- Networks become sufficiently modular as to be assembled by the customer?

# All Conclusions are *Temporary*



**Clockspeeds are increasing almost everywhere**

**eCommerce is a clockspeed driver**

**Value chain design is a key competency**

**Study of eFlies can help with crafting strategy**